Firm heterogeneity in growth option value: The role of managerial incentives

Growth option value varies widely across firms. This research explores managerial incentives as a source of firm heterogeneity in growth option value. We argue that when the payoff structure of managerial incentives corresponds to that of growth options, managers will be motivated to pursue actions that increase firms' growth option value, particularly when greater growth opportunities are available in an industry. Results indicate that stock option holdings and managerial stock ownership have a positive effect on growth option value, while short‐term pay has a negative effect. We also find support for a positive interaction effect between equity‐based managerial incentives and industry growth opportunities on growth option value. These findings highlight the critical role of managerial incentives in affecting firms' realization of growth option value. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why firms make unilateral investments specific to other firms: the case of OEM suppliers

This study examines why and under what conditions firms will make unilateral relationship‐specific investments to their transaction partners. We propose that firms are more likely to make such investments when the investment yields positive economic spillover values for other transactions with the same exchange partners as well as for third‐party transactions. We also model two types of positive inter‐project spillover effects that a transaction may generate: knowledge spillovers and reputation spillovers. We find empirical support for our developed theory in the context of Taiwanese suppliers of original equipment manufacturers. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific knowledge resources and competitive advantage: the roles of economic‐ and relationship‐based employee governance mechanisms

The resource‐based view of the firm emphasizes the role of firm‐specific resources, especially firm‐specific knowledge resources, in helping a firm to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. However, the deployment of firm‐specific knowledge often requires key employees to make specialized human capital investments that are not easily redeployable to other settings. Thus, in the absence of effective safeguards and trust building devices, employees with foresight may be reluctant to make such specialized investments. This study explores both economic‐ and relationship‐based governance mechanisms that might mitigate this underinvestment problem. Effective use of these governance mechanisms enables a firm to obtain greater performance from its efforts to deploy firm‐specific knowledge resources. Empirical results further support these key arguments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Venture capitalists' decision to withdraw: The role of portfolio configuration from a real options lens

When does a venture capital firm withdraw from an investment project prior to its completion? This study offers a real options view on this decision by examining the contingent effects of portfolio configuration. We explore how project withdrawal can be influenced by two distinct dimensions of portfolio configuration, portfolio focus in a strategic domain and portfolio diversity across multiple domains. The empirical analysis shows that while portfolio focus weakens the negative effect of industry‐level uncertainty on a venture capitalist's propensity to withdraw from a project, portfolio diversity strengthens the effect of uncertainty. This study informs current research on the boundary of real options theory and sheds light on the behavior of venture capitalists in financing entrepreneurship. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The value from acquiring and divesting a joint venture: a real options approach

This study examines the value created from acquiring and divesting a joint venture. Unlike previous research which focuses on parent firm factors, the study examines value in light of the reason behind the termination of the venture and the characteristics of the target market. Consistent with the real options view, the paper finds that ventures divested to refocus a parent firm's product market portfolio were associated with significant value creation. In contrast, ventures acquired with the objective of growth and expansion in a target market, while not associated with significant value creation, did not destroy value either. Apart from these results, the paper also finds that acquirers and divesters gained lesser value when they terminated ventures in uncertain and concentrated industries. These latter findings highlight an important caveat with regard to termination: joint ventures confer valuable flexibility which is also forgone once they are terminated. Implications are discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The moderating effect of innovative capacity on the relationship between real options and strategic flexibility

In dynamic sectors, organizations should be capable of adapting to unpredictable environmental conditions. Strategic flexibility grants organizations the capacity to respond to the changes in their environment in the direction required, renewing their strategies and making the required organizational changes. The goal of this study is to analyze how the use of real options relates to strategic flexibility from a managerial capacity perspective. Through an empirical study performed on European firms, we confirm that innovative capacity exercises a moderating role between real options and strategic flexibility. The fact that a firm's management has foreseen and contemplated real options does not necessarily lead to their execution; they must also be accompanied by some innovative capacity.     

Cutting the Gordian knot: The effect of knowledge complexity on employee mobility and entrepreneurship

Employee entrepreneurship and employee moves to rival firms (employee mobility) have both been recognized as critical drivers of the transfer of knowledge. Drawing on a unique database of intra‐industry inventor entrepreneurship and mobility events in the U.S. semiconductor industry, I examine the effect of the complexity of inventors' prior patenting activities on their decisions to join a rival firm or found a start‐up. The findings show that even though complexity inhibits knowledge diffusion to rival firms through employee mobility, complex knowledge may be underexploited within existing organizations and may still flow to startups through employee entrepreneurship. This study sheds new light on how technology shapes patterns of employee entrepreneurship and mobility, with implications for knowledge flows and competitive dynamics.     

