客户重要性与审计谈判

审计谈判对审计质量和会计信息质量具有十分重要的影响。本文运用实验经济学的方法研究了客户重要性对审计谈判的影响。研究发现,在与重要的客户谈判时,审计人员接受的客户最终的资产价值比较高,与客户在谈判中达成一致的比例也比较高;在与非重要客户谈判时,审计人员接受的客户最终的资产价值比较低,与客户在谈判中达成一致的比例也比较低。同时还发现,在与重要客户谈判时,审计人员更倾向于采用合作型谈判策略;在与非重要客户谈判时,审计人员更倾向于采用竞争型谈判策略。本文的发现表明,客户重要性明显地影响了审计质量。     

The effect of outcome and process accountability on customer–supplier negotiations

Prior studies on customer–supplier negotiations ( and ) find that negotiators who have access to relevant activity-based cost information are not always able to use this information to improve joint outcomes. Our study extends this literature by examining how the type of accountability (process and outcome accountability) influences the extent to which negotiators can obtain lower joint costs. We hypothesize and test a model that predicts that the type of accountability affects negotiated outcomes through its effect on negotiators’ fixed-pie bias revisions and the negotiation tactics they employ during customer-supplier negotiations. Results from an experiment show that negotiators held accountable for their negotiation processes are better able to reduce their fixed-pie biases and achieve lower joint costs compared to those who are held accountable for their negotiation outcomes. Using rich data based on taped negotiations, we demonstrate that the effect of accountability on joint costs is indirect through its effect on negotiators’ choice of negotiation tactics and the extent to which negotiators can reduce their fixed-pie biases.     

Auditor–client management relationships and roles in negotiating financial reporting

We carry out an interview based field study of chief financial officer (CFO)–audit partner dyads to examine the assumption that the roles played by each side and the nature of the relationships are similar across negotiations. These dyads freely discussed with us their relationship, a specific issue negotiated and it’s resolution process. Employing the lens of social positioning negotiation research, we find these negotiations are ‘fluid’, with continual redefinition not only of the substantive issues under negotiation, but also of the negotiation roles and relationships (i.e. ‘shadow’ negotiations). The CFO’s actions and expectations in these ‘shadow’ negotiations appear to define the auditor’s role and the relationship’s parameters, but both can evolve over time. The audit partners express a desire to be in the “ideal” relationship where they assume the role of the ‘expert advisor’ (as opposed to a ‘police officer’) but they seemingly have no explicit strategy to move the relationship toward a ‘proactive’ (rather than ‘reactive’) state. Furthermore, the audit partner is always the ‘relationship manager’ whose job it is to see that client management remains “happy”. These roles and relationships negotiated in the ‘shadows’ also affect how the negotiation process unfolds, including the set of alternative accounting treatments considered during negotiations. Finally, audit firms appear to manage the assignment of partners to engagements based on CFO preferences and remove those partners who are in “poor” relationships, irrespective of why the relationship is considered by the CFO to be “poor”. Implications for the broader research program on auditor–client management negotiations are discussed.     

The auditor’s strategy selection for negotiation with management: Flexibility of initial accounting position and nature of the relationship

The audit partner is usually the first mover in a negotiation with client management and has an intended strategy set going into such a negotiation. Negotiation strategies that make up the set may be integrative (both parties can gain or at least not lose) and distributive (there is a winner and a loser). We focus on five strategies: two integrative (expanding the agenda or problem solving) and three distributive (contending, conceding or compromising) and measure the audit partner’s intent to use these strategies’ associated tactics. We report the results of an audit negotiation experiment in which 140 highly experienced audit partners planned a negotiation in response to a case scenario that incorporated two key theoretical variables: the flexibility of the client initial accounting position and the nature of the prior relationship between the auditor and client management. In addition to intended tactics, we also examine these two variables’ effects on commitment to the goal of reducing net income. Our results indicate that in contrast to findings in the generic negotiation literature that show negotiators have a preference for distributive tactics and have difficulty employing integrative ones, our audit partners generally favored the use of integrative tactics over distributive ones when entering negotiations, irrespective of circumstance. However, the two theorized variables led to particular strategic choices when distributive tactics were intended; for example, when the audit partner perceived he or she was facing a client management that was inflexible in its initial accounting position, the partner was more likely to use contending tactics and less likely to use conceding and compromising tactics. Finally, we discuss implications of these results for practice and research.     

