Household's preferences and monetary policy inertia

Interest rates set by central banks puzzlingly move with a certain inertia. We show that household's preferences can be important determinants of the optimal interest rate inertia due to their impact on the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.     

Inflation, unemployment, and the time consistency of the US monetary policy

This paper verifies the performance of the Barro and Gordon (1983) model to explain the US inflation since the early 1950s. We divide the period from 1951:2 to 2010:2 according to each chairman of the Federal Reserve (FED). In addition, we consider aggregated periods, represented by pre-Volcker, Volcker-Greenspan, Greenspan-Bernanke, and whole sample. A genetic algorithm of stochastic search is applied to reduce the sensitivity of the maximum likelihood estimator to the initial parameter values. Surprisingly, our results show that the time consistency problem explains the US inflation during the Greenspan chairmanship at the FED.     

Transparency in monetary policy: A general equilibrium approach

We study a general equilibrium model with a central bank (CB) and two groups of agents, producers and workers. The CB maximizes a weighted average of utilities of the two groups. The CB has two possible types, one favoring workers and the other favoring producers. The CB's type is private information. We compare two possible monetary policy regimes, transparent and opaque. For realistic values of parameters, it is shown that workers are better off under the opaque regime, whereas producers are better off under the transparent regime. This result is shown to hold in two cases, when the range of possible monetary transfers is small and when the range of possible monetary transfers is large.     

A two-pillar DSGE monetary policy model for the euro area

The current financial crisis has revived the interest for monitoring both monetary and credit developments. Over the past two decades, consistent with the adoption of inflation targeting strategies by a growing number of central banks and the development of New Keynesian models for which monetary aggregates are largely irrelevant, money and credit have been progressively neglected in the conduct of monetary policy. A striking exception has been the Eurosystem, which has implemented a strategy known as the “two-pillar monetary policy strategy” giving a prominent role for money. In this paper, we develop a small optimizing model based on Ireland (2004), estimated on euro area data and featuring this two-pillar strategy. We evaluate an ECB-style cross-checking policy rule in a DSGE model with real balance effects of money. We find some evidence that indeed money plays a non-trivial role in explaining the euro area business cycle. This provides a rationale for the central bank to factor in monetary developments but also raises some issues regarding the reliability of M3 as an appropriate monetary indicator. We find some evidence that the ECB has systematically reacted to a filtered measure of money growth but weak evidence it has reacted more aggressively during excess money growth periods.     

Evaluating inflation targeting as a monetary policy objective for India

This study formulates a small open economy model for India with exchange rate as a prominent channel of monetary policy. The model is estimated using the Instrumental Variable-Generalized Methods of Moments (IV-GMM) estimator and evaluated through simulations. This study compares different cases of domestic and CPI inflation targeting, strict and flexible inflation targeting, and simple Taylor type rules. The analysis highlights the unsuitability of simple Taylor-type monetary rules in stabilizing the Indian economy and suggests that discretionary optimization works better in stabilizing this economy. There seems to be a trade-off between output gap stabilization and exchange rate stabilization in flexible domestic inflation targeting and CPI inflation targeting respectively. However, flexible domestic inflation targeting seems a better alternative from an overall macro stabilization perspective in India where financial markets are still not sufficiently integrated to ensure quick transmission of interest rate impulses and existence of rigidities in the economy.     

Forecasting ECB monetary policy: Accuracy is a matter of geography

Monetary policy in the euro area is conducted within a multi-country, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual context. How does this heterogeneity affect the ability of economic agents to understand and to anticipate monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB)? Using a database of surveys of professional ECB policy forecasters in 24 countries, we find remarkable differences in forecast accuracy, and show that these have important repercussions on market behaviour. Explaining the differences in forecast accuracy, we provide evidence that they are partly related to geography and clustering around informational hubs, as well as to country-specific economic conditions. In large part this heterogeneity can be traced to differences in forecasting models.     

Data uncertainty and the role of money as an information variable for monetary policy

In this study, we perform a quantitative assessment of the role of money as an indicator variable for monetary policy in the euro area. We document the magnitude of revisions to euro area-wide data on output, prices, and money, and find that monetary aggregates have a potentially significant role in providing information about current real output. We then proceed to analyze the information content of money in a forward-looking model in which monetary policy is optimally determined subject to incomplete information about the true state of the economy. We show that monetary aggregates may have substantial information content in an environment with high variability of output measurement errors, low variability of money demand shocks, and a strong contemporaneous linkage between money demand and real output. As a practical matter, however, we conclude that money has fairly limited information content as an indicator of contemporaneous aggregate demand in the euro area.     

