Convex Time Budgets and Individual Discount Rates in the Long Run

The purpose of this study is to use experimental data to estimate individual discount rates and test for hyperbolic discounting over a long time horizon. To do this, we employ the convex time budget experimental approach with cash payments over a 20 year time horizon. To date, there are few experimental studies that explore discount rates beyond a 1 year time horizon. Previous experimental studies that focus on short time horizons find high discount rates, which may not be applicable to decisions that affect outcomes in the distant future. Our findings are quite similar to the average rate of 4.9% found by Grijalva et al. (Environ Resour Econ 59:39–63, 2014), who similarly use a 20 year time horizon, but use the multiple price list elicitation method along with payment via government savings bonds. We find annual discounts rates in the range of 1.9–5.5%, depending on the specific model used. We also find evidence for declining discount rates, and that this hyperbolic pattern of behavior is related to the confidence subjects have in receiving distant-future payments.     

Multiple switching behaviour in different display formats of multiple price lists

A common approach to elicit risk attitude is the multiple price list with a series of binary choices. However, a frequently observed problem when using multiple price lists is that participants switch more than once from the safer to the riskier option, thus exhibiting multiple switching behaviour. The present study analyses whether the visualization of different multiple price lists reduce multiple switching behaviour. Therefore, we conduct two types of multiple price lists in two different display formats. Participants are randomly assigned into a textual or a visual group and carry out both multiple price lists in the corresponding display format. Our results reveal that different types of multiple price lists lead to differences in the extent of multiple switching behaviour. Moreover, we show that the visualization of a multiple price list can be an instrument to greatly reduce multiple switching behaviour.     

Permanence discounting for land-based carbon sequestration

One major concern regarding land-based carbon sequestration involves the issue of permanence. Sequestration may not last forever and may either be released in the future or require expenditures to maintain the practices that keep it sequestered. In this paper, we investigate the differential value of offsets in the face of impermanent characteristics by forming a price discount that equalizes the effective price per ton between a “perfect offset” and one possessing some with impermanent characteristics. We find this discount to be a function of the future needs to replace offsets (in the face of lease expiration quantity or volatilization upon activities such as timber harvest) and the magnitude of any needed maintenance costs. We investigate the magnitude of the discounts under alternative agricultural tillage and forest management cases. In those studies, we find that permanence discounts in the range of 50% are not uncommon. This means that in the market place an impermanent sequestration offset may only receive payments amounting to 50% of the market carbon price. Furthermore, we find that in the face of escalating carbon prices that offsets may prove to be worthless.     

Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs

This paper formalizes the idea that input transactions might be used to implement side payments among colluding firms. A model is proposed to analyze the effect of backward integration on collusive outcomes in a downstream duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs. Vertical integration expands the set of collusive outcomes that are sustainable for a given realization of the discount factor. This is an additional effect of vertical integration that antitrust authorities should consider. Side payments implemented by input sales are more relevant the larger the difference in marginal costs, since they allow for the shifting of production towards the relatively more efficient firms, while maintaining firms’ incentives to collude. A price of the input above that posted by an alternative source or sales of the input below cost may be observed, depending on the realization of downstream firms’ costs.      

延期支付下部分价格折扣的变质物品订货模型

一般的延期支付库存模型将产品采购价视为固定不变的,而实际商业活动中,价格折扣是供应商促销的一种常用手段。本文在进一步考虑"数量界限"的价格折扣问题的基础上,建立了一个延期支付下部分价格折扣的变质物品经济订购批量模型,分析了两种情况下订货商的最优订货策略,并用算例进行了说明。     

Correcting for transitory effects in RCTs: Evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment

Temporary randomized controlled trials are susceptible to transitory effects that would not result from a permanent treatment. We find a large and statistically significant “deadline effect”—a surge in spending in the final treatment year—in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, identified by random allocation to three- or five-year enrolment terms. Participants facing lower coinsurance rates show larger spending surges. Partialing out the price–deadline interaction reduces in magnitude estimates of the permanent price elasticity of drug spending (and in some specifications of outpatient and supplies spending). This implies higher optimal coinsurance rates and illustrates the importance of experimental design to identifying parameters of interest in randomized controlled trials.     

Estimated burden of cardiovascular disease and value-based price range for evolocumab in a high-risk,secondary-prevention population in the US payer context

Aim: To estimate real-world cardiovascular disease (CVD) burden and value-based price range of evolocumab for a US-context, high-risk, secondary-prevention population.