Uncertainty and the market valuation of R&D within a real options logic

The aim of this study is to provide new theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the effect of market and technological uncertainty on the market valuation of a firm's R&D capital. A set of hypotheses is developed adopting a real options logic and tested on a panel dataset of 290 manufacturing firms traded in the UK. Consistently with our theoretical model, we show that market and technological uncertainty have distinct effects on the valuation of R&D investments. The results have several important implications for resource allocation to R&D under uncertainty, which we discuss in the concluding section. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Real options reasoning and a new look at the R&D investment strategies of pharmaceutical firms

Real options reasoning (ROR) is a conceptual approach to strategic investment that takes into account the value of preserving the right to make future choices under uncertain conditions. In this study, we explore firms' motivations to invest in a new option. We find, based on an analysis of a large sample of patents by firms active in the pharmaceutical industry, that their investments in R&D are consistent with the logic of ROR. We identify three constructs—scope of opportunity, prior experience, and competitive effects—which have an influence on firms' propensity to invest in new R&D options and which could usefully be incorporated in a strategic theory of investment. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

Dysfunctional learning in decision processes: the case of employee reciprocity

While traditional economic models characterize individuals as boundlessly self‐interested, decades of empirical findings suggest that individuals' self‐interest motives are constrained by concurrent preferences for fairness. Individuals act on these preferences by behaving reciprocally: rewarding others perceived as behaving fairly and punishing others perceived as behaving unfairly. Successful firms must learn to navigate environments characterized by the reciprocity of their transaction partners. This paper investigates firms' judgments about employee reciprocity and posits a dysfunctional learning process whereby firms that overestimate employee reciprocity learn to correct their beliefs through feedback, while those that underestimate employee reciprocity do not. The result, demonstrated through computer simulation, is a systematic bias toward an overemphasis on employee self‐interest, and a resulting inefficiency in wage choices that hurts firm profitability. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

商业地产投资的实物期权特性及应用框架研究

商业地产开发投资中存在投资的不可逆性、外部环境的不确定性和决策的灵活性,因而具有实物期权特性。从确定要解决的问题、分析不确定性的来源、鉴别关键的不确定性因素、识别实物期权类型、构建期权定价模型、计算项目价值、检查计算结果和重新设计8个方面,构建了商业地产投资决策的实物期权分析框架。     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of incentives and communication in strategic alliances: an experimental investigation

This paper experimentally examines the determinants of the deviation between potential and realized value creation in strategic alliances. To better understand how decision making in alliances may influence success, we use an experimental design that juxtaposes two important factors that affect alliance members' decisions: economic incentives and communication. The evidence from our experiment sheds light on the relative impact of each, and more importantly, how both factors interact to explain successful outcomes. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Migration to 3G wireless broadband internet and real options: The case of an operator in India

The paper focuses on third generation wireless technologies and on alternative technologies for wireless local area networks. The authors present the evolutionary migration path from second to third generation systems. Technological, economic and behavioral factors related to decision-making towards the migration are proposed. As an example, the paper studies the case of the national incumbent operator of India. It analyzes qualitatively the migration problem from the perspective of the operator, the equipment manufacturer and the users. For the quantitative analysis, real options are used to value the investment decisions. The analysis suggests that the initial (sunk) investment cost, the average revenue per user, the growth of the subscriber base and the volatility of the markets are the key factors in the investment process.     

Applying knowledge management to project marketing in a demanding technology transfer project: Convincing the industrial customer over the knowledge gap

Literature in project and knowledge management has examined knowledge management in projects, but the utilization of knowledge management in project marketing is still largely unexplored. This study examines the links between knowledge management and project marketing activities in a project where the seller wants to convince the potential buyer about a demanding investment project. An in-depth case study illustrates this in a situation hampered by a technical knowledge gap between the parties. The buyer is committed when they can trust the seller's capability to successfully accomplish the project. The seller must criticize and communicate its core and project specific knowledge of technologies and customer needs through project marketing. A framework and implications on knowledge management and project marketing activities in different project phases is presented. It is proposed that knowledge management is a pertinent tool for project marketing as it helps to understand the roles of different knowledge types.