Optimal monetary policy for a small open economy

This paper focuses on the design of monetary policy rules for a small open economy. The model features optimizing behavior, general equilibrium and price stickiness. The real exchange rate is shown to affect the firm's real marginal cost, aggregate supply and aggregate demand. The welfare objective depends on the openness of the economy, and the optimal policy rule differs from that which obtains in a closed economy. The inflation versus output gap stabilization trade-off is caused by the real exchange rate. The implied optimal monetary policy regime is domestic inflation target coupled with controlled floating of the real exchange rate.     

Signalling commitment with monetary and inflation targets

This article studies a two-period game between the public and a central bank about whose ability to commit to an announced target the public is uncertain. The central bank chooses between announcing a target for an intermediate variable (money growth) and its goal variable, inflation. Prior to setting its instrument, the central bank receives private, noisy information about the link between money growth and inflation. Monetary targeting facilitates communication of the central bank's type, in that the probability of separation is always higher than under inflation targeting. This advantage of monetary targets from a dependable central bank's perspective is outweighed for most parameter values by the advantage of inflation targeting in terms of inflation control. If the regime choice is treated as a strategic decision, over a large range of parameter values both central banks choose the regime that a dependable central bank would prefer.     

Credit spread and monetary policy

We show that the spread-adjusted Taylor rule including a response to the credit spread is a theoretically optimal monetary policy under heterogeneous loan contracts. However, the optimal response to the credit spread is ambiguous, given the financial market structure.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

Distortionary fiscal policy and monetary policy goals

We reconsider the role of an inflation conservative central banker in a setting with distortionary taxation. To do so, we assume monetary and fiscal policy are decided by independent authorities that do not abide to past commitments. If the two authorities make policy decisions simultaneously, inflation conservatism causes fiscal overspending. But if fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy, inflation conservatism imposes fiscal discipline. These results clarify that in our setting the value of inflation conservatism depends crucially on the timing of policy decisions.     

Trade credit, bank lending and monetary policy transmission

This paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy. Most models of the transmission mechanism allow firms to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion. In our model we consider external finance from trade credit as an additional source of funding for firms that cannot obtain credit from banks. We predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in bank lending relative to trade credit. This is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16,000 UK manufacturing firms.     

Rule-of-thumb behaviour and monetary policy

We investigate the implications of rule-of-thumb behaviour by consumers or price setters for optimal monetary policy and simple interest rate rules. This behaviour leads to endogenous persistence in output and inflation and alters the policymaker's welfare objective. Our main finding is that highly inertial policy is optimal regardless of what fraction of agents occasionally follow a rule of thumb. We also find that a first-difference version of Taylor's (Carnegie-Rochester Conf. Ser. Public Policy 39 (1993) 195-214) rule generally has desirable properties. By contrast, the coefficients in other optimised simple rules tend to be extremely sensitive with respect to the fraction of rule-of-thumb behaviour.     

Optimal monetary policy and economic growth

A question at the center of many analyses of optimal monetary policy is, why do central banks never implement the Friedman rule? To the list of answers to this question, we add neoclassical production (specifically, the Tobin effect) as one possible explanation. To that end, we study an overlapping generations economy with capital where limited communication and stochastic relocation create an endogenous transactions role for fiat money. We assume a production function with a knowledge externality (Romer style) that nests economies with endogenous growth (AK form) and those with no long-run growth (the Diamond model). The Tobin effect is shown to be always operative. Under CRRA preferences, a mild degree of social increasing returns is sufficient (but not necessary) for some positive inflation to dominate zero inflation and for the Friedman rule to be sub-optimal, irrespective of the degree of risk aversion.     

Market concentration, macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary policy

This paper studies the effect of market structure and macroeconomic uncertainty on the transmission of monetary policy. We motivate our analysis with a simple model which predicts that: (1) investment and production in more concentrated sectors are more affected by demand shocks and (2) high uncertainty makes investment and production more sensitive to demand shocks. The empirical analysis estimates the effect of monetary shocks on sectoral output for different sectors in the US using a structural vector autoregressive (VAR) approach. The results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions.     

Managing financial market expectations: The role of central bank transparency and central bank communication

In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency and informal central bank communication on the formation of money market expectations. The sample covers nine major central banks from January 1999 to July 2007. We find, first, that transparency reduces the bias in money market expectations and dampens their variation. Second, informal communications help manage financial market expectations by reducing the variation of expectations. Third, various subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency index lead to a smaller bias in expectations (in particular, evaluation of policy outcome and explanation of interest rate decisions) and to a reduction in the variation of expectations (in particular, explicit prioritization of objectives and provision of information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances).     

Euler equations and monetary policy

Euler equations are the key link between monetary policy and the real economy in NK models. Under separable preferences, they fail to match interest rates. Non-separability between leisure and consumption significantly improves their fit and reliability for studying monetary policy.     

The financial accelerator and monetary policy rules

Comparing Bernanke et al.’s (1999) financial accelerator model to a comparable model without an operational financial accelerator mechanism, we find that financial acceleration is reduced when monetary policy reacts to the output gap and when firm-specific volatility rises.