Indexation and Wage Change Settlements: Evidence from Spanish Manufacturing Firms

An endogenous switching model of ex-ante wage changes under indexed and non-indexed settlements is estimated for the Spanish manufacturing sector using collective bargaining firm data for the 1984–1991 period. The likelihood of indexing the settlement is higher for nationwide unions than for other union groups within the works council and increases with the expected level of inflation. For wage change equations, a common structure for indexed and non-indexed settlements is strongly rejected, showing a source of nominal rigidity. For indexed contracts, the expected ex-ante total inflation coverage is nearly complete. It is also shown that workers pay a significant ex-ante change premium (differential) to obtain a cost of living allowance clause. However, the realised contingent compensation exceeds such a premium for all industries. Finally, important spillover efffects in wage setting and the decision to index the settlement have been detected.     

Employment protection regulation,trade unions and tenure of employment: An analysis in 23 European countries

This article focuses on the relationship between employment protection regulation (EPL), trade unions and tenure of employment. A main hypothesis is that EPL strictness tends to prolong tenure, because rigorous rules imply that remaining with the same employer gives more job security. The role of unions can be expected to be similar. These assumptions are related to issues regarding dualisation in the labour market. Data used are the European Working Conditions Survey 2010—including 23 countries and more than 18,500 employees—combined with national‐level data on EPL, unemployment, union density and collective bargaining coverage. The analyses reveal that EPL strictness and bargaining coverage are associated with longer tenure. The same goes for having an employee representative in the workplace. The institutional variables work through interactions with individual‐level variables. For example, the impact of age, which is strongly linked to tenure, increases with stricter EPL and higher bargaining coverage.     

Why So Unhappy? The Effects of Unionization on Job Satisfaction*

Using linked employer–employee data we investigate the job satisfaction effect of union membership in Britain. We develop a model that simultaneously controls for the determinants of individual membership status and for the selection of employees into occupations according to union coverage. We find a negative association between membership and satisfaction. However, having accounted for selection effects, we find that the negative association is confined to non‐covered employees. This is consistent with ‘voice’ effects, whereby non‐covered members voice dissatisfaction to achieve union goals, and with the possibility that membership increases preferences for collective bargaining, thus lowering members’ satisfaction in non‐covered environments.     

Performance Pay,Union Bargaining and Within‐Firm Wage Inequality*

Theory predicts that performance pay boosts wage dispersion. Workers retain a share of individual productivity shocks and high‐efficiency workers receive compensation for greater effort. Collective bargaining can mitigate the effect of performance pay on wage inequality by easing monitoring of common effort standards and group‐based pay schemes. Analyses of longitudinal employer–employee data show that the introduction of performance‐related pay raises wage inequality in non‐union firms, but not in firms with high union density. Although performance‐related pay appears to be on the rise, the overall impact on wage dispersion is likely to be small, particularly in European countries with influential unions.     

Cross-national differences in trade union membership in OECD countries

This article examines how trade union membership varies across 16 OECD countries in the 1980s. Higher density of membership is found to be associated with a higher degree of centralisation of wage bargaining, higher percentage of employees covered by collective bargaining, a larger public sector and a more leftist party of government.     

Convergent and divergent country trends in coordinated wage setting and collective bargaining in the public hospitals sector

Drawing on the findings of research in the public hospitals sector in five European countries 1 —France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK—this article assesses the character of change in wage setting and collective bargaining. It demonstrates the diversity of national arrangements by comparing key characteristics: (i) the bodies of collective representation (unions, professional associations and employer bodies); (ii) the degree of integration with the wider public sector framework; (iii) coordination (or competition) with the private hospitals sector; and (iv) the practice of à la carte provisions within individual hospitals. Despite national varieties of wage setting and collective bargaining, each country sector faces similar tensions—most notably the opposition between public (labour market) rules and health (product market) rules, and pressures to segment or integrate employment conditions by labour force group. By examining the nature of change in institutions for wage setting and collective bargaining in each country, the article contributes to our understanding of the extent of coordination and change of public sector wage setting and describes three scenarios: fragmentation (Germany); continuity (France and the Netherlands); and reconstruction (the UK and Norway).     

