Symbiotic production: The case of telecommunication pricing

In this paper we analyze a generalization of vertical monopolies in which monopoly suppliers trade essential inputs with one another. The most obvious applications of the model, which we call symbiotic production, are to postal and telecommunications services. We show how producers can use per-unit tariffs to achieve cooperative outcomes without colluding directly over consumer prices. We then show the firms have an incentive to collude in the setting of tariffs but that suchcollusion will lower consumer prices. This assumes that the suppliers are otherwise unfettered. In contrast, if the constituent monopolies are regulated, we show that collusion enables the firms to completely undo the restraints of regulation. The model has important policy implications for the international telecommunications market.     

Conflicting national policies: The creation of the euro and the rebalancing of telecommunications prices

Government departments have diverse interests, and on certain occasions, the need to achieve a priority objective in one department may lead to the adoption of inefficient policies in other areas, with long-lasting consequences. In this paper, we analyze the rebalancing of the telecommunications tariffs that took place in the European Union before and after the liberalization of the market in 1998. We show that the objective of satisfying the Maastricht inflation condition to allow participation in the European Monetary Union from 1999 led some national governments to block the rebalancing of telecommunications tariffs. Specifically, we demonstrate that in the years immediately before the liberalization of the telecommunications market, those countries that faced greater difficulty achieving the inflation objectives of the Maastricht Treaty reduced, rather than increased, the prices of local telephone calls and line rental. Furthermore, these countries did not intensify efforts to rebalance their tariffs after the creation of the euro. Our paper also shows that in this period the countries that diverged most from the inflation condition invested less in their telecommunications infrastructure.     

Technological change and multinational growth in international telecommunications services

Revolutionary technological and institutional changes, introduced since mid-seventies, are drastically altering the quiet functioning of international telecommunications markets, traditionally characterized by a strong multilateral oligopoly. In such multilateral oligopoly firms had little scope and opportunity for any form of international growth. Since the early eighties the scope for international growth of telecommunications carriers is emerging as a critical issue in international telecommunications. The economics of multinational firms and international trade make it possible to assess the role of technology gaps in the modernization process, international telecommunications tariff asymmetries and global outsourcing as the determinants of multinational growth of telecommunications carriers and their international strategies.     

Toward international settlement reform: FCC benchmarks versus ITU rates

The global telecommunications service market is undergoing significant change as more countries privatize suppliers, liberalize national markets, and encourage entry. Despite these changes, international settlement rates remain significantly higher than the cost to terminate calls and many carriers reap substantial monopoly profits from the settlement payments they receive. Annual US settlement payments approximate $5 billion. Settlement rates are declining but the progress has been slow. High settlement rates, by raising the cost of international telephone service, result in high calling prices. To accelerate a reduction in settlement rates, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted a set of maximum rates, called benchmark rates, which it expects US carriers to use in their settlements with other carriers and created a process designed to insure the implementation of these rates. The FCC benchmark rates vary primarily on the basis of a country's level of economic development. When the FCC took its action, the benchmark rates, which range from 15 to 23¢, were significantly below the rates in effect with most countries. The FCC action was widely criticized even though the rates exceed costs, vary according to countries’ levels of economic development, and will be phased in over five years to give countries time to adjust. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) took an unprecedented step of proposing an alternative set of settlement rates for its members. The ITU rates differ significantly from the FCC rates, being much lower for economically advanced countries and significantly higher for less developed countries. The ITU rates vary according to a country's teledensity but the rationale for the ITU categories lacks support. In addition, other, arbitrary categories are part of the plan. Neither the FCC nor the ITU approach to reducing settlement rates address the problem of reforming the international settlement process and replacing it with an economically efficient, market oriented payment scheme. The first stage of the FCC policy went into effect in 1999. Complemented by changing market conditions, the policy has lead to lower US settlement rates, but most rates still exceed competitive market levels. Virtually all US minutes in the FCC's top two income categories comply with the prescribed benchmark rates. In fact, many countries in these two categories have rates with US carriers that are below benchmark levels. Several less developed countries have also negotiated rates with US carriers that conform to the FCC plan. As a result, US carriers benefit from the FCC policy as their average settlement costs decline. These cost reductions make possible lower calling prices but the market structure of US international communications service industry may inhibit the flow-through of these savings to US consumers. US consumer's prices were falling before the FCC acted on settlement rates. The FCC action seems to have increased the pressure to further reduce these rates. At the same time, however, service markets are being increasingly segmented and price discrimination is more widely practiced so only some US consumers benefit from lower settlement rates.     

