Sovereign debt and reserves with liquidity and productivity crises

During the recent financial crisis, emerging economies have kept accumulating both sovereign reserves and debt. To account for this empirical fact, we model the optimal portfolio choice of a sovereign that is subject to liquidity and productivity shocks. We determine the equilibrium level of debt and its cost by solving a contracting game between sovereign and international lenders. Although raising debt increases the sovereign exposure to liquidity and productivity crises, the simultaneous accumulation of reserves can mitigate the negative effects of such crises. This mechanism rationalizes the complementarity between debt and reserves.     

Sovereign debt disputes: A database on government coerciveness during debt crises

This paper measures “debt disputes” between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research.     

Banking crises: An equal opportunity menace

The historical frequency of banking crises is similar in advanced and developing countries, with quantitative parallels in both the run-ups and the aftermath. We establish these regularities using a dataset spanning from the early 1800s to the present. Banking crises weaken fiscal positions, with government revenues invariably contracting. Three years after a crisis central government debt increases by about 86%. The fiscal burden of banking crisis extends beyond the cost of the bailouts. We find that systemic banking crises are typically preceded by asset price bubbles, large capital inflows and credit booms, in rich and poor countries alike.     

Foreign currency debt,financial crises and economic growth: A long-run view

Foreign currency debt is widely believed to increase risks of financial crisis, especially after being implicated as a cause of the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s. In this paper, we study the effects of foreign currency debt on currency and debt crises and its indirect effects on short-term growth and long-run output effects in both 1880–1913 and 1973–2003 for 45 countries. Greater ratios of foreign currency debt to total debt are associated with increased risks of currency and debt crises, although the strength of the association depends crucially on the size of a country's reserve base and its policy credibility. We found that financial crises, driven by exposure to foreign currency, resulted in significant permanent output losses. We estimate some implications of our findings for the risks posed by currently high levels of foreign currency liabilities in eastern Europe.     

Optimal Debt and Profitability in the Trade‐Off Theory

I develop a dynamic model of leverage with tax deductible interest and an endogenous cost of default. The interest rate includes a premium to compensate lenders for expected losses in default. A borrowing constraint is generated by lenders' unwillingness to lend an amount that would trigger immediate default. When the borrowing constraint is not binding, the trade‐off theory of debt holds: optimal debt equates the marginal interest tax shield and the marginal expected cost of default. Contrary to conventional interpretation, but consistent with empirical findings, increases in current or future profitability reduce the optimal leverage ratio when the trade‐off theory holds.     

The flight home effect: Evidence from the syndicated loan market during financial crises

This paper shows that the collapse of the global market for syndicated loans during financial crises can in part be explained by a flight home effect whereby lenders rebalance their loan portfolios in favor of domestic borrowers. The home bias of lenders' loan origination increases by approximately 20% if the bank's home country experiences a banking crisis. This flight home effect is distinct from flight to quality because borrowers of different quality are equally affected. The results indicate that the home bias in capital allocation tends to increase when adverse economic shocks reduce the wealth of international investors.     

Are twin currency and debt crises special?

In the literature on currency and banking crises it has become the standard procedure to distinguish pure currency crises, pure banking crises and combined (“twin”) currency and banking crises. We show theoretically and empirically that a similar differentiation should be chosen with regard to currency and debt crises. Twin currency and debt crises differ from both pure currency and pure debt crises in their determinants, course of events, and economic consequences. We find that each type of crises has a unique set of macroeconomic causes. We also identify internal contagion and selection bias effects, which may lead to biased empirical estimates if twin crises are not treated as a specific type of crises. Such a separation allows in significantly improving the efficiency of early warning systems especially for debt and twin crises.     

The role of household and business credit in banking crises

Private credit expansions are an important predictor of subsequent banking crises. We revisit that result with a new dataset from developed and developing countries that decomposes private credit into household credit and enterprise credit. We argue that household credit growth raises debt levels without much effect on long-term income. Rapid household credit expansions generate vulnerabilities that can precipitate a banking crisis. Enterprise credit expansions can have the same effects but it is tempered by the associated increase in income. Our estimates show that household credit expansions have been a statistically and economically significant predictor of banking crises. Enterprise credit expansions are also associated with banking crises but their effect is weaker and less robust.     

