A political economy model of road pricing

In this paper, we use a simple majority voting model to study the introduction of urban congestion tolls. The model allows for different types of uncertainty and considers different uses of the toll revenues. The following results are obtained. First, we show that individual uncertainty with respect to modal substitution costs may imply that a majority votes against road pricing ex ante, although a majority would have been in favor after its introduction ex post. Moreover, if a majority is against road pricing ex ante, there will also be no majority for organizing an experiment that would take away the individual uncertainty. Second, political uncertainty with respect to the use of the revenues corroborates the finding that ex ante more voters will be against the introduction of tolls. Third, both types of uncertainty suggest that fewer voters are against road pricing when toll revenues are used to subsidize public transport than when they are redistributed to all voters. Importantly, the results of this paper are consistent with a number of recent empirical observations on efforts to introduce road pricing, including the systematic rejection of road pricing in referenda, the more favorable attitudes towards road pricing after than before its introduction, and tying the toll revenues to support public transport.     

A political economy model of immigration quotas

The paper examines a model in which the number of immigrants allowed into a country is the outcome of a costly political lobbying contest between a firm and a union. The union and the firm bargain over the wage of natives after the number of immigrants that will be permitted is known. I assume that the lobbying contest is an all-pay auction (i.e., the lobbyist with the higher effort wins with certainty). Comparative statics results are derived to show how the reservation wage of immigrants, the price of the firms product, the size of the union and the cost of lobbying affect immigration quotas and the post-immigration wage of natives.Received: 4 June 2003, Accepted: 23 June 2004 JEL Classification: D72, D73, J5, J61I thank the editor, Amihai Glazer, Don Devoretz, Dan Usher, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. My thanks are especially due to Doug Allen and Gordon Myers who supervised this work as part of my doctoral thesis at Simon Fraser University, Canada. An earlier version of this paper was circulated as RIIM working paper #00-01, Simon Fraser University, Canada and also presented at the 2001 meetings of the Canadian Public Economics Study Group in Montreal, Canada.     

The political economy of capital punishment

Although the policy case against capital punishment appears largely settled and now closed within Britain and Europe there is a need to recognise that the well-entrenched pro-abolitionist conventional wisdom has essentially ignored the costs and exaggerated the benefits of removal of the death-penalty option.     

The political economy of growth in Morocco

This paper is an attempt to explain the relatively low performance of the Moroccan economy during the last four decades using a political economy approach. In that period, the Moroccan society benefited from sophisticated institutions that facilitated policy coordination and commitment. But, the existing institutions hampered the participation of large segments of the population and political parties representing them in the policymaking process. Also, the centralization of administration hindered local initiatives. However, numerous and significant structural reforms have been undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s and in recent years a strategy has been adopted that combines continued economic liberalization, increased democratization, and efforts to reduce poverty and promote human development. These changes have started to bear fruit in the past few years.     

The political economy of a racist housing market

While much empirical research indicates that blacks pay higher prices than whites for housing, models that generate this result have not been given a convincing theoretical structure. To remedy this deficiency, the paper develops two different models in which racial market segmentation is possible. The first considers a cartel controlling a white neighborhood threatened by black entry; the second considers the effort of a suburban government to exclude blacks. After developing these models, we contrast the conditions under which private collusion and public coercion generate exclusionary policies that restrict the supply of housing to minority groups.     

The political economy of international trade and factor mobility

Abstract. Free trade in goods and factors is efficient. When we move away from economic theory and consider the policies actually followed by governments, we observe distortions being implemented both on goods and factors trades. It is natural then to question the relative merits of the two types of intervention, and the normative literature has provided only partial answers. We ask then why is the international flow of goods and factors not free, and the political economy literature has looked at the two issues only separately. In studying the determination of trade policy, a theoretical paradigm has emerged, focusing on the role of influence driven contributions. This approach has also found strong empirical support. The literature on the political economy of factor mobility, on the other hand, is fragmented. Distortions in labor and capital flows are typically the subject of different studies, and only recently a unified framework has been proposed. More work has to be done in this area as well as in integrating the political economy of trade and factor movements.     