Successive Oligopolies with Differentiated Firms and Endogeneous Entry

We develop a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. We show that downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two‐tier structure while upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We analyze how two‐part tariffs and resale price maintenance shape the endogenous market structure and study their welfare effects. In contrast to previous literature, we find that welfare under linear prices can be larger than under twopart tariffs although the latter avoids double marginalization. This is because linear prices induce more downstream market entry.     

Interconnection in Network Industries

Recent deregulation of telecommunications in the U.S. and elsewhere has highlighted the importance of interconnection in network industries. In this paper, we analyse interconnection in a deregulated network where the participants compete in the final retail market. We consider both the case of a mature industry as well as one where a new entrant challenges the incumbent. In the later case, network externalities allow the incumbent to use the terms of interconnection to maintain its dominant position. Moreover, in either case, competition in the retail market can be undermined by collusion over access prices. We discuss the implications for some of the provisions of the new U.S. Telecommunications Act, specifically mandatory interconnection and reciprocity of tariffs, comparing these to the simple bill and keep rule.     

International competition policy and telecommunications. Lessons from the EU and prospects for the WTO

The changes in the international telecommunications market are rapidly outgrowing the existing structure of regulation. Moreover the trends in the sector indicate that if the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rule is to be viable some form of international competition policy is needed. This must tackle the difficult problems of market access, joint ventures and anticompetitive behaviour and most importantly prevent the different approaches to these problems leading to trade frictions, especially in the USA. Such rules have proved difficult, but not necessarily impossible, to develop as the stalled talks within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have shown. The paper considers the possible relevance of developments within EU telecommunications regulation where a competition policy-led regime is emerging.     

产品内国际分工中的收益分配——基于笔记本电脑商品链的分析

产品内国际分工拓宽了经济开放国家或地区的国际分工参与度．但处在产品内国际分工不同生产环节的企业所获收益却并非一致。本文对产品内国际分工中的收益分配问题进行了较为深入的理论探讨，得出结论——各分工环节的市场结构决定了其所获收益，并通过对笔记本电脑产品内分工体系的分析进一步证明了理论分析结果。     

英国电信产业的放松管制和对主导运营商BT的再管制

自 1 980年起 ,英国电信产业先后实施了邮政、电信分离 ,建立独立的管制机构 ,对开放市场准入和私有化以后仍然居于主导地位的运营商———英国电信公司 (BT)实施包括价格上限管制在内的一系列管制 ,促进了英国电信产业向竞争性结构的转化。目前 ,我国电信产业同样面临着放松管制以及放松管制以后如何重组和再管制主导运营商的棘手难题。本文拟对英国电信产业 2 0余年的改革经验进行比较系统的回顾和评析 ,以期对我国电信产业的下一步改革有所启示。     

The competitive effects of resale versus facility-based entry: evidence from the long-distance market

This paper examines the ability of entry by either resellers or facilities-based carriers to discipline the pricing behavior of a vertically integrated incumbent supplier. Theoretical considerations suggest that, once a sufficient amount of entry has occurred at both vertical stages—transmission and retail functions—additional entry at either stage can push final output toward the competitive level. Under these conditions, entry at either stage may serve as a gross complement or substitute for entry at the other stage. Data from the interLATA telecommunications market are used to test the relevant hypotheses. Our findings are not expected to be directly applicable to the local exchange and electricity markets as those markets are currently constituted. When these industries begin to exhibit structural characteristics that resemble the long-distance market, however, our findings should become relevant there as well.     

Interconnection in international telecommunications: An empirical investigation of United States settlement rates

Several national governments have expressed concern at the inability of carriers to negotiate lower accounting rates. Ergas and Patterson (1991) and Frieden (1997) argue that it is only on bilateral markets with facilities-based competition at both ends that conditions favour accounting rates reductions. In the absence of facilities-based competition, Frieden also suggests that service providers, such as resellers, may provide a second best opportunity to place downward pressure on accounting rates. This study extends the work of Ergas and Patterson by developing an econometric model of settlement rate pricing. The model is estimated on data for 27 US bilateral telephone markets for the period 1985 to 1995. Parameter estimates are used to identify settlement rate determinants, and so highlight impediments to efficient international telecommunications pricing. A novel feature of the model is the inclusion of a resale market structure variable.     

Optimal reciprocal access pricing and collusion

This work extends the network competition model of Armstrong [(1998). Network interconnection in telecommunications. Economic Journal, 108, 545–564] and Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998). Network competition: I. Overview and nondiscriminatory pricing. RAND Journal of Economics, 29, 1–37] by assuming that operators can maintain a certain level of collusion in the unregulated retail market, and access prices may be regulated through non-linear tariffs. It emerges that, in the case of partially collusive environments, the regulator can design cost-based non-linear access charges such that the result is socially optimal.     

