Definition-consistent measurement of exchange market pressure

Currencies can be under severe pressure, but in a managed exchange rate regime that is not fully visible via the change in the exchange rate. The literature has proposed a way to measure such exchange market pressure (EMP) indirectly, by adding interest rate changes and forex interventions to the exchange rate change. We demonstrate that this measure is not consistent with the definition of EMP and develop a new measure that is consistent. This is first derived within the commonly used monetary exchange rate model. Then we generalize the analysis by avoiding the use of an exchange rate model. We find that the interest rate should not be taken in the first-difference form used so far, but rather in level form and relative to the interest rate chosen if the country had no exchange rate objective. Applications on the European Monetary System and East Asian crises confirm that this improvement is highly relevant in practice.     

International dimensions of optimal monetary policy

This paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities. An inward-looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms’ markups are exposed to currency fluctuations. Such a policy raises exchange rate volatility, leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis-à-vis increased uncertainty in the export market. As higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers, optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices. Optimal rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary (or deflationary) bias. Gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non-monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass-through.     

Do the ECB and the fed really need to cooperate? Optimal monetary policy in a two-country world

A two-country model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness is employed to investigate the implications for macroeconomic stability and the welfare properties of three international policy arrangements: (a) cooperative, (b) non-cooperative and (c) monetary union. I characterize the conditions under which there is scope for policy cooperation and quantify the costs of non-cooperation and monetary union. The non-cooperative equilibrium may be suboptimal because of terms of trade spillover effects, while monetary union may be suboptimal because of the sluggishness of relative prices. Both the costs of policy competition and of a monetary union are sensitive to the values assumed for the intertemporal and international demand elasticity and the degree of openness of the economy. Independently of the calibration scenario adopted, the ECB has little to gain by coordinating with the Fed.     

One monetary policy and 18 central bankers: The European monetary policy as a game of strategic delegation

This paper employs a multi-country delegation monetary policy model and argues that a decision-making mechanism based on the median voter theorem where intensity of preferences cannot play a role does not capture important aspects of policy setting in the European Monetary Union. Replacing the median voter mechanism with a less restrictive “weighted mean mechanism”, it is shown that strategic delegation can lead to a surprising degree of central bank inflation aversion. This finding supports the “The Twin Sister Hypothesis” and the perception of the European Central Bank implementing the policy of the Bundesbank rather than a more inflationary monetary policy.     

The impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate: evidence from three small open economies

This paper studies the impact effect of monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand during the 1990s. Shocks are identified by the reaction of three month market interest rates to policy announcements that were not themselves endogenous to economic news on the same day. The main result is that a 100 basis point contractionary shock will appreciate the exchange rate by 2-3 percent on impact. The association of interest rate hikes with depreciations that is sometimes observed during periods of exchange market pressure is mainly attributable to reverse causality.     

Monetary union, price level convergence, and inflation: How close is Europe to the USA?

The pattern of price dispersion across European and US cities from 1990 to 2004 is documented. There is a striking decline in dispersion for traded goods prices in Europe, most of which took place prior to the launch of the euro. Dispersion in the euro area is now quite close to that of the USA. This evidence provides useful facts for future work assessing the importance of various developments in Europe: harmonization of tax rates, convergence of incomes and labor costs, liberalization of trade and factor markets, and increased coherence of monetary policy.     

Flexible inflation targets,forex interventions and exchange rate volatility in emerging countries

Emerging economies with inflation targets (IT) face a dilemma between fulfilling the theoretical conditions of “strict IT”, which imply a fully flexible exchange rate, or applying a “flexible IT”, which entails a de facto managed-floating exchange rate with foreign exchange (forex) interventions to moderate exchange rate volatility. Using a panel data model for 37 countries we find that, although IT lead to higher exchange rate instability than alternative regimes, forex interventions in some IT countries have been more effective to lower volatility than in non-IT countries, which may justify the use of “flexible IT” by policymakers.     

Optimal monetary policy with the cost channel

In the standard new Keynesian framework, an optimizing policy maker does not face a trade-off between stabilizing the inflation rate and stabilizing the gap between actual output and output under flexible prices. An ad hoc, exogenous cost-push shock is typically added to the inflation equation to generate a meaningful policy problem. In this paper, we show that a cost-push shock arises endogenously when a cost channel for monetary policy is introduced into the new Keynesian model. A cost channel is present when firms’ marginal cost depends directly on the nominal rate of interest. Besides providing empirical evidence for a cost channel, we explore its implications for optimal monetary policy. We show that its presence alters the optimal policy problem in important ways. For example, both the output gap and inflation are allowed to fluctuate in response to productivity and demand shocks under optimal monetary policy.     

