On the cyclical behavior of employment, unemployment and labor force participation

In this paper I evaluate to what extent a real business cycle (RBC) model that incorporates search and home production decisions can simultaneously account for the observed behavior of employment, unemployment and out-of-the-labor-force. This contrasts with the previous RBC literature, which analyzed employment or hours fluctuations either by lumping together unemployment and out-of-the-labor-force into a single non-employment state or by assuming a fixed labor force. Once the three employment states are explicitly introduced I find that the RBC model generates highly counterfactual labor market dynamics.     

The Great Inflation of the 1970s

The two leading explanations for the poor inflation performance during the 1970s are policy opportunism ( Barro and Gordon 1983 ) and "inadvertently" bad monetary policy ( Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 2000 , Orphanides 2003 ). The main models of the latter category are that of Orphanides (loose monetary policy was the outcome of mis-perceptions about potential output rather than of inflation tolerance) and of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (weak policy reaction to expected inflation led to indeterminacies). We show that both of these models can account for high and persistent inflation and also have satisfactory overall performance if an exceptionally large decrease in productivity took place at that time.     

Government Spending and the Taylor Principle

This paper explores how government size affects the scope for equilibrium indeterminacy in a New Keynesian economy, where part of the population live hand-to-mouth. The main result is that a higher level of public consumption is likely to generate indeterminacy and render the Taylor principle insufficient as criterion for equilibrium uniqueness. This holds even though fiscal policy serves to reduce swings in current income. Only if government consumption is a substitute for private consumption, will it narrow the scope for indeterminacy. Hence monetary policy should be conducted with an eye to the amount and composition of government consumption.     

The "Great Moderation" in the United Kingdom

We use a Bayesian time-varying parameters structural VAR with stochastic volatility for GDP deflator inflation, real GDP growth, a 3-month nominal rate, and the rate of growth of M4 to investigate the underlying causes of the Great Moderation in the United Kingdom. Our evidence points toward a dominant role played by good luck in fostering the more stable macroeconomic environment of the last two decades. Results from counterfactual simulations, in particular, show that (i) "bringing the Monetary Policy Committee back in time" would only have had a limited impact on the Great Inflation episode, at the cost of lower output growth; (ii) imposing the 1970s monetary rule over the entire sample period would have made almost no difference in terms of inflation and output growth outcomes; and (iii) the Great Inflation was due, to a dominant extent, to large demand non-policy shocks, and to a lesser extent—especially in 1973 and 1979—to supply shocks.     

Did sunspot forces cause the Great Depression?

We apply a dynamic general equilibrium model to the period of the U.S. Great Depression. In particular, we examine a modification of the real business cycle model in which the possibility of indeterminacy of equilibria arises. In other words, agents’ self-fulfilling expectations can serve as a primary impulse behind fluctuations. We find that the model, driven only by these measured sunspot shocks, can explain well the entire Depression era. That is, the decline from 1929 to 1932, the subsequent slow recovery, and the recession that occurred in 1937-1938.     

International welfare effects of monetary policy

In this paper, I examine the international welfare effects of monetary policy. I develop a New Keynesian two-country model, where central banks in both countries follow the Taylor rule. I show that a decrease in the domestic interest rate, under producer currency pricing, is a beggar-thyself policy that reduces domestic welfare and increases foreign welfare in the short term, regardless of whether the cross-country substitutability is high or low. In the medium term, it is a beggar-thy-neighbour (beggar-thyself) policy, if the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied (violated). Under local currency pricing, a decrease in the domestic interest rate is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy in the short term, but a beggar-thyself policy in the medium term. Both under producer and local currency pricing, a monetary expansion increases world welfare in the short term, but reduces it in the medium term.     

On optimal unemployment compensation

The design of an optimal unemployment compensation scheme is analyzed, using a dynamic principal-agent relationship between a risk-neutral planner (the principal) and risk-averse workers (the agents), where the planner's inability to observe workers’ job-search efforts creates a moral hazard problem. To design an implementable scheme, we require that each agent is guaranteed a minimum level of expected discounted utility, regardless of his past history. In contrast with previous studies, we find that the optimal contract is quite close to actual unemployment compensation schemes, both qualitatively and quantitatively.     

