Could making banks hold only liquid assets induce bank runs?

Restrictions placed on bank portfolios are analyzed in a banking model designed to capture the role of checking accounts in facilitating transactions. Forcing banks to hold only liquid assets creates the incentive for liquidity-based runs. Even when a run does not occur, welfare is reduced as a result of overinvestment in the liquid asset.     

Do negative interest rates affect bank risk-taking?

We offer early evidence on the impact of negative interest rate policy (NIRP) on banks’ risk-taking. Our primary result shows banks in NIRP-adopter countries reduce holdings of risky assets by around 10 percentage points following implementation of NIRP in comparison to banks in non-adopter countries. We augment this result by identifying NIRP’s impact on other aspects of banks’ risk-taking behaviour; NIRP is associated with reductions in banks’ loan growth and average loan price (by 3.7 percentage points and 59 basis points) and a rebalancing of asset portfolios towards safer assets. Secondly, we find the NIRP-effect is heterogeneous; post-NIRP risk-taking increases at strongly capitalised banks and at banks operating in less competitive markets that exploit market power to insulate net interest margins and profitability. Our robust empirical evidence supports the “de-leverage” hypothesis which suggests that banks acquire safer, liquid assets to bolster their capital positions rather than searching for value by acquiring riskier assets. We base our evidence on a sample of 2,584 banks from 33 OECD countries across 2012 to 2016, and from models that employ a difference-in-differences framework.     

Do stress tests affect bank liquidity creation?

We examine the impact of Federal Reserve stress tests from 2009 to 2016 on U.S. bank liquidity creation. Empirical results show that regulatory stress tests have a negative effect on both on-and off-balance sheet bank liquidity creation and asset-side liquidity creation. As banks enter the stress tests, they reduce their liquidity creation to avoid failing the stress tests. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks manage their risk exposures to meet higher capital requirements. The negative effect of stress testing on liquidity creation continues to persist in the quarters after the stress tests. Finally, stress test banks appear to increase liability-side liquidity creation. These findings highlight that the enhanced financial stability from greater regulatory scrutiny may be achieved at the expense of financial intermediation.     

Do bank regulation,supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank efficiency?

The recent global financial crisis has spurred renewed interest in identifying those reforms in bank regulation that would work best to promote bank development, performance and stability. Building upon three recent world-wide surveys on bank regulation (,  and ), we contribute to this assessment by examining whether bank regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or impede bank operating efficiency. Based on an un-balanced panel analysis of 4050 banks observations in 72 countries over the period 1999–2007, we find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively associated with bank efficiency, while greater capital regulation stringency is marginally and positively associated with bank efficiency. We also find that a strengthening of official supervisory power is positively associated with bank efficiency only in countries with independent supervisory authorities. Moreover, independence coupled with a more experienced supervisory authority tends to enhance bank efficiency. Finally, market-based monitoring of banks in terms of more financial transparency is positively associated with bank efficiency.     

Do bank managers signal through cash flow statements?

We empirically examine the cash flow statements for Japanese banks and whether their managers engage in classification shifting to temper concerns about risk exposure. To create a buffer against liquidity shocks, they shift cash flows from investing and/or financing activities to operating activities. We also find robust evidence that classification shifting intensifies in higher risk situations. Although prior research on managerial discretion focuses on earning management, we are the first to show cash flow management to avoid sequential negative changes in operating cash flows. We show that these activities convey valuable information about changes in banks' risk exposure.     

Do investors trade uniformly through time?

This study tests whether investors trade uniformly through time by analyzing the quarter-by-quarter trading decision of individual shareholders in one no-load mutual fund family over nearly six years. These shareholders' trading probabilities change dramatically through time. Time has a larger economic effect on the shareholders' trading decisions than data commonly used in prior research, including fund performance. This effect is larger among shareholders who have more prior transactions, and it is robust to controls for unobserved heterogeneity.     

Do bank bailouts affect the provision of trade credit?

We document that borrowers of banks that received capital support under TARP/CPP significantly increased their quarterly provision of trade credit (accounts receivable) during the crisis by 5.2%, while borrowers of other banks did not. The effect is strongest in 2008Q4, and larger for pre-crisis riskier, growth-oriented and bank-dependent firms and for firms that borrow from pre-crisis smaller, less profitable and better capitalized CPP banks. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that the effect is caused by CPP and not by heterogeneity between firms, banks and time periods. Our study provides novel evidence that suggests a beneficial multiplier effect of bank bailouts.     

