Reciprocity in Ranked Relationships: Does Social Structure Influence Social Reasoning?

Many economic and evolutionary theories have modeled cooperation as the evolutionary outcome of decisions made by autonomous, self-interested agents operating in a social vacuum. In this paper we consider the implications for cooperative interactions when prior social structures and corresponding social norms exist. In particular we investigate the influence of social rank/status on perceptions of fairness and tolerance of cheating. We review evidence from a series of experiments employing the Wason selection task (a test of conditional reasoning) and the ledger task (a decision making task) suggesting that people cued to adopt a perspective of high social rank are more tolerant of cheating and simultaneously believe that they have been more fairly treated (even when cheated) than people cued to adopt a perspective of low social rank. However, the evidence also suggests interesting cross-cultural differences in perceptions of fairness and tolerance of cheating in ranked relationships. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Second thoughts on free riding

We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.     

Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature

I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching.     

Evolutionary stability of social norms in a socioeconomic equilibrium model

A hybrid of a model of economic equilibrium in two markets and a social game is formed. The link between the two is established through a social norm that conditions correct social behavior on economic variables and therefore distorts the economic equilibrium allocation. The initial endowment of an individual determines whether she gains from a social norm. The evolution of norms is examined in a dynamic model where norms are more likely to persist if they deliver higher utility to their believers. Also it is assumed that norms lose importance when they are disobeyed by their believers. Optimally coordinating norms are not necessarily evolutionarily stable, and a suboptimal norm can be the outcome of the evolutionary process.     

IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE

This article provides experimental evidence on the impacts of irreversibility and imperfect monitoring on the efficiency and the equity of a repeated public goods game. We find that irreversibility and imperfect monitoring both lead to inefficient and unequal outcomes through different channels. Irreversibility lowers public goods contribution in earlier periods and makes the initial-period contribution gap between two players long-lasting. Imperfect monitoring hampers conditional cooperation and persistently reduces group contribution. A finite mixture estimation with conditional cooperators provides a coherent account of the treatment effects.     

Using patent analysis to establish technological position: Two different strategic approaches

Discussions on business strategy formation in the past 50 years can be separated into two categories: the inside-out and the outside-in approach. Technology is a critical factor when manager formulate their business strategy, and patents have served as an important indicator of technology. A patent portfolio can be used to understand the capabilities of a firm, as an inside resource pattern; and the patent citation of firms can be used to find the relationship of a firm, as an outside dependency. This study uses patent information to establish an effective model for the technological position of business methods. The 5 by 6 matrix was generated and four situations between firms were induced. Researchers and managers can use that matrix and situations to recognize the real competitors or cooperators, and formulate the technological strategies which include competition, cooperation, or complementary cooperation.     

Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?

A number of experimental studies have shown that the opportunity to punish anti-social behavior increases cooperation levels when agents face a social dilemma. Using a public good experiment, I show that in the presence of counter-punishment opportunities cooperators are less willing to punish free riders. As a result, cooperation breaks down and groups have lower earnings in comparison to a treatment without punishments where free riding is predominant. Approximately one quarter of all punishments are retaliated. Counter-punishments appear to be driven partly by strategic considerations and partly by a desire to reciprocate punishments.     

THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF COOPERATORS IN THE N‐PERSON PRISONERS’ DILEMMA WITH RANDOM ORDER MOVES*

The present paper examines the possibility of cooperation occurring in the N‐person prisoners’ dilemma, played with randomly ordered moves and imperfect information. To take into account imperfect cooperation, the degree of cooperation is evaluated in terms of the expected number of cooperators. It is shown that: (i) the expected number of cooperators is maximized at an equilibrium, a combination of strategies each of which is a type of trigger strategy; (ii) the maximum expected number of cooperators is attained in a state of imperfect cooperation for a range of payoff functions; and (iii) the maximum expected number of cooperators is non‐decreasing when the size of players’ group increases.     

Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game

We use a limited information environment to assess the role of confusion in the repeated voluntary contributions game. A comparison with play in a standard version of the game suggests, that the common claim that decision errors due to confused subjects biases estimates of cooperation upwards, is not necessarily correct. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the kind of contribution dynamics commonly attributed to the existence of conditional cooperators. We conclude that cooperative behavior and its decay observed in public goods games is not a pure artefact of confusion and learning.     

