The Wealth Effects of Capital Investment Decisions: An Empirical Comparison of Korean Chaebol and Non‐Chaebol Firms

Abstract:   This paper investigates the capital investment decisions of Korean firms and their impact on shareholder wealth. Overall, we find positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcements of 697 cases of investment projects during the period 1992–1999. This paper also finds that the investment decisions of business group ( chaebol ‐affiliated) firms do not increase shareholder wealth, while the capital investment decisions of non‐ chaebol firms generate significantly positive abnormal returns. The multivariate tests provide consistent evidence that the announcement effects for chaebol firms are lower than for non‐ chaebol firms, after growth opportunities, investment size and firm size are controlled for. The findings support the view that the organizational structure of Korean chaebols creates an incentive for managers to make non‐value maximizing capital investment decisions.     

Trading-off Corporate Control and Personal Diversification through Capital Structure and Merger Activity

Abstract:  In this study we use direct estimates of the portfolio diversification of the largest shareholder in a firm to study the impact of shareholder diversification on the firm. For firms where the controlling shareholder is an individual, our tests indicate that the owner-managers use debt, dual class shares and corporate control transactions (merger activity) to strategically trade off corporate control and the drawback of poor portfolio diversification. However, for firms where the controlling shareholder is an institution, our results indicate that control but not diversification is important.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

International Evidence on the Value of Corporate Diversification

The valuation effect of diversification is examined for large samples of firms in Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom for 1992 and 1994. We find no significant diversification discount in Germany, but a significant diversification discount of 10 percent in Japan and 15 percent in the U.K. Concentrated ownership in the hands of insiders enhances the valuation effect of diversification in Germany, but not in Japan or the U.K. For Japan, only firms with strong links to an industrial group have a diversification discount. These findings suggest that international differences in corporate governance affect the impact of diversification on shareholder wealth.     

Diversification,corporate governance and firm value in small markets: evidence from New Zealand

We find that diversified firms in New Zealand are associated with a value discount of 19–42 per cent relative to single‐segment (undiversified) firms. Although several competing explanations have been offered in the literature, we find that the strength of corporate governance explains between 15–21 per cent of this discount. Specifically, board size, busyness of directors, CEO ownership and whether or not compensation of directors includes equity‐based components collectively explain a large part of the reported discount. Our results from companies trading in New Zealand complement recent findings in the US by not only confirming the existence of a diversification discount but also emphasizing the role of poor governance in destroying shareholder wealth by pursuing a value‐destroying corporate strategy. All our results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity in the decision to diversify and the choice of corporate governance structure by employing two‐way fixed‐effects and dynamic‐panel generalized method of moments regression techniques.     

The Wealth Effect of Domestic Joint Ventures: Evidence from Taiwan

This study presents important international evidence by examining the wealth effect of domestic joint ventures by Taiwanese firms. In opposite to United States evidence, we find that announcements of domestic joint ventures by Taiwanese firms are, on average, associated with significantly negative abnormal stock returns. We also find that the stock market response to announced domestic joint ventures is significantly positively related to the announcing firms' investment opportunities, size of investment and debt ratio, and is significantly negatively related to the business relatedness variable. In contrast, free cash flow, firm size, relative firm size and managerial ownership are found to have no significant power in explaining the market response. Our results support the investment opportunities, synergy and complementarity hypotheses as well as a broad interpretation of the free cash flow hypothesis, but reject the absolute size, relative size and alignment-of-interests hypotheses. This study makes valuable contributions to the literature by providing the first direct evidence on the role of investment opportunities, synergy and alignment-of-interests in explaining the wealth effect of domestic joint ventures     

Corporate Diversification: What Gets Discounted?

Prior literature finds that diversified firms sell at a discount relative to the sum of the imputed values of their business segments. We explore this documented discount and argue that it stems from risk–reducing effects of corporate diversification. Consistent with this risk–reduction hypothesis, we find that (a) shareholder losses in diversification are a function of firm leverage, (b) all equity firms do not exhibit a diversification discount, and (c) using book values of debt to compute excess value creates a downward bias for diversified firms. Overall, the results indicate that diversification is insignificantly related to excess firm value.     

Nonshareholder constituency statutes and shareholder wealth: A note

We assess the effects of the introduction and passage of state nonshareholder constituency statutes on shareholder wealth. We find a small, but significantly negative effect on shareholder wealth for companies incorporated in states passing nonshareholder constituency statutes that did not already have corporate takeover defenses in place. Further, we find that firms that are poorly managed (as proxied by low market-to-book ratios) react more negatively to the statutes.     

