Is Asian Currency Unit Attractive to East Asian Economies？

Pegging the RMB exchange rate to the Asian currency unit (ACU) has not, at least in the short term, been proved a better solution than pegging to the US dollar or pegging to a G‐3 (US$, Japanese yen and euro) currency basket. Although the Asian currency unit can help Asian economies to keep the relative price of regional currencies stable, the cost of joining a formal regional monetary cooperation is the relinquishment of the autonomy of their domestic policies. Asian monetary cooperation needs to provide more potential benefits if it is to attract Asian economies. We argue that Asian monetary cooperation should be designed to solve the problem of regional trade imbalance, and regional exchange rate policy coordination should be adopted as the first step towards exchange rate cooperation. (Edited by Zhinan Zhang)     

The Long-run and Short-run Multipliers of Fiscal Policy in the Chinese Economy

To examine the long-run and short-run multipliers of fiscal policy in China, simple models with some basic characteristics of the Chinese economy are developed and then estimated using cointegration and error correction approaches. Empirical results confirm some similarities between the Chinese economy and well-developed market economies, but also uncover the unique features that China possesses, in terms of the multipliers of permanent and temporary changes in government spending, Okun's coefficient, and the short-run adjustment mechanism.     

China's Exchange Rate Movements and Corporate Currency Invoicing Strategies

Since China introduced a new managed floating exchange rate regime in 2005, the persistent appreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar has led Chinese firms to reassess their choice of invoice currency among the dollar and other international alternatives to price their exports. The present paper performs a systematic invoice currency analysis by surveying the published literature, summarizing criteria for decision-making, and evaluating the choices available to Chinese exporters implementing currency invoicing strategies to maximize expected profits. This study finds that the euro could play an increasing role as the invoice currency of Chinese firms, although the US dollar will still play a dominant role. Chinese exporters might shift gradually from the dollar to the euro in the face of the falling dollar, balancing between the two by necessity.     

Local Governance: Impacts of Fiscal Decentralization on Government Size and Spending Composition in Vietnam*

The study provides an understanding of the impacts of fiscal decentralization and local governance on government size and spending composition. We use a balanced panel data set of 63 provinces of Vietnam over the 2006–2015 period. By estimating the spatial Durbin model, we find that local public spending and government size grow over time and have spatial spillovers. Fiscal decentralization significantly reduces public spending and government size, which supports the Leviathan hypothesis. More interestingly, combining local governance, the marginal spatial spillover effects of the fiscal decentralization on public spending and government size are intensified. Our findings imply that local governments should enhance interregional collaboration in fiscal management to limit duplicate public spending and promote regional sustainable development.     

外汇储备超常增长下的财政政策选择

2001年以来,我国外汇储备加速增长,到2006年10月份突破1万亿美元,成为世界第一大外汇储备国.巨额外汇储备造成了外汇占款激增,增加了基础货币投放,致使当前我国通货膨胀压力加大,进一步削弱了货币政策独立性和有效性.为此,文章提出利用适度扩张的财政政策,即通过政府发行长期债券的方式吸纳多余的外汇储备,扩大内需,调节经济内外平衡.     

财政政策与货币政策的动态搭配和组合模式

基于经济周期的不同阶段,从IS-LM曲线和供求理论的双重视角解析利用财政政策与货币政策对宏观经济进行调控的内在机理,揭示两类政策搭配组合的理论逻辑,分析制约财政政策与货币政策调控效应的现实因素。研究发现,财政政策与货币政策的搭配组合要根据经济发展的不同阶段进行动态供给,以满足经济周期不同阶段的需求,如此方能实现经济的稳定增长。现阶段,我国应采取"更加积极的财政政策与稳健适度的货币政策"这一政策组合。产品市场与货币市场对利率的弱敏感性使政策刺激经济的效果受到制约,因而两类政策不仅要在总量层面"对冲"经济增速减缓的压力,而且要在结构层面增强协调性。     

居民收入差距与财政政策的关联度

改革开放以来,我国城乡经济获得较大的发展,城乡居民的收入水平有了很大的提高,城乡关系也得到了逐步改善,但城乡居民收入差距过大问题依然存在。财政是政府发挥作用的重要方式和手段,有其不可替代的功能,在缩小城乡居民收入差距、促进农民增收过程中担负着重要使命。建议加大财政对农业的总量投入,优化财政支农资金结构,加大财政对农村公共品供给的投入,完善现行财政管理体制。     

技术创新的财政激励

技术创新是国际竞争中主导成综合国力的重要手段.我国必需从政府采购制度、税收优惠政策、财政公共投资、财政补贴与合作等角度,做出现阶段激励技术创新的财政制度安排.     

