Strategic wage setting, inflation uncertainty and optimal delegation

The paper examines optimal monetary policy delegation in an economy where wages are set strategically by a single economy-wide union whose objectives relate to employment and the real wage. Crucially, the central bank exerts imprecise control over inflation, giving rise to a positive relationship between the mean value of inflation and its variance. In this context, union concerns with regard to the employment goal render equilibrium sensitive to the conduct of monetary policy. As a consequence, optimal delegation arrangements closely resemble those identified as optimal in models that assume a direct aversion to inflation on the part of unions.     

A dynamic macroeconomic model with monopolistic behavior in the labor market

Is the monopolistic behavior of a wage setting labor union compatible, in the long and in the short run, with price stability and full employment? What is the effect, if any, of economic policies? The answers are strongly affected by the prevailing technology and by the union's objective function. With limited short run production possibilities, a short run trade-off may exist between full employment and maximum expected real wage revenues. In the long run, however, when expectations are fully adjusted, this trade-off disappears. Therefore, a labor union consistently pursuing maximum short run expected real wage revenues may not maximize long run effective real wage revenues. Price stability is granted in the long run, provided inflation is not induced by public policy. The only instrument a pure consuming government has to fight long unemployment is to reduce its share of aggregate demand.     

Industry policy in Australia: debate and practice

This article analyses the debate over industry policy in Australia since the election of the Hawke Labor government in 1983. The social contract ‘Accord’ between that government and the union movement has been used by the latter to advance its own vision of industry policy. In contrast to most other parties associated with the formulation and implementation of industry policy, the unions have promoted interventionist mechanisms to lift output and investment. Much of the intellectual rationale, and some of the actual policy initiatives, are drawn from overseas, but the more singular union achievement has been the political strategy developed to convert ideas into innovative policy.     

Union Wage Effects and the Probability of Union Membership*

This paper uses Lee's (1978) model to determine the wage gains associated with trade union membership and the reasons individuals join trade unions in Australia The data are derived from the 1984 Australian National Social Science Survey. A major conclusion is that unions secure a 17.22 per cent wage gain for their members, other things the same. This expected wage premium is shown to have an important positive impact upon the union membership decision. The welfare loss associated with the union wage premium is argued to be relatively minor about one half of one per cent of gross domestic product     

Wage Indexation, Employment and Inflation

Price versus productivity-indexing is considered in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information and wage bargaining. In a perfectly price-indexed economy, the inflationary bias due to lack of credibility is eliminated. However, productivity-indexing is more appropriate to dampen macroeconomic fluctuations that are caused by real disturbances. We show that productivity-indexing alone guarantees both price and employment stability, provided the government's reputation is good enough and the union's bargaining power is not too strong. This reduces the degree of price indexation as the union becomes weaker and the government's reputation improves. Productivity-indexing is desirable with volatile productivity processes and weak unions.
JEL classification : E 24; E 52     

Taxes,Strikes and Wages

A union and a firm bargain about wage increases. The firm possesses private information about its revenues. A two-period screening model is used to derive equilibrium wage demands by the union and to calculate measures of strike activity. Changes in wage demands and dispute probabilities due to alterations in various taxes are analysed. A more progressive income tax, a lower level of income taxes and higher payroll taxes reduce wages and strike activity. Hence, tax policy can be used not only to affect wages and employment, but lso to influence strike incidence.     

Endogenous domestic market structure and the effects of a trade cost reduction in a unionised industry

In contrast to the existing partial equilibrium literature considering the effects of a trade cost reduction on unionised wage under a given market structure, we show the effects by determining the domestic market structure endogenously. A lower trade cost reduces the number of active domestic firms, but it increases unionised wage in the active domestic firms under decentralised unions. Although a lower trade cost increases wage in the active domestic firms, it reduces domestic employment and total union utility at the free entry equilibrium. So, a trade cost reduction benefits domestic employed workers by increasing the unionised wage, but its effect on the total domestic workers is not favourable. If there is a centralised union, a lower trade cost reduces the number of active domestic firms, unionised wage, domestic employment and union utility.     