Peer punishment in teams: expressive or instrumental choice?

A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who violate norms are often targeted by their peers for punishment. In an experiment with small teams we examine whether subjects treat punishment itself as a second-order public good. Results do not support this view and rather suggest a hard-wired taste for punishment; subjects are engaged in a cooperative task but ignore the public good characteristics of punishment.     

On the evolution of conditional cooperation

A long series of laboratory and field experiments, as well as conventional empirical studies, has established that (1) individuals voluntarily provide themselves with public goods at levels exceeding those predicted by the Nash voluntary contributions mechanism, and (2) agents reciprocate increases in the contributions of their counterparts in such settings (conditional cooperation). This paper presents a simple model of the evolution of preferences for conditional cooperation in the presence of a public good, which explains these two empirical findings without employing reputational or group selection arguments. In this model, individuals inherit preferences to match other agents' contributions to the provision of a public good, at some specified “matching rate.” Agents whose preferences induce them to be relatively successful – in material terms – increase in number, from one generation to the next. Under complete information and with randomly matched groups of N agents who have quasilinear preferences over the public good and a private good, the unique evolutionarily stable matching rate is 1, leading to Pareto optimal voluntary provision of the public good, regardless of group size N. The evolutionarily stable matching rate can be viewed as an endogenous social norm.     

Measuring conditional cooperation: a replication study in Russia

We replicate the strategy-method experiment by Fischbacher et al. (Econ. Lett. 71:397–404, 2001) developed to measure attitudes towards cooperation in a one-shot public goods game. We collected data from 160 students at four different universities across urban and rural Russia. Using the classification proposed by Fischbacher et al. (2001) we find that the distribution of types is very similar across the four locations. The share of conditional cooperators in our Russian subject pools is comparable to the one found by Fischbacher et al. in a Swiss subject pool. However, the distribution of the other types differs from the one found in Switzerland.     

Social structure and consumption: on the diffusion of consumer good innovation

This paper presents a simple evolutionary model to study the diffusion patterns of product innovations for consumer goods. Following a Veblenian theme, we interpret consumption as a social activity constrained by social norms and class structure. Societies that allow for more behavioral variety will experience faster adoption of new consumer goods. We also find that the speed of diffusion as well as the saturation levels reached depend greatly on the structure of a society. Combining these two effects, we conclude that a social structure displaying behavioral variety and an even class structure fares better than any other social set-up in terms of the speed of adoption of product innovations and product variety. JEL Classification: D11, O31 This paper has benefited from comments by Robin Cowan and seminar participants at the University of Economics in Vienna, the Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT), University of Maastricht, participants of the EMAEE 2003 Conference in Augsburg, Germany as well as the Schumpeter Conference 2004 in Milan, Italy. We also would like to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive criticism and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply. Correspondence to: A. Reinstaller     

Social norms and the fertility transition

This paper provides a norm-based explanation for two features of the fertility transition that have been observed in many different settings: the slow response to external interventions and the wide variation in the response to the same intervention. Most societies have traditionally put norms into place to regulate fertility. When the economic environment changes, individuals gradually learn through their social interactions about the new reproductive equilibrium that will emerge in their community. This characterization of the fertility transition as a process of changing social norms is applied to rural Bangladesh, where norms are organized at the level of the religious group and interactions rarely cross religious boundaries. Consistent with the view that changing social norms are driving changes in reproductive behavior in these communities, we find that the individual's contraception decision responds strongly to changes in contraceptive prevalence in her own religious group within the village whereas cross-religion effects are entirely absent. Local changes in reproductive behavior occur independently across religious groups despite the fact that all individuals in the village have access to the same family planning inputs.     

An experimental analysis of team production in networks

Experimental and empirical evidence highlights the role of networks on social outcomes. This paper tests the properties of exogenously fixed networks in team production. Subjects make the same decisions in a team work environment under four different organizational networks: the line, the circle, the star, and the complete network. In all the networks, links make information available to neighbors. This design allows us to analyze decisions across networks and a variety of subject types in a standard linear team production game. Contribution levels differ significantly across networks and the star is the most efficient incomplete network. Moreover, our results suggest that subjects act as conditional cooperators with respect to the information received from the network.     

