A general theory of controllability and expectations anchoring for small-open economies

Rational expectations are often used as an argument against policy activism, as they may undermine or neutralize the policymaker’s actions. Although this sometimes happens, rational expectations do not always imply policy invariance or ineffectiveness. In fact, in certain circumstances rational expectations can enhance our power to control an economy over time. In those cases, policy announcements can be used to extend the impact of conventional policy instruments. We present a general forward-looking policy framework and use it to provide a formal rationale for testing when policymakers can and cannot expect to be able to manage expectations. To describe the relevance of our results applications are shown for policy design in small-open economies. Those are the cases where domestic policies are at their weakest and our ability to influence expectations most constrained.     

The role of credit in the Great Moderation: A multivariate GARCH approach

During the Great Moderation, financial innovation in the US increased the size and scope of credit flows supporting the growth of wealth. We hypothesize that spending out of wealth came to finance a wider range of GDP components such that it smoothed GDP. Both these trends combined would be consistent with a decrease in the volatility of output. We suggest testable implications in terms of both growth of credit and output and volatility of growth. In a multivariate GARCH framework, we test this view for home mortgages and residential investment. We observe unidirectional causality in variance from total output, residential investment and non-residential output to mortgage lending before, but not during the Great Moderation. These findings are consistent with a role for credit dynamics in explaining the Great Moderation.     

The expectations theory works for monetary policy shocks

In practice, the expectations theory of the term structure is employed extensively in monetary policy analysis despite its empirical failure. This paper performs a conditional test of the theory that is directly relevant to monetary theory and policy. It finds that the theory holds quite well conditional on identified monetary policy shocks, but fails conditional on aggregate supply shocks that prompt an immediate jump in prices. It also finds that policy responses to movements in the term structure play an important role in uncovering evidence for the theory as predicted by McCallum [1994. Monetary policy and the term structure of interest rates. NBER Working Paper Series, no. 4938].     

Eyes on the prize: How did the fed respond to the stock market?

Since the stock market boom of the 1990s, many have suggested the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has adopted an unannounced policy goal of supporting equity values. This paper offers a new approach to disentangle the relationship between changes in equity values and monetary policy. Specifically, the paper distinguishes the FOMC's reaction to forecasts of traditional goal variables, which may depend on equity prices, from the FOMC's independent reaction to changes in equity prices. By using actual forward-looking variables examined by the FOMC before each action (the “Greenbook” forecasts), the authors find little evidence to support the proposition that the FOMC responds to stock values, except as filtered through a forecast of accepted monetary policy goal variables.     

Interest rate expectations and uncertainty during ECB Governing Council days: Evidence from intraday implied densities of 3-month EURIBOR

This paper analyses changes in short-term interest rate expectations and uncertainty during ECB Governing Council days. For this purpose, it extends the estimation of risk-neutral probability density functions up to tick frequency. In particular, the non-parametric estimator of these densities, which is based on fitting implied volatility curves, is applied to estimate intraday expectations of 3-month EURIBOR 3 months ahead. Estimates of the noise impact on the statistical moments of the densities enhance the interpretation. In addition, the paper assesses the impact of the ECB communication during Governing Council days. The results show that the whole density may react to the communication and that such repositioning of market participants’ expectations will contain information beyond that of changes in the consensus view already observed in forward rates. The results also point out the relevance of the press conference in providing extra information and triggering an adjustment process for interest rate expectations.     

Bidding behavior in the longer term refinancing operations of the European Central Bank: Evidence from a panel sample selection model

This paper analyzes individual bidding data of the longer term refinancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central Bank. We investigate how banks’ bidding behavior is related to a series of exogenous variables including collateral costs, interest rate expectations, market volatility and to individual bank characteristics like country of origin, size, and experience. A specific feature of these auctions is that the number and composition of bidders varies over time. Therefore, we estimate panel sample selection models to control for a bank’s endogenous participation decision. We find that bidding strategies depend on the banks’ attributes. Yet, different bidding behavior generally does not translate into differences concerning bidder success. There is evidence for the winner’s curse effect in LTROs indicating a common value component in banks’ demand for longer term refinancing.     

An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy

We propose a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi-commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal commitment plans, to be tempted to renege on them, and to succumb to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector. By interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the (lack of) credibility of the monetary policy authority, we investigate the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility. Our main finding is that, in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism, most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility.     

Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal rules

Welfare-maximizing monetary- and fiscal-policy rules are studied in a model with sticky prices, money, and distortionary taxation. The Ramsey-optimal policy is used as a point of comparison. The main findings are: the size of the inflation coefficient in the interest-rate rule plays a minor role for welfare. It matters only insofar as it affects the determinacy of equilibrium. Optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output. Interest-rate rules that feature a positive response to output can lead to significant welfare losses. The welfare gains from interest-rate smoothing are negligible. Optimal fiscal policy is passive. The optimal monetary and fiscal rule combination attains virtually the same level of welfare as the Ramsey-optimal policy.     