The learning cost of interest rate reversals

Many central banks in many time periods have sought to avoid interest rate reversals, but at present there is no good explanation of this phenomenon. Our analysis identifies a new learning cost associated with reversing the interest rate. In a standard monetary model with forward-looking expectations, data uncertainty and parameter uncertainty, a policy that frequently reverses the interest rate makes learning the key parameters of the model more difficult. Optimal monetary policy internalises this learning cost and therefore has a lower number of interest rate reversals.     

On money and output: Is money redundant?

There is an emerging consensus that money can be largely ignored in making monetary policy decisions. Rudebusch and Svensson [1999, Policy Rules and Inflation Targeting. In Taylor, J.B. (Ed.), Monetary Policy Rules. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 203-246; 2002, Eurosystem Monetary Targeting: Lessons from US Data. European Economic Review 46, 417-442] provide some empirical support for this view. We reconsider the role of money and find that money is not redundant. More specifically, there is a significant statistical relationship between lagged values of money and the output gap, even when lagged values of real interest rates and lagged values of the output gap are accounted for. We also find that inside and outside money provide significant information in predicting movements in the output gap.     

Fiscal and monetary policies and the cost of sudden stops

This article investigates the effects of monetary and fiscal policies on output growth during sudden-stop balance of payments crisis in emerging markets and developing countries. Sudden stops in capital flows, and subsequent deep recessions, are a frequent occurrence in these countries but there is no professional consensus, and little systematic empirical evidence, shedding light on the macroeconomic policy mix most likely to limit output losses during these episodes. To address this issue, we investigate 83 sudden-stop crisis in 66 countries using a baseline empirical model to control for the various determinants of output losses during sudden stops. We measure the marginal effects of policy on output losses, and find strong evidence that monetary tightening (rise in the discount rate or unsterilized rise in international reserves) and discretionary fiscal contraction are significantly correlated with larger output losses following a sudden stop. Fiscal expansion is associated with smaller output losses following a sudden stop, but monetary expansion has no discernable effect. The macroeconomic policy mix associated with the least output loss during a sudden-stop financial crisis is a discretionary fiscal expansion combined with a neutral monetary policy.     

Using a long-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument

Using a short-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument can be problematic near its zero bound constraint. An alternative strategy is to use a long-term interest rate as the policy instrument. We find when Taylor-type policy rules are used by the central bank to set the long rate in a standard New Keynesian model, indeterminacy—that is, multiple rational expectations equilibria—may often result. However, a policy rule with a long-rate policy instrument that responds in a “forward-looking” fashion to inflation expectations can avoid the problem of indeterminacy.     

Optimal Constrained Interest-Rate Rules

We show that if policymakers compute the optimal unconstrained interest-rate rule within a Taylor-type class, they may be led to rules that generate indeterminacy and/or instability under learning. This problem is compounded by uncertainty about structural parameters since an optimal rule that is determinate and stable under learning for one calibration may be indeterminate or unstable under learning under a different calibration. We advocate a procedure in which policymakers restrict attention to rules constrained to lie in the determinate learnable region for all plausible calibrations, and that minimize the expected loss, computed using structural parameter priors, subject to this constraint.     

The role of credit in the Great Moderation: A multivariate GARCH approach

During the Great Moderation, financial innovation in the US increased the size and scope of credit flows supporting the growth of wealth. We hypothesize that spending out of wealth came to finance a wider range of GDP components such that it smoothed GDP. Both these trends combined would be consistent with a decrease in the volatility of output. We suggest testable implications in terms of both growth of credit and output and volatility of growth. In a multivariate GARCH framework, we test this view for home mortgages and residential investment. We observe unidirectional causality in variance from total output, residential investment and non-residential output to mortgage lending before, but not during the Great Moderation. These findings are consistent with a role for credit dynamics in explaining the Great Moderation.     

An exploration into Pigou's theory of cycles

This paper explores a theory of business cycles in which recessions and booms arise due to difficulties encountered by agents in properly forecasting the economy's future needs in terms of capital. The idea has a long history in the macroeconomic literature, as reflected by the work of Pigou (Industrial Fluctuation, MacMillan, London, 1926). The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we illustrate the type of general equilibrium structure that can give rise to such phenomena. Second, we examine the extent to which such a model can explain the observed pattern of U.S. recessions (frequency, depth) without relying on technological regress. We argue that such a model offer a framework for understanding elements of both the recent U.S. recession and of the Asia downturns of the late 1990s.     

