Time deposit supply in the Brunner-Meltzer model

In this paper we shoe that some critical statements by Friedman and Froewiss about the Brunner-Meltzer model, particularly regarding the supply of time deposits, are based on a misinterpretation of Brunner and Meltzer's money supply and credit supply process. Admittedly, the process of time deposit supply is not extensively dealt with in the discussions on the model. We try to bridge this gap to some extent by analyzing time deposit rate setting of profit-maximizing banks using the Brunner-Meltzer model.     

Non-bank public and commercial bank portfolio behavior in the Brunner-Meltzer model: A review and clarification

This paper investigates the relationship between a portfolio theoretic model of non-bank public and commercial bank behavior and the Brunner-Meltzer non-linear money supply hypothesis. We examine the recent modification of the Brunner-Meltzer macroeconomic model suggested by Friedman and Froewiss (1977), discuss its shortcomings, and argue that the unmodified model is valid if one adopts the monetary sector equilibria definition of Saving (1977).     

Time deposits in the Brunner-Meltzer model of asset markets

Benjamin Friedman raised on a previous occasion questions about the interpretation of the multiplier formulation in our assetmarket model of the money suppl process. These questions addressed the role of time deposits in this process. This short note establishes the consistency of an equilibrium model of assetmarket interaction centered on a multiplier formulation. It states the rationale of the procedure and the nature of time deposit supply function the process.     

A profit-maximizing model of Federal Home Loan Bank behavior

In this article the price-setting behavior of the district Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) is investigated. Previous studies have viewed the FHLB system as a policy authority that sets the interest rate on FHLB advances in an attempt to stabilize mortgage and housing markets. In this study a profit-maximizing model of FHLB behavior is developed and empirically tested, and the results compared to a model of the FHLB system as a policy authority. The empirical results offer support for the hypothesis of profit-maximizing behavior and indicate that, in addition to the FHLB's cost of funds, factors that influence thrift demand for FHLB advances, deposits, and capital stock are important in explaining FHLB choice variables.     

Bank behavior and monetary policy

As a rule, economists have studied the interaction between bank behavior and monetary policy in the case of a ‘monetary base’ target. In many countries (among which France), this is not an adequate analysis of monetary policy: rather, the Central Bank pegs the interest rate at a desired level and supplies whatever amount of central money is needed at this rate. This paper presents a model where both the usual and the ‘French’ case can be analysed; both short- and long-run implications of monetary policy are considered in a partial equilibrium framework.     

Bidding behavior in the longer term refinancing operations of the European Central Bank: Evidence from a panel sample selection model

This paper analyzes individual bidding data of the longer term refinancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central Bank. We investigate how banks’ bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables including collateral costs, interest rate expectations, market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin, size, and experience. A specific feature of these auctions is that the number and composition of bidders varies over time. Therefore, we estimate panel sample selection models to control for a bank’s endogenous participation decision. We find that bidding strategies depend on the banks’ attributes. Yet, different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success. There is evidence for the winner’s curse effect in LTROs indicating a common value component in banks’ demand for longer term refinancing.     

Bank capital buffers in a dynamic model

We estimate a dynamic structural banking model to examine the interaction between risk-weighted capital adequacy and unweighted leverage requirements, their differential impact on bank lending, and equity buffer accumulation in excess of regulatory minima. Tighter risk-weighted capital requirements reduce loan supplies and lead to an endogenous fall in bank profitability, reducing bank incentives to accumulate equity buffers and, therefore, increasing the incidence of bank failure. Alternatively, tighter leverage requirements increase lending, preserve bank charter value, and incentives to accumulate equity buffers leading to lower bank failure rates.     

Bank capitalization and lending behavior after the introduction of the Basle Accord

In this paper, we provide evidence that banks with a low level of capitalization have reduced their commitment with respect to lines of credit after the introduction of the Basle Accord. A bank's lending behavior reflects its level of commitment towards borrowers, which in turn affects the level of effort it exerts on screening and monitoring the activities of borrowers. We find that the post-Basle Accord market reaction to the announcement of lines of credit issued by banks with a low level of capitalization is significantly lower than the reaction to other types of bank credit announcements. We interpret this result as evidence that some banks have a low level of commitment associated with lines of credit after the Basle Accord.

Bank liquidity and stability in an overlapping generations model

In an infinitely repeated version of the Diamond and Dybvig(1983) model, intergenerational transfers enable a bank to achieveinterest rate smoothing and to provide depositors with liquidityinsurance without Diamond and Dybvig's assumption of no sidetrades. The bank is subject to runs that may result from eitherexcessive withdrawals or the lack of new deposits. The lattercause, which cannot occur in Diamond and Dybvig's one-generationmodel, implies that suspension of convertibility may not preventbank runs. Government intervention may be necessary to maintainbank stability.     

