Short selling and the independence of business-related analysts: Evidence from an emerging market

This paper investigates whether short-sale deregulation improves analysts' independence in an emerging market where conventional mechanisms mitigating conflicts of interest are either ineffective or absent. Short selling reduces the effectiveness of analysts' favourable opinions in creating or sustaining overvalued stock prices, thus decreasing the incentives of institutional clients of brokerages to exert pressure on related analysts to initiate coverage and issue biased opinions. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find strong evidence that stocks that are eligible for short sales experience a greater reduction in coverage by related analysts than stocks that are ineligible for short sales. When covered firms become eligible for short sales, the quality of forecasts and recommendations issued by related analysts improves considerably. Further analyses show that shortable firms with a significant reduction in related analysts' coverage are more likely to underperform and to experience stock price crashes in the future. Altogether, our results are consistent with short selling effectively restoring related analysts' independence in emerging markets.     

Analysts and anomalies

Analysts' price targets and recommendations contradict stock return anomaly variables. Using an index based on 125 anomalies, we find that analysts' annual stock return forecasts are 11% higher for anomaly-shorts than for anomaly-longs. Anomaly-shorts’ return forecasts are excessively optimistic, exceeding realized returns by 34%. Recommendations also tend to be more favorable for anomaly-shorts, although this result varies across anomaly types. Consistent with analysts' slowly incorporating anomaly information, anomalies forecast revisions in both price targets and recommendations. Our findings imply that investors who follow analysts' actionable information contribute to mispricing.     

Why do analysts issue forecast revisions inconsistent with prior stock returns? Determinants and consequences

We examine the informativeness of analyst forecast revisions that are directionally inconsistent with prior stock price movements (sign‐inconsistent revisions). Sign‐inconsistent revisions represent approximately one‐half of the forecast revisions from 1995 through 2010. Our tests indicate that sign‐inconsistent revisions are less informative than are sign‐consistent revisions. Sign‐inconsistent revisions are less likely to be closer to actual earnings realizations and they generate smaller stock price reactions. We also find evidence that sign‐inconsistent revisions are associated with analysts' economic incentives to generate trading volume and their behavioural limitations related to information uncertainty. These results suggest that sign‐inconsistent revisions do not necessarily benefit investors.     

Analyst target price revisions and institutional herding

We document that institutional herding behavior is associated with analyst target price revisions even after controlling for the effects of analyst recommendations and earnings forecasts, and provide insights into the price impact of institutional herding. Institutional investors tend to buy the same stocks following an upward target price revision and sell the same stocks following a downward price revision. Moreover, institutional investors tend to overreact to analysts' target price revisions, which exacerbates the mispricing in the stock market. Such price destabilizing effect is particularly pronounced for herding among investment firms.     

What Drives Target Price Forecasts and Their Investment Value?

This paper examines the informativeness of analysts’ target price forecasts by relating the investment value of target prices to their primary drivers. Decomposing target price forecasts into near‐term earnings forecasts and price‐to‐earnings ratio forecasts, we show that target price revisions reflect information from both components. In addition, we also find that the relative importance of each component in target price revisions is related to firm characteristics. A portfolio based on target price implied expected returns delivers significant abnormal returns. More importantly, we find that the abnormal returns are associated with both earnings and price‐to‐earnings forecasts, which suggests that the informativeness of target price forecasts comes not only from analysts’ ability to forecast short‐term earnings but also from their ability to assess risk and long‐term growth prospect implied in price‐to‐earnings forecasts.     

The role of financial analysts in stock market efficiency with respect to annual earnings and its cash and accrual components

This study examines biases in stock prices and financial analysts' earnings forecasts. These biases take the form of systematic overweighting or underweighting of the persistence characteristics of cash versus accrual earnings components. Our evidence suggests that stock prices tend to overweight and financial analysts tend to underweight these persistence characteristics. Furthermore, we find that analysts' underweighting attenuates stock price overweighting. However, we find little evidence that the overweighting in stock prices attenuates analyst underweighting. This study brings a new perspective to the literature regarding the disciplining role of financial analysts in capital markets.     

