Personality variables as predictors of budget system characteristics

Personality measures, perceptions of organizational climate, and attitudes toward the budgetary system were gathered from 97 operating executives with heavy budgetary responsibilities in 18 companies, along with data concerning the degree of rigidity or degree of participation in the budgetary system of each company. The personality traits of authoritarianism, need for independence, and flexibility were found to be correlated with the individual's perception of organizational climate and with certain attitudes toward the budgetary system. A discriminant analysis of these personality variables indicates that they have predictive ability concerning the rigidity or participativeness of the budgetary system but have no predictive ability concerning the individual's attitude toward the system.     

Organization size, budget cycle, and budget related influence in city governments: An empirical study

This paper explores the relationship between budgeting and perceived power in city government organizations. Data are reported from a survey of perceived budget influence in six city governments in Texas. The findings suggest that perceived influence varies by stage of budget cycle, city size, level of hierarchy, department function, and vertical vs horizontal direction of influence. For example, during budget formulation city managers were perceived as having the most vertical power. During budget implemetation, there was a perceived increase in department head vertical power and a decrease in city council power. Perceptions of horizontal power suggested that budget departments generally had greater perceived influence than operating departments for budget formulation, but not for budget implementation. The findings are used to develop a strategic contingencies model of budget-related power, and to suggest some research steps for testing the proposed model.     

The effect of rankings on honesty in budget reporting

We conduct an experiment to investigate the effect of rankings, which are pervasive in practice, on the honesty of managers’ budget reports, which is important for sound decision making in organizations. Participants in our experiment are ranked in one of four ways: (1) firm profit, (2) own compensation, (3) both firm profit and own compensation, and (4) randomly, which serves as our baseline condition. None of the rankings affect participants’ remuneration. Compared to our baseline (random rankings) setting, where participants indeed exhibit honesty concerns, we find that rankings based on firm profit significantly increase honesty and that rankings based on own compensation significantly decrease honesty. Participants who received both rankings were significantly more honest than participants in the own compensation rankings condition. We did not, however, find significant differences in honesty between the both rankings and firm profit rankings conditions. As such, participants in the both rankings condition seemed to focus more on the firm profit metric than on the financially congruent own compensation metric. We also find that our results are stable across periods, suggesting that the effects of rankings neither increased nor dissipated over time. We discuss the contributions of our study and concomitant findings to accounting research and practice.     

The impact of elasticity on disposition effect driven momentum,substitutability, size,and January seasonality

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We find that momentum caused by disposition effect is mainly driven by stocks with unrealized capital gains and it is greater when price elasticity...     

Tick size,market structure,and market quality

Large tick sizes imposed on high-priced stocks on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) are significant binding constraints on bid-ask spreads. Nearly 60% of quoted spreads are equal to the tick size for stocks with the largest tick size and more than 87% of quoted spreads are equal to the tick size for stocks in the largest size portfolio. We also show that the average spread of KSE stocks with large tick sizes is greater than that of matched NYSE stocks, whereas the average spread of KSE stocks with the smallest tick size is smaller than the corresponding figure for the matched NYSE stocks. We interpret these results as evidence that traders on the KSE are paying large trading costs because of the artificially imposed large tick sizes.     

The effect of audit committee shareholding,financial expertise and size on interim financial disclosures

In recent years, corporate failures and accounting irregularities have led to concerns about the effectiveness of audit committees in the financial reporting process. In response, corporate governance committees in different countries have made specific recommendations designed to enhance the role of the audit committee in executing its financial reporting oversight duties. We investigate in this study, the effect of some of these recommendations by empirically examining the relationship between selected audit committee characteristics and the level of disclosure in interim reports of a sample of 262 UK listed companies. Specifically, the audit committee characteristics examined are shareholding of audit committee members (as a proxy for audit committee independence), audit committee size and audit committee financial expertise. Employing both a weighted and unweighted index to measure interim disclosure, the results indicate a significant negative association between shareholding of audit committee members and interim disclosure. Our results provide evidence of a significant positive association between interim disclosure and audit committee financial expertise. We find no significant relationship between audit committee size and the extent of disclosure in interim reports. Overall, however, our results suggest that audit committee characteristics have an impact on its monitoring effectiveness of the financial reporting process. These results have important implications for corporate governance policy-makers who have a responsibility to prescribe appropriate corporate governance structures to ensure that shareholders are protected.     

