Designing employment subsidies

The paper examines the relative effectiveness of two policy proposals in reducing unemployment and working poverty: hiring subsidies and wage subsidies. The hiring subsidies are targeted exclusively at the unemployed and are provided only for a limited period of time. The wage subsidies, on the other hand, are granted to all low-wage earners regardless of their employment history and are of limitless duration. Our analysis indicates that the relative effectiveness of the two policies depends on workers' prospective wage growth. The more upwardly mobile workers are (i.e. the more their wages rise with employment duration), the more effective will unemployment vouchers be relative to low-wage subsidies. Conversely, the greater the danger that workers come to be trapped in dead-end jobs with flat wage profiles, the more effective will low-wage subsidies be relative to unemployment vouchers.     

How low can U go?

• ? Although there is growing evidence that wage growth is building in response to low and falling unemployment in the advanced economies, there is scope for unemployment rates to fall further without triggering a pay surge.
• ? For a start, current unemployment rates in comparison to past cyclical troughs overstate the tightness of labour markets. Demographic trends associated with the ageing ‘baby boomer’ bulge have pushed down the headline unemployment rate – unemployment rates among older workers are lower than those of younger cohorts. And in a historical context, Europe still has a large pool of involuntary part‐timers.
• ? In addition, rising participation rates mean that demographics are less of a constraint on employment growth than widely assumed. In both 2017 and 2018, had it not been for increased activity rates (mainly for older cohorts), unemployment would have had to fall more sharply to accommodate the same employment increase. We expect rising participation rates to continue to act as a pressure valve for the labour market.
• ? Finally, unemployment rates were generally far lower during the 1950s and 1960s than now. If wages stay low relative to productivity, as was the case during that prior era, employment growth may remain strong, with unemployment falling further. In the post‐war era, low wages were partly a function of a grand bargain in which policy‐makers provided full employment in return for low wage growth.
• ? There is evidence to suggest that many post‐crisis workers have opted for the security of their existing full‐time job and its associated benefits despite lower wage growth, rather than change job and potentially earn more; the rise of the ‘gig economy’ has led some workers to value what they already have more. Put another way, the non‐accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) has fallen. So, the role of labour market tightness in pushing wage growth higher may continue to surprise to the downside.

     

Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

The Variation in Wage Rigidity by Occupation and Union Status in the Us

This study estimates wage equations with data disaggregated by occupation and union status, and it derives two measures of wage rigidity for each group of workers: the sensitivity of wages to unemployment and the speed with which wages respond to price inflation. The sensitivity of wages to an aggregate measure of unemployment was found to depend negatively on an occupation's skill level. In addition, union wages were more sensitive to unemployment than non-union wages and responded less rapidly to price inflation.     

Great expectations: Past wages and unemployment durations

Decomposing wages into worker and firm wage components, we find that firm-fixed components are sizeable parts of workers' wages. If workers can only imperfectly observe the extent of firm-fixed components in their wages, they might be misled about the overall wage distribution. Such misperceptions may lead to unjustified high reservation wages, resulting in overly long unemployment durations. We examine the influence of previous wages on unemployment durations for workers after exogenous lay-offs and, using Austrian administrative data, we find that younger workers are, in fact, unemployed longer if they profited from high firm-fixed components in the past. We interpret our findings as evidence for overconfidence generated by imperfectly observed productivity.     

Do inter-city differences in intra-city wage differentials have any interesting implications?

Recent research has related characteristics of cities to differences in the distribution of wages across workers with different skill levels. We demonstrate that these differences in wage differentials arise naturally as a compensating variation in Rosen’s theoretical model of inter-city wages. For example, if the income elasticity of demand for housing services is less than unity, cities with higher house prices will have smaller money wage differentials between low and high skill workers. This result has no implications for differences in either absolute or relative real productivity or welfare of unskilled workers. Similarly, changes in the amenity of an urban area may result in changes in relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers with no implications for real productivity or welfare differentials.Empirical tests in which housing cost differentials are added as a determinant of inter-city differences in an intra-urban wage differential model provide empirical confirmation of the theoretical expectations. It appears that intra-urban money wage differentials, differences in the quality of life, and variation in the cost of living in each city are jointly determined variables just as Rosen’s model of inter-city wage differentials predicts.     