Optimal sustainable monetary policy

In recent monetary policy literature, optimal commitment policy and its variant from a timeless perspective have been studied with emphasis on welfare gains from policy commitment. These policies, however, involve a time-consistency problem called a stabilization bias in forward-looking models. We analyze Chari and Kehoe's [1990. Sustainable plans. Journal of Political Economy 98, 783-802] sustainable equilibrium and examine optimal sustainable policy, i.e. a policymaker's strategy in the best sustainable equilibrium. This paper shows that such a policy becomes consistent with the optimal commitment policy in sufficiently later periods. It also shows that whether the optimal sustainable policy can attain the Ramsey equilibrium outcome depends on the magnitude of shocks hitting the model economy. Moreover, the paper finds a sustainable policy that attains higher social welfare than discretionary policy does.     

Identifying the interdependence between US monetary policy and the stock market

We estimate the interdependence between US monetary policy and the S&P 500 using structural vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology. A solution is proposed to the simultaneity problem of identifying monetary and stock price shocks by using a combination of short-run and long-run restrictions that maintains the qualitative properties of a monetary policy shock found in the established literature [Christiano, L.J., Eichenbaum, M., Evans, C.L., 1999. Monetary policy shocks: what have we learned and to what end? In: Taylor, J.B., Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1A. Elsevier, New York, pp. 65-148]. We find great interdependence between the interest rate setting and real stock prices. Real stock prices immediately fall by seven to nine percent due to a monetary policy shock that raises the federal funds rate by 100 basis points. A stock price shock increasing real stock prices by one percent leads to an increase in the interest rate of close to 4 basis points.     

Do central banks react to the stock market? The case of the Bundesbank

In this paper, we ask whether the Bundesbank, prior to the European Central Bank taking responsibility for monetary policy in 1999, reacted systematically to stock price movements. In contrast to the results for the US, our empirical findings show a generally weak relationship between German stock returns and short-term interest rates at the daily and the monthly frequency. The results are extremely robust to alternative model specifications. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a systematic reaction of the Bundesbank to German stock prices. However, we do find that, as in the US, the Bundesbank may have reacted to the stock market crash of 1987 by loosening monetary policy.     

Credit crunch in a small open economy

We construct an open-economy DSGE model with a banking sector to analyze the impact of the recent credit crunch on a small open economy. In our model the banking sector operates under monopolistic competition, collects deposits and grants collateralized loans. Collateral effects amplify monetary policy actions, interest rate stickiness dampens the transmission of interest rates, and financial shocks generate non-negligible real and nominal effects. As an application we estimate the model for Poland-a typical small open economy. According to the results, financial shocks had a substantial, though not overwhelming, impact on the Polish economy during the 2008/09 crisis, lowering GDP by approximately 1.5 percent.     

Using private forecasts to estimate the effects of monetary policy

I develop a methodology that uses the forecasts of market participants and of policy makers to estimate the effects of monetary policy on output and inflation. My approach has advantages over the standard practice of fitting a vector autoregression to the data. I apply my methodology to data on output, interest rates and prices. I find that, even using the Federal Reserve Board's Greenbook forecasts to control for the policy maker's information set, prices rise initially in response to a monetary contraction. This finding undermines the standard justification for including an index of commodity prices in VARs.     

The impact of monetary policy on asset prices

Estimating the response of asset prices to changes in monetary policy is complicated by the endogeneity of policy decisions and the fact that both interest rates and asset prices react to numerous other variables. This paper develops a new estimator that is based on the heteroskedasticity that exists in high-frequency data. We show that the response of asset prices to changes in monetary policy can be identified based on the increase in the variance of policy shocks that occurs on days of FOMC meetings and of the Chairman's semi-annual monetary policy testimony to Congress. The identification approach employed requires a much weaker set of assumptions than needed under the “event-study” approach that is typically used in this context. The results indicate that an increase in short-term interest rates results in a decline in stock prices and in an upward shift in the yield curve that becomes smaller at longer maturities. The findings also suggest that the event-study estimates contain biases that make the estimated effects on stock prices appear too small and those on Treasury yields too large.     

Taylor rules and the term structure

The expectations model of the term structure has been subjected to numerous empirical tests and almost invariably rejected, with the failure generally attributed to systematic expectations errors or to shifts in risk premia. Rules for monetary policy designed along the lines of Taylor [1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214] specify that the central bank adjusts short-term yields in response to deviations of inflation and output gaps from target level. Such rules give a good empirical account of the behavior of the short-term interest rate. Combining the Taylor rule and expectations theory, it is possible to generate—along lines pioneered by Campbell and Shiller [1987. Cointegration and tests of present value models. Journal of Political Economy 95, 1062-1088]—a series of theoretical long-term interest rates. When such theoretical rates are calculated for the US over 1980-2004, considerable support for the expectations theory emerges.     

Financial shocks and the US business cycle

Employing the financial accelerator (FA) model of Bernanke et al. [1999. The Financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework. In: Taylor, J.B., Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1C. Handbooks in Economics, vol. 15. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 1341-1393] enhanced to include a shock to the FA mechanism, we construct and study shocks to the efficiency of the financial sector during post-war US business cycles. These shocks are found to (i) be very tightly linked with the onset of recessions, more so than TFP or monetary shocks; (ii) remain contractionary after recessions have ended; (iii) account for a large part of the variance of GDP; (iv) be generally much more important than money shocks and (v) be strongly negatively correlated with the external finance premium.