IMPROVING THE ANALYTICAL AND DATA FRAMEWORK OF THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR FOR NATIONAL GOALS ACCOUNTING*

Provision of “market goods” follows the decision rules of traditional microeconomics; pricing and resource allocation for such goods tend towards Pareto optimality. The provision of “collective goods,” by contrast, depends on political (or quasi-political) collective decision processes; beneficiaries often receive a share of collective goods free of charge or well below average or marginal (private or social) costs. No inherent tendency towards optimality may be presumed and separate analysis of collective goods becomes an essential part of national goals accounting. The national-income-accounts (NIA) distinction between personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and government purchases of goods and services corresponds roughly to a division between market goods bought by the consumer and a major category of “collective goods” (i.e. “public goods” provided by government). However, a significant proportion of PCE represents “collective goods” paid for by government, business, or nonprofit organizations and provided on behalf of the consumer, whereas a part of NIA government purchases represents services paid for by the consumer (i.e. “market goods”). This article develops operationally meaningful distinctions among “market goods,”“collective goods,” and “tied aid” (a mixed category with market-good and collective-good characteristics). These distinctions are determined by the nature of the decision processes–rather than by the characteristics of the beneficiary or the supplier. This classification is related to the national income accounts and major discrepancies are pinpointed. The blurring of the distinction among market goods, collective goods and tied aid is found to be most consequential in the NIA treatment of “education” and “medical care” services. NIA data for these two services are restructured for national goals accounting purposes in order to illustrate both the quantitative importance and the empirical feasibility of classifying benefits by their respective decision processes.     

A laboratory study of advertising and price competition

We use a laboratory experiment to study advertising and pricing behavior in a market where consumers differ in price sensitivity. Equilibrium in this market entails variation in the number of firms advertising and price dispersion in advertised prices. We vary the cost to advertise as well as varying the number of competing firms. Theory predicts that advertising costs act as a facilitating device: higher costs increase firm profits at the expense of consumers. We find that higher advertising costs decrease demand for advertising and raise advertised prices, as predicted. Further, this comes at the expense of consumers. However, advertising strategies are more aggressive than theory predicts with the result that firm profits do not increase.     

Why equity cannot be separated from efficiency: the welfare economics of progressive social pricing

Applied neoclassical microeconomists maintain that when profits are constrained, and average costs are higher than marginal costs, Ramsey “inverse elasticity” pricing optimizes static consumer welfare. However, when weighted, instead of unweighted, consumer surplus aggregation is used, the Ramsey pricing rule becomes a “progressive social pricing rule,” which suggests that under plausible conditions “direct-elasticity” rather than “inverse-elasticity” pricing is consumer welfare optimal.     

EXCESSIVE COMPETITION ON HEADLINE PRICES

In a variety of purchasing situations, consumers may focus primarily on headline prices, disregarding the full costs associated with acquiring and maintaining a product or service contract. Even when this is the case, the literature has delineated various circumstances where intense competition can protect consumers through the so-called “waterbed effect.” In this article, we however show that when consumers have context-dependent preferences, competition may rather exacerbate their and society's harm by distorting product choice and provision. Then, consumer protection policy must sufficiently constrain hidden fees so that competition, along with high-quality firms' incentives to educate consumers, can restore efficiency.     

A Model of Money and Credit, with Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle

Many individuals simultaneously have significant credit card debt and money in the bank. The credit card debt puzzle is as follows: given high interest rates on credit cards and low rates on bank accounts, why not pay down debt? While some economists go to elaborate lengths to explain this, we argue it is a special case of the rate of return dominance puzzle from monetary economics. We extend standard monetary theory to incorporate consumer debt, which is interesting in its own right since developing models where money and credit coexist is a long-standing challenge. Our model is quite tractable—for example, it readily yields nice existence and characterization results—and helps put into context recent discussions of consumer debt.     

When do market games have transferable utility?

A pure exchange economy generates a “market game” in which the allocations achievable by any coalition are determined by the initial endowments of its members. Subject to certain regularity conditions, it is shown that for a market game it is possible to find utility representations for each consumer so that the game can be treated as a game with transferable utility if and only if indirect utility of all consumers can be represented in the Gorman polar form. This is the class for which aggregate demand behaves as if it were the demand of a single consumer.     

Advertising,learning, and consumer choice in experience good markets: an empirical examination*

This article empirically analyzes different effects of advertising in a nondurable, experience good market. A dynamic learning model of consumer behavior is presented in which I allow both “informative” effects of advertising and “prestige” or “image” effects of advertising. This learning model is estimated using consumer level panel data tracking grocery purchases and advertising exposures over time. Empirical results suggest that in this market, advertising's primary effect was that of informing consumers. The estimates are used to quantify the value of this information to consumers and evaluate the welfare implications of an alternative advertising regulatory regime.     

