Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique

We examine the role of off-path “superstitions” in macro-economics, and show how a false belief about off-path play is the key element underlying both the Lucas Critique and the game-theoretic concept of self-confirming equilibrium. However, the impact of false beliefs in these two cases is different: In the Lucas case, a policy maker's incorrect beliefs about off-path play can lead to the adoption of mistaken policy innovation. However, the consequences of such an innovation provide evidence that the belief that motivated them was wrong. In contrast, play may never escape an undesirable self-confirming equilibrium, as the action implied by the mistaken belief does not generate data that contradicts it; escape from the self-confirming equilibrium requires that players do a sufficient amount of experimentation with off-path actions.     

Altruism and the Political Economy of Income Taxation

I develop a model in which altruistic agents vote over quadratic income tax schedules. Agents have heterogeneous preferences and productivities, and the model incorporates the incentive effects of taxation. The main result of the paper establishes the existence of a self-confirming majority rule equilibrium in which agents' labor supply decisions are optimal given their tax liabilities and the tax policy is a majority rule equilibrium given the labor supply decisions. In equilibrium the actions by all agents confirm their expectations, but such expectations may be incorrect out of equilibrium. The model generates majority rule voting equilibria that involve progressive taxation.     

Optimal policy with credibility concerns

This paper considers a reputation model of optimal taxation in which the public is unsure about the government type. A long-lived government can be trustworthy (meaning that it commits to its announced tax rate) or opportunistic (meaning that it retains the ability to change its tax rate after announcing it). Unlike in most prior studies, the committed strategy in this model is optimally chosen by the trustworthy type. We show that this change has significant consequences for the equilibrium dynamics. The optimal committed strategy is found to vary with the time preferences of the two government types, the initial reputation of the government, and the elasticity of household production. This formulation explains differences in policy responses across governments in the face of similar credibility problems.     

ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF GOVERNMENT BORROWING IN A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM

Abstract.  This paper constructs a dynamic general equilibrium model with money in consumers' utility functions and investigates the equilibrium dynamics of government's debt. The limitation level of the government borrowing for which a dynamic equilibrium and the no Ponzi Game condition are compatible with each other is explicitly derived. The critical level depends on the long-run interest rate, primary balance, money supply etc.     

The Babu and the Boxwallah: Managerial Incentives and Government Intervention in a Developing Economy

In developing economies a firm's strategy is directed more often at the government than at other competing firms. As an initial step towards modeling such interactions this paper considers a situation where a government confronts a monopoly. The latter chooses price and maximizes profit and the former chooses a tax rate and maximizes tax revenue. The government and the monopoly can delegate the final decision-making to, respectively, a bureaucrat and a manager. The incentive equilibrium of the model is characterized. It is shown that this kind of industrial setting is likely to exhibit greater inefficiencies than that which arises in standard models.     

Existence of equilibrium in an overlapping-generations model with government debt

The Diamond overlapping generations (OLG) model with government debt has been widely utilized in economics, but the existence of the steady-state equilibrium is either assumed or illustrated numerically. This paper provides easily checkable conditions for the existence and uniqueness of steady-state equilibrium in this model. By checking the first derivatives of the production and utility functions and their interactions, we can determine whether the model has a nontrivial equilibrium or not. We show that the level of government debt, production technology, individual preference, and the growth rate are important for the existence of equilibrium. If government debt exceeds a certain level, equilibrium will not exist. Given technology, preference, and the growth rate, the upper-bounds of the government debt-output ratio in equilibrium can be determined based on our results.     

INFLATION PERSISTENCE AND FLEXIBLE PRICES*

If the central bank follows an interest rate rule, then inflation is likely to be persistent, even when prices are fully flexible. Any shock, whether persistent or not, may lead to inflation persistence. In equilibrium, the dynamics of inflation are determined by the evolution of the spread between the real interest rate and the central bank's target. Inflation persistence can be characterized by a vector autocorrelation function relating inflation and output. This article shows that a flexible‐price, general‐equilibrium business cycle model with money and a central bank using an interest rate target can account for such inflation persistence.     

Equilibrium Growth in a Small Economy Facing an Imperfect World Capital Market

A growth model of a developing economy facing an upward-sloping curve of debt is analyzed. Equilibrium is characterized by transitional dynamics in which consumption, capital, and debt converge to a common growth rate. The adjustment is through the debt-capital ratio, which drives the borrowing rate to a level at which growth rates are equalized. The economy is subject to two externalities: a production externality associated with government expenditure, and a financial externality associated with the upward-sloping supply of debt. The tax structure that enables the decentalized economy to attain the first-best equilibrium is characterized.     

