Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion

Selective immigration policies set lower barriers to entry for skilled workers. However, simple economic intuition suggests that skilled majorities should welcome unskilled immigrants and protect skilled natives. This paper studies the voting over a selective policy in a two-country, three-factor model with skilled and unskilled labor, endogenous migration decisions, costly border enforcement and aversion to immigration. Results show that heterogeneity in capital distribution forces skilled voters to form a coalition with unskilled voters, who become pivotal. The voting outcome is therefore biased towards the preferences of the latter, and consists in a selective protectionism. Finally, immigration aversion helps to explain why skilled majorities do not bring down entry barriers against unskilled workers.     

Panels with non-stationary multifactor error structures

The presence of cross-sectionally correlated error terms invalidates much inferential theory of panel data models. Recently, work by Pesaran (2006) has suggested a method which makes use of cross-sectional averages to provide valid inference in the case of stationary panel regressions with a multifactor error structure. This paper extends this work and examines the important case where the unobservable common factors follow unit root processes. The extension to I(1)$I\left(1\right)$ processes is remarkable on two counts. First, it is of great interest to note that while intermediate results needed for deriving the asymptotic distribution of the panel estimators differ between the I(1)$I\left(1\right)$ and I(0)$I\left(0\right)$ cases, the final results are surprisingly similar. This is in direct contrast to the standard distributional results for I(1)$I\left(1\right)$ processes that radically differ from those for I(0)$I\left(0\right)$ processes. Second, it is worth noting the significant extra technical demands required to prove the new results. The theoretical findings are further supported for small samples via an extensive Monte Carlo study. In particular, the results of the Monte Carlo study suggest that the cross-sectional-average-based method is robust to a wide variety of data generation processes and has lower biases than the alternative estimation methods considered in the paper.     

Competition as a track for preventing illegal immigration

Rich countries often face sizeable illegal migration. This paper suggests that these countries would use the financial aid which they give to the source countries as an instrument to prevent illegal immigration. The core of this policy is to allow the source countries to compete for the pre-determined aid, which would be distributed according to the cross-proportion of the apprehended illegal aliens. Moreover, we show that it may be beneficial for the rich country to split the source countries into competing pairs rather than allowing all of them to compete jointly. The rich country has basically two policy means: funds allocated to strengthening its border control; and the foreign aid given to the source countries. The multi-country general equilibrium model presented shows how the rich country, by choosing an appropriate mix of these two policy means, can minimize the number of illegal immigrants subject to its budget constrain.Received: 15 August 2002, Accepted: 21 January 2004, JEL Classification: F22Nava Kahana, Tikva Lecker: The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

Testing for co-integration in vector autoregressions with non-stationary volatility

Many key macroeconomic and financial variables are characterized by permanent changes in unconditional volatility. In this paper we analyse vector autoregressions with non-stationary (unconditional) volatility of a very general form, which includes single and multiple volatility breaks as special cases. We show that the conventional rank statistics computed as in  and  are potentially unreliable. In particular, their large sample distributions depend on the integrated covariation of the underlying multivariate volatility process which impacts on both the size and power of the associated co-integration tests, as we demonstrate numerically. A solution to the identified inference problem is provided by considering wild bootstrap-based implementations of the rank tests. These do not require the practitioner to specify a parametric model for volatility, or to assume that the pattern of volatility is common to, or independent across, the vector of series under analysis. The bootstrap is shown to perform very well in practice.     

Labor-market exposure as a determinant of attitudes toward immigration

This paper re-examines the role of labor-market competition as a determinant of attitudes toward immigration. We claim two main contributions. First, we use more sophisticated measures of the degree of exposure to competition from immigrants than previously done. In addition to education, we focus on the protection derived from (self-assessed) investments in job-specific human capital and from specialization in occupations that are (objectively) intensive in communication tasks. Second, we explicitly account for the potential endogeneity arising from job search. Methodologically, we estimate by instrumental variables, an econometric model that allows for heterogeneity at the individual, regional and country level. Drawing on the 2004–2005 European Social Survey, we obtain the following main results. First, natives that dislike immigrants tend to work in low-immigration jobs, biasing OLS estimates. Second, working in jobs that require high levels of specific human capital leads to relatively more pro-immigration attitudes, although this effect is only found for respondents with more than 12 years of schooling. Third, the degree of manual (communicational) intensity of workers' occupations has a negative (positive) effect on their pro-immigration views. This effect is the most significant, both in a statistical and in a quantitative sense, and is distinct from the protection from immigrant competition provided by formal education. Overall our results suggest a large role for skill-based labor market competition in determining individual attitudes toward immigration.     

