A choice‐theoretic analysis of a corporate tax holiday versus a subsidy

This paper attempts to compare the effect of a corporate tax holiday with that of a subsidy on the behaviour of the individual firm. Assuming the subsidy equals the amount of tax paid by a firm operating under the subsidy system, we find that the firm's net profit will be greater under the tax holiday than under the subsidy regime. Similarly, if the subsidy exceeds the tax by an amount that would equalize the profits made by the (“marginal”) firm under the two regimes, then it is found that firms with higher than “average” unit costs would opt for the subsidy system; conversely, firms with a low cost structure would maximize profits by selecting the tax holiday. Finally, a multiperiod analysis of the particular choice facing prospective manufacturers in Ciskei, shows that the firm would normally choose the subsidy system except if the current tax exceeded the subsidy at the output level representing maximum profit under the tax holiday.     

Comparing the welfare effects of income and excise taxes in the presence of the other taxation paradox

This paper implements numerically a general equilibrium model in which all private producers are price makers and the government utilizes tax revenues to provide a public good. After deriving the partial equilibrium condition for an excise tax to increase price by more than the tax (for a monopoly firm), numerical examples are given, demonstrating this phenomenon for both partial and general equilibrium. In the general equilibrium context, optimal excise taxation and optimal flat-rate income taxation are compared. In the excise tax regime, prices increase by more than the taxes. In the income tax regime, prices actually decline relative to the no-tax regime. In all of the examples given, flat-rate income taxation is superior to excise taxation in terms of welfare. The author has benefitted from exceptionally helpful comments received from J. Ronnie Davis, John D. Wilson, Ralph W. Pfouts, and Amy Crews. He has also benefitted from conversations with Franz Gehrels, David E. Wildasin, Herbert J. Kiesling, and Harold York. The usual disclaimer applies.     

WTO框架下政府战略性补贴政策应用研究

本文研究表明：作为战略性出口贸易政策替代品的战略性研发补贴，在提升本国企业竞争力和提高国民福利的应用过程中，其政策效果一方面严重依赖于企业产品成本和产品间替代弹性等微观因素；另一方面也受各国政府反应策略的极大制约。     

R&D subsidy,intellectual property rights protection,and North–South trade: How good is the TRIPS agreement?

This paper investigates the competition in technology and production between a firm in the North (developed country) and a firm in the South (developing country), and how such competition may be affected by the North’s subsidy on technology improvement and the South’s intellectual property rights (IPR) protection level. It is argued that allowing the North to choose the policy first could bring Pareto improvement. This paper also shows that requiring only the South to tighten its IPR protection (as required by the TRIPS agreement) without putting similar pressure on the North to provide more R&D hurts the South. A more rewarding outcome exists if both the IPR protection level and the technology subsidy rate are chosen optimally. We point out that maximizing world welfare does not consequently hurt the South, or require a tightening of IPR protection in the South.     

Strategic Intrafirm Innovation Adoption and Diffusion

A theory of oligopolistic innovation adoption is developed in which intrafirm diffusions occur because the marginal cost of adoption is increasing in the rate of adoption. The equilibrium intrafirm diffusion curve is S-shaped or concave, as are empirically observed ones. This diffusion curve is more likely to be S-shaped the more competitive the industry, the larger the marginal cost of adoption or the pre-innovation unit cost of production, or the smaller the demand. The diffusion is longer, and so the extent of adoption at any date is lower the more competitive the industry, the larger the marginal cost of adoption or the pre-innovation unit cost of production, or the smaller the demand. A surprising result is that an increase in the unit cost reduction from the innovation has an ambiguous effect on diffusion. Obviously, a larger cost reduction allows each firm to earn a larger flow profit at every date from the same rate of adoption. However, a more subtle effect is that it also allows the firm to earn the same flow of profit with a slower rate of adoption, and so lower adoption costs. That is, the firms also have an incentive to spread out the diffusion over a longer period of time to save on adoption costs.     

垂直产品差异、外国企业纵向控制与研发政策

在Spencer和Brander(1983)模型的基础上,本文引入产品纵向控制因素,考虑生产高质量产品的非一体化企业与另一国生产低质量产品的一体化企业进行市场竞争时,政府的最优研发政策。在企业进行Cournot竞争的情形下,若产品质量差异较大(小),非一体化企业所在国政府的最优研发政策为征税(补贴),而在企业进行Bertrand竞争的情形下,非一体化企业所在国政府的最优研发策略则是征税。     

扶持生态农业发展的财税政策探讨

发展生态农业是保护农业生态环境，促进农村生态文明建设的必然选择。生态农业的正外部性及风险性等决定了政府必须利用财税政策给予强有力的支持。为有效发挥财税政策引导农民发展生态农业的作用，必须适时开征农业生态税，实现农业补贴政策逐步向生态农业倾斜和优化支农财政支出结构。     

Subsidy and entry: the role of licensing

The strategic trade literature has mainly examined the importanceof per-unit subsidies or taxes. Unlike the earlier works, afixed amount of subsidy has been considered in this paper. Thispaper shows that even if this subsidy policy does not affectthe marginal calculations of the firms, this policy can significantlyalter other incentives of the firms. A commitment to the subsidypolicy can encourage the foreign firm to license its technologyto the domestic firm which, in turn, helps to increase the welfareof the domestic country. We find that, in equilibrium, the governmentof the domestic country does not need to provide the subsidy.We have also analyzed the role of the foreign government.     