Wage Spillovers,Inter-regional Effects and the Impact of Inward Investment

Abstract

This paper evaluates the extent of inter-industry and inter-regional wage spillovers across the UK. An extensive body of literature exists suggesting that wages elsewhere affect wage determination and levels of satisfaction, but this paper extends the analysis of wage determination to examine the effects of inward investment in the process. Thus far the specific effect of foreign wages on domestic wage determination has not been evaluated. We employ industry- and regional-level panel data for the UK, and contrast results from alternative approaches to space-time modelling. Each supports the notion that such wage spillovers do occur, though assumptions made concerning the modelling of spatial interaction are important. Further, such wage spillovers are more widespread for skilled than for unskilled workers and also lower in areas of high unemployment.     

Do inter-city differences in intra-city wage differentials have any interesting implications?

Recent research has related characteristics of cities to differences in the distribution of wages across workers with different skill levels. We demonstrate that these differences in wage differentials arise naturally as a compensating variation in Rosen’s theoretical model of inter-city wages. For example, if the income elasticity of demand for housing services is less than unity, cities with higher house prices will have smaller money wage differentials between low and high skill workers. This result has no implications for differences in either absolute or relative real productivity or welfare of unskilled workers. Similarly, changes in the amenity of an urban area may result in changes in relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers with no implications for real productivity or welfare differentials.Empirical tests in which housing cost differentials are added as a determinant of inter-city differences in an intra-urban wage differential model provide empirical confirmation of the theoretical expectations. It appears that intra-urban money wage differentials, differences in the quality of life, and variation in the cost of living in each city are jointly determined variables just as Rosen’s model of inter-city wage differentials predicts.     

Are shirking and leisure substitutable? An empirical test of efficiency wages based on urban economic theory

Recent theoretical work has examined the spatial distribution of unemployment using the efficiency wage model as the mechanism by which unemployment arises in the urban economy. This paper extends the standard efficiency wage model in order to allow for behavioral substitution between leisure time at home and effort at work. In equilibrium, residing at a location with a long commute affects the time available for leisure at home and therefore affects the trade off between effort at work and risk of unemployment. This model implies an empirical relationship between expected commutes and labor market outcomes, which is tested using the Public Use Microdata sample of the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. The empirical results suggest that efficiency wages operate primarily for blue collar workers, i.e. workers who tend to be in occupations that face higher levels of supervision. For this subset of workers, longer commutes imply higher levels of unemployment and higher wages, which are both consistent with shirking and leisure being substitutable.     

What is the most flexible component of wage bill adjustment? Evidence from Belgium

This paper decomposes wage bill changes at the firm level into components due to wage changes, and components due to flows of employment. It relies on an administrative matched employer–employee dataset of individual earnings merged with firms' annual accounts for Belgium over the period 1997–2001. The results are in line with what one would expect in a downward wage rigidity environment. On average, wage bill contractions result essentially from employment cuts in spite of wage increases. Wage growth of job stayers is moderated but positive; and wages of entrants compared with those of incumbents are no lower. The labour force cuts are achieved through both reduced entries and increased exits, due to more layoffs, especially in smaller firms, and wider use of early retirement, especially in manufacturing. In addition, the paper points out the role of overtime hours, temporary unemployment and interim workers in adapting hours worked to economic circumstances.     

Monopsonistic competition for the “best” workers

In this paper we analyse an economy where firms use labour as the only production factor, with constant return to scale. We suppose that jobs differ in their non-wage characteristics so each firm has monopsonistic power. In particular, we suppose that workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity. Then, each firm has incentives to offer higher wages in order to recruit the most productive workers. Competition among firms leads to a symmetric equilibrium wage, which is higher than the reservation wage, and to involuntary unemployment for the less productive workers, who are willing to work at the current wage but are not hired because their productivity is lower than the wage level. If firms have no institutional constraint on paying lower wages for the same job, an endogenous labour market segmentation emerges.     