Ireland's conundrum on union bargaining rights: assessing the Industrial Relations Amendment Act 2015

Anglophone countries address the question of workplace-level union bargaining rights via the mechanism of statutory recognition. Existing literature has evaluated such regimes as underpinned by several weaknesses. In contrast, Ireland presents an unusual case whereby the question of bargaining rights is resolved via collective dispute resolution procedures combining voluntary and statutory provisions. However, employer challenges and civil court rulings resulted in the weakening of these procedures from a trade union perspective. We assess the latest attempts to reform the Irish provisions via the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2015, evaluating the implications for unions and their capacity to represent members' on pay and working conditions in comparison to Anglophone statutory recognition regimes.     

Rising wage inequality,the decline of collective bargaining,and the gender wage gap

This paper investigates the increase in wage inequality, the decline in collective bargaining, and the evolution of the gender wage gap in West Germany between 2001 and 2006. Based on detailed linked employer–employee data, we show that wage inequality is rising strongly — driven not only by real wage increases at the top of the wage distribution, but also by real wage losses below the median. Coverage by collective wage bargaining plummets by 16.5 (19.1) percentage points for male (female) employees. Despite these changes, the gender wage gap remains almost constant, with some small gains for women at the bottom and at the top of the wage distribution. A sequential decomposition analysis using quantile regression shows that all workplace related effects (firm effects and bargaining effects) and coefficients for personal characteristics contribute strongly to the rise in wage inequality. Among these, the firm coefficients effect dominates, which is almost exclusively driven by wage differences within and between different industries. Labor demand or firm wage policy related effects contribute to an increase in the gender wage gap. Personal characteristics tend to reduce wage inequality for both males and females, as well as the gender wage gap.     

Corporate mergers and union wage premiums

Corporate mergers possibly enhance the labor negotiation advantage of employers. This study investigates the association between wage levels and merger activity to test the employer bargaining strength hypothesis. The results indicate significantly lower union wages as a consequence of merging. Merger activity, however, does not influence wage levels of non-union workers. These findings are supportive of the employer bargaining strength hypothesis.     

The bargaining power of teachers’ unions and the allocation of school resources

This paper examines how district size affects the bargaining power of teachers’ unions and the allocation of school resources. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that 33 states mandate collective bargaining while 5 states prohibited it. In states that mandate collective bargaining, we find that beginning salaries and the premium paid to experienced teachers increase with district size while the teacher–pupil ratio declines with district size. In contrast, in states that prohibit collective bargaining we find a negative relationship between district size and the premium paid to experienced teachers. District size also has a stronger positive effect on beginning salaries and a weaker negative effect on teacher–pupil ratios in states that prohibit collective bargaining. Collectively, our results suggest that more powerful unions bargain for more generous returns to teacher seniority at the expense of staffing ratios and base salaries.     

The economics of union organization: Efficiency,information and profitability

This article presents a game-theoretical model of union organization that highlights the role played by efficiency and asymmetric information as determinants of unionization and questions commonly-held assumptions about the effect of firm profitability on unionization decisions. In the model, employers set wages taking into account the effect of their choices on workers' incentives to unionize. As a result of employers' strategic wage setting, collective bargaining emerges in equilibrium only if it increases surplus or if there is asymmetric information about the consequences of unionization. While unionization is usually assumed to be more likely in more profitable firms, the model shows that the probability of unionization will be higher in firms with lower rents. It also shows that the union wage premium and unionization will tend to be negatively correlated.     

Wage versus efficient bargaining in oligopoly

This paper combines internal bargaining between firms and their employees with a situation of imperfect competition, in particular a Cournot‐oligopoly. Wage bargaining is compared with simultaneous negotiations on wages and employment (efficient bargaining). It turns out that for a large range of parameter values a prisoner's dilemma concerning profits exists. The dominant strategy is efficient bargaining, while the joint profits are maximized with wage negotiations. A simplified example considers economic welfare and utility of the unions. Different welfare measures are considered like the usual IO measure of consumer and producer surplus as well as others. The term ‘efficient bargaining’ is not justified (at least for the present example) if the profits and the rents of the unions are considered, as these are maximized with wage bargaining. However, consumer and producer surplus are highest with efficient bargaining. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Union wage premiums in Great Britain: Coverage or membership?

This paper presents estimates of union wage premiums for Great Britain and distinguishes between union membership and union coverage effects on wages. For this purpose a panel data system estimator is applied to data from the British Household Panel Survey.For female workers a coverage premium of 6.1% is estimated whilst no evidence of a union membership premium is found. This result lends support to the by-product theory of Olson (1965) [Olson Jr., M., 1965. The logic of collective action. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.)]: if female covered members receive other private benefits than a higher wage from the union the coverage premium could be viewed as a by-product. For male workers no evidence is found of a membership premium nor a coverage premium. To investigate potential bias in the estimated union effects particular attention is paid to measurement error in union membership and the inclusion of job-changes in the sample.     