税收征管与企业对外投资:来自“金税工程三期”的证据

近些年来，我国对外投资规模迅猛增长，税收征管强度也在不断提升。那么，税收征管是否推动了中国企业的对外投资行为呢？鉴于鲜有文献探讨这一极具现实意义的话题，本文利用"金税工程三期"政策上线这一提高税收征管能力的准自然实验，采用双重差分法首次实证检验了税收征管对企业对外投资行为的影响作用。研究发现："金税工程三期"这一增加企业纳税遵从度、促进"应收尽收"的税收征管政策冲击显著地提高了企业对外投资的可能性、增加了企业对外投资规模，并且这一结论在引入更多控制变量并排除同期其他政策干扰、安慰剂检验、更换样本周期、倾向得分匹配分析等情况下依旧稳健。潜在的影响机制分析发现，"金税工程三期"这一税收征管政策冲击增加了企业的避税动机，表现为企业偏好于向税率低的东道国进行投资。异质性检验结果显示，"金税工程三期"这一税收征管政策冲击对企业对外投资行为的影响作用在不同对外投资事件类型、不同所有制类型的企业、不同地区、不同行业之间存在明显差异。最后，依据本文结论提出了积极落实减税降费政策、适度地提升银行业竞争水平的政策建议。     

WTO框架下战略性补贴政策的制约因素与因应策略

本文从影响战略性补贴政策实施效果的微观机制和考虑别国报复时该政策所引发的各国福利变化两个角度,具体分析了WTO框架下战略性补贴政策在一国的应用问题。研究表明:作为战略性出口贸易政策替代品的战略性研发补贴,在提升本国企业竞争力和提高国民福利的应用过程中,其政策效果一方面严重依赖于企业产品成本和产品间替代弹性等微观因素;另一方面也受各国政府反应策略的极大制约。     

Transparency,Information Shocks,and Tax Avoidance

This study helps provide clarity to the prior mixed findings on the association between financial reporting transparency and tax avoidance by studying the effect that transparency has on tax avoidance in a cross‐country sample through aggregate‐ and firm‐level tests. Results using firm‐ and country‐level (aggregate) measures of transparency and tax avoidance show that countries and firms with greater levels of transparency exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance and that the effect of country‐level transparency is incremental to firm‐level transparency. Furthermore, results of difference‐in‐difference tests using the adoption of IFRS and the initial enforcement of insider trading laws around the world as exogenous shocks that increase transparency find that transparency has a statistically and economically significant effect on tax avoidance and address empirical concerns regarding endogeneity and reverse causality not fully addressed in the prior research. The results of these tests as well as tests that address potential correlated but omitted variables suggest that financial transparency is an important tool which regulators can use in battling tax avoidance.     

论我国生态税征收和比较的分析

本文认为我国目前生态环境破坏严重,应该进行生态补偿,而税收是有效的生态补偿的经济手段。在分析税收的基础上,本文指出了生态税从现行税收体制中单列的技术系统,建立了动态征收生态税的模型和比较不同地区税负水平的方法,最后提出了我国税制建立的设计原则。     

The effect of export tax rebates on export performance: Theory and evidence from China

This paper develops a Cournot quantity competition model to examine the effect of export tax rebate policy on export performance. The main conclusions drawn are as follows: (i) when a government raises the export rebate rate, the output of final goods for export by the domestic firm increases, while the output of the foreign competitor decreases; (ii) when a government raises the export rebate rate, the profit of the domestic firm increases, while that of the foreign competitor decreases; and (iii) the optimum export rebate rate is positive and greater than 1, indicating that the domestic government not only refunds fully the custom duties paid by the domestic firm on imported intermediate goods, but also offers export subsidies for its export of final goods.To corroborate the conclusions drawn based on the theoretical model, empirical analysis was carried out using the statistical data of China from 1985 to 2002. The test results of Spearman rank correlation coefficient show that China's export tax rebate policy has significant positive correlation with its exports, final domestic consumption, and foreign exchange reserve.     

Corporate tax systems and cross country profit shifting

The paper analyses optimal taxation of corporate profits whengovernments can choose both the rate and the base of the corporationtax, but are constrained to collect a given amount of corporatetax revenue. In a standard two-period model of investment andinternational mobility of portfolio capital only, the optimaltax system allows a full deduction for the costs of capital.When foreign direct investment is permitted, however, and firmscan shift profits between countries through transfer pricing,it will be optimal for each government to distort investmentdecisions in order to reduce tax rates and limit the incentivefor profit shifting.     