The effect of international firm mobility on wages and unemployment

Although the increase in international firm mobility is well documented, its effects on macroeconomic aggregates and the labour market remain controversial. Multinational enterprises (MNEs) benefit from an international outside option during wage bargaining, leading to a decrease in average wages. However, a strategic incentive to hire extra workers in a foreign (home) plant in order to reduce wages in the home (foreign) plant has an indirect positive effect on wages due to spillovers resulting from an increased demand for labour. In a framework of frictional unemployment, permitting MNEs leads to a decrease in unemployment. Abstracting from transport and plant fixed costs, MNEs lead to higher wages. Including transport and plant costs generally leads to lower wages, though the effects are small. The strategic hiring effect is important in mitigating the fall in wages.     

Wage premia and skill upgrading in Italy: why didn't the hound bark?

This paper presents firm-level evidence on the change of the employment share and the wage premium of non-manual workers in Italian manufacturing during the nineties. We find that the relative stability of the aggregate wage premium and employment share hides offsetting disaggregate forces: technical progress raises the relative demand for skilled labor within firms, whereas demand changes associated with trade reduce the relative demand for skills. Moreover, it is within the class of non-manual workers that most of the action takes place: the wage premium and employment share of executives rise substantially, while those of clerks fall in a similar proportion. Finally, we find that the export status of firms plays a key role in explaining labor market dynamics: exporters account for most of both demand-related and technology-related shifts. Overall, our results for Italy question the conventional view that the labor market is “rigid” due to labor market institutions.     

Progressive Taxes and the Labour Market: Is the Trade–off Between Equality and Efficiency Inevitable?

Does an income tax harm economic efficiency more the more progressive it is? Public economics provides a strong case for a definite ‘yes’. But at least three forces may pull in the other direction. First, low–wage workers may on average have more elastic labour supply schedules than high–wage workers, in which case progressive taxes contribute to a more efficient allocation of the total tax burden. Second, in non–competitive labour markets, progressive taxes may encourage wage moderation, and hence reduce the equilibrium level of unemployment. And third, if wage setters have egalitarian objectives, progressive taxes may reduce the need for redistribution in pre–tax wages, and hence increase the demand for low–skilled workers. This paper surveys the theoretical, as well as the empirical literature about labour supply, taxes and wage setting. We conclude that in a second best world, the trade–off between equality and efficiency is not always inevitable.     

Examining policy configurations as conditions for long-term unemployment and non-standard employment in OECD countries using fuzzy-set analysis

This paper investigates how particular configurations of institutional conditions cause high rate of long-term unemployment and non-standard employment rate for 18 OECD countries during the period of 2001–2008. The paper aims to investigate how employment protection legislation (EPL), unemployment benefit and statutory minimum wages are associated with long-term unemployment and non-standard employment. Using the fuzzy-set analysis, the paper examines how the combination of policies matters in causing long-term unemployment and/or non-standard employment. The result suggests that a low level of statutory minimum wage can lead to high levels of non-standard employment in combination with either strict EPL for permanent workers or weak EPLs for temporary workers. The long-term unemployment rate is suggested to be high when there is strict EPL for temporary workers in combination with high levels of statutory minimum wage. This paper highlights the importance of examining multiple policies as configuration.     

On-the-job search equilibrium with endogenous unemployment benefits

This paper develops an on-the-job search model with wage posting where unemployment benefits are proportional to past wages. We emphasize that this contributes to increasing the reservation wages of unemployed workers and introduces a feedback effect of the distribution of wages on the distribution of unemployment benefits. We show that the model predictions are consistent with some stylized French facts and quantify the impact of inefficient rejections of low-wage offers by the unemployed. We find that, by reducing the indexing of unemployment benefits to previous earnings and increasing lump-sum transfers, it is possible to increase both employment and welfare.     

