Individualistic philanthropy: the paradox of embodied participation for health‐related fund‐raising campaigns

• Movember and Julyna have emerged as examples of health‐related fund‐raising and awareness campaigns that require embodied participation in the form of temporary body modification. Reaching a younger demographic not traditionally motivated by appeals to altruism, these campaigns have capitalized on the signifying power of the body to reflect and construct identities and self‐perceptions to motivate participation. Taking a cultural studies approach and employing visual, textual, and discursive analyses of the campaigns' websites, a primary vector for information dissemination and recruitment, this study highlights how philanthropic activity has been successfully coded as making participants more physically, sexually, and socially desirable. In promoting such individualistic motives for philanthropy, however, these campaigns further a mentality that philanthropy is foremost about personal gain. The challenge these initiatives pose is how to convert participants from individualistic to altruistic models of philanthropy.

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluations of branding alliances between non‐profit and commercial brand partners: the transfer of affect

• There is growing interest in the trend towards co‐branding alliances between non‐profit and commercial entities,which are undertaken by these organisations to transfer associations and affect between each brand partner. Certainly, it makes sense that commercial entities want to gain more from their brands and that non‐profits want secured funding, however, in the same way that the joining of two brands can be beneficial, it can also bring with it major risks when the brand alliance is not well received and evaluations of the alliance are not favourable.
• This research supports the notion that both commercial entities and non‐profit organisations can benefit from a branding alliance, however, an understanding of how these brand alliances are evaluated is important. This research investigates evaluations of brand alliances and the resulting spillover effects for original brand partners that result from brand alliances.
• This research provides empirical support relating to reactions to brand alliances between a non‐profit organisation and a commercial business in terms of how original brand attitudes, familiarity of original brands and perceived brand fit impact on evaluations. While collaboration is important and has potential benefits for each partner—they rest on partner selection and fit between alliance partners. Managerial implications and future research directions are also provided.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Productivity – your countries need you!

• Increased global productivity could boost real wages, consumption, fiscal positions and alleviate fears of secular stagnation. But will it? Puzzles relate to the longer term global slowdown and to some countries' recent productivity‐less recoveries in jobs. We assess various explanations including mismeasurement, secular stagnation, financial sector malfunction and increased labour market flexibility. Our baseline forecast is for a moderate pro‐cyclical recovery in productivity but we show how downside risks imply it could be anaemic.
• Sustained weak productivity is a secular issue. Eight years after 2007, median productivity growth in OECD economies is less than Japan's was eight years into its lost decade. Aspects of secular stagnation and balance sheet adjustment have contributed. Measurement error may have played a role over the longer term.
• Recent experience divides recoveries into “haves” and “have nots” in terms of productivity and employment. The UK may finally be emerging from a “productivity‐less” recovery in employment after 2011; Spain and the Netherlands have experienced jobless recoveries in productivity; others, such as Canada and Sweden, have experienced pro‐cyclical (typically weak) recoveries in productivity; Italy hardly got going in either direction.
• Most theories provide, at best, a limited explanation for recent weak productivity performance. These include data mis‐measurement, increased labour market flexibility, financial sector malfunction and supply side secular stagnation.
• On balance, we think that a modest productivity bounce‐back could be imminent, caused by some demand recovery, tighter labour markets in major economies, higher real wages and firms deciding to invest more in capital, which enhances productivity and points the global economy towards normality.
• We also illustrate how global risk scenarios could dampen recovery. Negative skews imply mean G7 productivity growth across the scenarios would be an anaemic 1.1% in 2016, 0.5 percentage points (pp) lower than the baseline.

     