Consumer discrimination,duopoly, and black firm entry: The welfare effect of subsidies

Consumer discrimination, to the extent that it lowers expected profit for black owned firms, discourages the entry of new black firms. From a social welfare perspective, consumer discrimination may be welfare reducing, since market output is lower than otherwise. If so, a policy intervention that subsidizes new black firms may improve social welfare. This article presents a simple model of duopoly where consumer discrimination exists with uncertainty, and the only cost of production is a “loss of sales” cost. Given the Nash equilibrium, in which a black and white firm must select a price to charge, conditions are derived for which a profit subsidy to a new black firm increases, decreases, or has no effect on social welfare.     

固定支付方式下ICT推动节能减排的策略研究

ICT推动工业企业节能减排,实现绿色低碳发展,需要ICT低碳技术研发商、工业企业和政府的协同努力。考虑研发商和工业企业面对的研发和市场不确定性,分析二者通过固定支付方式合作时各自的最优投入,给出政府的激励和监管策略。研究表明ICT低碳技术研发商的最优投入与工业企业的买断费用、政府的资金资助和惩罚力度有关,而工业企业的最优投入仅与政府的税收优惠有关。增加买断费用或政府资金资助和惩罚,能够激励ICT低碳技术研发商提高其最优投入;增加政府税收优惠能够提高工业企业的最优投入;但需合理设置买断费用和政府经费资助的首期拨付比例以防范ICT低碳技术研发商的道德风险。     

International Capital Competition and Environmental Standards

This paper examines the welfare effects of capital taxation and environmental standards with and without a government spending constraint or international tax credits. This analysis delineates the intricate linkages of the two policy measures to both private income and government welfare. Loosening environmental control leads to more capital tax revenue for the government. The optimal capital tax rate may be of any sign, depending upon the ranking of the weights of government objectives and private utility. The same criterion also applies in determining how stringent the optimal environmental standards should be.     

The impact of technology identification policy on firm innovation: Evidence from China

Using firm-level data of companies listed on China's A-share market from 2006 to 2017, this research applies a difference-in-differences (DID) empirical method to test whether the state policy in China used for identifying firms as being “high-tech” enhances their innovative capabilities. This paper presents three main findings. First, multiple robustness tests confirm that the state technology identification policy does improve the total number of patent applications as well as the number of patent invention applications. Second, government subsidy is an important channel through which this policy affects a firm's innovation capabilities. Third, this policy has a more prominent and positive influence on the innovation capabilities of firms located in regions where there exist a higher rate of taxation in addition and relatively more developed products and factor markets. Fourth, we conduct a flexible back-of-the-envelope cost-benefit analysis to demonstrate that the high-tech firm identification policy does improve the overall level of social welfare. The empirical results of this paper have far-reaching implications for China's innovation policies.     

VATs in CEE Countries: A Survey and Analysis

Ten Central and Eastern European countries have applied for membership of the European Union (EU). The adoption of the value-added tax (VAT) is a nonnegotiable condition. Accordingly, all these countries have introduced the VAT which, in principle, is a highly product-neutral, factor-neutral and revenue-productive tax. A review of the structures of the various VATs indicates that more can be done to tax public sector bodies and cultural services. In some countries, immovable property and the agricultural sector can be treated more even-handedly. However, the most important structural weakness of the VATs is the exemption and lower taxation of so-called essential products. VATs are ill-suited to enhance progressivity in tax burden distribution. It is concluded that policymakers should now focus their attention on improving the administration of their VATs. As in many other countries, tax policy often is tax administration.     

Intra-industry adjustment and the correction of an externality

Conclusion The purpose of this paper is to apply some of the existing microeconomic theory literature on intra-industry adjustment resulting from factor price changes to the use of corrective taxes on externalities. The optimal tax to correct the effects of an externality is one placed directly on the external damage. Such a tax is sometimes not practically feasible, in which case either the inputs or output of firms in the externality-producing industry must be taxed as a proxy for the external damage.When the tax is placed on the input associated with the externality, the tax will only produce the optimal result if all firms produce an equal external damage which is proportional to the amount of the input which is used. If the amount of the externality produced by different firms is different, then an input tax will not satisfy the marginal conditions for optimality; and in some cases, the external damage may actually increase as a result of the input tax. An output tax, on the other hand, will never cause the external damage to increase, but will not in general satisfy the marginal conditions for optimality.When the amount of external damage caused by each firm in an industry is difficult to monitor, input or output taxes are two possible policy alternatives for controlling the externality. This paper has demonstrated that there are a number of problems associated with calculating the optimal input or output tax, and that a tax that is correct under restricted assumptions may actually aggravate the problem when examined in a more general environment. This analysis may explain why policy makers favor direct controls to reduce externalities, rather than taking the economist's frequent advice of using corrective taxes to price the externality.We are indebted to Charles Maurice for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.