Learning-by-Doing and Strategic Trade Policy

The paper models international rivalry between a domestic firm that is going through a learning-by-doing phase, and a mature foreign rival. It is shown that the optimal production subsidy for the domestic firm depends on the degree of strategic sophistication of the foreign firm. Optimal production subsidy rules are derived under various scenarios. They are shown to be very sensitive to the specification of the game between the domestic and the foreign firms. Whether the optimal subsidy should decrease over time depends on the strategic sophistication of the foreign firm.     

战略贸易政策新进展与发展中国家贸易政策

通过对战略贸易政策在贸易的政治经济学、不确定性、不完全承诺和不完全信息等四个方面的新进展进行讨论,得出结论:新贸易理论的新进展使得脱胎于发达国家的战略贸易政策更加接近发展中国家市场经常失灵的现实,从而对发展中国家的贸易政策有重要的指导意义。     

Strategic Trade Policy and Vertical Structure

We introduce intermediaries into the Brander-Spencer model of strategic trade policy. A key finding is that in regimes involving independent retailers, output competition and linear pricing (and two-part tariffs under certain restrictions), the optimal policy involves an export tax instead of a subsidy. If firms commit to vertical structure before governments commit to policy then under output competition firms choose integration, whereas if policy precedes structure then at least one firm chooses separation. Under price competition separation is a dominant strategy regardless of whether the structure decision is made before or after the policy decision.     

Strategic Trade Policy Under Uncertainty*

This paper extends the Brander-Spencer (1985) model by considering market uncertainty, exploring nonlinear policy, and examining firms' choices of strategic variables. By investigating the interrelationship between trade policy and market conduct, we find that unlike the often-studied linear policy, a nonlinear policy can influence the domestic firm's choice of strategic variables and hence alter the market conduct in favor of the domestic country. Therefore, a nonlinear policy proves strictly superior to a linear one.     

Strategic Trade Policy with Heterogeneous Costs

The paper examines optimal strategic trade policy under a heterogeneous cost oligopoly. The first‐best policy involves a structure of firm‐specific export subsidies/taxes in which the government favours the most efficient firms only with a sufficiently low social cost of public funds.     

新加坡的战略性贸易政策评析

本文首先对战略性贸易政策作了简单介绍,接着重点论述了新加坡经济发展过程中对战略性贸易政策的成功运用,介绍了这一政策运用的主要内容及其特点,文章最后就我国如何借鉴新加坡的经验提出政策建议。     

论战略性贸易政策在中国的适用性

基于规模经济和不完全竞争假说前提的战略性贸易政策作为贸易政策的新思路 ,受到极大的关注。本文分析了战略贸易政策的适用条件及其在中国的可能应用 ,文章最后提出了中国在使用这一政策的具体建议     

基于战略性贸易政策理论的"战略性自主创新政策"研究

在对战略性贸易政策重要成果综述的基础上,提出引入自主创新对战略性贸易政策理论在中国进行应用具有重要的意义,并构建了一个战略性自主创新政策理论的基本框架.     

Strategic Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

This paper investigates strategic export intervention in a final-good industry which uses an intermediate good supplied by a foreign monopolist. An export tax-cum-subsidy leads to horizontal and vertical rent extraction. The optimal government intervention in the final-good market is shown to depend on the pricing scheme employed by the intermediate-good producer.     

战略性贸易政策的理论及其在中国的实践

战略性贸易政策是随着战后国际贸易发展而产生出来的一种新的贸易保护理论,它引入了不完全竞争的国际市场结构这一事实作为其基本假设,论述了政府的政策性介入的合理性。实践中的战略贸易政策在各个不同的国家效果不同,所以对这种政策的成功并没有达成共识。不过,有选择地应用战略性贸易政策仍然对我国的贸易政策有重要的借鉴意义。     

Strategic Trade Policy and Signalling with Unobservable Costs

In an environment in which home firm costs are private information, home firm output can signal these costs to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. High-cost home firms have an incentive to misrepresent themselves as low-cost. This is understood by the foreign firm and the home policymaker and results in the first-period optimal per-unit output subsidy to the home firm being less than it would be if home firm output was not a signal of home firm costs. These results are extended to the case of simultaneous signalling and signalling through price.     

