The effects of abandonment options on operating leverage and forward hedging

This paper examines the behavior of the competitive firm under output price uncertainty when the firm is endowed with an abandonment option and has access to a forward market for its output. When the realized output price is less than its marginal cost, the firm optimally exercises its abandonment option and ceases production. The firm lets its abandonment option extinguish, thereby producing up to its capacity, only when the realized output price exceeds its marginal cost. The ex post exercising of the abandonment option as such convexifies the firm's ex ante profit with respect to the random output price. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full-hedging theorem holds in the presence of the abandonment option. The firm under-hedges its output price risk exposure in the forward market wherein the forward price contains a nonpositive risk premium. When the set of hedging instruments is expanded to include options, we show that both the separation and full-hedging theorems are restored. We further show that the firm prefers options to forwards for hedging purposes when both types of contracts are fairly priced.     

Currency Options and Export-Flexible Firms

This paper examines the production and hedging decisions of a globally competitive firm under exchange rate uncertainty. The firm is risk averse and possesses export flexibility in that it can distribute its output to either the domestic market or a foreign market after observing the realized spot exchange rate. To hedge against its exchange rate risk exposure, the firm can trade fairly priced currency call options of an arbitrary strike price. We show that both the separation and the full‐hedging results hold if the strike price of the currency call options is set equal to the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices. Otherwise, neither result holds. Specifically, we show that the optimal level of output is always less than that of an otherwise identical firm that is risk neutral. Furthermore, an under‐hedge (over‐hedge) is optimal whenever the strike price of the currency call options is below (above) the ratio of the domestic and foreign selling prices.     

Operational and financial hedging for exporting firms

This paper examines the interaction between operational and financial hedging in the context of an internationally competitive but domestically monopolistic firm under exchange rate uncertainty. Operational hedging is modeled by letting the firm make its export decision after it has observed the true realization of the then prevailing spot exchange rate. Financial hedging, on the other hand, is modeled by allowing the firm to trade fairly priced exotic derivatives that are tailor-made for the firm's hedging need. We show that both operational and financial hedging unambiguously entice the firm into producing more. We further derive sufficient conditions under which operational hedging dominates (is dominated by) financial hedging in terms of promoting the firm's optimal output.     

Bertrand–Edgeworth Duopoly with Buyouts or First Refusal Contracts

In this game the players are firms involved in a Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly market. Payoffs to the low priced firm depend only on the own price, whereas the payoff to the high priced firm depends on both its own price and the price of the opponent. The price of the opponent enters the payoff function of the high priced firm through buyout or a first refusal contract. Only when the total capacity in the market is less than the output in a monopoly situation, there is an equilibrium in pure strategies.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D43, L12.     

HEDGING AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER AMBIGUOUS PRICE AND BACKGROUND RISK

This paper examines the optimal production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm that possesses smooth ambiguity preferences and faces ambiguous price and background risk. The separation theorem holds in that the firm's optimal output level depends neither on the firm's attitude towards ambiguity nor on the incident to the underlying ambiguity. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the full‐hedging theorem holds and thus options are not used. When these conditions are violated, we show that the firm optimally uses options for hedging purposes if ambiguity is introduced to the price and background risk by means of mean‐preserving spreads. We as such show that options play a role as a hedging instrument over and above that of futures.     

Adam Smith’s division of labor and structural changes

This paper considers two different cases of division of labor: (i) the subdivision of different operations in order to produce a particular product in a given firm or plant; (ii) the specialization of firms in the same industry. Division of labor of the former type is limited by demand for output of a particular firm or plant, while division of labor of the latter type is limited by demand for the industry as a whole. It is argued that, in the case of an industry producing a homogenous product, an increase in the scale of production of any particular firm is likely to be associated with changes in the internal division of labor. In the case of inter-firm division of labor, decreasing unit costs may result from lateral disintegration. Finally, in the case of an industry producing a composite commodity (that is, a commodity composed of many different sub-commodities), firms’, disequilibrium behavior may lead to concentration of each firm to fewer sub-commodities, in the anticipation of the entry of new firms, or as a result of it.     