On the political economy of urbanization in the Third World

Cette analyse de l'urbanisation d'aprés-guerre en Afrique Occidentale est proposée comme un jalon pour l'économie politique de l'urbanisation dans le Tiers Monde. L'Afrique Occidentale est une des régions les moins urbanisées du monde qui cependant a récemment connu une urbanisation plus rapide que toute autre. Cette explosion urbaine est associée avec des inégalités sévères à trois niveaux:

• 1 un déséquilibre profond dans les conditions de travail et de vie entre le secteur urbain et le secteur rural
• 2 une forte concentration des ressources dans les capitales
• 3 une énorme disparité économique à l'intérieur des villes entre les masses et une petit élite

Si l'urbanisation en Afrique Occidentale est caractérisée par ces inégalités, il apparait qu'elle entraîne aussi des pertes économiques. Deux approches suggèrent que l'allocation des ressources est loin d'ětre optimale pour la croissance économique. D'une part des ressources sont gaspillées dans le chǒmage et le sous-emploi urbain, dans la croissance des grands centres métropolitains, et dans la construction des ‘quartiers spontanés’. D'autre part la présupposition que la forme prise par l'urbanisation est le résultat d'une allocation optimale des ressources est mise en doute quand les facteurs qui affectent les paramètres économiques ou qui interferent directement avec les décisions d'investissement sont soumis à l'examen, et quand l'attention est dirigée sur le processus politique qui s'avère constamment dominé par les intérěts et les préoccupations d'un petit groupe de dirigeants.     

Comptes rendus: The political economy of housing in Britain

Book reviewed in this article: Murie, A., Niner, P. and Watson, C. 1976: Housing policy and the housing system (HPHS). Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series , Volume I, No. I, Houses and people in the city (HPC), 1976. Antipode , Urban political economy issue (UPE) (ed M. Boody) Political Economy of Housing Workshop (PEHW) of the Conference of Socialist Economists 1975: Political economy and the housing question (PEHQ). Political Economy of the Housing Workshop of the Conference of Socialist Economists 1976: Housing and Class in Britain (HCB). National Community Development Project 1976: Whatever happened to council housing? (WHCH). National Community Development Project 1976: Profits against houses: an alternative guide to housing finance (PAH). Marx, K. edn. 1970: Capital, Volume 1. Nell, E. 1972: Economics: the revival of political economy. Broadbent, T. A. 1977: Planning and profit in the urban economy. Centro di Ricerche sui Modi di Produzione (a cura di Enzo Mingione) 1977: L'uso del territorio in Cina. Darke, R. and Walker, R. editors, 1977: Local government and the public. Sewell, W. and Coppock, J. , editors, 1977: Public participation in planning. Hart, D. A. 1976: Strategic planning in London: the rise and fall of the primary road network. Hayden, D. 1976: Seven American utopias: the architecture of communitarian socialism, 1790–1975. C. G. Pickvance , IJURR/RIRUR, Beverley Farm, University of Kent, Canterbury, England.     

Intergenerational conflict and the political economy of higher education funding

We examine how a population's age distribution and a growing divide between the ethnic composition of older and young generations is likely to affect support for higher education funding. Using detailed survey data on voter preferences for higher education funding and precinct-level vote returns from locally-funded community college bond referenda in California, we find that older voters are significantly less supportive of higher education funding than younger voters and that support among older non-Hispanic white voters is particularly weak when those voters reside in a jurisdiction where the college-age population is more heavily Hispanic.     

The impact of oil on the shetland economy

This paper uses input-output analysis to measure the impact of oil supply bases and oil construction on the economy of Shetland. The output, income and employment created in each local industry by oil activities is measured. Oil industry multipliers are derived. Possible negative effects of oil on the local economy are considered. Finally, a forecast is made of the impact of oil on the Shetland economy in 1985.     

The political economy of housing prices: Hedonic pricing with regression discontinuity

This paper uses hedonic pricing to empirically estimate the value of publicly provided local goods and services in the constituencies of the ruling party relative to those of the opposition parties. To improve control for omitted variables that change smoothly over space, we use a regression discontinuity design to restrict the sample to houses that are near the electoral boundaries. Using resale market prices of public flats in Singapore, in some cases we find a moderate but highly statistically significant difference in housing prices across the electoral boundaries that separate the constituencies of the ruling party and the opposition parties.