The effect of gender and firm identification on auditor pre-negotiation judgments

This paper extends current auditor negotiation research by considering the effects of two dimensions of auditors' identity that are posited to be relevant to auditors' negotiation: gender and audit firm identification. Women earn over half of college degrees in accounting, and hold more than half of accounting and auditing positions in the US, yet the balance of the gender of partners at audit firms is currently not equal (AICPA, 2017). However, as more women advance into partnership positions in firms, it is increasingly important to have an understanding of how gender affects the behaviors, processes and outcomes of negotiation, and thus the quality of financial statements. The auditor-client negotiation context has features, such as ambiguity and representation of others that can “trigger” the salience of auditors' gender and firm identity. Once salient, these two dimensions of auditors' identity shape auditors' motivational orientation towards negotiations, which, in turn, affects the auditors' negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes.The study finds that male and female auditors approach the negotiation over audit adjustments differently. Although many negotiation studies find that males negotiate more aggressively than do females, auditor-client negotiation offers a unique setting that has been found to reverse this common trend. We hypothesize and find that female auditors recommend higher audit adjustments than males. However, the level of firm identification moderates female's recommended audit adjustments such that at higher levels of firm identification, the larger audit adjustments recommended by females decrease. This finding is consistent with the growing research on gender differences in auditing and the research on gender and risk tolerance, which find females to be more risk averse, but contrary to much of the negotiation research which shows males as more aggressive and achieving higher negotiated outcomes. In supplemental analysis, we find that our results hold in the senior manager subsample but not in the partner subsample. This result is consistent with theory on gender differences which suggests that the differences will disappear with increased occupational socialization (Smith & Rogers, 2000). Practical implications are discussed.     

The roles of accounting in collective bargaining

In this paper, the roles that accounting information appeared to play in the negotiations between a not-for-profit organization and the association representing its professional employees are described and assessed. Using a case mode of inquiry, and drawing on the industrial relations and recent accounting literature, the paper explores the impact of accounting on both the process and outcome of the negotiations, and concludes by offering some tentative hypotheses on the roles of accounting in collective bargaining.     

The relative effectiveness of persuasion tactics in auditor–client negotiations

In this study, we examine the effectiveness of four persuasive arguments that auditors may use to convince clients to accept their desired position in auditor–client negotiations. In addition, we investigate how the style in which the argument is communicated by the auditor impacts its effectiveness. Our results indicate that the type of persuasion tactic used by auditors significantly impacts the amount of concessions made by clients. Specifically, we find that, while threatening to qualify the audit opinion can result in significant client concessions, a tactic of simply informing the client that other companies have handled the accounting issue in a way consistent with the auditor’s preference is as effective, or more effective, than all of the other tactics examined at eliciting significant concessions as well as engendering positive affect toward the auditor. This result is consistent with findings from the persuasion literature relating to the pervasive power of social validation. We also find that clients offer more concessions, evaluate the auditor more positively, and are more satisfied with the negotiation outcome when auditors communicate their arguments using a cooperative, as opposed to a contentious, communication style. The results of this study indicate that auditors may benefit from training in persuasion tactics in order to achieve more desirable negotiation outcomes.     

The legitimacy of new assurance providers: Making the cap fit

According to Bourdieu, legitimacy is a scarce symbolic resource that is subject to struggle and (re)negotiation. Focusing on the emergence and operation of the salary cap audit programs in the National Rugby League (NRL) in Australia and Canadian Football League (CFL) in Canada, this article explores the way in which auditors compete for legitimacy in new audit spaces. We highlight the way that capital from intersecting semi-autonomous fields were drawn upon to generate legitimacy for the new roles. We also draw attention to a range of practical strategies, including conscious ingratiation, sanctioning, and fairness appeals, which were mobilised to impose the auditors in their roles, populate the field with new rules and confer a new order. The contrasting case studies reveal the importance of contextual elements and the configuration of the field of power in each case. Implications for the claims of the accounting profession to new audit spaces are discussed.     

