A classroom exercise on executive incentive compensation schemes

This paper describes a classroom exercise that has been used in several graduate courses. The exercise provides the students with a framework for understanding the rationale behind some of the mechanisms we observe in reality: incentive compensation plans for executives, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), auditing, and lawsuits against auditors. As such, the exercise provides some answers for several questions of ‘why’ before getting into the ‘how’ of reporting. The case can be used in courses dealing with financial accounting, managerial control and microeconomics in the MBA level.     

Management turnover and executive compensation in synergistic takeovers

The purpose of this paper is to provide a model of management turnover and executive compensation for a synergistic takeover. I extend a principal-agent model to include a synergy factor. I argue that the choice of management structure—turnover or no-turnover—provides an opportunity for the shareholder to efficiently utilize three elements of the incentive contracts: effort, insurance (risk-reduction) and synergy.I explain high turnover rates after takeovers, especially in conglomerate mergers as compared to horizontal mergers. Also, my model is consistent with empirical evidence that there is a high rate of management turnover in friendly as well as hostile takeovers and thus complements the model of the disciplinary role of takeovers. I also discuss an optimal compensation structure in synergistic takeovers compatible with their corresponding organizational forms.     

高管薪酬信息披露的经济后果研究

高管薪酬信息披露有助于提升公司薪酬契约透明度及治理效率,但同时增加了公司的信息披露成本.因此,高管薪酬信息披露对于公司的经济后果研究是一个值得探讨的话题.通过高管薪酬信息披露对薪酬水平、薪酬业绩敏感性的影响,观测我国高管薪酬信息披露的后果,并进一步观测不同产权性质公司间的影响差异.结果表明:信息披露政策抑制了高管薪酬水...     

Family ownership,corporate governance,and top executive compensation

In this study we investigate how top management pay is determined in a family firm environment where even listed firms are effectively controlled by a single individual or a single family. Using data from Hong Kong, we find that executive directors' pay is reduced if the directors have substantial stockholdings. Moreover, pay is related to profits but not to stock returns. Our results are consistent with external blockholders and independent non‐executive directors persuading firms to base top management compensation on a firm's profitability. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

我国上市公司高管薪酬契约研究

文章分析了我国上市公司高管薪酬契约问题,并从公司治理角度提出改进薪酬契约设计的相关建议。     

The influence of executive compensation on the dispersion of security analyst forecasts

This study examines the association between executive compensation and security analyst forecast dispersion in an agency setting. It is hypothesized that firms that compensate their managers with long-term performance plans and high percentages of managerial stock will be less likely to engage in manipulation of financial statements and their financial performance will be easier to predict, thus resulting in less disperse forecasts. The results provide evidence that firms that compensate their managers with long-term performance plans and higher levels of the company stock have less dispersion associated with their security analyst forecasts and greater dispersion of their long-term growth in earnings.     

Labor-market exposure as a determinant of attitudes toward immigration

This paper re-examines the role of labor-market competition as a determinant of attitudes toward immigration. We claim two main contributions. First, we use more sophisticated measures of the degree of exposure to competition from immigrants than previously done. In addition to education, we focus on the protection derived from (self-assessed) investments in job-specific human capital and from specialization in occupations that are (objectively) intensive in communication tasks. Second, we explicitly account for the potential endogeneity arising from job search. Methodologically, we estimate by instrumental variables, an econometric model that allows for heterogeneity at the individual, regional and country level. Drawing on the 2004–2005 European Social Survey, we obtain the following main results. First, natives that dislike immigrants tend to work in low-immigration jobs, biasing OLS estimates. Second, working in jobs that require high levels of specific human capital leads to relatively more pro-immigration attitudes, although this effect is only found for respondents with more than 12 years of schooling. Third, the degree of manual (communicational) intensity of workers' occupations has a negative (positive) effect on their pro-immigration views. This effect is the most significant, both in a statistical and in a quantitative sense, and is distinct from the protection from immigrant competition provided by formal education. Overall our results suggest a large role for skill-based labor market competition in determining individual attitudes toward immigration.     

Public infrastructure as a determinant of productive performance in China

Public infrastructure investment is an essential part of China’s regional development policy. This raises the question to what degree public infrastructure capital matters for labor productivity in China, at the regional level as well as over time. This paper estimates cost function models of production in industrial enterprises, using province-level data from 1993 to 2003. The estimated rate of return in industrial production is 23–25%, and on average public infrastructure contributes 2–3% points to the growth in labor productivity among these enterprises.     

Scaling laws, talent amplification, and executive compensation in the commercial bank industry

This research takes an alternative approach in analyzing the distribution of executive compensation in the commercial banking industry. We make use of scaling laws—laws often applied in the physical sciences that relate the intensity of an event to its frequency—to quantify the distribution of compensation and to make inferences on the type of process that generates it. We find that the distribution of compensation for chief executive officers, chief financial officers and chief operating officers is consistent with the amplification of managerial talent. However, we find that senior lending officer compensation does not support such increasing returns to talent. (JEL G210, Y330)     

Say on pay and executive compensation: A systematic review and suggestions for developing the field

Say on pay (SOP) is a form of shareholder activism where shareholders express their opinions on executive compensation by casting a vote in the annual general meeting. To date, although a large variety of results, antecedents and outcomes have been mentioned and discussed, knowledge about SOP is still limited. This study, through a systematic literature review of 44 articles on SOP published between 2010 and 2018 in finance and management journals, aims to explore our understanding of SOP effectiveness by analyzing its conceptualization, theoretical foundations, methodological issues, antecedents and derived outcomes. After identifying some common patterns in SOP effectiveness that reflect a specific governance contextualization, we provide a guide to develop future research in the field, highlighting key implications for human resource management academics and practitioners.     

