Improved Forecasting of Mutual Fund Alphas and Betas

This paper proposes a simple back testing procedure that isshown to dramatically improve a panel data model's ability toproduce out of sample forecasts. Here the procedure is usedto forecast mutual fund alphas. Using monthly data with an OLSmodel it has been difficult to consistently predict which portfoliomanagers will produce above market returns for their investors.This paper provides empirical evidence that sorting on the estimatedalphas populates the top and bottom deciles not with the bestand worst funds, but with those having the greatest estimationerror. This problem can be attenuated by back testing the statisticalmodel fund by fund. The back test used here requires a statisticalmodel to exhibit some past predictive success for a particularfund before it is allowed to make predictions about that fundin the current period. Another estimation problem concerns theuse of a single statistical model for all available mutual funds.Since no one statistical model is likely to fit every fund,the result is a great deal of misspecification error. This papershows that the combined use of an OLS and Kalman filter modelincreases the number of funds with predictable out of samplealphas by about 60%. Overall, a strategy that uses very modestex-ante filters to eliminate funds whose parameters likely deriveprimarily from estimation error produces an out of sample risk-adjustedreturn of over 4% per annum.     

Bayesian Alphas and Mutual Fund Persistence

We use daily returns to compare the performance predictability of Bayesian estimates of mutual fund performance with standard frequentist measures. When the returns on passive nonbenchmark assets are correlated with fund holdings, incorporating histories of these returns produces a performance measure that predicts future performance better than standard measures do. Bayesian alphas based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) are particularly useful for predicting future standard CAPM alphas. Over our sample period, priors consistent with moderate to diffuse beliefs in managerial skill dominate more skeptical prior beliefs, a result that is consistent with investor cash flows.     

Macroeconomic Forces and Mutual Fund Betas

This paper develops and tests a model in which fund betas are linearly related to changes in macroeconomic factors. Tests using monthly returns for 171 mutual funds over 1978–1991 were run. Results indicate that equity funds betas, on average, are negatively related to inflation changes and default risk premia while bond fund betas, on average, are negatively related to changes in risk-free rates, industrial production growth, and the term structure. Betas for passive portfolios, however, are not related to the macroeconomic factors examined.     

False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas

This paper develops a simple technique that controls for "false discoveries," or mutual funds that exhibit significant alphas by luck alone. Our approach precisely separates funds into (1) unskilled, (2) zero-alpha, and (3) skilled funds, even with dependencies in cross-fund estimated alphas. We find that 75% of funds exhibit zero alpha (net of expenses), consistent with the Berk and Green equilibrium. Further, we find a significant proportion of skilled (positive alpha) funds prior to 1996, but almost none by 2006. We also show that controlling for false discoveries substantially improves the ability to find the few funds with persistent performance.     

Mutual Fund Family Size and Mutual Fund Performance: The Role of Regulatory Changes

We examine whether the previously documented positive association between fund family size and fund performance is affected by significant regulatory changes (i.e., Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), the Global Settlement (GS), and increased scrutiny as a result of trading scandals) that have occurred in the last decade. Using Reg FD as a beginning point for these structural changes, we find that, while fund family size was positively associated with fund performance in the period prior to the regulatory changes, this advantage is significantly weaker in the period subsequent to the regulatory changes. Consistent with the weakened advantage of fund family size in fund performance, we find that the greater stock‐picking skill of larger fund families, measured using the earnings announcement returns of the stocks they trade, also weakened subsequent to the regulatory changes. Using narrower event windows around the regulatory changes, we find that the previously documented superior return of large fund families was partly attributable to selective disclosure. We also find that fund families implicated in the trading scandals experienced a decline in their performance during the scandal period. Finally, we examine the role of large investment banks in providing an advantage to large fund families. Family size was positively associated with the extent to which funds traded in the same direction as forecast revisions by analysts from large investment banks in the period prior to Reg FD and the GS and this association declined significantly after the two regulatory events.     

Mutual Fund Liquidity Costs

One dollar in purchases or redemptions generates an average cost of $0.006 for US equity mutual funds during the period 1997‐2009, approximately 70% lower than prior estimates derived from older data. However, large cross‐sectional differences exist between funds. Many funds have costs near zero, but funds that hold relatively illiquid equities, have relatively concentrated portfolios, and manage relatively large amounts of assets have average liquidity costs significantly greater than the full sample average. Furthermore, despite a large difference in underlying asset liquidity, US bond funds and US equity funds have similar average liquidity costs.     

Mutual Fund Tax Clienteles

Mutual funds are held by investors in taxable and tax‐qualified retirement accounts. We investigate whether the characteristics, investment strategies, and performance of mutual funds held by these diverse tax clienteles differ. Examining both mutual fund distributions and mutual fund holdings, we find that funds held primarily by taxable investors choose investment strategies that result in lower tax burdens than funds held primarily in tax‐qualified accounts. Despite these differences, we find no evidence that any investment constraints that may arise from these tax‐efficient investment strategies result in performance differences between funds held by different tax clienteles.     

农村资金互助社融资难题待解

我国农村金融改革的表象是供给问题,而实质是农民组织化瓶颈约束问题,也就是如何发展农村合作金融,提高农民的市场主体交易地位的问题.这个问题不解决,农村金融体系根本建立不起来.     