The effect of accounting firm size and member rank on professionalism

The relationship between the number of employees in a firm, their rank, and the level of professionalism among firm members is evaluated in 19 accounting firms, involving 325 accountants engaged in public practice. Professionalism is measured using five individual traits plus a composite. Results indicate that one trait (i.e. a belief that the profession provides a service to society) and the composite were inversely related to firm size. Rank or position in the firm hierarchy demonstrated an even stronger, independent effect on three professionalism traits and the composite, with higher member rank associated with higher levels of professionalism. Issues related to the future study of professionalism among accountants are discussed.     

Type of earnings management and the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices: Evidence from Indonesia

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) conduct efficient or opportunistic earnings management and to examine the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on it.Using multiple regressions, we find evidence that the type of earnings management selected by JSE listed firms tends toward efficient earnings management. This evidence is inconsistent with the common view that earnings management in Indonesia is opportunistic. Family ownership has a significant influence on the type of earnings management selected. Firms with a high proportion of family ownership and non-business groups are more inclined to choose efficient earnings management than other types of firms. We find inconsistent evidence with regard to the impact of institutional ownership, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on type of earnings management.     

The size effect in the Mexican stock market

This paper tests for a firm size effect in the Mexican stock market using data from January 1987 to December 1992. Our initial tests indicate that average stock returns are positively related to market betas. We also find, however, that average returns are negatively related to firm size. To measure the effects on average return of betas that are unrelated to firm size, we examine portfolios formed on the basis of size and beta We find that beta is priced in addition to firm size for the Mexican stock market, even after carefully separating the effects of beta and size.     

The effect of fiscal stress and balanced budget requirements on the funding and measurement of state pension obligations

We examine the extent to which fiscal stress and state balanced budget restrictions affect the funding of state public employee retirement systems. Our results indicate a negative relation between pension funding levels and measures of both: (a) state fiscal stress and (b) the existence of balanced budget requirements. Our finding that fiscally stressed states meet balanced budget requirements through reduced funding of pensions raises public policy concerns over the fiscal integrity of employee pension funds in the public sector and the effectiveness of balanced budget requirements. Additionally, we find evidence that choice of pension discount rate is associated with states’ fiscal condition and the requirement to balance the budget. Our findings are consistent with the proposition that fiscally stressed states that are required to balance their budgets both underfund their pensions and select discount rates which obscure the underfunding.     

Firm size,ownership structure,and systematic liquidity risk: The case of an emerging market

Previous studies support the hypothesis that institutional ownership leads to an enhanced systematic liquidity risk by increasing the commonality in liquidity. By using a proprietary database of all incoming orders and ownership structure in an emerging stock market, we show that institutional ownership leads to an increase in commonality in liquidity for mid- to-large cap firms; however, only individual ownership can lead to such an increase for small cap firms, revealing a new source of systematic liquidity risk for a specific group of firms. We also reveal that commonality decreases with the increasing number of investors (for both individual and institutional) at any firm size level; suggesting that as the investor base gets larger, views of market participants become more heterogeneous, which provides an alternative way to decrease the systematic liquidity risk.     

The effect of state laws on capital structure

US manufacturing firms incorporated in states with stronger payout restrictions use less debt, while antitakeover statutes do not significantly reduce long-run leverage. Correcting for the endogenously determined choice of where to incorporate, we find that firms sort themselves according to state laws and capital structure needs. After accounting for self-selection, state antitakeover laws are positively associated with debt as a fraction of market value, possibly due to lower market values for these firms. Payout restrictions appear to reduce leverage for firms that have not reincorporated outside their home states. These constraints explain part of the negative relation between profitability and leverage.     

Firm size,sovereign governance,and value creation: Evidence from the acquirer size effect

This paper examines the relationship between acquirer size, sovereign governance, and value-creation in acquisitions. Prior literature indicates that larger acquirers' acquisitions create less shareholder wealth in developed markets, arising primarily from agency and entrenchment problems. However, in weak governance environments, size might have off-setting benefits, including increased market power and political connections. We use a sample of 17,647 takeovers from 45 countries to examine the acquirer size effect around the world. We find that the acquirer size effect exists internationally, but is smaller in magnitude in weak governance markets. Compared with larger acquirers in strong governance countries, large acquirers in weak governance countries do takeovers that generate higher stock-returns and increase post-takeover operating performance. Their deals are also more likely to be friendly, and take less time to complete. We also find that the benefits of larger acquirer size increase with the importance of political connections in the acquirer's country. The results suggest that country-governance can moderate the impact of corporate characteristics, such as corporate size.     