Relative information asymmetry as a determinant of the market reaction to corporate financing announcements

Information-asymmetry-based models predict that the market should react negatively to unanticipated external financing. Previous empirical studies lend limited support to these conjectures. This study examines the anticipation issue using financial analysts' earnings-forecast errors as a proxy for information available prior to the external-financing announcement. The conjecture is that external financing would be less anticipated for firms which financial analysts cannot accurately predict their earnings. Event study results indicate that high-prediction-error firms exhibit significantly lower announcement period returns than lowprediction-error firms for non-convertible debt, convertible debt, and common stock offerings.     

Inter- and intra-industry linkages as a determinant of FDI in Central and Eastern Europe

This paper uses an unpublished dataset on disaggregated foreign direct investment (FDI) in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), and is rooted in new economic geography literature. A 10% increase in access to suppliers based in the FDI recipient country or access to the EU15 market for intermediate goods increases FDI by about 2% in Central European countries and by 1% in Eastern European countries. We argue that Central (core) European countries specialise in upstream industries and re-export goods toward FDI-origin countries, while Eastern (periphery) European countries are also involved in this production chain, but to a lesser extent.     

Chief executive officer compensation,firm performance,and strategic coopetition: A seemingly unrelated regression approach

Coopetition denotes the simultaneous cooperation and competition in a business relationship and is broader in depth and width than competition. This pioneering comparative study employs a seemingly unrelated regression system to investigate the impact of peer-pay bias and pay-for-relative performance upon the highly controversial chief executive officer (CEO) pay. The analysis of the 21 Dow–Jones firms from 1992 to 2013 shows that the pay-for-performance relationship is contingent on the fit between CEO's strategic decisions and firm's core competency. The CEO pay is driven by the intensification of firm coopetition. We contribute to executive compensation, corporate strategy, and econometric methods.     

The use of executive share-based compensation in Poland: investigating institutional and agency-based determinants in an emerging market

In this paper we investigate the under-researched topic of the use of executive share-based compensation in Poland, and we analyse empirically whether theoretical explanations developed and applied mainly in the context of developed countries also hold in this specific context. Building on agency and institutional theories we study the determinants of using executive share-based pay in 362 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. As a result, we highlight the role of the state in Polish firms and the need to consider specifically principal–principal conflicts typical of emerging economies in post-state-socialist organisational research. Our findings not only reflect particularities of the institutional environment in the country studied but also highlight the limits of the traditional principal–agent lens applied in emerging economies.     

Structure and characteristics of top management teams as antecedents of outside executive appointments: a three-country study

We examine top management team (TMT) structure and characteristics as potential endogenous antecedents of outside appointments of non-CEO senior executives, an executive category that has not yet received significant research attention despite its importance for corporate outcomes. In doing so, we draw on human capital and similarity-attraction theories, thus combining two complementary managerial decision rationales. Additionally addressing the pressing need for cross-country TMT research, this study empirically analyzes a unique sample of 880 non-CEO TMT appointments at large non-financial corporations in France, Germany and the UK between 2006 and 2010. Overall, the results show that TMT endogenous factors such as structure, new executive characteristics and incumbent TMT characteristics may hold significant explanatory power for new executives' origin. Beyond the individual explanatory factors, the comparative nature of the study reveals three distinct country profiles of the degree by which the two theoretical rationales appear to influence appointment decisions.     

Extrinsic motivation as a determinant of knowledge exchange in sales teams: A social network approach

This paper investigates extrinsic motivation as a determinant of knowledge exchange among employees in sales teams. Applying a social network approach, we study different forms of knowledge-exchange behaviors from the perspective of a focal employee and from the perspective of the dyad. From the focal employees' perspective, we disentangle knowledge seeking from knowledge providing, and argue that these two behaviors are affected differently by employees' extrinsic motivation. From the dyad perspective, we take similarity in motivation of tied-to employees and reciprocity of exchange ties into account. To test our hypotheses, we apply exponential random graph models to data gathered from 138 employees in five different sales teams distributed across three companies in Central Europe. The results of our analysis from the focal employees' perspective show that extrinsically motivated employees generally engage in less knowledge exchange. The dyad perspective further highlights that sales employees proceed purposefully when they exchange knowledge with coworkers. For instance, two employees' relative levels of extrinsic motivation determine their willingness to engage in reciprocal knowledge exchange. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on the microfoundations of organizational knowledge management and draw conclusions concerning HRM practices used to foster extrinsic motivation, thereby affecting knowledge exchange.