Incentives and Endogenous Risk Taking: A Structural View on Hedge Fund Alphas

Hedge fund managers are subject to several nonlinear incentives: performance fee options (call); equity investors' redemption options (put); and prime broker contracts allowing for forced deleverage (put). The interaction of these option‐like incentives affects optimal leverage ex ante, depending on the distance of fund‐value from the high‐water mark. We study how these endogenous effects influence performance measures used in the literature. We show that reduced‐form measures that do not account for these features are subject to economically significant false discovery biases. The result is stronger for low‐quality funds. We propose an alternative structural methodology for conducting performance attribution in hedge funds.     

Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows

This paper studies the flows of funds into and out of equity mutual funds. Consumers base their fund purchase decisions on prior performance information, but do so asymmetrically, investing disproportionately more in funds that performed very well the prior period. Search costs seem to be an important determinant of fund flows. High performance appears to be most salient for funds that exert higher marketing effort, as measured by higher fees. Flows are directly related to the size of the fund's complex as well as the current media attention received by the fund, which lower consumers' search costs.     

Mutual Fund Manager Forecasting Behavior

I examine publicly released annual earnings forecasts issued in conjunction with stock recommendations by mutual fund managers of actively managed open-end mutual funds. I find that mutual fund manager annual earnings forecasts systematically overestimate the earnings number later disclosed at the annual earnings announcement. In further analyses, I attempt to distinguish between two explanations for this forecast bias: an untruthful reporting bias (market manipulation) and a truthful cognitive bias (optimism). These explanations generate different predictions about the timing of changes in fundholdings of forecasted securities between the forecast release and annual earnings announcement dates. I interpret my findings as more consistent with an optimism explanation for mutual fund manager annual forecast bias and less consistent with a market manipulation explanation for this bias. I am, however, unable to eliminate an unobservable selection bias either in the decision of the mutual fund manager to report a forecast publicly or in the media's decision to publish that forecast as an explanation for my finding that mutual fund manager forecasts are biased.     

Learning about Mutual Fund Managers

We study capital allocations to managers with two mutual funds, and show that investors learn about managers from their performance records. Flows into a fund are predicted by the manager's performance in his other fund, especially when he outperforms and when signals from the other fund are more useful. In equilibrium, capital should be allocated such that there is no cross‐fund predictability. However, we find positive predictability, particularly among underperforming funds. Our results are consistent with incomplete learning: while investors move capital in the right direction, they do not withdraw enough capital when the manager underperforms in his other fund.     

印度基金托管人制度

印度把基金托管人一般具有的基金资产保管和投资运作监督两个职能分开，分别由基金托管人(Custodian)和基金受托人(Trustees)承担。……     

On Mutual Fund Investment Styles

Most mutual funds adopt investment styles that cluster arounda broad market benchmark. Few funds take extreme positions awayfrom the index, but those who do are more likely to favor growthstocks and past winners. The bias toward glamour and the tendencyof poorly performing value funds to shift styles may reflectagency and behavioral considerations. After adjusting for style,there is evidence that growth managers on average outperformvalue managers. Though a fund's factor loadings and its portfoliocharacteristics generally yield similar conclusions about itsstyle, an approach using portfolio characteristics predictsfund returns better.     

Herding in the German Mutual Fund Industry

This paper analyses the trading activity of German mutual funds in the 1998–2002 period to investigate whether German mutual fund managers are engaged in herding behaviour. Another objective of the study is to determine the impact of this herd‐like trading on stock prices. Our results provide evidence of herding and positive feedback trading by German mutual fund managers. We show that a significant portion of herding detected in the German market is associated with spurious herding as a consequence of changes in benchmark index composition. Investigating the impact of mutual fund herding on stock prices, we find that herding seems to neither destabilise nor stabilise stock prices.     

首家资金互助社两周年回顾

为解决农村地区银行业金融机构网点覆盖率低、竞争不充分、农民贷款难等问题,2006年,银监会调整放宽农村地区银行业金融机构准入政策,引导各类资本到农村地区投资设立新型农村金融机构。紧接着2007年,银监会出台了《农村资金互助社管理暂行规定》和《农村资金互助社示范章程》,这为资金互助     

A First Look at the Accuracy of the CRSP Mutual Fund Database and a Comparison of the CRSP and Morningstar Mutual Fund Databases

This paper examines problems in the CRSP Survivor Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database (CRSP, 1998) and compares returns contained in it to those in Morningstar. The CRSP database has an omission bias that has the same effects as survivorship bias. Although all mutual funds are listed in CRSP, return data is missing for many and the characteristics of these funds differ from the populations. The CRSP return data is biased upward and merger months are inaccurately recorded about half the time. Differences in returns in Morningstar and CRSP are a problem for older data and small funds.     

The Components of Mutual Fund Fees

Several research studies have found that mutual fund expense ratios decline as funds get larger. This paper decomposes the annual expense ratios of actively managed domestic equity funds into their component fees. Most of the observed decline in total expense ratios comes from the small fees paid to outside service providers and the large majority of this decline occurs for the smallest one third of funds. The largest component of the expense ratio, advisory fees, is essentially constant for larger funds. The second largest component, marketing fees, increases as fund assets grow.     

国外基金的分类研究：—兼对我国基金分类的思考

随着我国基金业的发展，基金的数目会越来越多，也会面临基金的分类问题：投资者需要在众多的基金中挑选出适合自己的品种；基金管理公司需要找到合适的比较标准。……