The effect of tick size on managerial learning from stock prices

We investigate the effect of tick size, a key feature of market microstructure, on managerial learning from stock prices. Using a randomized controlled tick-size experiment, the 2016 Tick Size Pilot Program, we find that a larger tick size increases a firm's investment sensitivity to stock prices, suggesting that managers glean more new information from stock prices to guide their investment decisions as the tick size increases. Consistently, we also find that changes in managerial beliefs, as reflected in adjustments of forecasted capital expenditures, respond more strongly to market feedback under a larger tick size. Additional evidence suggests the following mechanism through which tick size affects managerial learning: a larger tick size reduces algorithmic trading, in turn encouraging fundamental information acquisition. Increased fundamental information acquisition generates incremental information about growth opportunities, macroeconomic factors, and industry factors, with respect to which the market has a comparative information advantage over management.     

A note on board characteristics,ownership structure and default risk in Taiwan

This study applies dynamic generalized method of moments estimation to examine the influences of ownership structure and board characteristics on default risk for a full samples and two subsamples (high‐tech and conventional) of publicly listed firms in Taiwan. Our findings reveal that certain characteristics of corporate governance have explanatory power for default probability, but the impact is not straightforward. In particular, the impact of internal and external governance structures on default risk is industry dependent. Accordingly, governance proposals that encourage higher ownership among directors and large block shareholdings in high‐tech firms or reduce managerial ownership in conventional companies can have a counterproductive effect on corporate governance and result in higher bankruptcy possibility.     

The effect of social connections on capital structure in supplier-customer relationships

Suppliers socially connected to major customers with relation-specific investments have higher leverage ratios compared to unconnected suppliers. The presence of connections partially reduces supplier underleverage observed in supplier-customer relationships with relation-specific investments. Consistent with the role of connections in bonding trading parties' commitment, connections to major customers help to increase customer purchases, and supplier leverage increases are primarily observed in firms with high intensity of customer purchases. Additionally, connected suppliers are associated with higher leverage primarily when information asymmetry between parties is high. Overall, connections help strengthening implicit contracts through establishing trust between trading parties.     

Capital rationing, competition, and misrepresentation in budget forecasts

In this study, we ask: how does the intensity of internal competition for resources affect the communication of private information in an organization? Although competition between different divisions or units for resources is pervasive in many organizations, much of the accounting literature examines non-competitive resource allocation and thus does not provide guidance on this point. To address this question, we conduct an experiment in which a principal allocates capital among three agents, who can each propose a single project. In the high (medium, low) competition condition, principals have sufficient funds to accept only one (only two, all three) projects. We test three competing predictions based on prior literature: (1) Agents will make maximum credible misrepresentations under both medium and high competition, in order to maximize their chance of receiving capital. (2) Agents will weigh the disutility of misrepresentation against the expected utility of receiving project funding, resulting in more misrepresentation at medium than at high levels of competition, because the probability of receiving funding is lower in high competition. (3) Misrepresentation will be highest in high competition, because agents will interpret the high-competition setting as one in which misrepresentation is most necessary to win funding and most socially appropriate. Consistent with the second prediction, misrepresentation is highest in medium competition. These results suggest that a medium level of competition is a less favorable setting for voluntary information-sharing than either uncompetitive or high competition settings, and therefore costly formal enforcement mechanisms such as post-audits are likely to be more valuable in medium-competition settings.     

The interactive effect of budgetary participation and budget favorability on attitudes toward budgetary decision makers: A research note

Referent cognitions theory predicts that employees who receive unfavorable budgets will have less negative attitudes toward budgetary decision makers if they participated in the budgetary process than if they did not participate. Questionnaire data from international managers were analyzed with regression to test for this predicted interaction between budgetary participation and budgetary outcome favorability. The results indicated that budgetary participation and budget favorability had the predicted interactive effect on the managers' attitudes toward their supervisor and their organization.     

构建我国差异化半强制性农业保险制度的探索

农业是我国的基础产业,农业生产的安全性和稳定性是国泰民安的基本保障.我国是一个自然灾害频发的国家,巨大灾害事故给农业生产造成严重的经济损失,农民因灾致贫返贫的实例屡见不鲜.而农业保险作为农业发展"保护伞"的作用却十分微弱.本文从我国农业保险现状出发,针对各地区自然经济条件的差异,提出了我国建立差异化半强制性农业保险制度...