Green Design and the Market for Commercial Office Space

This paper considers the relationship between energy-efficient design and the leasing/sales markets for commercial real estate. An economic model is provided that considers lease rates and occupancy in simultaneous equilibrium. The behavior of both is predicted to be influenced by efficient design attributes. Selling price is determined by both rents and occupancy; therefore the impact of efficient design on commercial sales activity should be distributed through the leasing market. The model is tested empirically using a national sample of sales and leasing data for class A office buildings. The evidence indicates that “green” buildings achieve superior rents and sustain significantly higher occupancy. The improved performance in the rental market is reflected in a significant premium for the selling price of Energy Star-labeled and LEED-certified properties.     

Local Office Rent Dynamics

This study applies rent adjustment models for ten major European office markets. We capture long-run equilibrium relationships of demand and supply variables and their short-term corrections in a two equation error correction model. We test whether the local nature of office markets makes a model based on national economics inaccurate if local and national markets do not move in tandem. For this we employ a unique dataset, which includes both disaggregated and national variables to model changes in real prime rents for a group of premier and second tier office market cities across Europe for the period 1990–2006. We explicitly compare results that are derived from models that include different levels of geographic aggregation. Results of the two stage error correction model indicate that international office rents adjust to short-run changes in office related economic activity, lagged rent changes, and to the deviation of rents from their long-run values. At the same time our results offer no proof that error correction mechanism models for office rents improve significantly by specifying economic growth figures beyond the national aggregated level for the cities included in our analysis.     

Disentangling the Short and Long-Run Effects of Occupied Stock in the Rental Adjustment Process

In the current stand of literature on the rental adjustment process starting with Hendershott et al. (Real Estate Economics, 30, 165-183, 2002a, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 24, 59-87, 2002b) it has become practice to treat the compound variable “occupied stock” as a supply variable. In this study we show that this variable deserves a more critical investigation and that the general view of a supply variable may be misleading. Using panel data covering 30 urban areas for 17 years, we investigate the rental adjustment process in the German office market. The application of recently developed cointegration techniques for non-stationary panel data in conjunction with the corresponding error correction model (ECM) enables us to overcome the data limitations, particularly existent for most European real estate markets. Hence, our primary motivation is (a) to demonstrate how “occupied stock” should be interpreted correctly and (b) to provide useful insights into the long-term relationships and short-run dynamics of real office prime rents. The empirical evidence suggests that a one percent rise in office employment increases real rents on average by 1.64% through higher demand for office space. On the other hand, a one percent increase in the supply of office space decreases real rents in the long run by 2.25%. The results from the error correction model show that deviations from the long-run equilibrium lead to an adjustment process which restores equilibrium within approximately 3 years.     

Term Structures in the Office Rental Market in Stockholm

This paper contains an empirical study of the rental term structure in a property market that included a dramatic boom and bust cycle. The study is applied to office leases in commercial properties located in Stockholm CBD, Sweden. The time period under study is 1977–1991. The number of observations (lease contracts) that we were able to make full use of in the regression analyses is n=861. For seven out of fifteen years studied, a significant term structure was observed. The estimated hedonic rent equation was also used to construct an office rental index.     

Housing Rents and Inflation Rates

This paper develops a quality-adjusted measure of marginal housing rents using a monthly statistic of landlord net rental income. The marginal rent index (MRI) exhibits deflation during recessions and leads the official rent index by 7 months. The modified inflation rate based on MRI suggests that the annual official inflation rate was overestimated by 1.7–4.1% during the Great Recession but underestimated by 0.3–0.7% during the subsequent expansionary period.     

Controlling the incentive problems in real estate leasing

This paper develops a formal model that characterizes potential conflicts of interest between real-estate landlords and tenants. The model demonstrates a tenant's incentive to undermaintain or overuse (i.e., abuse) a leased property while highlighting the moral hazard problem as a cause of the failure of the lease irrelevance proposition. As a consequence, the lease irrelevance proposition's faiure implies that if tenant abuse incentives are left unrestricted, the market for leased real estate may cease to function.The efficacies of various lease arrangements suggested by Smith and Wakeman (1985) and other researchers in controlling the tenant abuse incentives are evaluated in this framework as a means of counteracting the inherent problems. Our analysis supports the greater use of variable lease schemes (e.g., security deposits and penalty clauses), which peg real-estate lease rates to the level of property abuse rather than more traditional fixed payment contracting arrangements.     