Political crises and the stock market integration of emerging markets

This paper investigates the role of political crises in explaining the degree of stock market integration in emerging markets over the period 1991-2006. Using the International Crisis Behavior database, which contains detailed information on political crises around the world, and employing data on more than 15,500 firms, we assess whether political crises affect stock market integration in 19 emerging markets in South and East Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe. We conclude that crises with certain characteristics generally reduce the level of stock market integration in these regions. In particular, the beginning of a political crisis, its severity, the involvement of the US in the conflict, and the number of parties involved in a crisis all have impacts on the level of stock market integration in these markets.     

Are Commercial Mortgage Defaults Affected by Tax Considerations?

We study whether tax considerations are an important determinant of commercial mortgage default. We also study whether large lenders are better informed, or better at interpreting information for lending purposes, and hence have lower foreclosure rates; whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, and hence have lower foreclosure rates on larger loans; and whether commercial mortgage defaults are related to debt service coverage and loan-to-values, both initial and contemporaneous. The paper’s main findings are fourfold. First, holding all else equal, there is evidence that tax considerations influence investors’ decisions about when to “put” assets to lenders. The results are consistent with the argument of Constantinides (J Financ Econ 13:65–89, 1984). Second, the evidence suggests that large lenders are especially knowledgeable about commercial mortgage borrowers and commercial property markets, in that they have lower foreclosure rates than smaller lenders. Third, on the question of whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, we find that larger loans have, on average, lower default rates than smaller loans. Fourth, the findings suggest that lower default rates are associated with higher debt service coverage ratios, both initial and contemporaneous.     

Government finance in the wake of currency crises

We address three questions: (i) Can classical models be reconciled with the fact that many crises are marked by high rates of depreciation and small increases in seignorage revenue? (ii) What are the implications of different financing methods for post-crisis rates of inflation and depreciation? (iii) How do governments pay for the fiscal costs associated with currency crises? To study these questions we use a general equilibrium model in which prospective government deficits trigger a currency crisis. We then use our model in conjunction with fiscal data to interpret government financing in the wake of three recent currency crises: Korea (1997), Mexico (1994) and Turkey (2001).     

Consequences of Debt Forgiveness: Strategic Default Contagion and Lender Learning

I use a unique data set of loans to small business owners to examine whether lenders face adverse consequences when they grant debt forgiveness to borrowers. I provide evidence consistent with borrowers communicating their debt forgiveness to other borrowers, who then more frequently strategically default on their own obligations. This strategic default contagion is economically large. When the lender doubles debt forgiveness, the default rate increases by 10.9% on average. Using an exogenous shock to the lender's forgiveness policy, my findings suggest that as the lender learns about the extent of borrower communication the lender tightens its debt forgiveness policy to mitigate default contagion.     

Risk Shifting through Nonfinancial Contracts: Effects on Loan Spreads and Capital Structure of Project Finance Deals

We study capital structure negotiation and cost of debt financing between sponsors and lenders using a sample of more than 1,000 project finance loans worth around US$195 billion closed between 1998 and 2003. We find that lenders: (i) rely on the network of nonfinancial contracts as a mechanism to control agency costs and project risks, (ii) are reluctant to price credit more cheaply if sponsors are involved as project counterparties in the relevant contracts, and finally (iii) do not appreciate sponsor involvement as a contractual counterparty of the special purpose vehicle when determining the level of leverage.     

Sovereign liquidity crises: Analytics and implications for public policy

This paper offers an analytical framework with which to assess some recent proposals for strengthening the international financial architecture. We develop a model of sovereign liquidity crises that reflects two sources of financial stress – weak fundamentals and self-fulfilling expectations. We examine the nature of the underlying co-ordination game and investigate the properties of the unique equilibrium. In so doing, we are able to characterise the welfare costs of belief-driven crises, which we find to be potentially significant. We also evaluate some recent policy proposals including prudent debt and liquidity management, capital controls, greater information disclosure, and the efficacy of monetary policy tightening in the midst of crisis.     

