Psychological versus economic models of bounded rationality

That the rationality of individual people is ‘bounded’ – that is, finite in scope and representational reach, and constrained by the opportunity cost of time – cannot reasonably be controversial as an empirical matter. In this context, the paper addresses the question as to why, if economics is an empirical science, economists introduce bounds on the rationality of agents in their models only grudgingly and partially. The answer defended in the paper is that most economists are interested primarily in markets and only secondarily in the dynamics of individual decisions – specifically, they are interested in these dynamics mainly insofar as they might systematically influence the most useful approaches to modeling interesting markets. In market contexts, bounds on rationality are typically generated by institutional and informational properties specific to the market in question, which arise and are sustained by structural dynamics that do not originate in or reduce to individuals' decisions or psychological dispositions. To be sure, these influences interact with psychological dispositions, so economists have reason to attend to the psychology of valuation. But no general model of bounded rationality should ever be expected to feature in the economist's toolkit, regardless of the extent to which psychologists successfully identify specific human cognitive limitations. Use of moderate rational expectations assumptions should be understood in this light. Such assumptions are readily relaxed in specific applications, and in ways customized to modeling circumstances, that modelers, experimentalists, and econometricians are making steadily more sophisticated.     

Habit,Decision-Making,and Rationality: Comparing Thorstein Veblen and Early Herbert Simon

The article aims to contribute to the convergence between institutional and neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economics. It intends to help unify the behavioral foundations of these two strands of thought by returning to the original views of their main historical inspirations. It thus proposes a comparative analysis of the theory of human behavior developed by Thorstein Veblen and Herbert Simon, respectively. The article notably discusses how Simon’s early work links together the notions of habit, rationality, and the decision-making process, and explores the extent to which his views are consistent with, complementary to, or divergent from Veblen’s. The article highlights several commonalities between Simon and Veblen’s views on habits. However, Simon departs from Veblen in developing a dual model of human behavior which clearly differentiates habit-based from decision-based behaviors. The article argues that neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary economists should go beyond this binary model and build on the pragmatist-Veblenian approach, in which these two dimensions are intimately entangled. This process could allow the economists in question to take advantage of the most valuable insights of institutional economics regarding the interactions between individual choices and habits and institutions.     

Behavior and cognition of economic actors in evolutionary economics

An evolutionary perspective on the nature of economic activity requires a theory of human behavior and cognition that highlights human creativity and innovativeness, while at the same time recognizing that in many arenas of economic life change is slow and more routine aspects of behavior obtain. It is proposed that Herbert Simon’s conception of human behavior as largely “bounded rational” is capable of suiting both aspects. However, to be able to encompass the enormous advances humans have achieved over the years in their ability to meet a variety of wants, a theory of behavior and cognition suitable for evolutionary economics needs to recognize the evolving cultural context of economic behavior and cognition.     

Veblen’s Imperial Germany and the Industrialization of Latin America

Veblen’s Imperial Germany is a theory of development and industrialization, and the role the business enterprise played in these processes. Through a reassessment of Veblen’s Imperial Germany, this paper explores the main aspects that Veblen considered about the industrialization of England and Germany, deriving theoretical implications for the preconditions of a successful industrialization and development, based on an evolutionary Institutional perspective. Veblen’s analysis is then used to analyze the current state of the industrialization of Latin America, evaluating the last two decades since the 1990s, and comparing the orthodox approach, the neostructural view and the Veblenian perspective, arguing for the validity of a policy framework not reduced only to targeted protectionism but emphasizing the necessity of generating the institutional preconditions suggested by Veblen in his seminal work.     

渐进式抑或突破式：个体创新幅度对众包绩效的影响——基于计算仿真的分析

结合TCPE框架和NK模型，构建一个模拟众包问题解决过程的仿真模型，引入个体创新幅度表征个体创新搜索行为，引入个体有限理性水平和有限理性偏差表征个体认知能力，探讨个体创新幅度对众包绩效的影响机制,以及个体有限理性和任务复杂性的调节作用。结果发现：个体创新幅度与众包绩效存在两种影响模式：当任务非常简单时，个体创新幅度与众包绩效呈负相关关系；当任务复杂性较高时，个体创新幅度与众包绩效呈倒U型关系；两种影响模式不会受到个体有限理性水平和有限理性偏差的调节。在相对复杂的任务中，任务复杂性与个体有限理性偏差会调节实现最优众包绩效对应的个体创新幅度，任务复杂性越高、个体有限理性偏差越大，对应的个体创新幅度随之增加。个体创新幅度会削弱个体认知能力对众包绩效的影响，当个体认知能力较强时，需要采用渐进式创新；当个体认知能力较弱时，需要采用突破式创新。该结论可为企业在众包过程中营造平台创新氛围提供理论依据。     

