Airline mergers and their effect on network structure

The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 introduced high-level competition into the US domestic industry. The resulting network changes have created a deluge of research, largely focused on the hub-and-spoke structure. Over 15 years have passed since deregulation, and the industry still appears somewhat unsettled. Recent concerns of domestic carriers include downsizing of some hubs, and discussions of further consolidation of operations. Mergers may be the answer for airlines with shrinking markets within the US transportation system. This study examines the effect on network structure created by the merger of two carriers from the perspective of hub structures, accessibility and geographic coverage.     

High-technology employment and hub airports

Deregulation of the US domestic air transport market in 1978 brought significant benefits to air travelers. The scheduled airlines have been given the freedom to improve their efficiency through being able to adopt efficient network strategies and more effective operating practices. This study examines empirically the advantages enjoyed by those passengers having access to a major hub airport. These often include more direct services, more frequent services and a wider range of interconnecting destinations. We seek to examine the benefits that local urban areas enjoy as the result of a major airline selecting the region as the fulcrum point for its hub-and-spoke services.     

End of the free lunch? The responses of traditional European airlines to the low-cost carrier threat

The short-haul operations of traditional European airlines such as British Airways and Lufthansa have come under increasing pressure from the growth of low-cost carriers. This paper examines their competitive responses. These are found to include reductions in labour costs, greater use of regional aircraft and a run-down of secondary hubs. Minimum stay requirements on cheap fares have been axed in many markets, while changes to the on-board service and a move to direct-sell bring these airlines closer to the low-cost carrier product. The network strength is largely maintained, however, which appears a better strategy than setting up a low-cost subsidiary.     

The impacts of the Asian Economic Crises on Asian Airlines: short-run responses and long-run effects

The optimism shared by agencies such as IATA and the Air Transport Action Group on the growth in the demand for air travel has been temporarily derailed by the Asian economic crisis which appears to have dimmed the prospects for growth of many Asian carriers. Prospects for growth and expansion appeared to be excellent and were the driving force in setting the agenda for privatization, liberalization and the formation of new airlines. This paper discusses responses by Asian airlines with respect to redefining the scope of operations, capacity decisions, cost competitiveness, alliances and service decisions. It concludes with an argument that economic crisis appears to have shifted air transport policies in the direction of greater liberalization.     

Chapter 11 and the level playing field: Should chapter 11 be considered as a subsidy?

This paper assesses whether Chapter 11 is a form of subsidy for US airlines. US airlines have used Chapter 11 to restructure their operations. This has been criticized as a subsidy by major non US airlines and governments for a long time and recently, in the “level playing field” debate. Applying legal and economic perspectives of subsidy, we examine the different opportunities of Chapter 11 to reduce airlines’ costs. It is argued that most of the forms available, such as the modification of collective bargaining, do not constitute a subsidy. Only the termination of pension plans might involve a subsidy, but only using a legal definition of doubtful relevance since there is normally no use of public funds.     

Temporal configurations of European airline networks

The deregulation of the US domestic airline industry resulted in the reconfiguration of airline networks into hub-and-spoke systems. In contrast to the US airlines, airlines in Europe already operated spatially concentrated networks long before deregulation. This concentration at the national home-base was the outcome of bilateral traffic rights designated to the national carrier. With a few exemptions, however, most of these star-shaped networks were not coordinated in time. Transfer opportunities at most national airports only existed by accident. Only airports that were operated as gateways to Europe provided planned connectivity between intercontinental flights and European feeder services. The deregulation of the EU market stimulated a second phase of airline network restructuring. European airlines concentrated their networks by adopting or intensifying wave-system structures (‘banks’ to use the US term) in their flight schedules. This paper investigates these post-deregulation temporal concentrations in European aviation networks. The development and configuration of wave-system structures at European airline hubs is analyzed as well as the resulting transfer opportunities during the 1990s. It is found that a temporal concentration trend exists among European airlines with deregulation resulting in the adoption or intensification of wave-system structures by airlines. These wave-system structures, as well as overall traffic growth, have significantly stimulated the number of indirect hub connections. Airline hubs with wave-system structures generally perform better because of the increased indirect connectivity given the number of direct connections.     

Analyzing airlines market service using panel data

Quarterly panel data covering the largest 10,000 city-pairs in the domestic US from 1998 are used to investigate airlines market entry and exit decisions. Several models are estimated looking at changes in the number of carriers serving in a market. The influence of a number of markets characteristics is examined, including number of passengers, average fare, average yield, service concentration, great circle distance, and seasonality. The results suggest that airlines are more likely to enter a market when market concentration is high and there are high average fares. Also airlines tend to enter new markets in the second quarter, then in the fourth quarter, and then in the third quarter of the year.     