论战略性贸易政策与制度环境的稳定性

战略性贸易政策理论主张政府应积极干预存在超额利润或技术外溢效应的寡头垄断产业以实现本国社会净福利的最大化.然而最终是否能实现预期的干预效果与制度环境密切相关.本文通过研究表明保持一个稳定的制度环境对欲实施战略性贸易政策的国家而言是最优的选择.     

Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances

We argue that the stock of prior alliances between participantsin the biotechnology sector forms a network that serves as agovernance mechanism in interfirm transactions. To test howthis network substitutes for other governance mechanisms, weexamine how equity participation and pledged funding in strategicalliances vary with two features of the way alliance participantsare positioned in the network of past deals: proximity, or howclose two firms are to one another in the network; and centrality,or how deeply a firm is embedded in the network. As centralityand proximity increase, equity participation (measured by sizeand propensity) diminishes, whereas pledged funding increases.     

差异伯川德模型下战略性贸易政策的实验研究

采用经济学实验的方法,本科生作为被试,货币作为激励手段,研究Eaton和Grossman（1986）提出的差异伯川德竞争方式下一国政府的最佳贸易政策理论。实验设计时考虑实验参与者间交互作用的特性以及被试对＂政策＂与＂征税＂的各种可能的反应,设计了四个设置的实验,对实验数据从被试的决策动机、被试决策时的考虑因素进行分析,运用数学及统计软件进行分析。实验结果显示政府不愿干预国际贸易,不会对本国产品征收出口税;同时分析了本实验研究的现实意义。     

Free Entry, Quasi-Free Trade, and Strategic Export Policy

This paper analyzes governments' choices between strategic export subsidies and free trade as a commitment when firms are free to enter or exit in response to these choices. Entry and exit is treated as a discrete process. Within the context of a four-stage game, two types of equilibria emerge: a quasi-free-trade equilibrium in which one of the two governments commits to free trade, while the other has a Nash equilibrium subsidy that is zero and bilateral export subsidies. Concerning welfare effects, if fixed costs are large enough, both countries achieve a welfare gain relative to free trade.     

战略性贸易政策应用于中国轿车业量化效果的再考察--政策工具与外国政府行为对政策实施的影响

经验分析表明,战略性贸易政策可以起到从国外企业转移利润、支持本国企业竞争和提高国民福利的作用.本文以中国轿车业为例,在以前对我国单边实施进口关税效果量化分析的基础上,进一步应用数量模型对战略性贸易政策实施过程中应注意的两个问题进行考察,一是实施战略性贸易政策应当注意与其他政策工具相配合,二是应用该政策应当注意技巧,尽量避免引发其他国家的报复,这样才能收到更好的政策效果.     

贸易自由化、纵向关联市场与战略性环境政策——环境税对发展绿色贸易的意义

本文在一个两国出口至第三国的连续双寡模型中,研究贸易自由化对均衡环境政策及社会福利的影响。分析发现:(1)战略性环境政策的租金攫取效应可通过中间产品出口实现,但不一定会通过最终产品出口实现。(2)当污染的环境损害程度不大时,贸易自由化将降低各国环境税,从而使各国的环境保护出现"向底线赛跑";当环境损害系数较大时,贸易自由化将提高各国环境税。(3)社会福利水平为双边关税壁垒的凹函数(呈"倒U型"),贸易自由化对社会福利的影响不确定。此外,本文还分析了合理征收环境税对发展我国绿色贸易的意义。     

Patent Licensing in the Presence of Trade Barriers

We develop a two‐country duopoly model to explore the optimal licensing contract for an outsider licensor in terms of fixed‐fee and royalty licensing by taking into account trade barriers when firms produce a homogeneous product and engage in Bertrand competition in each market. The present paper focuses on the interaction between licensing and trade barriers in two international markets. We show that both royalty and non‐exclusive fixed‐fee licensing can be optimal. Furthermore, exclusive fixed‐fee licensing can be optimal, which is a result that is not discussed in the existing literature.     

Strategic Regulation Policy in the Internet

Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest in quality degradation.