Union Membership and the Legal and Institutional Environment: Labour Market Policy in Australia and the United Kingdom

This article examines how the political and institutional environment impinges upon unionisation. Changes in policy towards trade unions in two countries are contrasted: the United Kingdom under the Conservative government where the industrial relations legal environment shifted in a direction antithetical to unionism, and Australia under the Labor administration where the union movement was incorporated into the labour policy process through a corporatist, centralised wage-fixing system—the Accord. How these changes in the legal and institutional environment in the two countries affect the propensity to unionise is examined. It is found that in both the United Kingdom and Australia union density has declined from what it otherwise would have been in the absence of these radically different policies. It is argued that the extremes of corporatist centralisation and laissez-faire decentralisation, perhaps paradoxically, make it difficult for unions to increase their membership.     

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTION

This paper will set up a general equilibrium model with a distorted labour market to explore the effects of an environmental tax and union bargaining power on formal employment and the informal competitive wage. We find that when the government raises the environmental tax, both formal employment and informal competitive wage would fall. In addition, we confirm that a policy of labour market reform would increase both formal employment and the informal competitive wage.     

Labour market segmentation and union wage gaps

Abstract

There has been a great deal of research regard the effects of unions on union – non-union wage gap. Most of the studies regarding the impact of unions on wages have assumed that apart from the division between union and non-union workers, the labour market is relatively homogeneous. A number of economists, however, have argued that the labour market is segmented, implying that there are distinct labour markets and that some workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “bad jobs” while other workers employment opportunities are concentrated in “good jobs” which are rationed.

This paper will explore whether the relative wage differential between union and non-union workers differs between the independent primary, subordinate primary and secondary labour markets. Labour market segments are defined using “job zones”. “Job zones” are distinct groups defined by the level of specific vocational preparation necessary for a particular occupation, allowing for the comparison of skill levels and training for each occupation. The data on “job zones” comes from the Occupational Information Network database (O?Net). We estimate separate equations for union and non-union workers in each segment using data from the Current Population Survey and calculate union non-union differentials for each labour market segment. The findings of this paper suggest that the greatest differentials are in secondary labour markets followed by differentials in the subordinate primary labour market and that the smallest wage differentials are in the independent primary labour market.     

Volatility, Stabilization and Union Wage-setting: The Effects of Monetary Policy on the 'Natural' Unemployment Rate

In a unionized economy with nominal-wage contracts, the 'natural' (rational-expectations equilibrium) employment level is not invariant with respect to the stabilization rule followed by the monetary authority. This is because alternative monetary policies change the variance of the inflation rate (price level) relatively to the variance of some measure of economic activity (employment level), thereby influencing the trade-off desired by union members between the real wage and the probability of employment. Indeed, a more volatile employment level induces the (risk-neutral) union members to prefer a higher expected real wage.
(J.E.L: E5, J5).     

Union coverage and sectoral wages: Evidence from the Netherlands

This paper investigates the impact of union coverage on sectoral wages in the Netherlands. The semi-elasticity of the wage rate with respect to union coverage appears to be around 0.05; it is higher in the industrial than in the other sectors. The impact of union coverage on wages appears to be lower in the Netherlands than in the US and the UK. Union coverage increases the weight of internal (sector-specific) factors in wage determination and decreases the weight of external (labour market) factors. Apparently, unions increase the role of rent sharing in wage formation and stabilize employment.     

Unemployment and the 'Labour-management Conspiracy'

We study a model in which management and a union bargain over a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and over a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionised sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a 'labour-management conspiracy'.     

Wage Determination In Australia*

This paper examines whether a stable expectations-augmented Phillips curve exists for Australia. High real wages in the face of continuing high unemployment over the past decade have led to suggestions that the level of unemployment has little effect on wage determination, with the bargaining process taking place between employers and those employees in ‘secure employment’. Results from aggregate data suggest that the level of unemployment is relevant to wage determination. In addition, the impact of overtime on the growth in money wages is consistent with the view that those in secure employment are influenced by labour market conditions.     