The high-frequency response of exchange rates to monetary policy actions and statements

This paper investigates the impact of US monetary policy on the level and volatility of exchange rates using an event study with intraday data for five currencies (the US dollar exchange rate versus the euro, the Canadian dollar, the British pound, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen). I construct two indicators of news about monetary policy stemming separately from policy decisions and from balance of risk statements. Estimation results show that both policy decisions and communication have economically large and highly significant effects on the exchange rates, with the surprise component of statements accounting for most of the explainable variation in exchange rate returns in response to monetary policy. This paper also shows that exchange rates tend to absorb FOMC monetary surprises within 30-40 min from the announcement release.     

Rational expectations,changing monetary policy rules,and real exchange rate dynamics

This paper reexamines the explanatory power of Taylor rule fundamentals for real exchange rate determination. We assume the agents know the time-varying parameters in central bank policy rules. The empirical results suggest that a monetary policy rule with regime switching is better able to explain the real Deutschemark/dollar exchange rate from 1976 to 1998 compared with a fixed-regime monetary policy rule. The findings show the importance of accounting for the expectation formation effect in changing policy rules as emphasized by the Lucas critique. Ignoring these effects can undermine the value of the rational expectations models.     

Designing domestic institutions for international monetary policy cooperation: A Utopia?

In a wide variety of international macroeconomic models monetary policy cooperation is optimal, non-cooperative policies are inefficient, but optimal policies can be attained non-cooperatively by optimal design of domestic institutions/contracts. We show that given endogenous institutional design, inefficiencies of non-cooperation cannot and will not be eliminated. We model the delegation stage explicitly and show that subgame perfect, credible contracts (chosen by governments based on individual rationality) are non-zero, but are different from optimal contracts and hence lead to inefficient equilibria. Optimal contracts require cooperation at the delegation stage, which is inconsistent with the advocated non-cooperative nature of the solution. A general solution method for credible contracts and an example from international monetary policy cooperation are considered. Our results feature delegation as an equilibrium phenomenon, explain inefficiencies of existing delegation schemes and hint to a potentially stronger role for supranational authorities in international policy coordination.     

Credit booms,monetary integration and the new neoclassical synthesis

Credit to the private sector has risen rapidly in many new Central and Eastern European EU Member States (nMS) in recent years. The lending boom has recently been particularly strong in the segment of loans to households, primarily mortgage-based housing loans, and in those countries that operate currency boards or other forms of hard pegs. The main aim of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework to analyze the observed developments with a view to exploring some policy implications at a stage in which these countries are preparing for their prospective integration with the euro area. To achieve this, we first use a stylized new neoclassical synthesis (NNS) framework, which has recently been advanced by Goodfriend [Goodfriend, M., 2002. Monetary policy in the new neoclassical synthesis: A primer, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, July.] and Goodfriend and King [Goodfriend, M., King, R., 2001. The case for price stability. NBER Working Paper 8423]. We then discuss the implications of the NNS model for credit dynamics and ensuing monetary policy challenges. Specifically, we emphasize consumption smoothing as an important channel of the observed credit expansion and we show how it is related to and how it affects the monetary policy making in MS. In doing so, we place our discussion in the context of the monetary integration process in general and the nominal convergence process in particular.     

Designing targeting rules for international monetary policy cooperation

This study analyzes a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities, monopolistic competition and producer currency pricing. A quadratic approximation to the utility of the consumers is derived and assumed as the policy objective function of the policymakers.It is shown that only under special conditions there are no gains from cooperation and moreover that the paths of the exchange rate and prices in the constrained-efficient solution depend on the kind of disturbance that affects the economy. Despite this result, simple targeting rules that involve only targets for the growth of output and for both domestic GDP and CPI inflation rates can replicate the cooperative allocation.     

Cross-border spillover effects of unconventional monetary policies on Swiss asset prices

Unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) announced by the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan exert important spillover effects on asset prices in Switzerland. Using a broad UMP event set and a long-term bond-futures based measure of market anticipation, we show that surprisingly expansionary UMPs lower Swiss government and corporate bond yields, induce the Swiss franc to appreciate, and dampen Swiss equity prices. Four extensions provide further insights. First, the estimated effects are strongest for announcements by the ECB. Second, the impact on government bonds is largest for bonds with residual maturities of 7–10 years. Third, the impact of foreign UMP shocks on exchange rates and Swiss bond yields is less pronounced after the introduction of the minimum rate of 1.20 Swiss franc per Euro by the Swiss National Bank on September 6, 2011, indicating that domestic monetary policy action partially affects the impact of external monetary shocks on domestic financial markets. Fourth, the sign of spillover effects differs for positive and negative UMP surprises, but their strength does not.     