Conventionalism,coordination, and mental models: from Poincaré to Simon

This article focuses on the conventions that sustain social interaction and argues that they are central to Simon's decision-making theory. Simon clearly identifies two kinds of coordination by convention: behavioral mores that shape human actions, and shared mental models that govern human perceptions. This article argues that Poincaré–Carnap's conventionalism provides powerful support for Simon's theory; it contends that this theory offers a more convincing account of decision and coordination than Lewis' concept of convention. Simon's approach to applying conventionalist logic to social interaction emphasizes the normative role played by mental models in solving coordination problems and considers rationality in terms of both cognitive and moral considerations. By connecting conventional phenomena to social identifications, Simon stresses the resulting complexity of coordination problems     

How the P* Model Rationalizes Monetary Targeting: A Comment on Svensson

In this comment, we answer the question posed in Svensson’s (2000) paper ‘Does the P* Model Provide any Rationale for Monetary Targeting?’– in contrast to him ‐‐ in the affirmative. We argue that a strategy of monetary targeting can be rationalized within the P* framework. Furthermore, we demonstrate that money growth targeting is a special form of inflation forecast targeting based on a ‘limited’ information set. In contrast to ‘full information’ inflation forecast targeting, monetary growth targeting is likely to be more robust under changing conditions of the real world.     

Money and the emergence of knowledge in society

This paper deals with money’s epistemic relevance in society. Money presents theoretical difficulties for neoclassical economics, which treats it as a cost-reducing tool, leading to a socially neutral, aseptic view on money. Drawing from complexity and social theory I provide a socio-epistemic rationalization for money’s irreplaceable role. Building upon Ingham’s Money Is a Social Relation, I argue that money generates a new orderly system of complex social relations that in turn engenders knowledge as an emergent social and ontological phenomenon irreducible to the fragmented knowledge held by members of society. I show that ultimately money cannot be separated from economic knowledge and market rationality. This paper provides sociological and ontological accounts for the emergence of knowledge crucial to coordinate societies, thus extending recent explorations of the ontology of money.     

The One-Shot-Deviation Principle for Sequential Rationality

This article analyzes the fictitious play process originally proposed for strategic form games by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). We interpret the process as a model of preplay thinking performed by players before acting in a one-shot game. This model is one of bounded rationality. We discuss how fictitious play should then be defined for extensive form games and conclude that this is somewhat problematic. We therefore study two alternative definitions. For either of these, under a weak condition of initial uncertainty, a convergence point of a fictitious play sequence is a sequential equilibrium. For generic games of perfect information initial uncertainty also implies convergence of fictitious play.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.     

Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games

This article analyzes the fictitious play process originally proposed for strategic form games by Brown (1951) and Robinson (1951). We interpret the process as a model of preplay thinking performed by players before acting in a one-shot game. This model is one of bounded rationality. We discuss how fictitious play should then be defined for extensive form games and conclude that this is somewhat problematic. We therefore study two alternative definitions. For either of these, under a weak condition of initial uncertainty, a convergence point of a fictitious play sequence is a sequential equilibrium. For generic games of perfect information initial uncertainty also implies convergence of fictitious play.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.     

Adaptive theorizing in a maladaptive world

The Santa Fe Institute’s economics program has nurtured some of the discipline’s most highly innovative forml theorizing and interdisciplinary brainstorming since its inception in the late 1980s. This proceedings volume provides the occasion for a review of ten-year’s progress by researchers associated with the Institute. The initial programmatic proposals of the first volume have indeed ben fleshed out with a range of models incorporating bounded rationality, complex dynamics, genuine social interaction, open-ended evolution, and a hint at historical contingency. Some of the achievements and limitations of these approaches, both formal and otherwise, are discussed in this essay     

A return to Bentham's felicific calculus: From moral welfarism to technical non-welfarism

Abstract

This paper is a study of Bentham's felicific calculus. Challenging a view that contrasts ‘cardinal’ to ‘ordinal’ calculus, we show that these two forms of calculus constitute instead different phases of a single approach. Bentham sometimes has to rely upon proxy variables because of operational constraints, and consequently upon factors other than utility. As a utilitarian, Bentham is de facto welfarist from an ethical point of view. Surprisingly however, this study shows that Bentham resorts to non-welfare information in the actual application of his calculus. His approach reconciles non-welfarism from the technical standpoint with welfarism as a fundamental moral principle.     