Materials and methods: Burden of CVD was assessed using the UK-based Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD) in order to capture complete CV burden including CV mortality. Patients on standard of care (SOC; high-intensity statins) in CPRD were selected based on eligibility criteria of FOURIER, a phase 3 CV outcomes trial of evolocumab, and categorized into four cohorts: high-risk prevalent atherosclerotic CVD (ASCVD) cohort (n?=?1448), acute coronary syndrome (ACS) (n?=?602), ischemic stroke (IS) (n?=?151), and heart failure (HF) (n?=?291) incident cohorts. The value-based price range for evolocumab was assessed using a previously published economic model. The model incorporated CPRD CV event rates and considered CV event reduction rate ratios per 1?mmol/L reduction in low-density lipoprotein-cholesterol (LDL-C) from a meta-analysis of statin trials by the Cholesterol Treatment Trialists Collaboration (CTTC), i.e. CTTC relationship.

Results: Multiple-event rates of composite CV events (ACS, IS, or coronary revascularization) per 100 patient-years were 12.3 for the high-risk prevalent ASCVD cohort, and 25.7, 13.3, and 23.3, respectively, for incident ACS, IS, and HF cohorts. Approximately one-half (42%) of the high-risk ASCVD patients with a new CV event during follow-up had a subsequent CV event. Combining these real-world event rates and the CTTC relationship in the economic model, the value-based price range (credible interval) under a willingness-to-pay threshold of $150,000/quality-adjusted life-year gained for evolocumab was $11,990 ($9,341–$14,833) to $16,856 ($12,903–$20,678) in ASCVD patients with baseline LDL-C levels ≥70?mg/dL and ≥100?mg/dL, respectively.

Conclusion: Real-world CVD burden is substantial. Using the observed CVD burden in CPRD and the CTTC relationship, the cost-effectiveness analysis showed that, accounting for uncertainties, the expected value-based price for evolocumab is higher than its current annual cost, as long as the payer discount off list price is greater than 20%.     

On intrabrand and interbrand competition: The strategic role of fees and royalties

We examine oligopolistic markets with both intrabrand and interbrand competition. We characterize equilibrium contracts involving a royalty (or wholesale price) and a fee when each upstream firm contracts with multiple downstream firms. Royalties control competition between own downstream firms at the expense of making them passive against rivals. When the number of downstream firms is endogenous, each upstream firm chooses to have only one downstream firm. This result is in sharp contrast to previous literature where competitors benefit by having a larger number of independent downstream firms under only fixed fee payments. We discuss why allowing upstream firms to charge per-unit payments in addition to fixed fees dramatically alters their strategic incentives.     

Economic modeling for the US of the cost-efficiency and associated expanded treatment access of conversion to biosimilar pegfilgrastim-bmez from reference pegfilgrastim

Abstract

Aims: For this economic analysis, we aimed to model: (1) the cost-efficiency of prophylaxis with biosimilar pegfilgrastim-bmez for chemotherapy-induced (febrile) neutropenia (CIN/FN) compared to reference pegfilgrastim, and (2) the expanded access to CIN/FN prophylaxis and anti-neoplastic treatment that could be achieved with biosimilar cost-savings on a budget-neutral basis.

Methods: In a hypothetical panel of 20,000 cancer patients receiving CIN/FN prophylaxis and using the average sales price (ASP) for the second quarter of 2019 for reference pegfilgrastim, we: conducted an ex ante simulation from the payer perspective of the cost-savings of 10–100% conversion from reference to biosimilar pegfilgrastim-bmez using drug price discounting ranging from 10–35%; estimated the budget-neutral expanded access to biosimilar pegfilgrastim-bmez enabled by these cost-savings; and estimated the budget-neutral expanded access to anti-neoplastic treatment with pembrolizumab. The simulations were replicated using fourth quarter 2019 wholesale acquisition cost (WAC) for reference pegfilgrastim and biosimilar pegfilgrastim-bmez in a post facto analysis.

Results: In ASP simulations, cost-savings of using pegfilgrastim-bmez over reference pegfilgrastim in a 20,000 patient panel range from $1.3?M (at 15% price discount) to $3?M (35%) at 10% conversion rate and from $6.4?M to $14.9?M, respectively, at 50% conversion. These savings could provide prophylaxis with pegfilgrastim-bmez to an additional 352 (15% discount) to 1,076 patients (35%) at 10% conversion or 1,764–5,384, respectively, at 50% conversion. Alternatively, savings could be reallocated for anti-neoplastic treatment with pembrolizumab to 3 (15% discount) to 9 (35%) patients at 10% conversion or 19–45, respectively, at 50% conversion. When utilizing WAC, cost-savings range from $4.6?M (10% conversion) to $23.1?M (50%) which could provide pegfilgrastim-bmez to an additional 1,174 (10% conversion) to 5,873 patients (50%).