Convergence of productivity: a comment

We find that an important programming error was made by Hobijn and Franses ( 2000 ) in conducting multivariate stationarity tests. The empirical results in their paper are subject to errors. Other studies that have used the coded algorithm of Hobijn and Franses are likely to suffer the same problem. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing for a change in persistence in the presence of non-stationary volatility

In this paper we consider tests for the null of (trend-) stationarity against the alternative of a change in persistence at some (known or unknown) point in the observed sample, either from I(0)$I\left(0\right)$ to I(1)$I\left(1\right)$ behaviour or vice versa, of, inter alia, [Kim, J., 2000. Detection of change in persistence of a linear time series. Journal of Econometrics 95, 97–116]. We show that in circumstances where the innovation process displays non-stationary unconditional volatility of a very general form, which includes single and multiple volatility breaks as special cases, the ratio-based statistics used to test for persistence change do not have pivotal limiting null distributions. Numerical evidence suggests that this can cause severe over-sizing in the tests. In practice it may therefore be hard to discriminate between persistence change processes and processes with constant persistence but which display time-varying unconditional volatility. We solve the identified inference problem by proposing wild bootstrap-based implementations of the tests. Monte Carlo evidence suggests that the bootstrap tests perform well in finite samples. An empirical illustration using US price inflation data is provided.     

Testing for unit roots in time series models with non-stationary volatility

Many of the key macro-economic and financial variables in developed economies are characterized by permanent volatility shifts. It is known that conventional unit root tests are potentially unreliable in the presence of such behaviour, depending on a particular function (the variance profile) of the underlying volatility process. Somewhat surprisingly then, very little work has been undertaken to develop unit root tests which are robust to the presence of permanent volatility shifts. In this paper we fill this gap in the literature by proposing tests which are valid in the presence of a quite general class of permanent variance changes which includes single and multiple (abrupt and smooth-transition) volatility change processes as special cases. Our solution uses numerical methods to simulate the asymptotic null distribution of the statistics based on a consistent estimate of the variance profile which we also develop. The practitioner is not required to specify a parametric model for volatility. An empirical illustration using producer price inflation series from the Stock–Watson database is reported.     

immigration and the collapse of communism

Will Western Europe have to deal with a flood of emigrants from the East? Jonathan Eyal, of the Royal United Services Institution, argues that the West should not be unduly affected.     

Convergence of a market related game strategy

A special case of the adjustment process for competing firms, introduced elsewhere, is analysed. It is proved that all equilibrium states are characterised by the vanishing of the Jacobian of the payoff functions of the market game, and that under suitable initial conditions the process is a contraction mapping, implying convergence to equilibrium.     

Forward recursion for markov decision processes with skip-free-to-the-right transitions part ii: non-standard applications

This paper is the sequel to Wijngaard and Stidham (1986). The topic is a countable state average reward semi-Markov decision process with a transition mechanism that is skip-free to the right. The applications are controlled GI /M/1 queues. Skip-free to the right means that state n cannot be reached from the states i (< n ) without reaching first state n −1. In such decision processes the reversed optimality equation can be used to estimate the optimal average reward by bi-section. Wijngaard and Stidham (1986) show that it is possible to use upper and lower bounds on the value function for this bi-section. This paper considers queueing problems where this bi-section can not be used in a standard way. Instead of an upper bound on the value function is is possible now to use the character of the optimal strategy.     

Convergence in games with continua of equilibria

In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we introduce a technique developed in Bhat and Bernstein (2003) as a useful way to answer this question. We illustrate it with the best-response dynamics in the local public good game played on a network, where continua of Nash equilibria often appear.     