Social norms and individual savings in the context of informal insurance

This paper develops a theory of informal insurance in the presence of an intertemporal technology. It is shown that when an insurance agreement suffers from enforcement problems, constraints on individual savings behaviour can enable the group to sustain greater cooperation. This result provides a motivation for a variety of social norms observed in traditional societies which discourage ‘excessive’ accumulation of wealth by individuals. The paper also shows that social norms that discourage savings are more likely to benefit poorer communities and thus, paradoxically, cause them to fall further behind even as it serves a useful purpose.     

Conditional cooperation in a sequential move game

Cooperation is a pervasive social phenomenon, but more often than not economic theories have little to say about its causes and consequences. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that cooperative behaviour might be motivated by pure self-interest when the “social” payoff in a game is increasing. We report the results of a series of experiments on the Centipede game. The experiments are organised in two subsequent steps. Subjects first participate in a 2-period trust game, randomly matched with unknown partners. We apply the strategy method in order to elicit their social preferences. On the basis of their pre-game behaviour, individuals are divided into three main social groups: selfish individuals, pure altruists and reciprocators. At the second step of the experiment, subjects play a repeated 6-move Centipede game with an increasing final payoff. Each subject plays twice, in a low and in a high-stake Centipede game, and he/she is informed about his/her co-player social preferences. We provide statistical evidence to identify the origin of cooperation within homogeneous and heterogeneous social groups. We construct a Poisson regression model to assess the determinants of the duration of conditional cooperation in the Centipede.     

Play locally,learn globally: group selection and structural basis of cooperation

In group-structured populations, altruistic cooperation among unrelated group members may be sustainable even when the evolution of behavioral traits is governed by a payoff-based replicator dynamic. This paper explores the importance in this dynamic of two aspects of group structure: global or local interaction in a public goods game and global or local cultural transmission (learning) of behavioral traits. To clarify the underlying dynamic, I derive an extension of the Price equation for the decomposition of changes in the population frequency of a binary trait. I use this to analyze the effect of different structures of interaction and learning on within- and between-group variances of the frequency of cooperative behaviors and thereby on the evolution of cooperation. Of the four population structures given by global/local learning and global/local interaction, local interaction with global learning provides the most favorable environment for the evolution of cooperation. This combination of learning and interaction structures supports a high level of between-group variance in the frequency of cooperative types, so that most cooperators benefit from being in groups composed mostly of cooperators. However, while global learning is essential to the evolution of cooperation, cooperation is more robust when learning is not entirely global because local learning process, ironically, limits the extent to which defectors can free ride on cooperative group members.      

Which norms are strong reciprocators supposed to enforce? Not all norms are psychologically the same

Gintis’ (2000) analysis of strong reciprocity in terms of group survival leads to the conclusion that any norm, be it cooperative or prudential, that potentially enhances group survival will be enforced by a significant subset of individuals (strong reciprocators) who enforce norms even at their own individual expense. Gintis’ assumption that the human mind is an initially structureless receptacle for cultural norms further reinforces this view. In contrast, I argue that humans possess a natural domain-specific competence for social cooperation that is distinct from our prudential competence in dealing with potential hazards. I review a range of psychological evidence including multidimensional scaling studies, studies of emotional reactions, reasoning, functional MRI and judgments about punishment suggesting that not all norms are psychologically equivalent, with only a subset of norm violations eliciting punitive sentiments.     

Identity,Utility, and Cooperative Behaviour: An Evolutionary Perspective*†

This paper provides an argument for the advantage of a preference for identity‐consistent behaviour from an evolutionary point of view. Within a stylized model of social interaction, it is shown that the development of cooperative social norms is greatly facilitated if the agents possess a preference for identity‐consistent behaviour. As compliance with cooperative norms (in the long run) has a positive effect on the agents’ pay‐offs, it is argued that such a preference is evolutionarily advantageous. Notably, the argument, which assumes that agents always act in accordance with their preferences, also accounts for the cost of those features that are crucial for the selection process.