China‐commodity nexus at the heart of global upturn

• ? The China‐commodity nexus has been at the heart of the global upturn in trade and industry. It could directly and indirectly account for as much as 70% of the recovery since mid‐2016, based on our analysis. We think this nexus will continue to support world growth in the near term, but the global upturn is vulnerable to moderating Chinese growth and slippage in commodity prices.
• ? China has directly accounted for around a third of the upturn in world trade, similar to the contribution of G7 countries. But adding in indirect effects, China's influence is likely to have been much more significant. Stronger Chinese demand has contributed to an improvement in the trade performance of its Asian trading partners, commodity exporters and other advanced economies.
• ? Using a model simulation that introduces positive shocks to imports in “greater China” and to commodity prices (based on the scale we have seen since mid‐2016), our top‐end estimate for China's contribution to the upturn in world trade is around 70%.
• ? The simulation points to especially strong improvements in output and exports for economies such as South Korea, Japan, Malaysia and some commodity exporters. This broadly matches the pattern of performance seen over recent months, though commodity exporters' performance has been quite mixed.
• ? G7 investment growth is likely to have played only a modest role in the recent global upturn. But Japan is an exception, while upgrades to investment forecasts for South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have also been large.
• ? A 1% rise in commodity prices could raise commodity exporters' investment by 0.3–0.6%, based on our analysis. As a result, there could be additional improvement in commodity exporters' investment this year, supporting world growth. However, with our forecasts suggesting that commodity prices are set to slip further over the coming quarters, this boost could prove short‐lived.

     

Increased word‐of‐mouth via strategic cause‐related marketing

• This research examines word‐of‐mouth (WOM) promotions as an additional consequence of a successful cause‐related marketing (CRM) partnership. Firms properly aligned in CRM partnerships should increase positive feelings that can translate into positive WOM from the public. WOM efforts should be considered in marketing campaigns to develop successful long‐term CRM strategies. Additionally, carefully planned CRM campaigns with positive WOM give firms a competitive advantage without the backlash of consumer skepticism often reported when firms attempt to manipulate WOM campaigns. This study is grounded in associative learning theory which provides support for the strengthened associative links between firm and charity when the relationship is properly aligned. This empirical study suggests that strategically aligned CRM relationships can improve positive WOM recommendations. Results of ANOVA and factor analysis indicate that consumers are more receptive to CRM partnerships that consist of compatibility between firm and charity that persist over time. Results suggest that consumers are more likely to recommend the more properly aligned partnerships to others.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cause‐related events: fulfilling the objectives of social partnerships

• Cause‐related events are growing in frequency and popularity. These events enable corporates and not‐for‐profit organisations to collaborate for mutual benefit, within the strategic framework of a social partnership. However, while anecdotal evidence indicates that millions of dollars are invested in events, less is known about how the strategic objectives of social partnerships are achieved via cause‐related events. We present the findings of an ethnographic study of two social partnerships and contribute insights into how and why events help them achieve their strategic objectives. Case analysis data reveals that the fit between events and partnerships; the people, teams, and relationships; and collaboration of resources all contribute to generating competitive advantage and value. We discuss the managerial implications for those collaborating to organise a cause‐related event.

Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Risk‐weighting debt implies more fiscal space

• ? Markets are more tolerant of fiscal expansion than governments typically fear. The composition of major economies' government debt has become safer and this is reflected in our estimates of a new indicator – risk‐weighted debt (RWD). Using RWD to measure debt provides a relatively benign indication of risks to sustainability in the major economies since 2004.
• ? Our RWD measures consist of six categories of debt holders, with weights allocated to their risk‐to‐flight potential. Debt holders range from riskier foreign banks and non‐banks (highly weighted), which would be most inclined to sell when times get tough, to safer entities such as central banks (zero weight).
• ? RWD looks less alarming than unweighted measures. Major economies' total public debt rose by 10% of GDP on average since 2011; RWD was up by just 1% of GDP.
• ? Japan and Italy show the biggest relative improvements when the focus shifts to RWD from debt‐to‐GDP. The two countries' RWD has fallen significantly since 2011.
• ? RWD improvements limit the extent to which indebtedness threatens sustainability.

     

Global wages: we don't (yet) have lift‐off

• ? Policymakers, most notably in the US, have been expecting wage growth to pick up for some time as job markets tighten. But the data over the last six months have shown few indications of wage lift‐off. Our review of the latest evidence suggests that although labour markets are, on the whole, still tightening, we see increased downside risks to our forecasts for faster global wage growth in 2018–19.
• ? Rates of “churn” in labour markets – a possible precursor to faster wage growth – have continued to rise in the US and parts of Europe.
• ? But other structural factors may still be holding wages down. A recovery in prime‐age participation in the US may be helping to cap wage rises, as may a pool of “underemployed” workers in the US and UK (though this pool is shrinking fast).
• ? Productivity growth also remains weak, running at a 0.5%–1% annual pace in Q1 2017 across the US, UK, Germany and Japan. This compares with a G7 average pace of 1.5% per year in 1985–2006.
• ? Overall, the risks to our baseline forecast of faster wage growth in the major economies in 2018 look skewed to the downside. We expect wage growth to firm in 2018 by 0.5–1 percentage points in the US, UK, Germany and Japan. We would give this modal forecast a probability of around 60%, but with a 25% chance that wage growth is somewhat slower than this and only a 15% chance that it is higher.