The competitive advantage of honesty

We study competitive markets where firms may lie to their workers to reduce costs. Consumers may benefit from firms’ dishonesty through lower market prices. Does firms’ (dis-)honesty affect consumers’ purchasing decisions? Our experiment shows that when honesty is fully transparent, it can provide a competitive advantage: Honest firms sell more and – despite higher costs – achieve higher profits. This finding is in line with our equilibrium predictions when allowing for dishonesty-averse consumers. By identifying circumstances in which consumers – although not the addressee of dishonesty – “punish” firms for their within-firm dishonesty, we contribute both to behavioral ethics and behavioral industrial organization.     

When Competition is Not Enough: Consumer Protection

Rather than market structure, it is the nature of the goods and services and the cost of obtaining and processing information that may place consumers in a poor bargaining position. The article outlines the key provisions for consumer protection in Australia, Part V of the Trade Practices Act. It discusses search costs, and the factors that limit search, and explains how the conduct of suppliers (or others) may reduce search costs. Asymmetry of information is identified as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for misleading consumers. When products are sub standard or are used incorrectly, they may harm consumers or cause property damage and in some circumstances this may be best addressed via product liability laws. The article concludes by considering how firms or industries can be more pro-active in relation to consumer protection.     

Oil market share dynamics: A Markov chain analysis of consumer and producer adjustments

We develop an “optimal market share rule” model of cartel behavior which when applied to the OPEC cartel appears capable of explaining its stability and responses to changed market events. In particular, by attaching importance to market shares based approximately on costs, OPEC members can by maintaining optimal shares deter deviant member attempts to break cartel rules. After a thorough discussion of the theory, the model is tested empirically using a Markov probability model. The estimated Markov transition matrix is further decomposed into what Theil has called the exchange matrix and the mean passage matrix. Dynamic adjustment processes in the market are revealed by the latter while an emerging pattern of OPEC member surveillance of consumers is revealed by the former which facilitates cartel stability. Inspection of these matrixes further suggests that after the formation of OPEC there is evidence of less potential for producer conflict while there appears more evidence for consumer conflict. While these results must be tentative in view of the fact that they have been estimated using a simplified two consumer — two producer model and limited data, it is argued that the results are highly suggestive and the approach in this study can be extended to cover all producer and consumers, and can be integrated into a complete model of the world oil market.     

ESTIMATING VALUE ADDED OF ILLEGAL PRODUCTION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

Several economists continue to assert that the official national accounts of many countries do not cover a large “hidden” or “underground” economy. This article looks at one component of the underground economy, namely illegal activities. According to the UN System of National Accounts, production of goods and services that are illegal should be included in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) if both the producers and consumers are willing partners to the transactions involved. We examine the estimates of illegal production recently made by several countries in the Western Balkans and conclude that, if illegal activities were fully included in their official GDP estimates, they would increase by about 1 percent. Trade in narcotics and prostitution are the two most important kinds of illegal activities in most countries and we look in detail at how estimates for these activities were made by the Western Balkan countries.     

Aggregation and pairwise aggregation of demand when the distribution of income is fixed

This paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for “pairwise aggregation” of the demand functions of a group of consumers (conditions under which the mean demand for each pair of consumers satisfies the Slutsky restrictions) when the distribution of income is fixed. The sufficient conditions imply existence of a “representative” competitive consumer whose demand is the mean demand of the group. The necessary conditions imply that such a representative consumer exists for every fixed income distribution only if the consumers have homothetic preferences or, alternatively, if for each price vector, all the consumers' income expansion paths lie in the same plane.     

Faddists,Enthusiasts and Canadian Divas: Broadcasting Quotas and the Supply Response

This paper constructs a model of the recorded music market to investigate the consequences of local content requirements in broadcasting for the “internationalization” of domestic music. It models the entry decisions of bands, the contracting decisions of record companies, the airplay decisions of radio stations and the radio listening and recording purchasing decisions of consumers. The paper shows that a local content quota leads, perversely, to the increased internationalization of domestic music. A quota that also requires increased broadcasting of “new” music yields an additional welfare loss but does nothing to a record company's incentives to sign up new bands.     

中国居民消费与资产收益:基于收入群体的分析

The equity premium puzzle is found during the test of the Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) with aggregate consumption data. Because of income disparity, many consumers lack financial assets to intertemporally allocate their consumptions under income constraints. Thus, it is likely to lead to a specification error by employing aggregate consumption data to test the CCAPM. This paper examines the impacts of the economically constrained (low-income) consumers and unconstrained (high-income) consumers on the CCAPM using urban consumption expenditures in China delineated by consumer income, and tests the income constraint hypothesis. The empirical results show that the CCAPM is not more consistent with the consumption pattern of the higher-income consumers. Including the income constraint into the analyses of the consumption and asset returns does not unravel the equity premium puzzle.      