Tax Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets with Environmentally Conscious Consumers

This paper analyses the effects of tax competition on environmental product quality, pollution and welfare in a two-country, vertically differentiated, international duopoly, in which consumers are environmentally conscious. The firm in each country chooses first the environmental quality of its product (which reflects the emissions generated in the production process) and then the price. In equilibrium one country will be more polluted than the other because firms choose different levels of environmental quality of their products. We find that a country’s optimal commodity tax is higher if the domestic firm is the more polluting supplier. Furthermore, non-cooperative commodity tax rates are inefficiently high in equilibrium. This is because, in this framework with environmentally aware consumers, commodity taxes affect the choice of firms regarding their emissions. Therefore, a domestic tax reduction not only raises the profits of the foreign firm but also lowers its emission levels, resulting in higher welfare for the other country. We also analyse the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative commodity and emission taxes with border tax adjustments. With these two policy instruments available, commodity taxes are higher.     

The distribution of household consumption-expenditure budget shares

This paper explores the statistical properties of household consumption-expenditure budget share distributions – defined as the share of household total expenditure spent for purchasing a specific category of commodities – for a large sample of Italian households in the period 1989–2004. We find that household budget share distributions are fairly stable over time for each specific category, but profoundly heterogeneous across commodity categories. We then derive a parametric density that is able to satisfactorily characterize (from a univariate perspective) household budget share distributions and: (i) is consistent with the observed statistical properties of the underlying levels of household consumption-expenditure distributions; (ii) can accommodate the observed across-category heterogeneity in household budget-share distributions. Finally, we taxonomize commodity categories according to the estimated parameters of the proposed density. We show that the resulting classification is consistent with the traditional economic scheme that labels commodities as necessary, luxury or inferior.     

Investment, uncertainty and irreversibility

This paper investigates the irreversibility of investments and the impact this has on the nature of the relationship between investment and uncertainty. The empirical analysis uses firm‐level data and is based on a survey of 210 rice‐milling firms in the Mekong River Delta in Vietnam, which was carried out during the year 2000. We show that uncertainty reduces investment of rice millers in the presence of irreversibility, as is predicted by the real options approach to investment. We do not find evidence that the negative association between uncertainty and investment is influenced by the degree of irreversibility.     

Currency hedging with options and futures

This paper examines the optimal hedging decision of a competitive exporting firm which faces concurrently hedgeable exchange rate risk and non-hedgeable price risk. We show that the hedging role of currency options is due to two distinct sources of non-linearity: (i) the multiplicative nature of the price and exchange rate risk; and (ii) the marginal utility function of the firm. In particular, we show that a long put option position is optimal when the price risk is negatively correlated with the exchange rate risk and/or the firm is prudent.     

Export Flexibility And Currency Hedging*

This article studies the behavior of an export‐flexible firm under exchange rate uncertainty. We show that the separation theorem holds if selling exclusively in the domestic market is suboptimal even under the most unfavorable spot exchange rate. Otherwise, the firm's optimal output depends on its preferences and on the underlying uncertainty. We further show that the full‐hedging theorem holds only when the firm always finds it optimal to sell its entire output in the foreign market. Otherwise, export flexibility introduces a convexity into the firm's foreign exchange risk exposure, which calls for the use of currency options for hedging purposes.     

Irreversibility,mean reversion,and investment timing

This paper examines the effect of irreversibility on investment under mean reversion. We develop a continuous-time model wherein a risk-neutral firm is endowed with a perpetual option to invest in a project at any time by incurring a fixed investment cost at that instant. The project, once undertaken, generates a stream of cash flows that are governed by a mean-reverting stochastic process. The firm is then allowed to liquidate its project at any time to partially recover the fixed investment cost. The recovery rate of the fixed investment cost inversely gauges the degree of irreversibility of investment. Using a real options approach, we derive an analytical solution to the value of the firm that is analogous with an American compound option. We show that greater irreversibility of investment induces the firm to raise its investment trigger, thereby deferring the undertaking of the project. We further show that greater irreversibility of investment has a detrimental effect that makes the firm less valuable.     

A behavioral cobweb-like commodity market model with heterogeneous speculators

According to empirical studies, speculators place significant orders in commodity markets and may cause bubbles and crashes. This paper develops a cobweb-like commodity market model that takes into account the behavior of technical and fundamental speculators. We show that interactions between consumers, producers and heterogeneous speculators may produce price dynamics which mimics the cyclical price motion of actual commodity markets, i.e., irregular switches between bullish and bearish price developments. Moreover, we find that the impact of speculators on price dynamics is non-trivial: depending on the market structure, speculative transactions may either be beneficial or harmful for market stability.     