Rare disaster risk and the expected equity risk premium

Consistent with the predictions of rare disaster models, we find that a proxy for the time‐varying probability of rare disasters helps to explain fluctuations in expectations of the equity risk premium. Our proxy for disaster risk is a recently developed measure of global political instability, and the expected market risk premium is from Value Line analysts' expected stock returns. Consistent with long‐run risk models, uncertainty about expected GDP growth and expected consumption growth is also significantly positively related to the expected market risk premium. We obtain similar results when we use the earnings–price ratio and the dividend–price ratio as proxies for the expected market risk premium.     

Investor Sentiment and Pre-IPO Markets

We examine whether irrational behavior among small (retail) investors drives post‐IPO prices. We use prices from the grey market (the when‐issued market that precedes European IPOs) to proxy for small investors' valuations. High grey market prices (indicating overoptimism) are a very good predictor of first‐day aftermarket prices, while low grey market prices (indicating excessive pessimism) are not. Moreover, we find long‐run price reversal only following high grey market prices. This asymmetry occurs because larger (institutional) investors can choose between keeping the shares they are allocated in the IPO, and reselling them when small investors are overoptimistic.     

Evaluating analysts' value: evidence from recommendation revisions around stock price jumps

Recent studies document that analyst recommendation revisions tend to coincide with important corporate events, but offer mixed evidence on whether these revisions still contain significant information content. In this paper, we use large discontinuous changes, known as jumps, in stock prices as proxy for significant events and examine the information content of analyst revisions. We find that although recommendation revisions are more likely to be clustered around stock price jumps, they still contain significant information, especially those issued prior to jumps.     

ABNORMAL RETURNS AND ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECAST REVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUBLICATION OF “STOCK HIGHLIGHTS” BY VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY

We examine the reaction of stocks and the response of financial analysts' earnings forecasts to securities recommended as “Stock Highlights” by Value Line Investment Survey. Significant abnormal returns appear around the publication of stock highlights. Stock price responses are relatively efficient and permanent. Using earnings expectation data provided by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System, we find analysts raise their forecasts significantly following Value Line recommendations. Near-term forecast revisions are significantly related to stock returns at the time of the recommendations. Thus, an explanation for Value Line's security recommendation success is its ability to generate firm-specific earnings information.     

The role of analyst forecasts in the momentum effect

We evaluate the extent to which sell-side equity analysts can facilitate market efficiency when there is increasing uncertainty about a stock's future value. The prevalence of the 52-week-high momentum anomaly, that can be largely attributed to information uncertainty, provides a setting for examining the value and timing of analysts' earnings forecast revisions. Our study finds that analysts can provide value-relevant signals to investors by picking up indicators of momentum. The ability to identify under or over-valued stocks suggests that analysts are important information intermediaries in the price-continuation momentum effect. However, we also observe pervasive asymmetric reaction to good and bad news throughout our study that is consistent with incentive-driven reporting and optimistic biases. Nevertheless, analysts' forecast revisions are informative at different stages to re-establish stock prices back to their fundamental valuation.     

STOCK PRICES AND INFLATION

Numerous empirical studies establish that inflation has a negative short‐run effect on stock returns but few studies report a positive, long‐run Fisher effect for stock returns. Using stock price and goods price data from six industrial countries, we show that long‐run Fisher elasticities of stock prices with respect to goods prices exceed unity and range from 1.04 to 1.65, which tends to support the Fisher effect. We also find that the time path of the response of stock prices to a shock in goods prices exhibits an initial negative response, which turns positive over longer horizons. These results help reconcile previous short‐run and long‐run empirical evidence on stock returns and inflation. Also, they reveal that stock prices have a long memory with respect to inflation shocks, such that investors should expect stocks to be a good inflation hedge over a long holding period. JEL Classification: G12     

Analysts’ Momentum Recommendations

We document that the likelihood of analyst recommendations following past stock returns decreased abruptly in 2003, coinciding with the Global Settlement and other regulatory changes designed to restrain analysts’ conflicts of interest. We also document that the likelihood of recommendations following past stock returns is abnormally high for recommendations issued after negative stock returns (but not for those issued after positive stock returns), among inexperienced and inaccurate analysts, among large brokerage houses, and for companies with high share turnover. Moreover, the recommendations that are more likely to follow past stock returns are accompanied by earnings forecast revisions that are larger in magnitude and less accurate ex post. Overall, our findings suggest that analysts with conflicts of interest and limited ability are more likely to base their recommendations on past stock returns. Finally, we document that the recommendations that are more likely to follow past stock returns (especially those that were issued before 2003 and those that are issued after negative stock returns) contribute to existing price momentum by generating incrementally stronger short‐term and long‐term stock returns.     