财政分权、地方财政支出偏好与城市用地规模扩张——以长三角地区为例

摘要：文章通过利用1996-2010年长三角地区16个核心城市的面板数据,实证考察了财政分权、地方财政支出与城市用地规模扩张之间的关系。研究表明：财政务权和地方政府竞争体制使得地方政府在财政支出上存在着明显的偏向,三者均是城市用地规模扩张的主要推动因素;不同城市用地规模扩张的速度存在差异;体制因素是城市用地规模盲目扩张的深层次原因。为了从根本土改变地方政府的行为为鼓励,需立足中国实际,完善现有的财政体制,规范中央和地方的财政收支;改革现行的政绩考核体制,保持官员任期的连续性和稳定性;要深化我国的户籍制度改革,打破居民迁移的体制壁垒。实现”用脚投票”的机制．     

实施稳健财政政策重在结构调整

我国财政政策从“积极”转到“稳健”三年来,宏观调控初见成效,但目前经济生活中存在的主要问题是收入差别明显、价格不均衡、财税政策的不完善和结构失衡。因此,2008年财政政策在总体“稳健”前提下更应注重结构调整,应加大政府转移支出的力度,优化经济结构;继续完善税制,促进经济增长;推进公共财政建设,关注民生问题。     

国外政府财政绩效考评的经验借鉴

20世纪80年代以来,世界范围内兴起的"新公共管理"运动,对于现代政府治理产生了深远影响.文章试图在国际比较的分析之上,就市场经济国家的财政绩效管理加以适当梳理,为中国财政绩效管理模式的构建.提供一个具有较强借鉴意义的参照体系;为研究探索我国公共财政支出的绩效管理办法,科学评价公共财政支出经济性和有效性提供有益的经验借鉴.     

财政分权、地方政府行为与劳动者报酬份额

中国经济高速增长伴随劳动份额快速下降,为什么会产生这种现象引起广泛的关注,文章从财政分权的视角进行了研究。在财政分权的激励和约束之下,地方政府为实现经济增长和晋升的目标,弱化对劳动者的保护,以便为“招商引资”创造良好“投资环境”。文章通过建立2000—2009年全国范围内和区域范围内的省级面板数据模型,验证了财政分权对劳动者收入份额的影响以及存在的区域差异,并提出改进目前以GDP作为主要指标的政绩考核机制、从制度上提高劳动收入占比的政策建议。     

促进低碳经济发展财税政策的国际实践及启示

文章论述了欧盟、美国、日本等经济发达国家在促进低碳经济发展方面的财税政策,分析其特点,并结合我国国情,从建立绿色预算制度、加大财政投入力度、改革税收制度、完善税收优惠政策以及加强制度创新、提高财税政策效果等方面提出了促进低碳经济发展的对策建议。     

财政转移支付的政治经济学:理论与实证

传统的财政转移支付理论认为中央政府的财政转移支付旨在经济效率和财政均等化,这忽视了影响财政转移支付的政治因素。文章拘建了中央政府以政治稳定为目标,通过向各省的财政转移支付来维持社会稳定的理论模型,利用1995-2009年的省际面板数据发现,国家政治稳定因素在我国的财政转移支付中的效应显著。其中维护国家统一和社会秩序稳定的因素起了主要作用。因此,对我国财政转移支付体系的改革不能仅仅停留在缩小纵向和横向财政失衡上面,必须同时从经济效率和政治稳定的角度来探讨财政转移支付体系的改革。     

东亚经济体的汇率稳定与出口结构因素

本文从理论视角描述了汇率对出口价格传递机制:在进口的投入品比例高时,或出口产品与外国产品相似、竞争激烈时,出口变化对汇率的变动不敏感。而东亚地区出口结构符合这一特性。对于不可避免地增加汇率弹性的中国,也只有使出口结构高级化,才是人民币升值坚实的基础。     

货币与财政政策后续效应评估:40次银行危机样本

以20世纪80年代以来40次重要的系统性银行危机为基础,对金融危机后的货币政策和财政政策选择进行实证评价。实证结果表明,"适度扩张"的货币政策和财政政策能产生相对较优的经济效果,应成为金融危机后的主要政策选择,但由于两种政策刺激或稳定经济的效力都集中体现在短期,为避免持续和大规模货币扩张和财政赤字带来的负面影响,一旦危机消退、经济企稳回升,之前作为"反危机工具"出现的扩张性货币和财政政策就应该逐步淡出。     

Delegation and Fiscal Policy in the Open Economy: More Bad News for Rogoff's Delegation Game

This article studies the open-economy Rogoff delegation game, taking into account both intra-country and intercountry interactions between fiscal authorities and central banks. With representative bankers, the Nash equilibrium of fiscal and monetary authorities independently responding to supply-side shocks sees insufficient monetary adjustment and an imbalance towards fiscal stabilization if shocks are sufficiently symmetric; the opposite occurs if shocks are sufficiently asymmetric. Appointing conservative bankers shifts the fiscal–monetary balance away from monetary towards fiscal policy. Unilateral delegation benefits that country; but when all countries independently delegate, the outcome is only favorable if shocks are sufficiently asymmetric.