Social security, life insurance and annuities for families

In this paper we ask whether an aspect of social security, namely its role as a provider of insurance against uncertain life spans, is welfare enhancing. To this end we use an OLG model where agents have a bequest motive and differ in sex and marital status and where families are formed and destroyed and their characteristics evolve (exogenously) according to U.S. demographic patterns of marriage, divorce, fertility and mortality. We compare the implications of social security under a variety of market structures that differ in the extent to which life insurance and annuities are available. We find that social security is a bad idea. In economies where the private sector provides annuities and life insurance, it is a bad idea for the standard reason that it distorts the intertemporal margin by lowering the capital stock. In the absence of such securities social security is still a very bad idea, only marginally less so compared with economies with annuities and life insurance. We also explore these issues in a world where people live longer and we find no differences in our answers. As a by-product of our analysis we find that the existence of life insurance opportunities for people is important in welfare terms while that of annuities is not.     

Comments on Orphanides and Williams’ “Robust monetary policy”

Comments on the paper by Orphanides and Williams from the November 2006 Carnegie-Rochester conference.     

Futures-thinking and identity: Why “Futures Studies” is not a field, discipline, or discourse: a response to Ziauddin Sardar's ‘the namesake’

The term we use to describe the study or research of the future or futures is indeed important, and “futures studies” is preferable, although there is considerable dispute as to who and what is involved. Even more important is the far deeper problem of defining the “we” and what “we” in fact do. Futures studies not only considers wickedly complex problems, but it is itself a wicked entity, with many puzzles and contradictions. To illustrate, a taxonomy of 12 types of futurists, first articulated in 1985, is revisited, with special emphasis on the relative handful of Synoptic Generalists, the larger category of Specialized Futurists, the still larger entity of Futurized Specialists, and the largest entity of Closet Futurists who think about futures-often in a leading-edge way-but do not identify at all with futures studies, or are seen as futurists. Most contributors to Futures and other futures journals, as well as listees in the 2000 Futurist Directory, appear to have a secondary “futurist” identity at best. The fuzzy entity of “futures studies” is thus quite unlike any field or discipline, because it is easily entered by specialists who identify with the entity weakly, while many of the most important futures-thinkers are outside the entity. Instead of denying this paradox, the reality should be acknowledged, and an alterative paradigm for “futures studies” should be seriously considered.     

The impact of Milton Friedman on modern monetary economics: Setting the record straight on Paul Krugman's “Who was Milton Friedman?”

Paul Krugman's essay “Who Was Milton Friedman?” seriously mischaracterizes Friedman's economics and his legacy. In this paper, we provide a rejoinder to Krugman on these issues. In the course of setting the record straight, we provide a self-contained guide to Milton Friedman's impact on modern monetary economics and on today's central banks. We also refute the conclusions that Krugman draws about monetary policy from the experiences of the United States in the 1930s and of Japan in the 1990s.