Temporary shocks and offshoring: The role of external economies and firm heterogeneity

We construct a model of offshoring with externalities and firm heterogeneity. Due to the presence of externalities, temporary shocks like the Y2K problem can have permanent effects, i.e., they can permanently raise the extent of offshoring in an industry. Also, the initial advantage of a country as a potential host for outsourcing activities can create a lock in effect, whereby late movers have a comparative disadvantage. Furthermore, the existence of firm heterogeneity along with externalities can help explain the dynamic process of offshoring, where the most productive firms offshore first and the others follow later. Finally, we work out some unexpected welfare implications which show that net industry profits can be lower in an outsourcing equilibrium than in a regime of no outsourcing. Consumer welfare rises, and under fairly plausible conditions this effect can offset the negative impact on profits.     

Progressive taxation and corporate liquidation policies with mean-reverting earnings

This paper develops a real options model of an all-equity financed firm that receives mean-reverting earnings and is subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold such that the firm pays no corporate income taxes should its earnings be less than this threshold. The firm possesses a perpetual option to liquidate its operation for a deterministic salvage value at any time. We show that the firm optimally exercises the liquidation option at the first instant when its earnings reach an endogenously determined threshold (the liquidation trigger) from above. Using numerical analysis, we show that the liquidation trigger is higher or lower than the exogenously given tax exemption threshold, depending on whether the tax exemption is below or above a unique critical level, respectively. We further show that the liquidation trigger is strictly decreasing for all tax exemption thresholds less than the critical level, and can be hump-shaped for all tax exemption thresholds greater than the critical level, especially when the salvage value is small. Corporate income taxes as such are not neutral when tax schedules are progressive.     

A public firm in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination

We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.     

Capital Structure, Macroeconomic Variables & Stock Returns. Evidence from Greece

This paper aims to investigate the impact that the capital structure of a firm has on its stock price performance. We apply regression analysis at a sample consisting of Greek listed non-financial companies over the period 1998-2009, both at the full sample level and at four leverage deciles. In doing so, we test if leverage is priced as a risk factor by constructing a leverage factor. The main contribution of our work is that we diversify capital structure studies by broadening the limited work that has been accomplished on the base of leverage as an explanatory variable of returns. Our findings show that the leverage risk factor contains significant information content and that it adds a considerable portion in the explanation of stock returns.     

Imperfect Forward Markets and Hedging

This paper considers a hedging model of a risk-averse competitive firm facing output price uncertainty. Imperfections exist in forward transactions in that the firm faces a downward-sloping demand function for its forward sales. We show that the optimal output and hedge ratio of the firm are, in general, not separable, and are related in a deterministic manner. We also derive some economic implications of production and hedging decisions when firms differ in their attitudes towards risk. A more risk-averse firm is shown to produce less and hedge more than a less risk-averse firm.
(J.E.L.: D21, D81).     

Dynamic Moral Hazard and Executive Stock Options

This paper shows that the optimal executive compensation scheme in a dynamic moral hazard environment is convex in the firm value. This implies that the optimal contract should include stock options. This is because the private benefit of shirking is increasing in firm value and the manager's utility is concave. Therefore, in contrast to the previous literature that takes stock options in the incentive contract exogenously, we rationalize the optimality of their use endogenously. Moreover, we show that the optimal amount of stock options (restricted stocks) increases with agency cost and the executive's reservation utility, decreases with the degree of risk aversion of the manager, and increases (decreases) with the firm size.     

Tax competition for foreign direct investments and the nature of the incumbent firm

We investigate tax/subsidy competition for foreign direct investments (FDI) between countries of different size when a domestic firm is the incumbent in the largest market and we study how the nature (public or private) of the incumbent firm affects policy competition. We show that, differently from the case of a private firm, the country hosting the incumbent always benefits from FDI if the domestic firm is a public welfare‐maximizing firm. We also show that the public firm acts as a disciplinary device for the foreign multinational that will always choose the efficient welfare‐maximizing location. An efficiency‐enhancing role of policy competition may then arise only when the domestic incumbent is a private firm, whereas tax competition is always wasteful in the presence of a public firm.