Incidence and duration of unemployment spells: Implications for the male–female wage differentials

We demonstrate in this paper that the incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells affect the male–female gender wage differential. The results indicate that after controlling for sample selectivity bias in the wage equation, the incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells account for about 14.2% and 39.6%, respectively, of the wage differential that exists between males and females. We observed that while the duration of unemployment accounts for a substantial portion of the wage differential in both the service (48.8%) and the manufacturing (17.0%) sectors, the impacts of the incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells variables on the wage differential are rather small in the service (0.07%) and the manufacturing (1.6%) sectors. Also, high incidence of unemployments is associated with low wages for males and females in all samples. In contrast, longer durations of unemployment spells tend to increase males’ wages and decrease females’ wages in the full and service sector samples. At the macro level, the results seem to suggest that promotion of gender wage equality should be associated with policies that will minimize the female's incidence of unemployment and duration of unemployment spells.     

The cyclicality of effective wages within employer-employee matches in a rigid labor market

This study analyzes real wage cyclicality for male full-time workers within employer-employee matches in Germany over the period 1984-2004. Five different wage measures are compared: the standard hourly wage rate; hourly wage earnings including overtime and bonus pay; the effective wage, which takes into account unpaid overtime; and monthly earnings, with and without additional pay. None of the hourly wage measures exhibits cyclicality except for the group of salaried workers with unpaid overtime. Their effective wages show a strongly procyclical reaction to changes in unemployment. Despite acyclical wage rates, salaried workers without unpaid overtime experienced procyclical earnings movements if they had income from extra pay. Monthly earnings were also procyclical for hourly paid workers with overtime pay. These findings suggest that cyclical earnings movements are generated by variable pay components, such as bonuses and overtime pay, and by flexible working hours. The degree of earnings procyclicality revealed for the German labor market is comparable to the United States.     

Wage‐setting Decisions on Newly Hired Employees: Survey Evidence from Colombian Firms

This paper uses a survey on wage formation applied to 1305 Colombian firms to study wage‐setting decisions of newly hired employees. The survey indicates that wages of the newly hired are based mainly on a predefined wage structure. This may help to explain, in part, the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities in the Colombian formal labour market, since firms are unwilling to differentiate the pay of new hires from the wages of existing workers. Using multinomial logit models, we find that firm size and the share of temporary workers increase the relative risk of using a predefined internal structure over bargaining between employee and employer when setting the wages of the newly hired employees. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of minimum wages on wages,work and poverty in Nicaragua

In this paper we use an individual- and household-level panel data set to study the impact of changes in legal minimum wages on a host of labor market outcomes including: a) wages and employment, b) transitions of workers across jobs (in the covered and uncovered sectors) and employment status (unemployment and out of the labor force), and c) transitions into and out of poverty. We find that changes in the legal minimum wage affect only those workers whose initial wage (before the change in minimum wages) is close to the minimum. For example, increases in the legal minimum wage lead to significant increases in the wages and decreases in employment of private covered sector workers who have wages within 20% of the minimum wage before the change, but have no significant impact on wages in other parts of the distribution. The estimates from the employment transition equations suggest that the decrease in covered private sector employment is due to a combination of layoffs and reductions in hiring. Most workers who lose their jobs in the covered private sector as a result of higher legal minimum wages leave the labor force or go into unpaid family work; a smaller proportion find work in the public sector. We find no evidence that these workers become unemployed.Our analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and household income finds: a) increases in legal minimum wages increase the probability that a poor worker's family will move out of poverty, and b) increases in legal minimum wages are more likely to reduce the incidence of poverty and improve the transition from poor to non-poor if they impact the head of the household rather than the non-head; this is because the head of the household is less likely than a non-head to lose his/her covered sector employment due to a minimum wage increase and because those heads that do lose covered sector employment are more likely to go to another paying job than are non-heads (who are more likely to go into unpaid family work or leave the labor force).