Conclusions: Prophylaxis with biosimilar pegfilgrastim-bmez increases the value of cancer care by generating significant cost-savings that could be reallocated to provide expanded access to CIN/FN prevention and anti-neoplastic therapy on a budget-neutral basis.     

The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?

This paper considers the stability of tacit collusion in price setting duopolies with repeated interaction. The minimum discount factor above which tacit collusion can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium is called the critical discount factor δ*. In addition, δ* is often used as an intuitive measure for the stability of a tacit cartel, assuming that a collusive equilibrium is more difficult to sustain when δ* increases. However, according to standard theory the distance δ − δ* between the actual and the critical discount factor does not matter for stability as long as δ > δ*. This paper contributes experimental evidence that supports the intuitive idea that a larger critical discount factor makes collusion a less likely outcome.      

Eliciting Individual Discount Rates

Controlled laboratory conditions using monetary incentives have been utilized in previous studies that examine individual discount rates, and researchers have found several apparently robust anomalies. We conjecture that subject behavior in these experiments may be affected by (uncontrolled) factors other than discount rates. We address some experimental design issues and report a new series of experiments designed to elicit individual discount rates. Our primary treatments include: (i) informing subjects of the annual and effective interest rates associated with alternative payment streams, and (ii) informing subjects of current market interest rates. We also test for the effect of real (vs. hypothetical) payments and for the effect of delaying both payment options (vs. offering an immediate payment option). The statistical analysis uses censored data techniques to account for the interactions between field and lab incentives. Each of the information treatments appears to reduce revealed discount rates. When both types of information are provided, annual rates in the interval of 15%–17.5% are revealed, whereas rates of 20%–25% are revealed in the control session. Each of the treatments also lowers the residual variance of subject responses.     

On the Impact of “Callback” Competition on International Telephony

In this paper we build a simple three-country model to evaluate the impact of callback on international telephony. The effects on both accounting rates and collection prices are studied. Callback firms exploit arbitrage opportunities in collection prices among countries, rerouting calls that originate in countries with high prices for international phone calls via countries with low prices. Contrary to what is commonly perceived, we show that callback tends to magnify the distortions associated with the current accounting rate regime. In particular, callback puts upward pressure on low price countries accounting rates and on collection charges. Callback companies are assumed to enjoy a volume price discount on each rerouted call; we show that the larger the price discount offered to callback companies, the higher the prices for international calls in the country hosting callback.     

Reconciling sustainability, systems theory and discounting

Most definitions of sustainability imply that a system is to be maintained at a certain level, held within certain limits, into the indefinite future. Sustainability denies run-away growth, but it also avoids any decline or destruction. This sustainability path is hard to reconcile with the renewal cycle that can be observed in many natural systems developing according to their intrinsic mechanisms and in social systems responding to internal and external pressures. Systems are parts of hierarchies where systems of higher levels are made up of subsystems from lower levels. Renewal in components is an important factor of adaptation and evolution. If a system is sustained for too long, it borrows from the sustainability of a supersystem and rests upon lack of sustainability in subsystems. Therefore by sustaining certain systems beyond their renewal cycle, we decrease the sustainability of larger, higher-level systems. For example, Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction posits that in a capitalist economy, the collapse and renewal of firms and industries is necessary to sustain the vitality of the larger economic system. However, if the capitalist economic system relies on endless growth, then sustaining it for too long will inevitably borrow from the sustainability of the global ecosystem. This could prove catastrophic for humans and other species. To reconcile sustainability with hierarchy theory, we must decide which hierarchical level in a system we want to sustain indefinitely, and accept that lower level subsystems must have shorter life spans. In economic analysis, inter-temporal discount rates essentially tell us how long we should care about sustaining any given system. Economists distinguish between discount rates for individuals based on personal time preference, lower discount rates for firms based on the opportunity cost of capital, and even lower discount rates for society. For issues affecting even higher-level systems, such as global climate change, many economists question the suitability of discounting future values at all. We argue that to reconcile sustainability with inter-temporal discounting, discount rates should be determined by the hierarchical level of the system being analyzed.     

