Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover

We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance. Compared to outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock grants. The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest that new stock grants drive the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover performance is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation in the full sample and when analyzing forced and voluntary turnovers separately. We find limited evidence that future operating income is positively associated with option grants following forced turnover. Post-turnover improvement in operating income is positively associated with an increase in new stock grants for the incoming relative to the outgoing CEO.

Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation

We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO’s compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) compared to stock-based performance measures (market returns). In additional tests, we further find that CEO compensation in these firms has lower variance and a higher proportion of cash (versus stock-based) compensation. We further find that CEOs’ incentives (measured as changes in CEO annual wealth which includes expected changes in the value of the CEO’s equity holdings in addition to yearly compensation) do not vary across governance structures. These findings are consistent with CEOs in firms with high takeover protection and where they have more influence on governance negotiating different contracts.

Director Compensation and CEO Bargaining Power in REITs

We analyze director compensation for Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and investigate the relations between director compensation and other measures of the board independence and board monitoring. Using 136 REITs in 2001, we find that REITs that pay higher equity-based compensation to their board members are associated with higher financial performance. Our data indicate that board equity-based compensation is positively related to the existence of an independent nomination committee, however, it has no significant relationship with board size, proportion of outside directors, CEO duality and CEO tenure and ownership.

Bank capitalization and lending behavior after the introduction of the Basle Accord

In this paper, we provide evidence that banks with a low level of capitalization have reduced their commitment with respect to lines of credit after the introduction of the Basle Accord. A bank's lending behavior reflects its level of commitment towards borrowers, which in turn affects the level of effort it exerts on screening and monitoring the activities of borrowers. We find that the post-Basle Accord market reaction to the announcement of lines of credit issued by banks with a low level of capitalization is significantly lower than the reaction to other types of bank credit announcements. We interpret this result as evidence that some banks have a low level of commitment associated with lines of credit after the Basle Accord.

Interest rate risk of German financial institutions: the impact of level,slope, and curvature of the term structure

We investigate here the sensitivity of the equity values of a large sample of German financial institutions to movements in the term structure of interest rates. While similar approaches rely on a single interest rate factor only, we quantify the exposure to changes in level, slope, and curvature, which are the driving factors of term structure changes. Our main findings are: (i) banks and insurances are exposed to level and curvature changes but only marginally to slope movements; (ii) the interest rate risk exposure depends on the banking sector investigated; (iii) level and curvature changes are priced in the cross-section of stock returns.

Publicly traded versus privately held: implications for conditional conservatism in bank accounting

Compared with privately held banks, publicly traded banks face greater agency costs because of greater separation of ownership and control but enjoy greater benefits from access to the equity capital market. Differences in control and capital market access influence public versus private banks’ accounting. We predict and find that public banks exhibit greater degrees of conditional conservatism (asymmetric timeliness of the recognition of losses versus gains in accounting income) than private banks. We predict and find that public banks recognize more timely earnings declines, less timely earnings increases, and larger and more timely loan losses. Although public ownership gives managers greater ability and incentive to exercise income-increasing accounting, our findings show that the demand for conservatism dominates within public banks and that the demand for conservatism is greater among public banks than private banks. Our results provide insights for accounting and finance academics, bank managers, auditors, and regulators concerning the effects of ownership structure on conditional conservatism in banks’ financial reporting.

Multimarket Contact and Profitability in Banking: Evidence from Italy

In this paper we test the theory according to which multimarket contact is a crucial factor hampering competition among firms, because it lowers the incentive to behave aggressively in one market if there is fear that rivals retaliate in other common markets. We consider the Italian banking industry in the period 2002–2005, employing both market-level and firm-level data. The empirical evidence supports theory predictions, since profitability is positively related to the average number of contacts among banks, and appear to be higher for those credit institutions experiencing more links. This result has also policy implications, given the increasing consolidation (and hence the growing number of interactions in local markets) that has characterized this sector in the last years.

