Holding company affiliation versus branching by independent banks: A cost analysis for interstate banking

Prohibition of interstate branching forced nearly all banks interested in interstate expansion to establish holding company affiliations. But it is not clear whether holding-company affiliation or branching by independent banks is preferable for consumers. By contrasting 1994 data of consolidated multibank holding companies with that of independent banks with branches, we assess their relative scale economies and cost advantages by asset size. Our analysis supports the assertion of the U. S. Department of Treasury that expansion through interstate branching would provide immediate cost savings and increase consumer benefits.     

Who Benefits from Deregulating the Separation of Banking Activities? Differential Effects on Commercial Bank,Investment Bank,and Thrift Stock Returns

We analyze the deregulation impact on commercial banks, investment banks, and thrifts associated with four major events progressively integrating commercial and investment banking activities in the United States during the 1990s. We find that commercial banks are the only group to react favorably to Federal Reserve announcements relaxing firewalls and easing restrictions on commercial bank revenues from investment banking activities. These regulations primarily benefit large banks. The Bankers Trust acquisition announcement of investment bank Alex Brown is associated with increased wealth for each of the three types of financial service institutions. At the eventual deregulation of the financial services industry, with the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act in 1999, the values of commercial banks and investment banks increase significantly although thrifts are not affected.     

The Relaxation of Entry Barriers in the Banking Industry: An Empirical Investigation

Until recently, state laws restricted entry into local banking markets in many states by limiting both branching and multibank holding company (MBHC) operations. To the extent that these laws impeded entry into local banking markets, the removal or relaxation of the restrictions should have reduced barriers to entry, leading to more competitive price levels in the affected markets. This paper tests for such effects by examining the changes in deposit interest rates offered by banks operating in markets affected by liberalization of state banking law relative to the changes in deposit interest rates offered during the same time period by banks operating in markets not affected by such liberalization. We find evidence that liberalization of state laws restricting intrastate MBHC operations, interstate branches, and interstate MBHC operations caused deposit interest rates to become more competitive. We, however, find no evidence of such effects associated with the removal of restrictions on intrastate branching.     

On the wealth and risk effects of commercial bank expansion into securities underwriting: An analysis of Section 20 subsidiaries

We investigate the abnormal returns and market-based risk effects of four Federal Reserve Board decisions to allow bank holding companies to engage in investment banking through Section 20 subsidiaries. Positive abnormal returns for commercial banks were observed for initial, limited powers granted by the Federal Reserve. However, authorization to engage in underwriting corporate debt and equity and subsequent expansion of potential revenues from underwritings produced negative abnormal returns and increases in risk.     

Financing bank stock ownership: A question of conflict of interest

The bank stock loan conflict of interest question arises when compensating balances are intermingled with a bank's correspondent balances for the benefit of those bank stockholders seeking a bank stock loan. This study attempts to determine if this practice exists usign two-stage least square regression analysis and cross-sectional data obtained from one-bank holding company applications in the Tenth Federal Reserve District. Our results suggest that bankers with established correspondent banking relationships capitalize on their correspondent balances to obtain favorable interest rates on bank stock loans.     

Capital changes at large affiliated banks

The federal bank regulators imposed numerical capital guidelines in December 1981. If these guidelines are binding, then banking organizations may respond to the costs of regulation in various ways. If the regulations are not binding, then further reliance may be placed on market discipline. This study develops two models of changes in the equity capital to assets ratio of large banks affiliated with bank holding companies—a regulatory model in which capital regulations are a binding influence and a market model in which financial markets influence capital ratios. The two models are examined empirically through a disequilibrium framework and maximum likelihood estimation techniques. The results suggest that most banks are predominantly influenced by regulatory forces. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Florida State University     

Vertical integration to avoid contracting with potential competitors: Evidence from bankers' banks

We examine a vertical integration decision within the commercial banking industry. During the last quarter of the 20th century, some community banks reduced their traditional reliance on correspondent banks for upstream products and services by joining bankers' banks, a form of business cooperative. Research on vertical integration focuses primarily on firm-specific investment, market power, and government regulation. However, this case is difficult to explain in terms of these standard vertical integration motives. Our evidence suggests that bankers' banks are a response to technological change and deregulation that results in increased costs faced by community banks in dealing with correspondent banks as both suppliers and potential competitors. For instance, loan participations require sharing proprietary information about major loan customers, something a community bank would not want to provide to a potential competitor.     