Inter-urban competition and air transport in the deregulated era: The Nashville case

American cities are acting in a competitive environment as a result of forces like economic restructuring, capital mobility, and state devolution. Since the late 1970s, the federal government has dismantled the spatial boundaries of investment through the deregulation of several important sectors of the economy, including the airline industry. Transportation geographers have investigated how deregulation allowed airlines to develop a hub-and-spoke system. However, post-deregulation airline development has yet to be approached from the perspective of urban entrepreneurialism. Another layer of inter-urban competition has been added through new geographical patterns of airline investment, and capturing hub status through airport development may be especially valuable for mid-size cities. Most large cities have hub status, while small cities have no realistic chance of becoming major players in the air transportation network, thus making the hub an opportunity for mid-size cities. A case study of Nashville, Tennessee illuminates the strong local emphasis on airport expansion in the deregulated environment. Local business and government have been active and innovative, although not always successful, in policies that improve Nashville’s accessibility and position in the urban hierarchy.     

Economies of scale in the US airline industry

This study investigates economies of scale in the US airline industry using annual data, from 1987 to 2009, on the largest airlines. The paper estimates both a translog and Cobb–Douglas model of both an economic and transportation definition of economies of scale. The study shows that the results from models based on the two definitions are remarkably similar except during rapid growth in output and that the largest US airlines operate under modest scale economies.     

Spatial structure and network behaviour of strategic airline groups: A comparison between Europe and the United States

The Gini-index has gained in legitimacy when measuring traffic distributions of air traffic as compared to other more established measures, such as Herfindahl's. In order to render the index more meaningful for policy-makers, a partial decomposition into strategic groups of airlines along distinct geopolitical scopes of air traffic is suggested. Air traffic across airports is considered an aggregate of complex networks that are subject to multiple constraints, such as geopolitics or technology. A multi-layered analytic approach accounts for network operators as economic agents that behave in strategic ways within these constraints. Our approach allows for comparing traffic distributions in Europe with that of the US and, in particular, introduces a normative component by isolating patterns in airlines’ strategies that are likely to induce different degrees of spatial concentration and balanced traffic distributions within these common markets.     

Institutional and structure changes in air navigation service-providing organizations

Airlines markets throughout the world have gradually gone through a liberalization process over the past 25 years. Regulatory changes involving other parts of the air transportation supply chain have globally been the subject of far less dramatic changes, and indeed some elements are still largely publicly owned monopolies. There have, however, been gradual reforms to the ways in which are traffic control and navigation services are being provided. A diversity of models has gradually emerged, ranging from traditional state ownership, through a variety of corporatized structures, to regulated private companies. While many of these new institutional forms are still at a relatively early stage in their history and development, there is still scope, using fairly well-established managerial economic approaches, to assess the implications of their structures. The analysis is based on a multi-dimensional performance matrix (e.g., including safety and financial considerations) and embraces a diversity of institutional models from around the world (e.g., a public/privatize partnership in the UK, a non-share corporation in Canada and Switzerland, and state owned in France and the US).     

Multi-period efficiency and productivity changes in US domestic airlines

This study tracked the static efficiency and dynamic productivity changes of 14 US airlines from 2006 to 2015. Moreover, we estimated the principal economic drivers of the environmental variables to increase the US domestic airlines' efficiency using the double bootstrap regression analysis. The major aspects of this study are as follows: First, network legacy carriers have the highest efficiency, whereas low-cost carriers are lowest. Nonetheless, network legacy carriers still have room to improve scale inefficiency. Second, the fluctuations in technical change, rather than in efficiency change, tended to have greater effect on the fluctuation of Malmquist productivity index for US domestic airlines. Third, M&A between US airlines have both positive and negative effects in terms of efficiency and economies of scale. Fourth, cost environmental factors have a negative effect on US airlines' efficiency, while revenue factor is a positive effect. The results of this study may help US airline industry practitioners to understand the US domestic airline environment from an operator's perspective.     

Why Ansett Airlines Failed and How to Prevent It Happening Again

Ansett Airlines, Australia's second largest, ceased operations in September 2001. With debts of $A3 billion it was placed in administration on behalf of creditors. The immediate consequences included 16,000 employees out of work and, on the day flights ceased, an estimated 47,000 passengers with tickets in hand but no planes to board. Anger and annoyance triggered a search for somebody to blame and many reports in the media, along with ministers in the Australian Government, blamed the airline's management. An analysis of the case leads to a different conclusion. While Ansett's management might have been deficient, a factor that seems to have triggered the failure, a deeper issue is its principal cause. It is the policy of competitive markets imposed on Australia's domestic airlines by successive governments. In a country where the resident population and the tourist destinations are dispersed over great distances, there is high dependence on airline services. Simultaneously the small population combined with the geography of major air routes and the economics of airlines means that air travel markets cannot sustain a highly competitive airline industry of the sort seen in the USA in recent decades and introduced in Australia in the 1990s. Australia needs intelligent airline regulation, a co-operative and sustainable industrial framework within which competition is tolerated, but only in a limited scope.     