深信服上网行为管理助力中国进出口银行信息化

金融信息化的快速发展为中国进出口银行的业务带来了新的发展生机,各种业务平台的建立和完善加速了企业的前进步伐。庞大的互联网在提供便捷的信息服务的同时,也给IT管理者带来压力。虽然银行内网部署了防火墙、入侵检测等网络安全设备,但是网络的管理仍然面临一些挑战：银行的办公网中,经常会出现邮件收发延迟,网页打开慢甚至打不开的情况,严重影响了工作效率;     

基于三层结构模型的银行综合柜面业务系统

2001年,建行湖南省分行实施了全省数据大集中.由于大集中前城市综合网络业务系统缺乏统一规划,存在长沙地区的A机(Unisys大中型系列机)和长沙以外地区的HP9000系列小型机两种不同的系统模式,导致系统体系重复、数据来源渠道分散、资源利用率低,业务处理的中间环节多、时间长、差错率高,系统运行故障频繁等一系列问题的产生,亟待进行整合改造.为此,建行湖南省分行经过广泛讨论和调研,提出了全省数据物理集中的总体构架.     

“小银行”如何成长为“好银行”——访张家口市商业银行董事长朱有平

张家口地处晋、冀,内蒙古三地要冲,踞塞外赵北的险要隘口,历来是兵家必争之地.曾经作为封闭的军事重镇,张家口市直到1995年才对外开放.和许多乘着改革开放大潮而起的地区相比,张家口市无论在城市规模还是GDP总量上都尚未发育成一个经济强市.     

Dynamic behavior of capital accumulation in a cash-in-advance model

This paper analyzes the dynamic behavior of capital accumulation in Stockman's cash-in-advance model. If the cash-in-advance constraint applies only to consumption, then money is superneutral along the transition path as well as in the long run. Alternatively, if the cash-in-advance constraint applies to gross investment as well as consumption, then a permanent increase in the rate of monetary growth reduces the steady state capital stock. The effect on the speed of adjustment depends on the sign of a certain simple function of the parameters of preferences and technology.     

Bank regulatory size thresholds,merger and acquisition behavior,and small business lending

Size threshold-based regulatory requirements are pervasive in banking, but little is known about how they affect the merger and acquisition (M&A) behavior of banks around the thresholds. M&As cause discrete increases in size, so we hypothesize changes in banks' M&A behavior near regulatory size thresholds and associated real effects (changes in small business lending by the acquiring banks). We develop a novel research design that estimates indirect treatment effects for banks just below the thresholds. We find strong evidence of indirect treatment effects on bank M&A behavior and the small business lending of the merged banks. Our results illustrate the importance of indirect treatment effects in difference-in-differences studies involving size thresholds.     

银行承兑汇票中的问题

银行承竞汇票业务的不规范行为给银行带来了风险隐患。应完善内控制度，拓展票据业务范围，修改有关法规，改进承兑汇票业务操作办法。     

Transparency in Bank Risk Modeling: A Solution to the Conundrum of Bank Regulation

After financial disasters, financial risk models are often blamed for failing to provide adequate warning. The author argues that, in many cases, the models provided accurate warnings but were ignored by market participants who did not like what they said. The financial crisis of 2008–2009 was not the first time this has happened. The author describes similar but smaller debacles in 1994 and 1998 that had their roots in financial innovation that took place a decade earlier. In both cases, risk models warned that volatile securities would become impossible to hedge; but rather than exiting those positions as they should have done, some market participants simply ignored the flashing warning lights. Some current financial risk models have proven to be quite robust. Large commercial banks have mined their internal data to create empirical models of default probability that forecast accurately out of sample. Default models based on contingent claims analysis have been available for years, including some that use continuously‐traded equity and equity options prices. Hybrid models that combine empirical data‐mining and forward‐looking market‐based signals have been shown to provide reliable early warning signals about corporate credit risk. The author recommends making banks' data bases and risk models freely available to regulators, ratings agencies, and independent analysts. When provided with access to the findings of independent efforts to measure the riskiness of bank portfolios, public scrutiny and third‐party analysis would compel bank senior management to improve risk measurement and increase transparency. Banks would benefit by restoring market confidence in the quality of their books. Making risk models transparent could also help break the present impasse between regulators and financial intermediaries. It may be possible for markets to establish a standard for credit risk that is more robust and more trustworthy than the ratings‐based system that fell into disrepute after the 2008 crisis. This would be preferable to the present thrust of bank regulation, which proposes to apply the severest standards to bank ownership of risk, and threatens to dampen economic growth.