     

The diversification of charities: from religion‐oriented to for‐profit‐oriented fundraising

• Charities are increasingly relying on more complex and diversified fundraising structures to raise funds and attract benefactors. In adopting a historic perspective, this research identified five emergent fundraising structures, namely religion‐oriented, business‐oriented, marketing‐oriented, consumer‐oriented, and for‐profit‐oriented. The analysis critically evaluates the role that institutions and resources have played in each funding structure and draws conclusions concerning the management of charitable fundraising in a world where charitable fundraising, consumerism, and social media networking are increasingly entwined with the for‐profit motive.

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Creating customer value in the not‐for‐profit sector: a case study of the British Library

• Public sector organisations are being increasingly subjected to both legislative and competitive pressures forcing them to reconsider their relationships with users and customers (Chapman and Cowdell, 1998 ) in order to develop a more overt marketing orientation (defined as focusing on customer needs as the primary drivers of organisational performance (Jobber, 2004 )). The creation of customer value underlies the development of a meaningful marketing orientation, and is a nettle that more public sector and not‐for‐profit organisations will have to grasp. This article considers how a more marketing‐oriented approach was adopted by the British Library in order to clarify and communicate its value proposition to its identified target markets, and in doing so, hopefully achieving a sustainable competitive advantage on an ongoing basis.

Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The global impact of a sharper US‐China slowdown

• ? We forecast a moderate global slowdown through 2020, but risks are looming of a sharper downturn in China and the US. If these were to materialise, our simulations suggest global GDP growth would hit a post‐crisis low, with the level of GDP dropping by 0.6% and growth slowing by 0.4 ppt in 2019/20.
• ? Economies with strong trade linkages to China and the US – Korea, Taiwan and Mexico – would suffer most. Conversely, a weaker dollar, lower oil prices and relatively smaller trade flows with the US and China would offset the blow in Europe and for some EMs, including Turkey, Argentina and India.
• ? Since 2010, Chinese activity has been a powerful leading indicator of every major economy's exports, proving stronger than similar indicators for US or eurozone activity. This is even the case for non‐Asian economies such as Canada, Mexico, Italy, Germany, France and the UK. This may reflect deepening trading relationships and the relatively high volatility of Chinese cyclical indicators over the period.
• ? Over the past decade, global macro stability has been supported by the US and Chinese cycles moving counter to each other. But this could reverse if the ongoing Chinese policy stimulus fails to gain traction and the weakness gains momentum.

     

Co‐creating nonprofit brand equity

• The concept of brand equity (BE) has been the subject of much recent discussion in the field of nonprofit branding and also has been the concept of brand co‐creation in the field of branding. This study combines these aspects and examines the BE co‐creation of a nonprofit entity, the Finnish Defence Forces military driving school. Empirical data were collected from industrial logistics service providers and military recruits. A theoretical BE model was further developed using structural equation modeling in an exploratory manner to reveal whether the BE model of the military driving school is similar from both viewpoints. Similar workable models were found, indicating strong BE co‐creation and thereby contributing to the field. To support the future co‐creation of BE of the military driving school, it is important to ensure that the recruits take positive experiences from the school and industrial logistics service providers carefully consider how they relay their experiences about the school to other truck drivers. The attitudes of recruits towards the military driving school are likely eventually to conform to those of civilian truck drivers. Finding workable models required omitting some BE dimensions and measures of earlier models. Moreover, using data from one country alone may be a limitation of the study. Therefore, nonprofit BE measures should be further developed and tested with data from further afield.