A political economy model of immigration quotas

The paper examines a model in which the number of immigrants allowed into a country is the outcome of a costly political lobbying contest between a firm and a union. The union and the firm bargain over the wage of natives after the number of immigrants that will be permitted is known. I assume that the lobbying contest is an all-pay auction (i.e., the lobbyist with the higher effort wins with certainty). Comparative statics results are derived to show how the reservation wage of immigrants, the price of the firms product, the size of the union and the cost of lobbying affect immigration quotas and the post-immigration wage of natives.Received: 4 June 2003, Accepted: 23 June 2004 JEL Classification: D72, D73, J5, J61I thank the editor, Amihai Glazer, Don Devoretz, Dan Usher, and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. My thanks are especially due to Doug Allen and Gordon Myers who supervised this work as part of my doctoral thesis at Simon Fraser University, Canada. An earlier version of this paper was circulated as RIIM working paper #00-01, Simon Fraser University, Canada and also presented at the 2001 meetings of the Canadian Public Economics Study Group in Montreal, Canada.     

Large balls left empty by a critical branching Wiener field

The particles distributed according to a Poisson random field execute independent critical branching Wiener processes. It looks natural that the largest empty ball around the origin becomes larger and larger with time. The asymptotic behaviour of the radius of the largest empty ball is studied.     

Convergence to Walrasian equilibrium with minimal information

We consider convergence to Walrasian equilibrium in a situation where firms know only market price and their own cost function. We term this a situation of minimal information. We model the problem as a large population game of Cournot competition. The Nash equilibrium of this model is identical to the Walrasian equilibrium. We apply the best response (BR) dynamic as our main evolutionary model. This dynamic can be applied under minimal information as firms need to know only the market price and the their own cost to compute payoffs. We show that the BR dynamic converges globally to Nash equilibrium in an aggregative game like the Cournot model. Hence, it converges globally to the Walrasian equilibrium under minimal information. We extend the result to some other evolutionary dynamics using the method of potential games.

     

Modeling society with statistical mechanics: an application to cultural contact and immigration

We introduce a general modeling framework to predict the outcomes, at the population level, of individual psychology and behavior. The framework prescribes that researchers build a cost function that embodies knowledge of what trait values (opinions, behaviors, etc.) are favored by individual interactions under given social conditions. Predictions at the population level are then drawn using methods from statistical mechanics, a branch of theoretical physics born to link the microscopic and macroscopic behavior of physical systems. We demonstrate our approach building a model of cultural contact between two cultures (e.g., immigration), showing that it is possible to make predictions about how contact changes the two cultures.     

Convergence of optimal harvesting policies to a normal forest

This paper extends the forestry maximum principle of Heaps (1984) to allow the benefits of harvesting to be the utility of the volume of the wood harvested as in Mitra and Wan, 1985, Mitra and Wan, 1986. Unlike those authors, however, time is treated as a continuous rather than as a discrete variable. Existence of an optimal harvesting policy is established. Then necessary conditions are derived for the extended model which are also sufficient. The conditions are used to show that under certain boundedness conditions, sequences of optimal harvesting policies contain subsequences which converge pointwise a.e. and in net present value to an optimal harvesting policy. This result is then used to show that any optimal logging policy must converge in harvesting age to a constant rotation period given by modified Faustmann formula. The associated age class distribution converges to a normal forest.     

Convergence in Europe - a matter of perspective?

Although the debate over convergence has been fuelled by two observed trends - the harmonisation of labour market conditions and the adoption of new models of employment and production - these developments seem to be going in different directions. The article distinguishes between the context of employment relations and generic changes in production paradigms and examines how the interactions between them are being played out in Europe.     

Identification and Estimation of Club Convergence Models with Spatial Dependence

This article deals with heterogeneity and spatial dependence in economic growth analysis by developing a two‐stage strategy that identifies clubs by a mapping analysis and estimates a club convergence model with spatial dependence. Since estimation of this class of convergence models in the presence of regional heterogeneity poses both identification and collinearity problems, we develop an entropy‐based estimation procedure that simultaneously takes account of ill‐posed and ill‐conditioned inference problems. The two‐step strategy is applied to assess the existence of club convergence and to estimate a two‐club spatial convergence model across Italian regions over the period 1970 to 2000.