Asymmetric Information and the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy

Abstract. This paper analyses the consequences of asymmetric information in credit markets for the monetary transmission mechanism. It shows that asymmetric information can not only reinforce but can also weaken or overcompensate the effects of the standard interest rate channel. Crucial is that informational problems lead to an external finance premium that can be positive or negative for marginal entrepreneurs. Tight money may lead to an increase in the absolute value of this premium, implying that there is a credit channel of monetary policy, but its working direction is ambiguous.     

Measuring Monetary Policy in Germany: A Structural Vector Error Correction Approach

Abstract. A structural vector error correction (SVEC) model is used to investigate several monetary policy issues. While being data-oriented the SVEC framework allows structural modeling of the short-run and long-run properties of the data. The statistical model is estimated with monthly German data for 1975–98 where a structural break is detected in 1984. After splitting the sample, three stable long-run relations are found in each subsample which can be interpreted in terms of a money-demand equation, a policy rule and a relation for real output, respectively. Since the cointegration restrictions imply a particular shape of the long-run covariance matrix this information can be used to distinguish between permanent and transitory innovations in the estimated system. Additional restrictions are introduced to identify a monetary policy shock.     

Currency Crises, Monetary Policy and Corporate Balance Sheets

Abstract. This paper studies how the exposure of a country's corporate sector to interest rate and exchange rate changes affects the probability of a currency crisis. To analyze this question, we present a model that defines currency crises as situations in which the costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate exceed the costs of abandonment. The results show that a higher exposure to interest rate changes increases the probability of crisis through an increased need for output loss compensation and an increased efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output. A higher exposure to exchange rate changes also increases the need for output loss compensation. However, it lowers the efficacy of monetary policy in stimulating output through the adverse balance sheet effects of exchange rate depreciation. As a result, its effect on the probability of crisis is ambiguous.     

Economic policy uncertainty,financial markets and probability of US recessions

We use probit recession forecasting models to assess the ability of economic policy uncertainty indexes developed by Baker et al. (2013) to predict future US recessions. The model specifications include policy indexes on their own, and in combination with financial variables, such as interest rate spreads, stock returns and stock market volatility. Both in-sample and out-of-sample analysis suggests that the policy uncertainty indexes are statistically and economically significant in forecasting recessions at the horizons beyond five quarters. The index based on newspaper reports emerges as the best predictor, outperforming the term spread at the longer forecast horizons.     

Trade credit, bank lending and monetary policy transmission

This paper investigates the role of trade credit in the transmission of monetary policy. Most models of the transmission mechanism allow firms to access only financial markets or bank lending according to some net worth criterion. In our model we consider external finance from trade credit as an additional source of funding for firms that cannot obtain credit from banks. We predict that when monetary policy tightens there will be a reduction in bank lending relative to trade credit. This is confirmed with an empirical investigation of 16,000 UK manufacturing firms.     

The financial accelerator and monetary policy rules

Comparing Bernanke et al.’s (1999) financial accelerator model to a comparable model without an operational financial accelerator mechanism, we find that financial acceleration is reduced when monetary policy reacts to the output gap and when firm-specific volatility rises.     

Endogenous growth, monetary shocks and nominal rigidities

We introduce endogenous growth in a standard NK model with staggered prices and wages. We find that the source of nominal rigidities, the shock persistence and the type of Taylor rule affect the relationship between monetary volatility and growth.     

Precautionary demand for foreign assets in Sudden Stop economies: An assessment of the New Mercantilism

Financial globalization had a rocky start in emerging economies hit by Sudden Stops. Foreign reserves have grown very rapidly since then, as if those countries were practicing a New Mercantilism that views foreign reserves as a war chest for defense against Sudden Stops. This paper conducts a quantitative assessment of this argument using a stochastic intertemporal equilibrium framework in which precautionary foreign asset demand is driven by output variability, financial globalization, and Sudden Stop risk. In this framework, credit constraints produce endogenous Sudden Stops. We find that financial globalization and Sudden Stop risk can explain the surge in reserves but output variability cannot. These results hold using the intertemporal preferences of the Bewley–Aiyagari–Hugget precautionary savings model or the Uzawa–Epstein setup with endogenous impatience.     