Are real options a missing piece in the diversification-value puzzle?

This paper examines the impact of corporate diversification on a firm's market value in terms of changes in its mix of value sources between growth options and assets-in-place. We argue that the traditionally assumed replicability of corporate diversification benefits by individual investors might not be as feasible when diversification implies acquiring new growth options as when it only involves assets-in-place investments. We further explain why a different effect of diversification on a firm's mix of value sources can occur, therefore leading to a mediating role of growth options between diversification and market value. Using a panel sample of U.S. firms from 1998 to 2010, we find that a firm's growth options portfolio helps explain the effect of diversification strategy on its market value.     

Causes and effects of employee stock option plans: Evidence from Singapore

This study highlights the determinants for the adoption of employee stock option plans (ESOPs) in Singapore and measures the impact of ESOP announcements on the shareholder wealth of adopting companies. We find that ESOP value is positively associated with a firm's growth opportunities but negatively related to interest coverage. Although larger firms are more likely to adopt ESOPs relative to smaller ones, among those that use ESOPs, the larger firms tend to use less ESOPs than the smaller ones. A further investigation of the market response to the adoption of ESOPs shows that the stock price reacts positively to such announcements, suggesting that investors view ESOPs favorably. The evidence demonstrates that ESOPs tend to align managerial with shareholder interests and contribute to the improvement of company performance.     

The impact of technology-motivated M&A and joint ventures on the value of IT and non-IT firms: a new examination

We extend Lee and Lim (Rev Quant Financ Account 27:111–123, 2006) who provide empirical evidence on the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and joint ventures on the value of information technology (IT) and non-IT firms. Using technology-motivated transactions, we examine whether there are differences in market response to the announcement of M&As and joint ventures, and we consider the long-term performance of such firms. We find the market provides no (positive) reaction to joint ventures (M&As) at the announcement. We also present new evidence suggesting the market reacts more favorably to the announcement of technology M&As relative to joint ventures for our full sample, IT sample and non-IT sample. However, our examination of these firms’ long-term performance suggests the initial reaction is not fully supported. The findings suggest improved (declining) operating performance for joint venture (M&A) firms, and evidence to conclude joint venture firms achieve superior long-term performance changes for both accrual- and cash-based measures. To explain these inconsistencies, we employ a set of control variables previously documented as determinants of the innovation ownership decision. For joint venture firms, we find that, while the market fails to consider the importance of the firms’ R&D intensity and growth prospects in its initial reaction, these are ultimately key indicators of their future performance. The evidence also suggests the market overreacts to M&A announcements because it over-weights the impact of R&D intensity on the firms’ future performance in its initial response.     

Selling to buy: Asset sales and acquisitions

This study explores the impact of joint corporate asset restructuring decisions, where firms sell an asset in order to fund a subsequent acquisition (selling-to-buy). We find that firms with asset sales are associated with increased acquisition probability. The effect is more pronounced for financially constrained firms. We also show that, in addition to the established improved firm efficiency from focus-increasing asset sales, financially constrained firms obtain the necessary funds to conduct focus-increasing acquisitions, improving further their efficiency. This translates into both higher long-run operating performance and stock abnormal returns at the asset sale announcement.     

Corporate governance,shareholder rights and firm diversification: An empirical analysis

Grounded in agency theory, this study investigates how the strength of shareholder rights influences the extent of firm diversification and the excess value attributable to diversification. The empirical evidence reveals that the strength of shareholder rights is inversely related to the probability to diversify. Furthermore, firms where shareholder rights are more suppressed by restrictive corporate governance suffer a deeper diversification discount. Specifically, we document a 1.1–1.4% decline in firm value for each additional governance provision imposed on shareholders. An explicit distinction is made between global and industrial diversification. Our results support agency theory as an explanation for the value reduction in diversified firms. The evidence in favor of agency theory appears to be more pronounced for industrial diversification than for global diversification.     

Corporate diversification,ownership structure,and firm value: The Singapore evidence

We provide international evidence on the level and value of corporate diversification using a sample of 145 Singapore firms. We find that the level of diversification is positively related to firm size and negatively related to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. However, we find no evidence that insider ownership has a significant impact on the level of diversification. We find significant value loss from diversification only for those firms with low managerial ownership, suggesting that value-reducing diversification stems from agency problems. Outside block ownership does not have a significant impact on the value of diversification. Thus, while outside blockholders may act as a deterrent on the level of diversification, there is no evidence that they can effectively reduce the agency problems for those firms with low managerial ownership.     