Financial liberalization and banking crises: The role of capital inflows and lack of transparency

This paper shows that the liberalization of capital inflows may undermine bank stability in emerging markets. After financial liberalization, uninformed international investors rationally provide large amounts of funds at low cost. This enables insolvent banks to accumulate bad loans. In equilibrium, when a substantial amount of losses may have been accumulated, solvent banks do not find it any longer optimal to issue debt at the interest rate that would compensate investors for risk. Investors anticipate this and stop holding bank debt. When the market for bank liabilities breaks down, insolvent banks default. I show that, because of wasteful investment, the liberalization of capital inflows may decrease aggregate welfare.     

Incentives to innovate and financial crises

In this paper I develop a model of a competitive financial system with unrestricted but costly entry and an endogenously determined number of competing financial institutions (“banks” for short). Banks can make standard loans on which plentiful historical data are available and unanimous agreement exists on default probabilities. Or banks can innovate and make new loans on which limited historical data are available, leading to possible disagreement over default probabilities. In equilibrium, banks make zero profits on standard loans and positive profits on innovative loans, which engenders innovation incentives for banks. But innovation brings with it the risk that investors could disagree with the bank that the loan is worthy of continued funding and hence could withdraw funding at an interim stage, precipitating a financial crisis. The degree of innovation in the financial system is determined by this trade-off. Welfare implications of financial innovation and mechanisms to reduce the probability of crises are discussed.     

Mortgage Default during the U.S. Mortgage Crisis

Which theory can quantitatively explain the rise in mortgage defaults during the U.S. mortgage crisis? This paper finds that the double‐trigger hypothesis, which attributes mortgage default to the joint occurrence of negative equity and a life event such as unemployment, is consistent with the evidence. By contrast, a traditional frictionless default model strongly overpredicts the increase in default rates. This paper provides microfoundations for double‐trigger behavior in a model where unemployment causes liquidity problems for the borrower. This framework implies that mortgage crises may be mitigated at a lower cost by bailing out borrowers instead of lenders.     

Why does sovereign risk differ for domestic and external debt? Evidence from Scandinavia, 1938–1948

This study shows empirically that the political costs of sovereign default can differ considerably for domestic and external debt. The analysis uses new evidence from Danish and Swedish bond markets around World War II, a time when markets went from being fully integrated to fully segmented overnight. By linking the exogenous wartime shocks to changes in default costs on domestic and external debt, it is found that these costs explain a significant part of the variation in the sovereign yield spread across markets. The results suggest that governments can choose strategically on which debt, the domestic or the external, to default on, and that this decision hinges on the relative size of the political default costs.     

Cross-hedging strategies between CDS spreads and option volatility during crises

This paper presents a joint analysis of the term structure of credit default swap (CDS) spreads and the implied volatility surface for five European countries from 2007 to 2012, a sample period covering both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European debt crisis. We analyze to which extent effective cross-hedges can be performed between the credit and equity derivatives markets during these two crises. We find that during a global crisis a breakdown of the relationship between credit risk and equity volatility may occur, jeopardizing any cross-hedging strategy, which happened during the GFC. This stands in sharp contrast to the more localized European debt crisis, during which this fundamental relationship was preserved despite turbulent market conditions for both the CDS and volatility markets.     

Exchange Rate Crises and Fiscal Solvency

This paper combines insights from generation one currency crisis models and the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) to create a dynamic FTPL model of currency crises. The initial fixed‐exchange‐rate policy entails risks due to an upper bound on government debt and stochastic surplus shocks. Agents refuse to lend into a position for which the value of debt exceeds the present value of expected future surpluses. Policy switching, usually combined with currency depreciation, restores fiscal solvency and lending. This model can explain a wide variety of crises, including those involving sovereign default. We illustrate by explaining the crisis in Argentina (2001).