The transformation of the wage and performance appraisal system in a Japanese firm

This paper analyses how performance appraisal has affected the wages of employees in a unionized Japanese firm over time, using firm-level wage and performance appraisal data. Data show that the wage and performance-appraisal systems have been shifting to a performance basis, and away from the heavy reliance on age and seniority characteristic of the old systems. In the process, wage differentials among employees are becoming wider, particularly among those 37 to 41 years old and those 49 to 55 years old. Management introduced the new wage system through a process of concessionary bargaining. Surprisingly, employees, rather than the enterprise union, were able to convince management to modify their initial plans during bargaining over the new wage system.     

Free riders: the rise of alternative unionism in Denmark

In this article we analyse some disturbing trends in the Danish labour market: while collective bargaining coverage is still relatively high, union density has been declining and—worse than that—there has been a substantial shift away from recognised and in favour of alternative unionism. The alternative unions are not parties to collective agreements, and they offer membership much cheaper than the recognised unions, in effect taking a free ride on the institutional supports that used to be effective only for the recognised unions. The article explains this conundrum by pointing to the political and institutional backgrounds to this development, which threatens to erode the very basis for the Danish collective bargaining system. On the background of general statistics and of a general employee survey, we point out the reasons behind the challenges confronting the recognised unions, pointing out that the recognised unions must become both more efficient in the member services and more cost efficient, if they wish to halt the present downhill trend.     

The trade union response to agency labour in Britain

The growth of agency work in recent years has posed a challenge to trade unions, which must decide if they will accept agency workers as part of their constituency and accept employment agencies as legitimate labour‐market actors. This article analyses the reaction of British unions to agency work and identifies four main responses: exclusion, replacement, regulation and engagement. It concludes with an evaluation of union policies, which stresses the need for unions to secure broad regulation of the agency labour market either through multi‐employer bargaining or employment law.     

The de-collectivisation of pay setting in Britain 1990–98: incidence,determinants and impact

What were the causes and consequences of declining collective bargaining coverage in Britain? The demise of collective bargaining did not lead to a greater use of individualised payment mechanisms, ‘high-involvement’ practices or productivity gains. Wage inequality rose as a result of the decline. However, workplaces that abandoned bargaining created more jobs. Overall, these results raise questions about Britain’s labour market performance during the 1990s because they suggest that falling unemployment as a result of weaker trade unions came at the price of slower productivity growth and widening male wage inequality.     

‘Unbound’ employers' associations and derogations: erosion and renewal of collective bargaining in the German metalworking industry

Declining union density, the reduction in coverage or informal derogations from collective agreements are signs of erosion of the corporatist German system of collective bargaining. However, new developments can be observed like ‘unbound’ employers' associations or derogations from collective agreements. These new developments make it necessary to reassess the prospects of collective bargaining. At the first sight they seem to be little more than indicators of erosion or exhaustion, but the in‐depth analysis reveals that these developments can be starting points of renewal because they give stimuli to increase the associational power of employers' associations and, even more important for collective bargaining, unions. As a result, however, collective bargaining will become less corporatist in style.     

Teacher union responses to education reforms: job regulation and the enforced growth of informality

This article examines the school teacher union responses to education reforms. The removal of formal collective bargaining arrangements is strengthening the significance of the traditional union structures, and the responses reflect both the pressures of the reforms and the traditions of the three main unions     

Endogenous scope of bargaining in a union–oligopoly model: when will firms and unions bargain over employment?

The scope of firm–union bargaining is shown to be endogenously determined in a union–oligopoly model with decentralized negotiations. If the unions' power is sufficiently high, all bargaining units choose to negotiate over wages alone, i.e., universal right-to-manage bargaining emerges in equilibrium. Otherwise, wage/employment bargaining and right-to-manage bargaining coexist in the same industry. In equilibrium, some firm–union pairs will always choose to bargain over employment as well, since the firms become Stackelberg leaders in the market by committing to a particular output during the negotiations. The firms and their unions both benefit from the additional Stackelberg rents, provided that the unions' power is small enough. Our analysis suggests that there is not necessarily a negative relationship between unions' power and sectoral employment rates.