The effect of cost information on buyer–supplier negotiations in different power settings

We investigate the influence of total cost of ownership (TCO) information on buyer–supplier negotiations in different power settings. Based on social exchange theory and recent literature on information processing, we expect that buyers with detailed TCO information and less power than their negotiation partners may try to (re)gain control over their own outcomes by sharing information. The results of our experiment indicate that the performance disadvantage of less powerful buyers is less pronounced when the buyer has detailed TCO information, whereas more powerful buyers do not seem to be able to profit from TCO information. These somewhat counterintuitive findings are explained through detailed analysis of the buyer’s negotiation behavior, which shows that less powerful buyers who have access to TCO data use problem solving techniques more frequently than powerful buyers, who tend to rely on distributive bargaining techniques instead. We conclude that power can motivate a failure to share TCO information, resulting in less effective interfirm negotiation outcomes.     

The impact of auditor rotation on auditor–client negotiation

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to investigate how mandatory audit firm rotation affects auditor–client negotiations. Drawing upon process theories of negotiation, we examine the strategies used by auditors and clients as well as the outcomes of their negotiations in alternative settings in which mandatory rotation is imposed or is not imposed. We posit that mandatory rotation changes (1) the dynamics of the audit market by increasing the number of clients who are in the market for a new auditor, and (2) the political costs to a client who switches auditors. These changes, in turn, alter the willingness of the auditor and the client to cooperate during negotiation. The results suggest that with mandatory rotation auditors adopt less cooperative negotiation strategies, producing asset values that are more in line with the auditor’s preferences than with the client’s preferences and more negotiation impasses.     

Toward an Archival Measure of the Likelihood of Auditor–Client Management Negotiation: An Exploration of the Audit Lag Measures Conjecture*

Salterio (2012) hypothesized that adaptations of an audit efficiency measure, audit report lag (the length of time between the financial statement year‐end date and the auditor's report date), could provide measures of underlying auditor–client management (ACM) negotiation likelihood. Salterio argued that these measures would enable archival researchers to examine issues that heretofore were the exclusive domain of experimental and field researchers. Using an audit report lag measure and a measure of abnormal audit report lag lags (the residual based on audit report lag determinants model), we show that a larger lag is associated with higher audit fees after controlling for other known determinants of audit fees. We also show that larger lags are associated with higher levels of discretionary accruals—that is, lower accrual quality. Based on our findings, we suggest that there is support for Salterio's hypothesis that audit report lags and abnormal audit report provide valid archival proxies for the differences in year‐end ACM negotiation likelihood. We suggest that this proxy will allow researchers to study issues related to published accounting numbers in light of whether negotiations are likely to have occurred in addition to providing regulators and others the means to determine what clients of audit firms are more likely to have different types of ACM relationships.     

A theory of negotiated equity financing

We examine the sale of equity within the context of a modelof negotiation between a firm and a less well informed purchaser.We introduce a simple form of negotiation by allowing the firmto set the price of the issue and by assuming that the purchaseis a financier-underwriter who acts strategically. This transactionis analyzed as a noncooperative game, and we identify sequentialequilibria that are consistent with observed behavior: namelythat negotiations occasionally fail, that market reactions toequity offers are not uniformly negative, and that equity placementsare often underpriced.     

Takeover duration and negotiation process

We study the relations between takeover negotiations duration, competition and learning, focusing on the private phase of bidder-initiated transactions. While the negotiation goes on, both parties learn about true deal synergies. At any moment, rival bidders can show up and compete for the target. Using a discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic programming approach, we derive the equilibrium relations between the negotiation duration, the pressure of potential competition and the learning process. Next, we perform a calibration exercise on a large sample of merger negotiations with hand-collected data from the Securities and Exchange Commission filings. Our results provide evidence of a very competitive M&A (Mergers and acquisitions) market.     

Accounting logics, reconfiguration of ERP systems and the emergence of new accounting practices: A sociomaterial perspective

This paper extends our knowledge on how software-based accounting tools might work effectively within an organization. The empirical data that we focus on are events that unfolded following the introduction of a new ERP system at an Ivy League University. We describe a negotiation process that occurred after roll-out that resulted in a reconfiguration of the ERP to integrate some of the legacy functionalities that were familiar to organizational participants and which were considered by them to provide a more effective way to manage their finances. Our contribution to the literature is not only to show the importance of such post-roll-out modifications for creating a working information system, but also to extend previous accounts of non-linear accounting change processes by emphasizing how these modifications are dependent on the particular entanglement of users and technology (the sociomaterial assemblage) rather than either features of the technology or the agency of the humans involved. Moreover, our analysis of the case data suggests that management accounting in particular may not be easily captured in ERP packages, even where the technology architectures are supposedly designed for a particular industry. The case data also points to issues of affordability and the power of communities of practice as mediating the extent to which these familiar accounting logics may become integrated within the ERP system.     