Do bank regulations affect board independence? A cross-country analysis

Based on the hand-collected board structure data of 277 listed banks across 55 countries, and the bank regulation and supervision database compiled by the World Bank, this paper provides the first cross-country assessment of the impacts of bank regulations on board independence of banks. In line with Beck et al. (2006), we examine the effects of two types of regulation policies, the first involving the empowerment of supervisory agencies to monitor and discipline banks directly, and the second focusing on encouraging private monitoring of banks through requiring disclosure of more accurate and complete information. We find that empowering official supervisory agencies to discipline banks directly reduces board independence, but encouraging private sector monitoring of banks increases it. The findings suggest that the first type of regulations tends to crowd out the internal governance of banks, while the second crowds in it. We also find that the legal system with better investor rights protection and better contracts enforcement not only increases board independence but also enhances the crowding in effect of promoting private monitoring and decreases the crowding out effect of direct official supervision on board independence.     

Do mutual fund managers time market liquidity?

This paper examines mutual fund managers' ability to time market-wide liquidity. Using the CRSP mutual fund database, we find strong evidence that over the 1974–2009 period, mutual fund managers demonstrate the ability to time market liquidity at both the portfolio level and the individual fund level. Liquidity timing predicts future fund performance and the difference in the risk-adjusted returns between top and bottom liquidity-timing funds is approximately 2% per year. Funds exhibiting liquidity-timing ability tend to have longer histories, higher expense ratios, and higher turnover rates.     

Board diversity reforms: Do they matter for EU bank performance?

We examine the impact of governance reforms related to board diversity on the performance of European Union banks. Using a difference‐in‐difference approach, we document that reforms increase bank stock returns and their volatility within the first 3 years after their enactment. The type of reform matters, with quotas increasing return volatility. The effectiveness of reforms depends on a country's institutional environment. The impact of reforms on return volatility is found to be beneficial in countries more open to diversity, with common law system and with greater economic freedom. Finally, reforms play a bigger role in banks that have ex ante less heterogeneous boards.     

Supervisors as information producers: Do stress tests reduce bank opaqueness?

Supervisory stress tests assess the impact of an adverse macroeconomic scenario on the profitability and capitalisation of a large number of banks. The results of such stress test exercises have recently been disclosed to the public in an attempt to restore confidence and to curb bank opaqueness by helping investors distinguish between sound and fragile institutions. In an unprecedented effort for transparency, the 2011 European Union stress test lead to the release of some 3400 data points for each of the 90 participating banks. This makes it an ideal setting to investigate a number of hypotheses on the information role of the stress tests.     

Do non-traditional banking activities reduce bank liquidity creation? Evidence from Vietnam

The study analyzes the impact of engaging in non-traditional banking activities on bank liquidity creation. This strand of research has almost gone unnoticed by academics so far. Based on a dataset of Vietnamese commercial banks from 2007 to 2018, we document that the liquidity creation function of banks decreases with the income from non-traditional banking segments. This impact is observed in both on- and off-balance sheets across multiple robustness tests of the static and dynamic panels regressed by the ordinary least squares method and the generalized method of moments. Further decomposing the non-interest income sources, we find that banks that engage more in non-traditional activities for fees and commissions tend to reduce the liquidity creation more compared to other counterparts. The findings offer insightful implications for regulatory agencies and bank managers in the determination of liquidity creation behavior in emerging markets.     

Do all new brooms sweep clean? Evidence for outside bank appointments

Banks in bad financial shape are more likely to appoint executive directors from the outside than those in good shape. It is, however, not clear whether all of these appointments necessarily lead to the desired turnaround. We analyze the performance effects of new board members with external boardroom experience (outsiders) by distinguishing between good and bad managerial abilities of executives based on either ROA or risk-return efficiency of their previous employers. Our results show that banks appointing bad outsiders underperform other banks while those appointing good outsiders do so to a lesser extent. The performance differentials are highly pronounced in high-risk banks and in the post-crisis period.     

How do insured deposits affect bank risk? Evidence from the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act

This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.     

International financial stress spillovers to bank lending: Do internal characteristics matter?