Reputation as a governance mechanism? Evidence from payout policy of insider‐controlled firms in Taiwan

This paper examines the effect of entrenched insiders’ reputational concerns on corporate payout policy in Taiwan, a market in which typical public firms are controlled by a single dominant shareholder who is subject to weak takeover threats and has incentives and abilities to extract private benefits by oppressing minority equity holders. The reputation‐building hypothesis predicts that firms with higher expropriation risk by a controlling shareholder make more payouts to credibly commit not to expropriate minority shareholders, thereby establishing reputation in the capital market for risk diversification and low‐cost external financing. I show that corporate payout intensity is significantly and positively correlated with measures related to the moral hazard of dominant owners. The reputation effect manifests in firms that most value it; the interaction analyses indicate that younger, smaller, or growth firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk pay more cash dividends. Moreover, firms are less likely to omit dividends and more likely to resume dividends when their controlling shareholders are more entrenched. Finally, I show that the value of cash dividends is higher for firms with higher controlling shareholder expropriation risk and that expected dividend increases in these firms are value enhancing.     

Firm diversification and the value of corporate cash holdings

This paper studies the effect of firm diversification on the value of corporate cash holdings. We develop two hypotheses based on efficient internal capital market and agency problems. We find that the value of cash is lower in diversified firms than in single-segment firms, and that firm diversification is associated with a lower value of cash in both financially unconstrained and constrained firms. We find that firm diversification has a negative (zero) impact on the value of cash among firms with a lower (higher) level of corporate governance. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that firm diversification reduces the value of corporate cash holdings through agency problems.     

Excess cash holdings and shareholder value

We examine the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Australia and the impact on shareholder wealth of holding excess cash. Our results show that a trade‐off model best explains the level of a firm’s cash holdings in Australia. We find that ‘transitory’ excess cash firms earn significantly higher risk‐adjusted returns compared to ‘persistent’ excess cash firms, suggesting that the market penalises firms that hoard cash. The marginal value of cash also declines with larger cash balances, and the longer firms hold on to excess cash. The results are consistent with agency costs associated with persistence in excess cash holdings.     

Legal shareholder protection and corporate R&D investment

This paper investigates the effects of shareholder protection law on corporate R&D investment. I find that the institutional protection of shareholder benefits reduces both underinvestment and overinvestment in R&D projects. Legal shareholder rights significantly increase R&D investment for firms that may underinvest, but reduce R&D for firms that may overinvest. Shareholder protection further enhances the growth of firms in R&D intensive industries, and promotes the economic growth of innovative countries. The results consistently show that enforcing stronger legal shareholder protection can help firms achieve an overall more efficient capital allocation to productive R&D investment.     

Does CEO reputation matter for capital investments?

This paper examines the association between CEO reputation and corporate capital investments. The efficient contracting hypothesis predicts a positive association between CEO reputation and wealth effects of corporate capital investments. In contrast, the rent extraction hypothesis predicts that the wealth effects of capital investments are negatively associated with CEO reputation. We find that the stock market's responses to announcements of capital investments are more favorable for firms with more reputable CEOs. Moreover, CEO reputation mitigates the negative stock price reaction associated with announcements of capital investments by firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Additional analysis indicates that firms with more reputable CEOs exhibit significantly better post-investment operating performance improvements than those with less reputable CEOs, especially in firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Collectively, our results suggest that the efficient contracting hypothesis dominates the rent extraction hypothesis in terms of net economic impact of capital investments on the investing firm.     

Domestic and International Equity REIT Joint Ventures: Structuring Corporate Options

We examine a sample of 185 Joint Ventures parented by publicly-traded Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts 1994–2001. These transactions are found to be motivated by a wide variety of corporate strategies. Shareholder returns for REIT parents are significantly positive, which is consistent with wealth effects previously reported for joint ventures formed by non-REIT real estate firms. In a subsample of joint ventures formed to structure partial dispositions of property, however, abnormal returns are significantly negative, which is consistent with the free cash flow theory of Jensen. REIT joint venture experience in Asia has been neutral for value, but may improve in the future if early ventures have created options for more efficient partnerships later.