The dollars and sense of bank consolidation

For nearly two decades banks in the US have consolidated in record numbers – in terms of both frequency and the size of the merging institutions. Rhoades (1996) (S.A. Rhoades, 1996. Bank Mergers and Industrywide Structure, 1980–1994. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Staff Study 169) hypothesizes that the main motivations were increased potential for geographic expansion created by changes in state laws regulating branching and a more favorable antitrust climate. To look for evidence of economic incentives to exploit these improved opportunities for consolidation, we examine how consolidation affects expected profit, the riskiness of profit, profit efficiency, market value, market-value efficiencies, and the risk of insolvency. Our estimates of expected profit, profit risk, and profit efficiency are based on a structural model of leveraged portfolio production that was estimated for a sample of highest-level US bank holding companies by Hughes et al. (1996) (Hughes et al., 1996. Efficient banking under interstate branching, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 28, 1045–1071.) Here, we also estimate two additional measures that gauge efficiency in terms of the market values of assets and of equity. Our findings suggest that the economic benefits of consolidation are strongest for those banks engaged in interstate expansion and, in particular, interstate expansion that diversifies banks’ macroeconomic risk. Not only do these banks experience clear gains in their financial performance, but society also benefits from the enhanced bank safety that follows from this type of consolidation.     

Holding company affiliation and bank stability: Evidence from the US banking sector

Is affiliation with a multibank holding company beneficial for bank stability? We revisit this question by examining the response of market-based risk measures of independent and multibank-holding-company banks to an exogenous negative shock (the 2005 US hurricane season). We find evidence consistent with bank holding companies playing an important role in mitigating negative shocks, with affiliates of more liquid holdings remaining more stable in terms of both systemic and individual stability. We also conduct an event study showing that markets perceive multibank-holding-company banks' dynamics after the shock as value-enhancing.     

Deposit Insurance and Risk Management of the U.S. Banking System: What is the Loss Distribution Faced by the FDIC?

We examine the question of deposit insurance through the lens of risk management by constructing the loss distribution faced by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We take a novel approach by arguing that the risk management problem faced by the FDIC is similar to that of a bank managing a loan portfolio, only in the FDIC’s case the risk arises from the potential for loss of the individual banks in its portfolio. We explicitly estimate the cumulative loss distribution of FDIC insured banks using two variations of the Merton model and find that reserves are sufficient to cover roughly 99.85% of the loss distribution, corresponding to about a BBB+ rating. However, under different stress scenarios (higher correlations, fat-tailed bank returns, increased loss severity) that level can be much lower: approximately 96% corresponding to about a B+ rating.JEL classification: G210, G280.Any views expressed represent those of the author only and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.     

Reserve regulation and recourse as a source of risk premia in the federal funds market

In this paper we demonstrate that there is a pronounced and persistent daily pattern of returns in the federal funds market, centered on Wednesday. We present evidence that explains this phenomenon as a reflection of the optimal behavior of banks operating in an environment in which there are effective reserve requirements and a penalty cost for recourse to discount borrowing. In particular, we report empirical evidence that shows there was a significant upward shift in the amplitude of this pattern of daily returns that resulted from (1) the increase in uncertainty associated with the change in Federal Reserve operating procedures during the 1979–1982 period, and (2) the imposition of a surcharge on discount borrowing instituted by the Federal Reserve. Our results demonstrate that what otherwise might be regarded as anomalous interest-rate behavior is consistent with the optimal response of banks to the regulatory environment within which they operate.     

Did the Reserve Requirement Increases of 1936–37 Reduce Bank Lending? Evidence from a Quasi‐Experiment

We analyze the impact of contractionary monetary policy through increases in reserve requirements on bank lending. We compare the lending behavior of banks that were subject to the requirement increases in 1936–37, Federal Reserve member banks, to a group of banks that were not subject to the reserve increase, Federal Reserve nonmember banks. After implementing the difference‐in‐difference estimators, we find that the increases in reserve requirements did not create financing constraints for member banks and lead them to reduce lending. Therefore, the actions of the Federal Reserve concerning the required reserve ratios cannot be blamed for instigating the economic downturn of 1937–38.     

Capital Constraints,Asymmetric Information,and Internal Capital Markets in Banking: New Evidence

A growing literature investigates the role of internal capital markets in mitigating financial constraints faced by the subsidiaries of a conglomerate. Most studies have relied on indirect tests based on correlations between the cash flows and the investment of the subsidiaries. In contrast, we avoid the widespread criticisms of such specifications by providing direct tests that focus on the mechanisms through which internal reallocations of funds occur. We find that internal capital markets are used by multibank holding companies to mitigate capital constraints faced by individual bank subsidiaries. In addition, we show that internal capital management within a multibank holding company involves not only the movement of capital to those subsidiaries with a relatively greater need for capital but also the movement of assets (loans) from less well capitalized to better capitalized subsidiaries by means of loan sales and purchases among the subsidiaries. Furthermore, net loan sales are used to allow efficiency‐enhancing specialization among bank subsidiaries, insofar as those subsidiaries with the best loan origination opportunities are able to focus on loan originations even if they do not have sufficient capital to hold the loans. Our evidence is consistent with banks affiliated with holding companies more actively participating in loan sales and purchases because, by using their internal secondary loan market, they are able to avoid the “lemons” problem faced by stand‐alone banks.     