The purpose of this paper is to unveil and assess the potential US financial spillover on Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) bank lending and to check whether bank's internal characteristics shape such an effect or not. For this purpose, a dynamic panel model is estimated using the GMM system using data on an unbalanced panel of GCC banks over the period 2003–2018. We have found evidence of financial stress spillovers on bank lending and that their distributional impacts vary across time, banks size and capitalization. However, the role of banks liquidity in shaping the impacts of financial stress on lending is found to depend on dry-ups/abundance of market funding liquidity. The results are robust to both splitting the sample into pre- and post- crisis periods as well as to the inclusion of additional potential lending supply determinants.     

Do tourism receipts affect bank profitability? Analytical evidence from 85 tourism economies

Using data from 17,077 banks in 85 tourism economies during 1995–2016, this study analyzes the impact of international tourism receipts on banks’ profitability and hence financial stability. This study uses two-step system dynamic generalized method of moments estimator techniques to find that the tourism receipts are received through both direct and indirect channels and adversely affect bank profitability. Developing and low-income countries experience the greatest negative impact on profitability. Banks in European countries suffer the highest negative impact, whereas those in the United States are affected the least. Commercial and savings banks experience the highest negative impact of tourism. The findings of the study emphasize prudence in fiscal spending in countries where tourism constitutes a significant part of government revenue. The deleterious impact of COVID-19 on the flow of tourism revenue is likely to affect bank profitability and financial stability of the countries dependent on tourism. Therefore, it is of great significance to policy planners worldwide. The study also opens new vistas for research.     

Do subordinated debt holders discipline bank risk-taking? Evidence from risk management decisions

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995–2009 period, I document that the ratio of subordinated debt affects bank risk management decisions consistent with the market discipline hypothesis only when subordinated debt is held by the parent holding company. In particular, the subordinated debt ratio increases the likelihood and the extent of interest rate derivatives use for risk management purposes at bank holding company (BHC)-affiliated banks, where subordinated debt holders have a better access to information needed for monitoring and control rights provided by equity ownership. At non-affiliated banks, a higher subordinated debt ratio leads to risk management decisions consistent with moral hazard behavior. The analysis also shows that the too-big-to-fail protection prevents market discipline even at BHC-affiliated banks.     

Do loan loss reserves behave like capital? Evidence from recent bank failures

Regulatory capital guidelines allow for loan loss reserves to be added back as capital. Our evidence suggests that the influence of loan loss reserves added back as regulatory capital (hereafter referred to as “add-backs”) on bank risk cannot be explained by either economic principles underlying the notion of capital or accounting principles underlying the recording of reserves. Specifically, we observe that, in sharp contrast to the economic notion of capital as a buffer against bank failure risk, add-backs are positively associated with the risk of bank failure during the recent economic crisis. Furthermore, the positive association of add-backs with bank failure risk is concentrated among cases in which the add-backs are highly likely to increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. The evidence cannot thus be fully explained by accounting principles either, since the role of loan loss reserves according to those principles does not depend on whether the reserves generate a regulatory capital increase. Additional analysis suggests that the observed influence of loan loss reserves on bank failure risk may be an unintended consequence of their regulatory treatment as capital.     

Which bank is the “central” bank?

Liquidity flows through a financial network cannot be accurately described using external processing constraints alone. Behavioral aspects of participants also matter. A method similar to Google's PageRank procedure is used to produce a ranking of participants in the Canadian Large Value Transfer System in terms of their daily liquidity holdings. Accounting for differences in banks’ processing speeds is essential for explaining why observed distributions of liquidity differ from the initial distributions, which are determined by the credit limits selected by banks. Delay tendencies of banks are unobservable in the data and are estimated using a Markov model.     

Role of bank credit on local growth: Do politics and crisis matter?

Although state-owned banks are expected to promote the growth of less-developed regions, especially in developing economies, several cross-country studies report that lending by state banks is associated with the inefficient allocation of credit and low levels of development. Further, state banks have been found to lend to their cronies, especially around elections. In this paper, we study the lending activities of state-owned and private banks during the period 1992–2010 and analyze the relationship between the credit these banks provide and local economic growth in Turkey during crisis periods and in election years. We find that the share of state-owned banks in the credit market in crisis periods and local election years is significantly higher than their share in non-crisis and non-election periods. The per capita real credit that state-owned banks provide during crisis years is found to be positively associated with local growth in all provinces. Our results suggest that although state-owned banks might issue loans for political reasons in election periods, they also seem to play an important role in offsetting the adverse effects of economic shocks, especially in developed provinces.