Unemployment Benefits, Contract Length and Nominal Wage Flexibility

In a bargaining model, we show that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage flexibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks. Long‐term wage contracts lead to higher expected real wages and hence higher expected unemployment than short‐term contracts. Therefore, a decrease in the benefit level reduces the expected utility gross of contract costs of a union member more with long‐term than with short‐term contracts, thereby creating an incentive for shorter contracts. Incentives for employers are shown to change in the same direction.     

Competing to Outsource in the South

This paper analyzes foreign direct investment (FDI) competition in a three‐country framework: two Northern countries and one Southern country. We have in mind the competition of Airbus and Boeing in a developing country. The host‐country government endogenizes tariffs, while Airbus and Boeing choose domestic output and FDI. Wages and employment in the home countries are negotiated. We find that in the unique equilibrium, both Airbus and Boeing compete to undertake FDI in the developing country. This arises because the host country can play off the multinationals, which in turn stems from three factors: (a) oligopolistic rivalry; (b) quid pro quo FDI; (c) strategic outsourcing—FDI drives down the union wages at home if the host‐country wage is sufficiently low. However, if the host‐country wage is sufficiently high, the union wage increases under FDI. In such cases, FDI competition benefits the multinationals, the labor unions, as well as the host country.     

A Wage–Tax Policy to Increase Employment

We use MONASH, a dynamic general equilibrium model, in an analysis of the macroeconomic effects of combining a freeze on Award wage rates in Australia with the granting of tax credits to low-wage workers in low-income families. Our results suggest that if this policy were successful in lowering the actual real before-tax wage rates of workers in the Award system, then it would have favourable short-run effects on aggregate employment. These effects would persist into the long run if the policy led to rightward shifts in labour supply curves. The downside risk of the policy is that it would be counteracted by over-Award payments, leaving a budgetary problem with no compensating employment gain. At the same time, the Award system would be rendered irrelevant to the determination of wage rates, possibly increasing the costs of wage bargaining.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

A Vision for Australia: Indicators from Singapore

This article suggests that Australia could benefit from observing more closely Singapore's current development strategy. The production of labour intensive manufactures primarily by foreign firms and for export formed the core of Singapore's successful economic advance in the 1960s and 1970s. While a factor endowment strength—comparatively cheap labour—lay behind this achievement, the Singapore government actively supplemented this strength by creating a business environment highly favourable to the needs of foreign investors.
With full employment and rising wage levels since then, Singapore lost its comparative advantage in the production of low wage manufactures to other East Asian countries. Recently, its development has been based more on created than inherited advantages. The Singapore government argues that the resources crucial to sustained per capita income advance in middle and higher income countries are not natural resources but rather information, technology, investible funds, research and development (R&D) spending and professional people. Singapore aims to develop its business environment to attract such resources to Singapore.
The government's vision for Singapore is a nation where the share of professional and highly skilled manpower in the workforce rises over time. This employment goal informs the government's approach to all policy matters: infrastructure development, education, urban development, microeconomic reform, taxation, fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy, support for manufacturing and service activities, and attitudes to foreign investors.
By comparison with Australia, Singapore has a very level playing field. The government sees no conflict between intervening to attempt to create competitive advantage while vigorously pursuing microeconomic reforms to make the playing field in Singapore still more level.     

Monetary Institutions,Monopolistic Competition,Unionized Labor Markets and Economic Performance*

Recent literature on the interactions between labor unions and monetary institutions features either a supply or a demand channel of monetary policy, but not both. This leads to two opposing views about the effects of central bank conservativeness. We evaluate the relative merits of those conflicting views by developing a unified framework. We find that: (i) the effect of conservativeness on employment depends on unions’ relative aversion to unemployment versus inflation, and (ii) for plausible values of this relative aversion (and more than one union), social welfare is maximized under a highly conservative central bank. We also evaluate the effects of centralization of wage bargaining and product market competition on unemployment and inflation.