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS AND MARKET SEGMENTATION IN CHINA'S STOCK MARKETS

We study market segmentation in China's stock markets, in which local firms issue two classes of shares: class A shares available only to Chinese citizens and class B shares available only to foreign citizens. Significant stock price discounts are documented for class B shares. We find that the price difference is primarily due to illiquid B‐share markets. Relatively illiquid B‐share stocks have a higher expected return and are priced lower to compensate investors for increased trading costs. However, between the two classes of shares, B‐share prices tend to move more closely with market fundamentals than do A‐share prices. Therefore, we find A‐share premiums rather than B‐share discounts in China's markets. JEL classification: G15     

Oil price uncertainty and stock price informativeness: Evidence from investment-price sensitivity in China

We study the effects of oil price uncertainty (OPU) on stock price informativeness based on investment-price sensitivity. Using Chinese stocks from 2008 to 2021, we find a negative relationship between OPU and the strength of Tobin's q (a standardized measure of prices) for predicting investment opportunities. This finding is likely due to the crowding out of informed investors rather than the financial constraints brought by a higher cost of capital. Investment-price sensitivity also decreases more among firms in less-competition, high sales volatility, and lower analysts' attention. What is more, the reduction in investment-price sensitivity is more concentrated in public utilities, agriculture & livestock, and industry instead of in real estate or commerce industries. These findings indicate that OPU decreases the acquisition of information related to firms, and consequently, price informativeness for future investment decisions.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

To buy or not to buy? The value of contradictory analyst signals

We study the predictive ability of individual analyst target price changes for post-event abnormal stock returns within each recommendation category. Although prior studies generally demonstrate the investment value of target prices, we find that target price changes do not cause abnormal returns within each recommendation level. Instead, contradictory analyst signals (e.g., strong buy reiterations with large target price decreases) neutralize each other, whereas confirmatory signals reinforce each other. Further, our analysis reveals that large target price downgrades can be explained by preceding stock price decreases. However, upgrades are not preceded by stock price increases, thereby demonstrating asymmetric analyst behavior when adjusting target prices to stock prices. Our results suggest that investors should treat recommendations with caution when they are issued with large contradictory target price changes. Thus, instead of blindly following a recommendation, investors might put more weight on the change in the corresponding target price and consider transaction costs.     

Investor Reaction to Celebrity Analysts: The Case of Earnings Forecast Revisions

We examine the effects of analysts' celebrity on investor reaction to earnings forecast revisions. We measure celebrity as the quantity of media coverage analysts receive in sources included in the Dow Jones Interactive database, and find that media coverage is positively related to investor reaction to forecast revisions. The effect of celebrity on the reaction to forecast revisions remains significant after controlling for forecast performance variables examined in prior studies (ex post forecast accuracy, ex ante accuracy, award status, and other variables shown to be related to forecast accuracy). While these results are consistent with the familiarity of the analyst's name affecting the market reaction, we cannot rule out that our measure of celebrity is correlated with error in the performance measures we examine and/or correlated with other unexamined dimensions of forecast performance. A content analysis of a random subsample of the media coverage of our sample analysts suggests that our findings likely are not due to the increased availability of forecast revisions. Finally, an investigation of the excess returns around the quarterly earnings announcement date suggests that market participants react too strongly to forecast revisions issued by analysts with high levels of media coverage. Taken together, these findings suggest that an analyst's level of media coverage can affect the initial market reaction to his forecast revisions.     

Commodity Prices and Stock Market Behavior in South American Countries in the Short Run

Using Geweke feedback measures, we present empirical evidence that largely supports the hypothesis that the stock markets of South American countries are highly affected by changes in commodity prices after controlling for changes in exchange rates, interest rates, and North American stock market changes. In total, six different Goldman Sachs commodity price indexes are tested against the unexplained variation in stock market returns for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, covering the period 1995-2007. The Argentinian, Brazilian, and Peruvian stock markets are significantly affected by changes in commodity prices the same day. Venezuela's stock market, however, does not react to changes in commodity prices, even including energy prices. Stock market returns for Chile show a contemporaneous relation with energy and metals prices, whereas Colombia's equity market is affected by price changes for agricultural and industrial metals. In all cases, we find a contemporaneous relation and no indication of a lead or lag relationship.