The Effects of Liquidity Regulation on Bank Demand in Monetary Policy Operations

We estimate the effects of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), a liquidity requirement for banks, on the tenders that banks submit in Term Deposit Facility operations, a Federal Reserve tool created to manage the quantity of central bank reserves. We identify these effects using variation in LCR requirements across banks and a change over time that allowed term deposits to count toward the LCR. Banks subject to the LCR submit tenders more often and submit larger tenders than exempt banks when term deposits qualify for the LCR. These results suggest that liquidity regulation affects bank demand in monetary policy operations.     

Banks' Liquidity and the Cost of Liquidity to Corporations

We consider the liquidity shock banks experienced following the collapse of the asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the fall of 2007 to investigate whether banks' liquidity conditions affect their ability to provide liquidity to corporations. We find that banks that borrowed more from the Federal Home Loan Bank system or the Federal Reserve's discount window following that liquidity shock passed a larger portion of their borrowing costs onto corporations seeking access to liquidity when compared to the precrisis period. This increase is larger among banks with a bigger exposure to the ABCP market, credit lines that pose more liquidity risk to banks, and borrowers that are likely dependent on the credit‐line provider. Our findings show that the crisis that affected the banking system had a negative effect not only on the price of credit to corporations, but also on the price corporations pay to guarantee access to liquidity.     

Liquidity Risk,Bank Networks,and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Reducing systemic liquidity risk related to seasonal loan demand was one reason for founding the Federal Reserve System. Nevertheless, less than 8% of state‐chartered banks joined the Fed in its first decade. Banks facing high liquidity risk from seasonal loan demand were more likely to join the Fed in its first decade. We also find evidence consistent with the notion that banks could obtain some indirect access to the discount window through interbank transfers. Some banks apparently joined the Fed to pass through discount window liquidity to other banks via the interbank network.  Joining the Fed increased member banks’ lending.     

Thawing frozen capital markets and backdoor bailouts: Evidence from the Fed's liquidity programs

During the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced several emergency liquidity programs as supplements to the discount window (DW): TAF, PDCF, and TSLF. Using data on loans to large commercial banks and primary dealers, we find that the programs were used by relatively few institutions and thus provided limited relief to banks that relied on short-term debt markets. Although usage increased after Lehman's bankruptcy, most commercial banks avoided the DW and TAF. We also find that the programs were more often used by failed European banks than by healthy US banks, likely because these loans are expensive relative to private market funds. Our results also show that usage of PDCF and TSLF programs, while higher, was more often used by primary dealers in weaker financial position.     

Reprint of: Thawing frozen capital markets and backdoor bailouts: Evidence from the Fed's liquidity programs

During the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced several emergency liquidity programs as supplements to the discount window (DW): TAF, PDCF, and TSLF. Using data on loans to large commercial banks and primary dealers, we find that the programs were used by relatively few institutions and thus provided limited relief to banks that relied on short-term debt markets. Although usage increased after Lehman's bankruptcy, most commercial banks avoided the DW and TAF. We also find that the programs were more often used by failed European banks than by healthy US banks, likely because these loans are expensive relative to private market funds. Our results also show that usage of PDCF and TSLF programs, while higher, was more often used by primary dealers in weaker financial position.     

Informational Barriers to Entry into Credit Markets*

Economic theory suggests that asymmetric information between incumbents and entrants can generate barriers to entry into credit markets. Incumbents have superior information about their own customers and the overall economic conditions of the local credit market. This implies that entrants are likely to experience higher loan default rates than the incumbents. We test these theoretical predictions using a unique database of 7,275 observations on 729 individual banks’ lending in 95 Italian local markets. We find that informational asymmetries play a significant role in explaining entrants’ loan default rates. The default rate is significantly higher for those banks that entered local markets without opening a branch, suggesting that having a branch on site may help to reduce the informational disadvantage. We also uncover a positive correlation between banks’ loan default rates in individual local markets and the number of banks lending in that market. We argue that these informational barriers can help to explain why entry into many local credit markets by domestic and foreign banks was slow, even after substantial deregulation. * The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank of Italy. The authors thank Franklin Allen, Dario Focarelli, Andrea Generale, Luigi Guiso, Francesca Lotti, Marco Pagano, Alberto Franco Pozzolo, Paola Sapienza, Alessandro Secchi, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, the Federal Reserve of Chicago, the 2003 BIS Workshop on Applied Banking Research, the 2003 EARIE Conference, the First Banca d’Italia/CEPR Conference on Money, Banking and Finance, the 2004 FIRS Conference on Banking, Insurance and Intermediation and the 2004 EEA Meeting for their comments. The usual disclaimer applies to all of them.     

EFFECT OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICIES ON BANK EQUITY RETURNS

We investigate the reaction of bank equity returns to changes in the relevant Federal Reserve (Fed) policy tool, which is the federal funds rate during periods of interest rate targeting and the discount rate during periods of reserves targeting. Three policy periods from 1974 to 1996 are investigated. We find that bank equity returns are inversely related to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool and that the degree of sensitivity of bank equity returns is conditioned on the direction of the change in the Fed policy tool. Also, we find that values of larger commercial banks and low‐capital‐ratio commercial banks are more exposed to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool. JEL classification: G11, G12, G14.