Monetary policy in open economies

The recent literature on monetary policy in open economies has produced a strong presumption in favor of activistic policy and flexible exchange rates. We argue that this result may owe much to the combination of two commonly made assumptions: That nominal goods prices are rigid. And that the monetary authorities have a lot of information about the economy. When the source of nominal rigidity is found in wages and monetary policy is conducted according to less information demanding rules (such as a standard interest rate rule) policies that stabilize the money supply or the nominal exchange rate may perform better.     

Dichotomy between macroprudential policy and monetary policy on credit and inflation

This paper compares macroprudential policy and monetary policy using a simple New Keynesian model with credit. Macroprudential policy is effective in stabilizing credit with limited impact on inflation. Monetary policy stabilizes inflation, but is ‘too blunt’ for credit stabilization.     

Financial imbalances and gradualism

In the last years, in the major OECD economies, while inflation has become lower and more stable, episodes of financial instability and large cycles in asset prices have shown up with (often) non-negligible effects on economic activity. These facts should call for a larger concern with financial imbalances by the central bank. Adapting the model by Caplin and Leahy (1996)—where a central bank, which is uncertain about the state of the economy and its reaction to policy, seeks an optimal search strategy to influence private agents' responses—by substituting the central bank's price stability objective with a financial stability one, we find that the monetary authority should follow a less aggressive policy than the one suggested by the original model. However, initial conditions play a crucial role in determining the degree of gradualism by the policy maker with the policy becoming more and more aggressive as the initial interest rate shrinks.     

Poole in the New Keynesian model

We study the properties of alternative central bank targeting procedures within the standard New Keynesian model. We find that Poole's famous insights concerning the output stabilization properties of money and interest rate targeting obtain when intertemporal substitution is low. And that output volatility rankings do not induce similar welfare rankings. Unlike the popular presumption, money targeting always fares better for money demand shocks. For fiscal shocks, money targeting does better for low and worse for high degree of intertemporal substitution. The opposite pattern obtains for supply shocks.     

Monetary Policy Delegation and Transparency of Policy Targets: A Positive Analysis

Abstract. We show that, in a two‐stage model of monetary policy with stochastic policy targets and asymmetric information, the transparency regime chosen by the central bank does never coincide with the regime preferred by society. Independent of society's endogenous choice of delegation, the central bank reveals its inflation target and conceals its output target. In contrast, society would prefer either transparency or opacity of both targets. As a conclusion, the choice of the transparency regime should be part of the optimal delegation solution.     

Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union

Abstract. The paper analyzes the relation between monetary uncertainty and government incentives to implement economic reforms in order to reduce structural distortions and make economies more flexible. It is shown that uncertainty about the central bank's behavior leads to more reforms. I relate this result to the debate about central bank structure in a larger European monetary union.     

Business cycle asymmetry via occasionally binding international borrowing constraints

This paper illustrates how occasionally binding credit constraints can be quantitatively important to delivering business-cycle asymmetries. An empirical exercise suggests that countries display some business-cycles asymmetries, and an open-economy real business-cycle model is assessed where an international borrowing constraint binds occasionally. In the model, downward movements with a slack constraint are sharper and quicker than upward movements with a binding constraint, and this can deliver asymmetry over the business cycle. The model is calibrated to Canadian data and suggests that a necessary ingredient for asymmetry is a high initial level of foreign debt.     

Cross-country differences in monetary policy execution and money market rates’ volatility

Volatility patterns in overnight interest rates display differences across industrial countries that existing models—designed to replicate the features of individual countries’ markets—cannot account for. This paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches cross-country differences in patterns in interest volatility by incorporating differences in how central banks manage liquidity in response to shocks. Our model is consistent with central banks’ practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short-term interest rates conflicts with another high-frequency objective, such as an exchange rate target.