Equilibrium real interest rates and the financial cycle: Empirical evidence for Euro area member countries

We estimate the equilibrium real interest rate for nine Euro area member countries and the Euro area as a whole using quarterly data from 1995 to 2015. We expand the standard model of estimating real equilibrium interest rates to incorporate the financial cycle for the private sector. We show that adding the financial cycle indeed alters the equilibrium real interest rate estimates and, in line with previous studies, that there is a fall in the equilibrium real interest rate over time. Our results indicate that in most member countries the real rate is lower than its equilibrium level. Hence, they should not worry about secular stagnation now. This is because secular stagnation is likely to occur when real interest rates are higher than their equilibrium levels. This result can serve as a starting point for further research in this field, e.g. by adding public sector financial cycles or disentangling the roles of households, corporations and the government.     

PUBLIC PROTECTION OR PRIVATE EXTORTION?

We analyze the strategic interaction between a firm, an extortionary mafia, and a potentially corrupt government. The model identifies several results. First, government spending is not monotonic in revenues. Second, although the firm wants the government to challenge the mafia (it uses the threat of electoral sanctions to induce the government to do so), in equilibrium, the firm does not directly appeal to the government for protection even though it is extorted. The more likely the government is to uncover mafia extortion independent of an appeal from the firm, the more effective the firm's threat of electoral sanction is at motivating the government to invest in law enforcement. This is because the electoral threat to punish failure on the government's part is only a compelling reason to invest in law enforcement when the government actually expects to confront the mafia. This same logic also implies that the relationship between mafia strength and government corruption is somewhat counterintuitive. When the mafia is strong in equilibrium (i.e. pervasive and extorting large fees), the government is not very corrupt. When the mafia is weak, the government is highly corrupt. Finally, an extension shows that if the mafia and government can collude, then the harsher the threatened sanctions against the mafia, the less likely the government is to challenge the mafia because the mafia is more willing to bribe the government.     

Macroeconomic implications of a sharing compensation scheme in a model of endogenous growth

This paper develops an endogenous growth model that sheds light on the roles of the revenue-sharing scheme in a macro-economy. We show that a higher sharing ratio attributable to labor unambiguously promotes the equilibrium working time, but has an ambiguous effect on the balanced-growth rate. Of interest, if the economy is characterized by a higher degree of monopoly, a sharing compensation system is more likely to boost the balanced growth rate. In a normative analysis, we show that to remedy the distortions caused by the sharing scheme and market imperfections, the government should provide a subsidy to capital incomes, while it may either tax or subsidize labor incomes.     

House price dynamics: Evidence from Beijing

To study the house price dynamics in China, this paper extends the traditional life-cycle model by incorporating land supply, regime shifts and government regulation factors. The models are estimated with an error correction framework using quarterly data from 2000 to 2007 in Beijing. The conclusions are as follows. (1) There exits a stable co-integration relationship between house price and fundamentals; land supply and financial regimes are also important determinants of long-run equilibrium house prices. (2) Short-run dynamics depend on changes of fundamentals and the adjustment process of housing market. Land supply has a significant impact on house price fluctuations while demand factors such as user costs, income and residential mortgage loan have greater influences. The adjustment speed of real house prices to the long-run equilibrium has been reduced significantly since 2005 which means exogenous shocks can cause prolonged deviation of real house prices from the equilibrium level.     

Mutually acceptable courses of action

We offer a game-theoretic framework that enables the analysis of situations whereby rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. We introduce a new solution concept: a mutually acceptable course of action, which can be viewed as an (incomplete) contract or a social norm that free rational individuals would be willing to follow for their own diverse reasons. We show that by varying the degree of completeness of the underlying course of action, our concept can be related to commonly used solutions, such as perfect equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (rationalizable) self-confirming equilibrium, and rationalizable outcomes. We are grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for very useful and helpful comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were circulated under the title “Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together”. We thank participants at the World Congress of Game Theory Society (2004), the International Conference on Game Theory (2004), the European Meeting (2004), and the Econometric Society World Congress (2005). Financial support from SSHRC and NSERC of Canada, and the National Science Council of Taiwan are gratefully acknowledged.     