THE OPTIMAL LISTING STRATEGIES IN ONLINE AUCTIONS

This article proposes a unified framework to completely characterize the seller's optimal listing strategy in the online auction as a function of her rate of time impatience. Specifically, the fixed‐price listing, the regular auction, and the buy‐it‐now (BIN) auction are each a solution of the seller's single optimization problem under different values of the rate of intertemporal discount: The perfectly patient seller adopts the regular auction, the sellers with a medium range of time impatience adopt the BIN auction, and the most impatient of sellers adopt the fixed‐price listing. Moreover, under mild conditions, the reverse price is inversely related to the value of the seller's discount factor, either within or across formats. This in turn implies that the posted price in the fixed‐price sale is greater than the reserve price of the BIN auction, followed by that of the regular auction. These predictions offer clear empirical implications.     

TURNPIKE PROPERTIES OF A MONEY‐IN‐THE‐UTILITY‐FUNCTION MODEL*

This study establishes the global stability of a long‐run stationary state in a money‐in‐the‐utility‐function model. The major finding is that the constant money supply rule results in a stable allocation and price system if consumers discount their future utilities sufficiently weakly. Nominal and real interest rates will be in the neighbourhood of the inverse of the consumers’ discount factor β^‐1.     

Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products

We study the optimal ( i.e. revenue maximizing) auction of multiple products. We make three major points. First, we extend the relationship between price discrimination and optimal auctions from the single-product case to the multiple-product case. A monopolist setting prices for multiple products may offer discounts on purchases of bundles of products; similarly, the optimal auction of multiple products facilitates price discrimination by allocating products inefficiently to customers who are willing to purchase both products. Second, we demonstrate that optimal auctions are qualitatively distinct from monopoly sales of multiple products. Because of uncertainty about the values of other consumers, two products are bundled probabilistically in an optimal auction for a customer who is willing to buy both of them. A customer may then receive a discount on a lower-valued product without receiving a higher-valued product. Third, we show that in an optimal auction of two products the allocation of one product may vary with the amount of competition for the other product.     

TARGETING FARM PROGRAMS

"Targeting" in the agricultural policy context generally means directing payments to small or financially vulnerable farms or to poor farm families. This may seem a worthy objective. If farm programs were designed to act as welfare, then focusing the benefits on the needy clearly would be appropriate. Payments now are roughly the difference between the market price per unit produced and a high government price per unit. Therefore, farms with more output get larger payments. Further, revising farm programs to act as aid to the needy would be difficult. Targeting amendments currently proposed generally are unworkable and likely would do little to change the actual distribution of benefits. Finally, because farmers currently are eligible for other aid programs and because few producers of significant output meet general welfare criteria, seemingly little real reason exists for attempting to convert farm programs rather than simply phasing down the payment levels overall.     

Discounting the Distant Future: An Experimental Investigation

We use a laboratory experiment to elicit discount rates over a 20-year time horizon using government savings bonds as a payment vehicle. When using a constant (exponential) discount rate function, we find an implied average discount rate of 4.9 %, which is much lower than has been found in previous experimental studies that used time horizons of days or months. However, we also find strong support for non-constant, declining discount rates for longer time horizons, with an extrapolated implied annual discount rate approaching 0.5 % in 100 years. There is heterogeneity in discount rates and risk preferences in that people with more optimistic beliefs about technological progress have higher discount rates. These findings contribute to the debate over the appropriate discount rate to use in comparing the long-term benefits of climate change mitigation to the more immediate costs.     

Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes

Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation that results in the same collusive price has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly when collusion is sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-punishment strategies. In a Cournot duopoly model with linear demand and quadratic costs, it is shown that the critical discount factor is lower with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results in the same collusive price. However, in contrast to Colombo and Labrecciosa (J Public Econ 97:196–205, 2013) it is shown that the revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax.     

The Challenges of Climate Policy

Climate policy planners and the public should be aware of both economic challenges and arguments that may influence the intensity of the climate policies with which they have to cope. This article examines six economic challenges: cap‐and‐trade versus taxes, non‐price regulations, energy efficiency policies, mitigation versus adaptation, trade effects, and transmission planning. Three additional challenges affect the end itself: ‘fat tails’, discount rates, and whether environmental protection should be evaluated by willingness to pay. If future generations cannot compensate the present for climate policy costs, climate policy is inherently redistributive and cannot be evaluated through cost–benefit analysis alone.