Managerial Rationale for Entry and the Relation to Performance and Small-Business Lending

In a survey of banks founded from 1994–2002, we find over 85% of respondents think their small-business market was underserved, 72% felt the market needed more competition, almost half indicated they were likely to start a bank because takeover activity displaced them, and 75% entered due to a market merger. Markets of banks started by displaced managers or following a merger have performance and lending characteristics similar to comparable banks, but larger changes in asset growth rates. Managers who responded that small-businesses were underserved have higher numbers and amounts of small-business loans 3 years after entry. Managers responding that entry was due to mergers eliminating community banks have lower ROA, but larger changes in market ROA. Markets had smaller changes in ROA when entry was to provide competition or when managers thought the small business market was underserved.

Credit Unions and Small Business Lending

Among the issues raised by consolidation within the banking industry is a concern that small businesses will be less able to obtain credit as community banks are acquired by larger or non-local institutions. Community banks have traditionally been a major source of funding for small businesses. The impact of bank consolidation on credit availability may depend in part on whether the remaining community institutions expand their small business lending activities. This study examines whether credit unions have a propensity to extend business loans in markets that have experienced bank merger and acquisition activity. We find some evidence that credit unions are more likely to engage in business lending in markets characterized by greater bank merger and acquisition activity. Moreover, the estimated economic significance is meaningful in many of the specifications.

CEO Involvement in Director Selection: Implications for REIT Dividend Policy

This paper examines the relationship between CEO entrenchment and dividend policy of real estate investment trusts (REITs). We develop an index for CEO entrenchment using CEO tenure and duality and find that this index has significant impact on dividend policy. We further separate our sample into two sub-groups: REITs with and without nomination committees. Our analyses show a strong positive relationship between CEO entrenchment level and dividend payout for REITs without a nomination committee. In REITs with nomination committees, CEO entrenchment has less influence on dividend policy. We conclude that dividend policy serves as a substitution for other governance mechanisms. Further, our results are consistent with the evidence for other US firms—CEO that are more entrenched pay higher dividends to avoid shareholder sanctions and the threat of takeover.

Executive Compensation in UK Property Companies

We study the drivers of executive compensation in the listed UK property sector. The UK provides an excellent opportunity to analyze executive compensation due to high transparency in the different components of executive compensation. We show that company size is the most important variable in explaining the level of executive compensation. We find that absolute and relative share performance significantly explains long-term compensation, that management style has a distinct influence on the level of executive compensation, and that using alternative monitoring mechanisms (institutional shareholders, debtholders, and outside directors) leads to higher levels of long-term incentives. We find only weak evidence of pay-performance sensitivity for both cash and long-term compensation. Executive shareholdings provide a much stronger link between pay and performance than does executive compensation.

Concentration of Banking Relationships in Switzerland: The Result of Firm Structure or Banking Market Structure?

Switzerland is one of the countries with the highest concentration of bank–customer relationships. The present paper seeks to find out whether this can be explained by the structure of Swiss firms or by the organization of the Swiss banking market. Using survey data from small and medium-sized enterprises in 1996 and 2002, we examine the influence of firm-, loan-, and bank-specific variables on the number of banking relationships. We find that firm and industry structure have the largest explanatory power, while banking market structure and conduct play a minor role. Relationship lending by state-owned cantonal banks and small regional banks tends to enhance the concentration of banking relationships.

The association between audit committees,compensation incentives,and corporate audit fees

This study uses audit fee data from the 2001–2003 reporting periods to examine the relationship between measures of audit committee effectiveness and compensation incentives with corporate audit fees. Our results suggest that audit committee size, committee member expertise, and committee member independence are positively associated to audit fee levels, consistent with the notion that audit committees serve as a complement to external auditors in monitoring management. In contrast, CEO long-term pay and insider ownership are inversely related to audit fee levels, substituting for external audit effort in motivating management. Notwithstanding results on the full sample of firm-years, we uncover significant differences in the determinants of audit fees between the years examined. An important implication of these results is that explaining the intra-firm variation in audit fees over time is clearly necessary in order to understand the antecedents and consequences of audit fees.