Centralized institutions and cascades

Why do sudden and massive social, economic, and political changes occur when and where they do? Are there institutional preconditions that encourage such changes when present and discourage such changes when absent? I employ a general model which suggests that cascades which induce massive equilibrium changes are more likely to occur in regimes with centralized coercive power, defined as the ability to impose more than one type of sanction (economic, legal, political, social, or religious). Centralized authorities are better able to suppress subversive actions when external shocks are small, as citizens have little incentive to incur numerous types of sanctions. However, citizens are also more likely to lie about their internal preferences in such regimes (e.g., falsely declare loyalty to an oppressive government), entailing that larger shocks are more likely to trigger a cascade to a vastly different equilibrium. The model is applied to the severity of protests that followed austerity measures taken in developing nations since the 1970s.     

Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction in a Simple Accelerator Model

In this paper, a simple Keynesian and discrete time multiplier ?C accelerator model is developed, which results after the inclusion of the money market and a balanced government budget constraint in Samuelson??s (1939) business cycle model. The resulted model is proved to be less stable and the evolution of income around its equilibrium is more likely to exhibit a sinusoidal way of movement. The magnitude of the main tools of fiscal and monetary policy is assumed to be determined solely by the government and the Central Bank respectively, so that income??s constant amplitude around its intertemporal equilibrium value is minimized.     

Self-fulfilling expectations,history, and big push: A search equilibrium model of unemployment

We set up a search equilibrium model with general matching technologies to study the phenomenon of large-scale and persistent unemployment. Our emphasis is on dynamics. We find, in addition to self-fulfilling expectations, history or initial level of employment plays a nonnegligible role for selecting the equilibrium converging to the steady state with large unemployment. We also discuss some policy implications. We propose a method similar to the idea of big push in economic development for the economy trapped in the state of large unemployment to escape from it.     

Public capital,sustainable debt and endogenous growth

We analyze an endogenous growth model with public capital and public debt where we posit that the primary surplus of the government is a positive function of cumulated past debt with an exponentially declining weight put on debt further back in time. We consider two scenarios: first, we study the model assuming that the government runs a balanced budget and, then, we compare the outcome to that of the model with permanent deficits. We analyze growth effects of the two scenarios and we study how fiscal policy of the government affects the dynamics of the model economy. It is demonstrated that the balanced growth rate is higher when cumulated past public debt is smaller. Further, we show that the debt policy of the government crucially determines the dynamics of the model economy and that endogenous growth cycles can arise.     

Status Preference, Wealth and Dynamics in the Open Economy

Abstract. The implications of status preference in a simple open economy model are investigated in this paper. The open economy is modeled as a continuum of identical representative agents who have preferences over consumption and status. In the paper status is identified as relative wealth, which takes the form of relative holdings international financial assets. A symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium is derived in which status is the source of transitional dynamics for domestic consumption and the current account balance. This result illustrates another way to combine transitional dynamics with interior equilibria in the small open economy Ramsey model with perfect capital mobility. We also show that status preference plays a critical role in influencing the open economy's adjustment to government expenditure and world interest rate shocks.     

Are bygones not bygones? Modeling price-level targeting with an escape clause and lessons from the gold standard

Like the gold standard, price-level targeting (PT) involves not letting past deviations of inflation be bygones; both regimes return the price level (or price of gold) to its target. The experience of suspension of the gold standard in World War I and resumption in the 1920s (for some countries at a different parity) is reviewed. It suggests that, in practice, PT might operate with an escape clause that would allow rebasing of the price target in the face of large shocks. Using a calibrated general equilibrium model, we show that such an escape clause can produce multiple equilibria. For some parameterizations, there is a low credibility equilibrium (with high expectation of a reset) associated with high output volatility and frequent resets. These problems reduce, or reverse, the expectational advantage PT has over inflation targeting.     

Low level equilibrium trap,unemployment, efficiency of education system,child labour and human capital formation

This paper builds an overlapping generations household economy model to examine the impact of adult unemployment on the human capital formation of a child and on child labour, as viewed through the lens of the adult’s expectations of future employability. The model indicates that the higher the adult unemployment rate in the skilled sector, the lesser is the time allocated by an unskilled adult towards schooling of her child. We also find that an increase in the unskilled adult’s wage may or may not decrease child labour in the presence of unemployment. The model predicts that an increase in child wage increases schooling and human capital growth rate only if the adults in the unskilled sector earn less than subsistence consumption expenditure. As the responsiveness of skilled wage to human capital increases, schooling and human capital growth rates increase. The model dynamics bring out the importance of education efficiency and parental human capital in human capital formation of the child. In the case of an inefficient education system, generations will be trapped into low level equilibrium. Only in the presence of an efficient education system, steady growth of human capital is possible. Suitable policies that may be framed to escape the child labour trap are discussed as well.