Behind the scenes of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime

This paper explores the process of abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime during sudden stops in a small open economy. The Bank of Korea’s exchange rate policy reports during the East Asian crisis suggest that its fixed exchange rate regime was forced to collapse due to the depletion of usable foreign reserves, which resulted from the credit policy of the Korean central bank to support domestic banks in need of foreign currency liquidity. To capture the Korean crisis experience, I build a quantitative small open economy model in which, in response to the country risk premium shock, the foreign-currency credit policy of a central bank under fixed regime leads to the exhaustion of international reserves and consequent exchange rate regime shift. This model does well at replicating the observed contraction in Korean aggregate variables.     

Has the euro affected the choice of invoicing currency?

We present a new approach to study empirically the effect of the introduction of the euro on the pattern of currency invoicing. Our approach uses a compositional multinomial logit model, in which currency choice is explained by both currency-specific and country-specific determinants. We use unique quarterly panel data on the invoicing of Norwegian imports from OECD countries for the 1996–2006 period. We find that eurozone countries have substantially increased their share of home currency invoicing after the introduction of the euro, whereas the home currency share of non-eurozone countries fell slightly. In addition, the euro as a vehicle currency has overtaken the role of the US dollar in Norwegian imports. The substantial rise in producer currency invoicing by eurozone countries is primarily caused by a drop in inflation volatility and can only to a small extent be explained by an unobserved euro effect.     

To intervene,or not to intervene: Monetary policy and the costs of currency crises

In case of speculative attacks, the central banks' decisions to intervene or not to intervene seem to play an important role for the economic costs of currency crises. The central bank can either abstain from intervening or start an intervention, which in turn can be successful or unsuccessful. Therefore, an adequate analysis of the costs of currency crises has to take into account three different types of currency crises: (i) an immediate depreciation without any central bank interventions, (ii) a successful defense, and (iii) an unsuccessful attempt to defend the exchange rate. We find that the decision of the central bank to intervene or to remain passive is risky. If the central bank intervenes and succeeds she can achieve the best growth performance on average. However, if the interventions are not maintained and the currency depreciates the subsequent output loss is particularly severe. Abstaining from an intervention yields a scenario with a relatively small drop in output. Giving in to a speculative attack rather than trying to fight it can thus be a suitable option for a risk-averse central bank.     

Habit formation and the persistence of monetary shocks

The dynamic effects and relative importance of monetary shocks in the US business cycle are studied using a sticky-price dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with habit formation and capital adjustment costs. The model is estimated via maximum likelihood using data on output, real money balances, and the nominal interest rate. Econometric results indicate that the model has a strong internal propagation mechanism that can explain the persistent and hump-shaped response of US output and consumption to monetary shocks.     

Interest rate interactions in the classical gold standard, 1880-1914: was there any monetary independence?

This paper examines an hypothesis of Svensson (1994) (Journal of Monetary Economics 33, 157-199) that a credible target zone can confer on a country a degree of independence in the operation of its monetary policy, even when exchange rates are fixed. We test this hypothesis for the Classical gold standard using a newly created monthly data base for the period 1880-1913. Building on the recently noted finding that the Classical gold standard represented a credible, well-behaved, target zone system we propose a number of ways of testing the Svensson’ model. Our main finding is that the Classical gold standard did indeed confer some independence in the operation of monetary policy for participating countries. This would seem to have an important bearing on the kind of institutional framework required for a modern day target zone to function effectively and, in particular, to weather speculative attacks.     

Time Inconsistency and Free‐Riding in a Monetary Union

In monetary unions, a time inconsistency problem in monetary policy leads to a novel type of free‐rider problem in the setting of non‐monetary policies. The free‐rider problem leads union members to pursue lax non‐monetary policies that induce the monetary authority to generate high inflation. Free‐riding can be mitigated by imposing constraints on non‐monetary policies. Without a time inconsistency problem, the union has no free‐rider problem; then constraints on non‐monetary policies are unnecessary and possibly harmful. This theory is here detailed and applied to several non‐monetary policies: labor market policy, fiscal policy, and bank regulation.