Contextual issues of the convergence of International Financial Reporting Standards: The case of Germany

The objective of this paper, using Germany as a case study, is to show that accounting as the language of business is deeply embedded in a country's social, political and economic environment and that these contextual factors cannot be ignored in the process of convergence. Specifically, by invoking the accounting ecology framework and interviewing selected stakeholders, this study critically examines the unique features of accounting in Germany and raises issues related to the adoption of IFRS. The findings of this study provide evidence of the importance of considering the contextual influences in successful adoption of IFRS in a country.     

Procurement under public scrutiny: auctions versus negotiations

We compare two commonly used mechanisms in public procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a general characterization of both mechanisms based on public scrutiny requirements and show—contrary to conventional wisdom—that an intransparent negotiation always yields higher social surplus than a transparent auction. Moreover, there exists a lower bound on the number of sellers such that the negotiation also generates a higher buyer surplus.     

Understanding the Restatement Process

Much research examines investors' reactions to restatements and the effects of restatements on chief executive officer (CEO), chief financial officer (CFO), and auditor turnover; however, little research explores the process of restating financial reports. In this study, we investigate the process of issuing a restatement. We specifically focus on the interactions among the parties involved (e.g., CFO, board, audit committee, audit partner, and regulators) in determining and ultimately resolving a restatement, as well as the impact of the restatement on the relationships among these parties. We investigate the restatement process via semi‐structured interviews. We immersed ourselves in the restatement process by interviewing all parties typically involved, such as CFOs, auditors, and regulators. Given the findings in the auditor–client management negotiation area, which suggest that negotiation of accounting treatment and disclosure is frequent, our findings indicate that negotiations and/or difficult discussions take place among the parties involved when determining whether a restatement is necessary as well as in achieving the ultimate restatement outcome. Our findings (based on a small sample) suggest that the restatement process may influence or be influenced by such factors as the nature of the misstatement, the party that identified the misstatement, the reaction of the various parties to the misstatement, disagreement among the parties on whether to restate, communication with the regulator, the press release, client size, the personality of the CFO, audit committee strength, and the relationships among the parties subsequent to the restatement.     

A multi-agent-based negotiation support system for distributed transmission cost allocation

We have developed a multi-agent system (MAS), based on the network flow model and KQML, called MASCAN, to support negotiations in the cost allocation of network transmission. This is very important to industries that have different entities connected with lines or pipes, such as the Internet and telecommunications. Such an approach is especially useful to the utility industries, such as electricity and gas, and the transportation industry. In the system, each agent represents a node in a network, for example supplier or consumer. Agents do not receive any centralized controls or information from centralized sources to guarantee autonomy–a key requirement for the agent. In this all decisions are made locally based on the rules or knowledge that each agent has or captured to communicate or coordinate with other agents for the cheapest path under fair-play requirements. We also assume that each agent is rational, that is, one of the goals or objectives of agent decisions or movements is to minimize costs or increase profits. The solution to cost allocation is to search for the equilibrium point of a non-cooperative game subject to the given constraints, for example network capacity. We applied MASCAN to model and support the negotiation of cost allocation in power transmission, and the results and how this approach supported the process of negotiation are perceived to be closer to the real-world negotiation and the outcomes were accepted more easily by the participants. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pretrial negotiations under optimism

We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of information. However, they may also agree to settle prior to an arrival. We derive the settlement dynamics prior to an arrival: negotiations result in either immediate agreement, a weak deadline effect—settling at a particular date before the deadline, a strong deadline effect—settling at the deadline, or impasse, depending on the level of optimism. Our findings match stylized facts.     

Budget negotiations in multi-period settings

Budgets are typically set through a negotiation process that is repeated in successive periods, often between the same superior and subordinate. Despite this, little is known about budget negotiations in multi-period settings. Temporal interdependence is a fundamental aspect of budget negotiations in multi-period settings, and it refers to the fact that in multi-period budget settings, superiors’ (subordinates’) decisions and actions in one period can be influenced by subordinates’ (superiors’) decisions and actions in earlier periods and, in turn, can influence subordinates’ (superiors’) decisions and actions in later periods. We report the results of an experiment that addresses two issues related to temporal interdependence.