Intellectual property rights: An international economics perspective

This paper considers the enforcement of intellectual property rights in an international setting. I consider some of the traditional problems associated with protection of such rights in a closed economy and discuss complications added by an international dimension. Globally-optimal and nationally-optimal policies are compared. A simple model of policy choices is derived and optimal tax/subsidy and rights enforcement policies demonstrated. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the current U.S. approach of discriminatory treatment on the basis of the national origin of an infringing product and argues that it is inferior to subsidies for providing incentives for R&D and to tariffs for shifting profits to U.S. firms.I am grateful to Marius Schwartz for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Any remaining errors are, of course, my own.     

Why is the international accounting rate system in terminal decline, and what might be the consequences?

This paper looks at the incentives and opportunities existing in the provision of international telephony and argues that the present accounting rate system is unsustainable. The paper also provides a framework within which current or proposed regulations governing trade in international telecommunications services can be analysed. The enormous profits available in this sector, together with developments in digital and fibre optic technology, are resulting in a breakdown of the Implicit cartel arrangements which have largely prevented operators from on-selling services (a type of arbitrage). However, liberalization by only part of the world will give rise to a potentially serious new problem—monopoly opportunism by operators in non-liberalized countries. The paper analyses this and other potential problems that can be expected to arise in the future.     

International Telecom Settlements: Gaming Incentives, Carrier Alliances and Pareto-Superior Reform

Liberalized countries that allow competition in international telecommunications favor traffic re-routing practices as arbitrage against foreign monopolists. This view is seriously incomplete. Monopolists, allied with carriers in liberalized countries, can use these practices to reduce termination payments to nonalliance carriersöthereby harming also consumers in liberalized countriesöby gaming regulations that require equal termination rates at both ends and 'proportional return' (the monopolist's traffic is allocated among carriers in proportion to their shares of traffic to its country). We also present a simple bilateral settlements reform that eliminates gaming incentives and other proportional-return distortions, yet benefits both countries.     

Supra-national regulation for supra-national telecommunications carriers?

The article reviews the extraordinary number of international ventures by major telecommunications organizations and explores problems for traditional national regulation that these global networks create. A theoretical model is defined that illustrates the adjustment process of different national policies to each other. The choice of various supra-national regulatory arrangements is shown to be affecting substantive policy. The article then discusses options for coordination and concludes that the concrete problems created by supra-national carriers do not justify the hidden cost of elaborate mechanisms of supra-national policy. Since such coordination has traditionally been used to prop up monopoly arrangements, a better approach for the foreseeable future is to encourage more national policy experimentation and focus less on international policy coordination.     

Competition in telecommunications

The author examines the impact of competition from both domestic and international perspectives. He provides a critique of the pro-competition argument, although a number of advantages of competition are also outlined. The advantages are discussed in relation to equipment and services. International trends towards competition are then described and the disadvantages of such trends are debated in relation to cross-subsidization, interconnection, the telecommunications manufacturing industry, and the market structure. Finally, competition in the international arena is discussed.     

An empirical analysis of multiple services and choices of consumer in the Swedish telecommunications market

Received analyses state that firms can use a multiple services offering strategy to retain customers and capture new customers. Factors that determine the multiple services strategy include product discount, service provider and customer characteristics. Consequently, this study addresses the fundamental question: what are the key determining factors that explain the probability that a consumer buys multiple services? A generalized Poisson regression model is employed to examine whether the product discount, service provider, socio-economic variables and geographical location impact consumer decisions. Data from a national survey in 2009 commissioned by Post-och Telestyrelsen, the Swedish telecommunications regulator, are analyzed. The results clearly show that the discount, service provider and income of the consumer affect the consumer׳s buying decision. A consumer who receives a discount or has a high income is more likely to buy multiple services or select more services from the current service provider into his basket than a consumer who does not receive discount or has lower income. Service providers, cable TV operators and telecommunications carriers can also lock-in their consumer and expand their market position from one particular service to another using bundling service. Thus, this may be the time for the telecommunications regulator to consider the market definition.     

Network liberalization and developing countries: The case of Chile

The opening of Chile's telecommunications infrastructure to private and foreign investment has led to a rapid modernization of the network and to improvements in universal service. In 1994 all remaining regulatory entry barriers to the local, long-distance and international markets were removed for both service providers and network operators. Full digitization of switches and specific characteristics of the Chilean network structure have led to fierce price competition in the market. In spite of the small market size the strategic behaviour of the main market players is unlikely to succeed. As a result the market is likely to remain highly competitive. While the liberalization process has so far spurred the universal service goal, further improvements will mainly depend on whether entry takes place in the local market.