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Brexit adds to gloom over long‐term growth prospects

• The prospect of continued weak productivity growth and less support from rising labour supply means we are relatively gloomy about medium‐term growth prospects. Our forecasts show potential output growth of just 1.6% a year from 2017–2030. This would be well below the average of the decade prior to the financial crisis (2.7%) and in line with our estimate for the 2007 and 2016 period which included the global financial crisis.
• We have become more pessimistic about the extent to which growth in total factor productivity is likely to accelerate. This is partly due to a judgement call that more of the weakness since the financial crisis reflects structural factors. Brexit is also likely to weigh on long‐term prospects, resulting in a degree of trade destruction and lower FDI inflows than would be the case were the UK to remain in the EU. Brexit is also likely to result in less capital deepening.
• Demographic factors also point to weak potential output growth moving forwards. High levels of inward migration have mitigated the impact of an ageing population recently. However, immigration is likely to fall sharply over the next decade, as first an improving European labour market reduces incentives to migrate and then the UK Government adopts more restrictive immigration policy. We are also coming into a period where there will be fewer increases in state pension age than of late.
• Since the mid‐1990s there has been a surge in the number of people going to university, resulting in strong contributions from human capital. But this will be less important moving forwards as university admissions reach a ceiling.
• Stronger growth in potential output would be possible if Brexit results in trading arrangements which are closer to the status quo, or if policy is more ‘liberal’, than our baseline assumptions.

     

Housing slump could cut world growth to decade‐low

• ? A combined slump in house prices and housing investment in the major economies could cut world growth to a 10‐year low of 2.2% by 2020 – and to below 2% if it also triggered a tightening in global credit conditions.
• ? In such a scenario, inflation would remain well below target in the main economies, and US Fed rates would be up to 100 basis points lower than in our baseline by 2021.
• ? Signs of a global house price downturn are already visible, with around a third of our sample of economies seeing falling prices and world residential investment starting to decline. High house price valuations add to the risk that this downturn will deepen in the coming quarters, hitting consumer spending.
• ? Using the Oxford Global Economic Model, we find that a 10% fall in house prices and an 8% fall in housing investment both cut growth by around 0.3%‐0.4% across regions. Adding a sharp Chinese downturn, such as that seen in 2015, has a large additional impact on growth in Asia .

     

Scenarios for long‐term world growth

• In the second of two articles on long‐term world growth, we present a set of stylised scenarios for world growth in the next decade. Our baseline forecast, which sees growth edging down, is compared to scenarios based on ‘lost decades’ in China and India, lower productivity and investment growth and a bigger drag from excess debt. The more likely of these scenarios could cut world growth by around 0.5 percentage points per year, rising to a 1.5 percentage point cut for the most extreme scenario.
• Our baseline forecast assumes productivity and investment grow at a similar pace in the next decade to the past ten years. But there are downside risks to productivity growth, especially in Emerging Markets (EMs). And with investment in China and in commodity exporters slowing, our investment forecast relies on a significant rebound in the major economies.
• Demographic factors are a significant downside risk to our forecast. The negative impact of demographic changes on growth in Japan since the 1990s was not generally foreseen. This risk exists in the US and Europe but also in emerging Asia, a particular concern given that the latter region accounted for over 50% of world growth in 2000–14.
• Growth in commodity‐exporting economies could undershoot our current predictions. Historical evidence suggests a danger that the drop in commodity prices could extend for several more years. Even with zero real growth in commodity prices, aggregate GDP growth in the main commodity exporters might only be around 2.5% per year.
• Another risk area is debt. International evidence suggests debt ratios above certain thresholds slow growth. We find that countries accounting for 44% and 31% of world GDP respectively exceed these estimated public and corporate debt thresholds. But the share is lower, and has dropped, for household debt, thanks to deleveraging in the G7.

     

