Analysts Earnings Forecasts and the Roles of Earnings and Book Value in Equity Valuation

This study examines the effect of the degree of association between current earnings and expected future earnings on the relative importance of earnings and book value for explaining equity price. Consensus analysts forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings are used to proxy for expected future earnings and are compared to reported current earnings to measure the degree of the association. We find that the value-relevance of current earnings negatively correlates with the extent to which consensus analysts forecasts deviate from current earnings. We also find that the incremental explanatory power of book value for equity price positively correlates with this measure. These results remain robust after controlling for factors known to be affecting the value-relevance of earnings such as negative earnings and the earnings-to-book ratio. Our results also show that this analysts' forecast-based measure of `earnings persistence' dominates historical earnings variance in explaining cross-sectional variations in the value-relevance of earnings and book value.     

管理层业绩预告违规与分析师监管

本文从外部治理的角度考察了分析师对业绩预告违规的影响及其对监管制度的替代作用。研究结果表明,分析师跟踪可以显著降低上市公司业绩预告违规的概率;进一步控制分析师跟踪规模后发现,有明星分析师跟踪以及来自高声誉券商的分析师数量越多、分析师预测分歧度越低,预测越准确,这种治理作用越显著。但是分析师的监管作用仅在上市公司受监管较弱时有效,对受监管力度较强上市公司的业绩预告违规行为则没有显著影响,表明分析师对业绩预告的治理效应仅在监管力度较弱时发挥作用,成为监管制度的有效替代。本文拓展了我国分析师研究的领域与视角,并为监管部门信息披露制度的制定与执行提供了新的经验证据。     

国外证券分析师盈利预测实证研究综述

在对投资决策、资本成本、公司评估、盈余与股价的关系等进行探讨的文献中，分析师的盈利预测被广泛地用作盈利预期的代理变量，成为理论研究的一项基础。本文对国外证券分析师盈利预测的实证研究文献进行了综述，分析、比较了盈利预测业绩衡量标准、各衡量模型的优劣、乐观偏差、预测修正、意见分歧以及分析师跟进等理论。     

The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival

This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard‐to‐predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.     

业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

Prospectus Earnings Forecasts: Evidence And Explanations

Recent changes to prospectus regulations have generated considerable controversy. While the legally enforceable definition of “required information” may be uncertain, it seems clear that earnings forecasts are expected to play an important role. However, we find that the accuracy of these forecasts is questionable, as are many of the explanations offered for differences with the actual results. This calls into question the methods used for estimating future earnings and, ultimately, the usefulness of such forecasts. Laws relating to liability for prospectus information make this an issue of some concern for investors, as well as accountants and other professional advisers.     

Fundamental Information and Monetary Policy: The Implications for Earnings and Earnings Forecasts

Building on the work of Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) and Abarbanell and Bushee (1997 and 1998) this paper tests whether market-based information including dividend yield (Fama and French, 1998), firm size (Reinganum, 1981), and the ratio of book value to market value (Fama and French, 1992) add explanatory power to accounting data for predicting future earnings. The paper also tests whether earnings changes and the predictability of those changes are conditioned on monetary policy. It is found that the ratio of book value to market value is significantly related to earnings changes. Analyst forecast accuracy differs depending on monetary policy regime, but this difference is not due to differing interpretation of fundamental signals on financial statements appearing under differing monetary policy regimes. It is also found that there is a significant relation between monetary policy, earnings changes, and the level of signals concerning earnings changes.     

Business Cycle and Management Earnings Forecasts

This study examines the effects of the economic cycle on the properties of management earnings forecasts. Although a large volume of accounting literature examines the determinants of managerial earnings forecasts, the properties of such forecasts, and the response of market participants to earnings forecasts (Cameron 1986; King et al., 1990; Hirst et al., 2008), research on management earnings forecasting incentivized by macro‐economic factors has received scant empirical investigation. We use the National Bureau of Economic Research economic cycle definition to operationalize economic recession, and consider some commonly used management earnings forecast characteristics, including forecast likelihood, forecast frequency, forecast error, forecast pessimism, and forecast precision. We find that the likelihood of providing management earnings forecasts and frequency of forecasts increases during economic recession. We also find that economic recession is positively associated with forecast error, but negatively associated with forecast precision. Our findings suggest macro‐economic factors as an important determinant of management earnings forecasts properties.     

Rational Expectations and Security Analysts' Earnings Forecasts

This paper investigates the rationality of security analysts' forecasts. The forecasts of analysts participating in Lynch, Jones, and Ryan's Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/BE/S) data base are evaluated relative to past values of their own forecast errors, past values of forecasted earnings per share, and quarterly percentage changes in publicly available macroeconomic and financial time series. The publicly available series include the consumer price index, unemployment rate, oil prices, stock prices, gross national product, and corporate profits. The authors conduct a generalized orthogonality test and include only information available to analysts at the time the forecasts are made. The empirical results reject analyst forecast rationality, but not without exception.     