Tax distortions and the case for price stability

We investigate the case for price stability in the general version of the New Keynesian (NNS) model with capital and several shocks. The model includes, in addition to the standard imperfect competition and monetary frictions, a non-trivial, endogenous tax distortion. We find that the case for perfect price stability is not significantly weakened. Optimal policy tolerates a small amount of output gap and price variability by reacting less strongly to supply and fiscal shocks in comparison to a policy that aims at perfect price stabilization.     

Fundamental Economic Shocks and the Macroeconomy

We ask how macroeconomic and financial variables respond to empirical measures of shocks to technology, labor supply, and monetary policy. These three shocks account for the preponderance of output, productivity, and price fluctuations. Only technology shocks have a permanent impact on economic activity. Labor inputs have little initial response to technology shocks. Monetary policy has a small response to technology shocks but "leans against the wind" in response to the more cyclical labor supply shock. This shock has the biggest impact on interest rates. Stock prices respond to all three shocks. Other empirical implications of our approach are discussed.     

In search of the natural rate of unemployment

The natural rate of unemployment can be measured as the time-varying steady state of a structural vector autoregression. For post-War US data, the natural rate implied by this approach is more volatile than most previous estimates, with its movements accounting for the bulk of the variation in the unemployment rate, as well as substantial portions of the variation in aggregate output and inflation. These movements, in turn, can be related to variables associated with labor-market search theory, including unemployment benefits, labor productivity, real wages, and sectoral shifts in the labor market. There is also a strong negative relationship between inflation and the corresponding measure of cyclical unemployment, supporting the existence of a short-run Phillips curve.     

Learnability and monetary policy: A global perspective

The recent literature on monetary policy design has emphasized the importance of equilibrium determinacy and learnability in the choice of policy rules. This paper contains an analysis of the learnability of the equilibrium in a class of simple, micro-founded models in which the policy authority uses a Taylor-type monetary policy rule. Unlike previous analyses, the model economy is not linearized about a steady state—instead, a global perspective is adopted. Globally, the nonlinear model economy can possess rational expectations equilibria other than the steady state consistent with the inflation target of the monetary authorities. These include a second, low inflation ‘liquidity trap’ steady state, periodic equilibria, and sunspot equilibria. The main results in the paper characterize the conditions under which these alternative equilibria maybe stable under adaptive learning, even when the policy rule obeys the Taylor principle. The stability of multiple equilibria is associated with policy rules which are forecast-based. An important finding is that backward-looking Taylor-type policy rules can guarantee that the unique learnable equilibrium is the steady state associated with the inflation target of the monetary authority.     

Identifying the influences of nominal and real rigidities in aggregate price-setting behavior

We formulate a generalized price-setting framework that incorporates staggered contracts of multiple durations and that enables us to directly identify the influences of nominal vs. real rigidities. We estimate this framework using macroeconomic data for Germany (1975-1998) and for the U.S. (1983-2003). In each case, we find that the data are well-characterized by nominal contracts with an average duration of about two to three quarters. We also find that new contracts exhibit very low sensitivity to marginal cost, corresponding to a relatively high degree of real rigidity. Finally, our results indicate that backward-looking price-setting behavior (such as indexation to lagged inflation) is not needed in explaining the aggregate data, at least in an environment with a stable monetary policy regime and a transparent and credible inflation objective.     

Indeterminacy, aggregate demand, and the real business cycle

We show that under indeterminacy aggregate demand shocks are able to explain not only aspects of actual fluctuations that standard RBC models predict fairly well, but also aspects of actual fluctuations that standard RBC models cannot explain, such as the hump-shaped, trend reverting impulse responses to transitory shocks found in US output (Cogley and Nason, Am. Econom. Rev. 85 (1995) 492); the large forecastable movements and comovements of output, consumption and hours (Rotemberg and Woodford, Am. Econom. Rev. 86 (1996) 71); and the fact that consumption appears to lead output and investment over the business cycle. Indeterminacy arises in our model due to capacity utilization and mild increasing returns to scale.