Canada‐style trade deal most likely Brexit scenario

• ? All options for the Brexit endgame remain on the table. A free‐trade agreement (FTA) along the lines of the EU's deal with Canada looks like the most likely outcome. The two sides will also need to reach agreements on customs and regulations, with the latter involving the UK compromising on maintaining a high degree of regulatory alignment, to provide a permanent fudge on the Irish border issue. But there is still a sizeable risk of a “no deal” outcome .
• ? We expect a transitional deal to be agreed relatively quickly. The UK has suggested it would prefer a bespoke arrangement, but the EU is unlikely to offer such an option. We expect the UK to remain bound by EU rules during the transition, with the transitional period ending on 31 December 2020.
• ? If the two sides continue to pursue the preferred option of a FTA, it is unlikely to be completed by the end of the transition period. We expect the EU to reject the UK's request for a comprehensive agreement including services and insist on a Canada‐style deal. The Irish border issue means that customs and regulatory agreements would need to accompany such a deal. We place a 40% chance on this outcome.
• ? The question of regulatory alignment and the time required to negotiate a detailed FTA could spin the talks off in one of two opposing directions. If the prime minister is unable to get her party to agree to maintain a high degree of regulatory alignment, the talks could break down. If this occurs, we think it's very unlikely that the UK would honour the phase‐one agreement to maintain regulatory alignment, and we see a 30% chance that the UK walks away from the talks, resulting in a “cliff‐edge” Brexit in 2019.
• ? If the UK accepts the need to maintain regulatory alignment with the EU, it could conclude that joining the EEA and participating in the single market are better than lengthy FTA negotiations, resulting in an inferior deal. But the need to respect the four freedoms means this remains a relatively low probability outcome (20%). Wth Parliament seemingly committed to Brexit, remaining in the EU looks unlikely (10%).

     

Blame the baby boomers for depressed wage growth

• ? While ‘blame’ may sound harsh, the reality is that in an ageing society, the over‐60s accounting for a bigger share of the workforce equals lower wage growth. This is particularly pertinent for the eurozone right now with the baby boomer generation entering the last phase of their working life. Our analysis shows that the very sizeable over‐60 cohort is depressing aggregate wage growth by up to 0.3 ppts annually. That may also help explain why inflation is still subdued .
• ? European policy makers are scratching their heads about why wage growth has not picked up in line with economic growth over the past two years. For the ECB this is relevant as it tries to understand why inflation remains low. While much of the debate centres around unemployment and the Phillips curve, this article looks at the impact of an ageing society on wage growth.
• ? Even though this is more of a structural, rather than a cyclical, perspective, it is particularly important for the eurozone economies right now, because the large post‐World War II baby boomer generation is strongly pushing up the elderly share of employment (measured as those aged 60 and above). As the share of the over 60s in total employment grows, so does their weight in aggregate wage growth.
• ? The crucial point is that wages increase with age, but at a decreasing rate, and stay essentially flat above 55. The main reasons are that the elderly invest much less in continued education and are less inclined to switch to better‐paying jobs.
• ? Our analysis shows how substantial the negative impact of an ageing workforce is on wage growth in the eurozone. By simulating an alternative demographic scenario, we estimate that wage growth in 2015–17 would have been 0.3 ppts per year higher had it not been for the ageing baby‐boomers. Similarly, forecasts for 2018–20 not accounting for the baby‐boomers may overstate wage growth by some 0.2 ppts or more annually.

     

Compliance with Producer Responsibility Legislation: Experiences from UK Small and Medium‐sized Enterprises

This study investigated the legal performance of UK small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) with producer responsibility legislation. The research incorporated legislation controlling packaging and packaging waste, waste electrical and electronic equipment and the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment. Compliance audits and interviews were conducted with SMEs, regulators, government officials and SME support organisations. A total of 44 SMEs from the north‐west of England were audited between April and September 2008. The study's findings suggest:

• low levels of ‘letter of the law’ and ‘spirit of the law’ compliance;
• enforcement activity and surveillance of SME compliance was generally low; there has not been any formal enforcement action taken under the WEEE Regulations or the RoHS Regulations and enforcement under the PER Regulations is extremely low.

Recommendations on how to improve SME compliance control systems are provided. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Understanding why people do not give: strategic funding concerns for AIDS‐related nonprofits

• In this increasingly competitive environment for the individual donor's time and money, it is especially important for AIDS‐related nonprofits to understand why people choose not to give. Voluntary donations to organizations serving persons with HIV/AIDS could be negatively influenced by the social stigma that continues to be associated with the disease. Using the empathy‐altruism hypothesis from social psychology, the impact of gender, homosexuality, promiscuity, and drug use on donor cognitive situational empathy, emotional situational empathy, and altruism is examined. The findings have significant implications for nonprofits. Understanding the impact of these behaviors on giving is a first step in gauging the magnitude of challenges that AIDS‐related nonprofits may face in fund‐raising activities. Additionally, this information should be invaluable in the development of educational and/or promotional strategies to increase private sector support. Finally, initiatives in communication and marketing strategy are discussed to improve fund‐raising efforts.

Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.