政治不确定性与管理层自愿业绩预测

本文以2006-2013年我国A股上市公司为样本,以企业总部所在省份的省委书记变更作为政治不确定性的衡量,研究了政治不确定性对于管理层自愿业绩预告和预告精确度的影响。结果发现,在官员变更的当年,管理层会更倾向于自愿发布业绩预告,并且业绩预告的精确度也会提高。进一步研究发现,政治不确定性对业绩预告自愿披露倾向和精确度的影响在民营企业、新任官员为外部调任时、分析师跟踪人数更多的公司中更为显著。最后本文也从资本市场反应的角度进行了补充检验,发现市场在政治不确定性更高时对业绩预告的反应也更强烈。本文的发现对于理解政治不确定性的微观影响及管理层自愿业绩预测的作用都有一定的贡献。     

Confirming Management Earnings Forecasts, Earnings Uncertainty, and Stock Returns

In this study we examine the association among confirming management forecasts, stock prices, and analyst expectations. Confirming management forecasts are voluntary disclosures by management that corroborate existing market expectations about future earnings. This study provides evidence that these voluntary disclosures affect stock prices and the dispersion of analyst expectations. Specifically, we find that the market's reaction to confirming forecasts is significantly positive, indicating that benefits accrue to firms that disclose such forecasts. In addition, although we find no significant change in the mean consensus forecasts (a proxy for earnings expectations) around the confirming forecast date, evidence indicates a significant reduction in the mean and median consensus analyst dispersion (a proxy for earnings uncertainty). Finally, we document a positive association between the reduction of dispersion of analysts' forecasts and the magnitude of the stock market response. Overall, the evidence suggests that confirming forecasts reduce uncertainty about future earnings and that investors price this reduction of uncertainty.     

Earnings Forecasts and the Information Contained in Spinoff Announcements

This study examines spinoff announcements in conjunction with financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings. The analysis shows that spinoff announcement abnormal returns are significantly related to the firm's information environment as proxieci by financial analysts’ earnings prediction errors. The findings also indicate that analysts significantly increase their short-term earnings forecasts in response to spinoffs, but do not significantly revise their long-term earnings forecasts. However, the earnings revisions are not significantly different across prediction error groups, which confirms that spinoff-related abnormal returns cannot be attributed solely to expected performance gains.     

Management Earnings Forecasts,Earnings Announcements,and Institutional Trading in China

Abstract:

In this study, we investigate the trading behavior of institutional investors in China according to management earnings forecasts (MEFs) and earnings announcements (EAs). MEFs are mandatory under the stringent regulatory framework in China. We find evidence that both MEFs and EAs have an effect on the market. However, MEFs have a bigger effect on the market than do EAs. According to a sample of semiannual observations of firms from 2003 to 2008, we find that changes in the stock ownership of institutions are positively associated with EAs but not significantly associated with MEFs. When we further examine the relations between institutional characteristics and trading strategies, we find that growth funds exploit the arbitrage opportunity of MEFs.     

Analyzing the Analysts: When Do Recommendations Add Value?

We show that analysts from sell-side firms generally recommend "glamour" (i.e., positive momentum, high growth, high volume, and relatively expensive) stocks. Naïve adherence to these recommendations can be costly, because the level of the consensus recommendation adds value only among stocks with favorable quantitative characteristics (i.e., value stocks and positive momentum stocks). In fact, among stocks with unfavorable quantitative characteristics, higher consensus recommendations are associated with worse subsequent returns. In contrast, we find that the quarterly change in consensus recommendations is a robust return predictor that appears to contain information orthogonal to a large range of other predictive variables.     

The Predictive Content of Earnings Forecasts and Dividends

This paper compares the properties of dividend announcements and management earnings forecasts as predictors of earnings and firm value. First, the two predictors are compared on the basis of their ability to predict earnings. Then the information they convey about firm value is assessed by comparison of the performance of investment strategies based on values of the two predictors. Finally, the effects of dividend announcements on stock prices are considered.     

分析师留学经历与盈利预测质量

基于2005-2015年期间的分析师预测数据,本文研究发现,相对于非留学分析师,具有海外留学经历的分析师的预测准确性更低,通过分组检验发现,上述结果主要存在于分析师的从业初期和分析师与企业高管之间不具有社会关系时。进一步研究发现,分析师留学越早,时间越长,其预测准确性相对越低。另外,当企业公开信息质量较高时,海外留学分析师与非留学分析师在预测准确性上的差异消失。由此可见,在我国关系型社会中,海外留学归国分析师在认知和获取私有信息方面存在相对劣势,其并没有提供更高质量的盈余预测。本文的研究发现丰富了有关分析师预测质量的研究文献,同时也为当前规范和提高企业信息披露质量的制度改革提供了资本市场的经验证据。     

Managerial Career Concerns and Risk Management

We present a dynamic model of corporate risk management and managerial career concerns. We show that managers with low (high) initial reputation have high (low) career concerns about keeping their jobs and receiving all future income. These managers are more likely to speculate (hedge) early in their careers. In the later stage of their careers when managers have less career concerns, there is no speculative motive for self interested managers. On the other hand, highly reputable managers have minimal career concerns and they engage in neither hedging nor speculation early in their careers, but they may choose to hedge after poor early performance.