On the role of liquidity in emerging markets stock prices

This paper investigates the impact of liquidity on emerging markets' stock prices. Particular attention is given to the estimation of Jensen's alpha and the quantity of risk. Our empirical analysis gives rise to two main issues. The first is related to the presence of an extra premium, i.e. “alpha puzzle”. The second is the time-varying component of the quantity of risk, i.e. “beta puzzle”. We find that local liquidity factors do not explain the presence of positive and statistically significant alphas. This puzzle is solved by means of transaction costs. In addition, we show that global liquidity factors, such as VIX and Open Interest, statistically affect the market price of risk. Our empirical finding proves the time varying nature of the global risk factors. Finally, we argue that standard asset pricing models cannot solve the two puzzles simultaneously.     

Product recall with symmetric uncertainty and multiunit purchases

A common view in retail electricity markets is that retailers discriminate based on consumers’ loyalty: loyal consumers pay more and switchers can (and do) select the cheapest offers) when they switch. The premium is colloquially known as a “loyalty tax” or “loyalty premium”. Reflecting this understanding Australia’s governments, regulators and consumer advocates have encouraged consumers to switch electricity retailers. Using a sample of 47,114 household electricity bills we test whether consumers that had switched in the previous 12 months (“switchers”) pay less than consumers who remained with their retailers (“remainers”) in the previous 12 months. We find that the annual bills of switchers are expected to be AU$48 (4%) lower than remainers and that the median switcher could reduce their bills by 21% by selecting the cheapest offer. Classifying retailers into tiers however provides some nuance to the main conclusion: the third tier of retailers (the new entrants with market shares of less than 3%) impose higher loyalty taxes than the other two tiers (incumbents and mid-sized retailers). The middle tier of retailers impose the lowest loyalty tax, and in fact for many consumers they may reward loyalty. These findings suggest that the loyalty tax is (typically) smaller than widely considered, it varies across tiers of retailers and even engaged consumers typically do not select the lowest priced offer. This raises the question of whether switchers are motivated by lower bills as well as other factors or whether the main challenge is search difficulties.

     

来源国形象、消费者偏见与中国品牌跨国营销——中国电子产品在美国的品牌来源国效应检验

来源国效应对一国产品的海外销售产生着重要影响。本文以在美国销售的中国H公司运动手表作为被试商品,在606份有效样本基础上,通过多元线性回归验证了中国品牌电子产品在美国的来源国效应。通过与其他七个国家进行对比,本文发现,虽然中国在美国消费者心目中的产品国家形象较为正面,但相对中国经济地位和产品质量而言,美国消费者对中国电子产品和中国品牌的“来源国偏见”普遍存在,“Made in China”目前仍是中国品牌在美国营销的不利因素。在以往研究的基础上,本文将来源国效应中的产品国家形象划分为整体绩效形象、整体制度形象和产品类属形象,在此基础上检验了多个消费者因素对来源国效应的调节作用,首次检验了消费者网购依赖度对消费者购买倾向的影响,并且发现消费者产品知识负向调节来源国效应,这一结论可以导出明确的管理启示。本文结论进一步深化了来源国效应相关研究,弥补了发展中国家逆向拓展发达国家市场时来源国效应研究的不足。     

THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ON REAL EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE BASED ON A NEW DATASET

Do alternative exchange rate regimes affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently? The existing empirical evidence is quite mixed with slightly more papers supporting that they do. We show that such lack of consensus is mainly due to current literature limitations regarding the measurement of real exchange rates (RERs), the identification of exchange rate regimes (ERRs), and the control for the incidence of real and nominal shocks. To address these limitations, we construct a novel monthly dataset for 63 countries over the period 1946–2007, which includes market‐determined multilateral RER and a proxy for terms of trade. We find that ERRs indeed affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently. While the evidence is generally consistent with Mussa's sticky prices argument, we find that for nonadvanced countries in post‐Bretton Woods there exists a “U‐shape nominal flexibility puzzle of RER.” We also find evidence of a “short‐run RER volatility puzzle.” Having controlled for the incidence of real and nominal shocks, nonadvanced countries' RER volatility remains between 25% and 150% greater than that of the advanced economies. Moreover, the key literature finding that short‐term RER volatility is higher in Bretton Woods (BW) than in post‐Bretton Woods (PBW) for industrialized countries vanishes when using market‐determined multilateral RER instead of official bilateral RER. (JEL F31, F33, F41)     

An economic model of religious organization under oppressive regulation

This paper aims to explain the behavior of certain religious organizations in countries with severe regulation that limits the religious market, such as those under communist rule. Religious organizations in those countries sometimes choose to operate both legally and illegally. The model proposed here shows that such behavior may increase the consumer welfare of religionists compared to solely legal or illegal provision of religious services. It assumes that religious organizations maximize the consumer surplus of their adherents. The choice of a religious organization between legal and illegal provision of religious services depends on the costs of religious participation imposed by the government and the set-up costs of dual operation. As an illustration, the paper accounts for the different response of the Catholic Church to restrictions imposed by the communists in Poland and Czechoslovakia.