Revenue and operational impacts of depeaking at U.S. hub airports

Historically, peaked schedules have been used with hub-and-spoke networks to maximize passenger connection opportunities. Although peaked schedules can generate more attractive connecting itineraries and revenue for an airline, they are costly to operate because additional manpower and equipment resources are needed to serve the peak periods. Several airlines experimented with depeaking their hubs as a way to reduce costs and improve operations in the 2000s. Prior studies have quantified operational improvements and cost savings associated with depeaking; however, none have quantified revenue impacts. We use difference-in-differences methods to quantify revenue and operational impacts associated with depeaking for five U.S. hubs. Results show that depeaking tends to improve operations, but may negatively impact revenue per available seat mile (RASM). In some cases, revenue losses exceed reported cost savings.     

Airline cost changes: To what extent are they passed through to the passenger?

Since the start of the Millennium airline costs have been highly volatile, mainly due to large fluctuations in jet fuel prices. An important question for airlines and regulators is whether airlines are able to pass through cost changes to their prices. Little empirical evidence on the pass-through of costs exists. In this paper, we investigate which pass-through rates are most likely. According to economic theory, the pass-through of costs depends strongly on the type of cost increase (firm-specific or sector-wide) and market conditions (monopoly, oligopoly, perfect competition). In monopolistic markets, the shape of the demand curve also matters (linear, constant elasticity, log, power function). A pass-through rate of 100% is often assumed based on the reasoning that the aviation sector is highly competitive. We analyse market concentration in all airline markets in the world, and generally find a high level of concentration. Additionally, different airlines offer different products based on a variety of factors, including service, flight frequency, legroom, bags allowed on board, flight time and transfer time. Therefore, most aviation markets can be characterised as differentiated oligopolies. As airlines choose their quantities first (flight schedules) and adapt their prices to demand (yield management), we consider the Cournot model the best choice. In such markets, firmspecific cost changes will be passed through by a rate of less than half while sector-wide cost changes are passed through by a rate of more than half. In specific situations, the pass-through rate may be different. Examples are limited airport capacity (congestion), cross-subsidization, and the extent to which there is a level playing field.     

The impact of flight delays on passenger demand and societal welfare

US airline passengers increasingly have access to flight delay information from online sources. As a result, air passenger travel decisions can be expected to be influenced by delay information. In addition, delays affect airline operations, resulting in increased block times on routes and, in general, higher carrier costs and airfares. This paper examines the impact of flight delays on both passenger demand and airfares. Delays are calculated against scheduled block times as well as against more idealized feasible flight times. Based on econometric estimations, welfare impacts of flight delays are calculated. We find that flight delays on a route reduce passenger demand and raise airfares, producing significant decreases in both consumer and producer welfare. Since producer welfare effects are estimated to be three times as large as consumer welfare effects, we conclude that from an economic efficiency rationale, airlines should be required to pay for the bulk of flight delay remediation efforts.     

Impact of e-business on air travel markets: Distribution of airline tickets in Korea

Early e-business activity in the airline industry was limited to the provision of flight schedule information to customers on websites. Recently, however, many airlines have expanded the capability of their web sites for selling tickets to make use of this cheap distribution channel. Here, we explore the impacts of airline e-business on the performance of air ticket distribution channels. Through a conjoint analysis, we suggest a model to estimate the change of market sales for each distribution channel. The impact of e-business on air travel markets and some implications on e-business strategy for both airlines and travel agents are also identified through an empirical survey.     

Flight delay impact on airfare and flight frequency: A comprehensive assessment

This paper presents a comprehensive empirical analysis of flight delay impact on airfare and flight frequency in the US air transportation system. We model airfare and flight frequency as functions of cost and demand characteristics, competition effects, and flight delays at origin, destination, and intermediate hub airports. Estimation results confirm that airlines tend to pass delay cost onto passengers through higher fare, whereas delay has an upward effect on flight frequency. We find that proportionate airport delay reduction across the system can result in annual fare reduction in the order of billion dollars.     

Network structure and capacity requirement: The case of China

This paper analyzes capacity requirement by alternative network structures. Based on a simple model, it is concluded that the capacity required under a hub-and-spoke network would be more than twice as large as the capacity required under a fully connected network. In recent years, China has experienced unprecedented growth in the demand for air travel, which has put continuous pressure on the expansion in airport capacity. Still as a developing country, China suffers from insufficient investment in infrastructure. Therefore, given scarce capacity, it may be more efficient for the major air carriers not to adopt the hub-and-spoke network in Chinese domestic markets.     

Fuel hedging and airline operating costs

Fuel hedging is a common risk management tool used in the airline industry. But past studies have not addressed the question of whether fuel hedging creates any benefit to airline operations. This study is the first work that empirically examines the role of fuel hedging in reducing airlines’ operating costs. Using US airlines data from 2000 through 2012, we find that, after accounting for the presence of cost inefficiency, fuel-hedging airlines had about 9–12% lower operating costs, but this effect is statistically insignificant. Irrespective of the hedging status, US airlines could reduce operating costs by an average of 12–14% per year without reducing output.