Revealing the depth of reasoning in <Emphasis Type="Italic">p</Emphasis>-beauty contest games

The aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of information on levels of reasoning on individuals' choices in p-beauty contest games. In the baseline design, subjects received information only on the average and target values from the previous period. In the alternative design, the winner(s) explained in a short message (30 words maximum) what reasoning he/she applied in selecting the target value and then stopped playing. The winner's message, the winning number, the target and average values were then displayed on all computer screens. The results show that non-winning players imitate the level of rationality of winners, and a significant proportion of the population adopt strategies which are best responses to other imitators' behaviour rather than to the average level of rationality. Both the imitative strategies and the best responses to the imitative strategies stimulate a strong acceleration of the learning process. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C72, C91, C92     

Techno-economic paradigms as typical interfaces between producers and users

In this paper it is suggested that techno-economic paradigms should not only be considered as means of coordination among the producers of technological knowledge but also as means of coordination between groups of producers and users of specific types of artefacts, as shared specifications of typical interfaces between the two parties. If such interfaces are simplified and standardized, the information needs of the parties will be delimited (and this is necessary in the worlds of bounded rationality à la Simon and Hayek). However, successful product innovation will often presuppose an information-rich interaction and thereby often presuppose non-standardized interfaces. In the paper these two conflicting principles are developed in order to clarify several controversial issues within the theory of innovation and evolution.     

Is H.A. Simon a theoretician of decentralized planning? A comparison with F.A. Hayek on planning,market, and organizations

Herbert A. Simon acknowledged Friedrich A. Hayek as a founder of the notion of bounded rationality; yet Simon considered Hayek’s perspective incomplete, and, more in general, their views on market mechanisms, planning, and organization exhibit considerable differences. The comparison between these authors sheds light on Simon’s interpretation of planning, which emerges within his theory of organization (and not in traditional debates on socialism). Contrary to Hayek, he maintained that planning, in specific circumstances, is more advantageous than the market; and in both administration and organization, it involves a decentralized structure based on near independent sub-units. Decentralization of decisions also appears in social planning, which evolves through continuous interactions among planners (i.e., agents and institutions), and it is a process connoted by the absence of “fixed goals”. Finally, Simon defined modern economies more in terms of “organizational economies” than in those of “market economies” and this highlights a further difference with respect to the Austrian economist. This leads to analysis of the nature of organizations as hierarchical and “near-decomposable” structures, which refers to Simon’s theory of complexity and gives an epistemological explanation to the relation between centralization and decentralization.     

Do Migrants get Good Jobs in Australia? The Role of Ethnic Networks in Job Search*

We study the role of ethnic networks in migrants’ job search and the quality of jobs they find in the first years of settlement. We find that there are initial downward movements along the occupational ladder, followed by improvements. As a result of restrictions in welfare eligibility since 1997, we study whether this increases the probability that new migrants accept ‘bad jobs’ quickly and then move onto better jobs over time. Holding employability constant, our results support this view. However, accounting for their higher employability, new migrants seem to fare better up to 1.5 years after settlement.     

Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets

This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium.     

Some Misunderstood Aspects of the Final Chapter of Keynes’s General Theory

ABSTRACT

Some seriously misunderstood issues arise in three paragraphs in the last chapter of Keynes’s General Theory concerning the relationship between his theory and orthodox theory. That these passages permit a form of theoretical reconciliation is a view shared by prominent commentators of opposing persuasions. Joan Robinson and John Eatwell strongly criticised Keynes for inconsistency and for opening the door to neoclassical elements that undermine his theorising, while Paul Samuelson made Keynes’s comments the foundation of his textbook neoclassical synthesis. The reconciliation view, however, is based on hasty non-contextual readings and is mistaken. More careful analysis leads to three conclusions: neither internal inconsistency nor neoclassical appeasement exists; Keynes’s paragraphs are aligned with the theoretical positions previously advanced in the General Theory; and what is actually deployed is a complementarity view relating his macro-theory to one particular part of orthodox micro-theory. Rejecting the dominant view, however, does not remove the issue of the absence in Keynes’s work of an adequately exposited micro-theory to accompany his macro-theory.