Information, Credit Risk, Lender Specialization and Loan Pricing: Evidence from the DIP Financing Market

We provide an empirical support for theories of lender specialization using the recently developed market for Debtor-in-Possession (DIP) financing. The legal environment in which DIP financing operates represents a natural laboratory for testing determinants of lending specialization (e.g. lender choice). We find that the choice of lender is not driven by credit risk, but by information considerations and that this lending specialization has loan pricing effects. In short, banks (non-bank lenders) lend to more (less) transparent firms and at lower (higher) loan spreads. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that banks provide important and useful services.

Bank Competition,Risk, and Subordinated Debt

This paper studies a dynamic model of banking in which banks compete for insured deposits, issue subordinated debt, and invest in either a prudent or a gambling asset. The model allows banks to choose their level of risk after the interest rate on subordinated debt is contracted. We show that requiring banks to issue a small amount of subordinated debt can reduce their gambling incentives. Moreover, when equity capital is more expensive than subordinated debt, adding a subordinated debt requirement to a policy regime that only uses equity capital requirements is Pareto improving.

Economic consequences of financial reporting changes: diluted EPS and contingent convertible securities

This paper examines the economic consequences of changes in the financial reporting requirements for contingent convertible securities (COCOs). Using a sample of 199 COCO issuers from 2000 to 2004, we find that issuers are more likely to restructure or redeem existing COCOs to obtain more favorable accounting treatment when the financial reporting impact on diluted earnings per share (EPS) is greater and when EPS is used as a performance metric in CEO bonus contracts. These results provide new evidence that managers are willing to incur costs to retain perceived financial reporting and compensation benefits. We also present evidence of significantly negative stock returns around event dates associated with the financial reporting changes, consistent with investor anticipation of the agency costs associated with the rule change.

Income Diversification and Bank Performance: Evidence from Italian Banks

Using annual data from Italian banks, we study the link between non-interest revenues and profitability. We find that income diversification increases risk-adjusted returns. Our results provide econometric evidence consistent with current studies on EU banks, but do not support findings on the U.S. experience. In our view, the differences depend primarily on the relative importance of local banks: we find that the relation is stronger at large banks. In addition, we find that there are limits to diversification gains as banks get larger. Small banks can make gains from increasing non-interest income, but only when they have very little non-interest income share to start with. The source of non-interest income is less important than its level.

IMF Bank-Restructuring Efficiency Outcomes: Evidence from East Asia

We report new findings on bank efficiency in East Asian countries for the pre- and post-IMF restructuring periods. We find that bank efficiency has improved, but only to the pre-IMF intervention level, and that restructured banks are not more efficient than their unrestructured counterparts. Different restructuring measures have different effects. Bank closures are economically justified, but mergers show short-term efficiency losses. Recapitalization and reprivatization of badly performing banks lead to efficiency improvement, but also increase government ownership. Ease of entry that has allowed for more foreign bank participation results in slightly improved performance of badly performing banks.

Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and the Potential Competitive Impact of Basel II in the Market for Residential Mortgages

U.S. banking regulators have proposed a bifurcated system of capital regulation where the largest, internationally active banking organizations would be subject to significantly more risk sensitive regulatory capital requirements than are currently in place, while most others would remain subject to the current rules. The proposed new capital regime has the potential to affect the competitive landscape among banking institutions, particularly in the area of residential mortgage lending. We analyze the potential competitive effects of the proposed, bifurcated regulatory capital system on competition in the residential mortgage market from the perspective of the theory of regulatory capital arbitrage. We then apply the theory and available evidence to perform some benchmark calculations that suggest a significant, potential shift of market share and income to the largest banking institutions in the mortgage market.

Trading Intensity and Real Estate Performance

This paper investigates whether it is possible to create value through the active management of direct property portfolios. Using data from the USA, the UK and Australia, we examine whether trading intensity and portfolio growth explain the risk and return characteristics of listed property companies. The results suggest that beating the market by pursuing tactical asset selection and investment timing strategies is difficult even when acquiring and disposing of properties in illiquid private property markets. When the property type in which the firm specializes is included as a control variable in the regressions, none of the portfolio management intensity indicators developed in this paper is significantly associated with abnormal performance or systematic risk.