Residential Asking Rents and Time on the Market

Landlords offering a house in the rental market face a difficult strategic pricing decision. The revenue maximizing decision for the landlord involves a tradeoff between the rental rate and time on the market. Because the turnover of renters is higher than owners, and because the landlord must bear some carrying costs on a vacant house, pricing the rent too high may decrease revenue due to a higher vacancy period and pricing it too low may reduce the revenue when occupied. While there is substantial research on the relationship between listed prices and time on the market for freehold interests, this is the first study to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between asking rent, contract rent and time on the market for single family residential rental (leasehold) property interests. We present two models; a rental price model and a duration model for time-on-the market. Using data from the Dallas–Fort Worth area we find that landlords who set a lower asking rent relative to predicted rent can expect a shorter marketing period for their properties. The results also indicate that overpricing the asking rent and then lowering it at a later date leads to a longer marketing time (after the reset) and often a lower rent. These finding are reasonably robust for low-, mid-, and higher-valued rental properties.

Asymmetric Properties of Office Rent Adjustment

In this paper we use an error correction model for understanding the changes in real office rents for a panel of 15 U.S. MSA’s over the period 1990-2007. We find that office rents in all cities react positively to a rise in office employment and lagged rent changes, while lagged deviations from equilibrium rent levels exhibit a slow and partial adjustment over time. Given the non-negativity constraint of vacancy rates we extend the basic model by examining whether rents react to positive changes in employment conditional on the vacancy rate level. Our results show that office rents react significantly stronger to increases in employment when vacancy rates are below the long-term average. We also repeat the analysis for clusters of cities based on similarities in rent and employment dynamics using multi dimensional scaling. The cluster results confirm the overall conclusions and show that our results are not solely valid for the full panel of cities.     

Do Information Rents in Loan Spreads Persist over the Business Cycles?

In this paper, we seek empirical evidence for information rents in loan spreads by analyzing a sample of UK syndicated loan contracts for the period from 1996 to 2005. We use various measures for borrower opaqueness and control for bank, borrower and loan characteristics and we find that undercapitalized banks charge approximately 34 bps higher loan spreads for loans to opaque borrowers. We further analyze whether this effect persists throughout the business cycle and find that this effect prevails only during recessions. However, we do not find evidence that banks exploit their information monopolies during expansion phases.     

A Lintner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents

We develop a dynamic agency model in which payout, investment, and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus net repurchases) follows Lintner's (1956) target adjustment model. Payout smooths out transitory shocks to current income and adjusts gradually to changes in permanent income. Smoothing is accomplished by borrowing or lending. Payout is not cut back to finance capital investment. Risk aversion causes managers to underinvest, but habit formation mitigates the degree of underinvestment.     

Rent Control with Matching Economies: A Model of European Housing Market Regulation

Housing markets are thin, and consumer search for housing is costly, time consuming, and risky. Mismatches between tenants and dwellings are common in a laissez-faire market. There are scale economies in accumulating tenants and houses and then matching them up to improve welfare. In many European countries, some housing is rent controlled and rationed by public centralized matching. Waiting time, risk in rationing, and risk in matching are costs that arise from such regulation. We show that welfare improvements over laissez-faire occur if gains from centralized matching can offset the decrease in housing quality, the possible increase in waiting times, and the risks in rationing induced by rent controls. Under regulation, there is a welfare maximizing partition of the stock into free and controlled markets; and contrary to observed practice, it is often welfare improving to set controlled rents above (not below) laissez-faire, which increases the supply offered for centralized matching and the opportunity for a better match.     

Pricing Upward-Only Adjusting Leases

This paper presents a stochastic pricing model of a unique, path-dependent lease instrument common in the United Kingdom and numerous commonwealth countries, the upward-only adjusting lease. In this lease, the rental rate is fixed at lease commencement but will be reset to the market rate at predetermined intervals (usually every five years) if it exceeds the contract rent. We derive a closed form expression for the market rent of a lease with upward-only adjustments. Results indicate what the initial coupon rate on a 10-year lease with one reset should be relative to that on a symmetric up-and-downward adjusting variable rate lease under various economic conditions (level of real interest rates and expected drift and volatility of the underlying rental service flow). We also consider the calculation of effective rents when free rent periods are given.     

The Cyclic Behavior of the Greater London Office Market

This paper applies structural econometric methodology to estimating and forecasting the greater London office market. We assemble a time series covering the 1970–1995 period and estimate equations for net space absorption, movements in rents, and new building orders. Together with two identities, calculating the stock and vacancy, these form a complete model. We estimate a generally inelastic supply and demand relationship that yields a dynamically stable system. Without unanticipated economic shocks, the market is noncyclic. Therefore the building boom of the 1980s largely is delayed response to the huge growth in service jobs that occurred over that period.     

Post‐financial crisis changes in financial system structure: An examination of the J.P. Morgan & Co. Syndicates after the 1907 Panic

In the post‐2008 crisis period, policy makers debate the implications of banking system concentration. To shed light on this debate, we study a postcrisis period in which less banking regulation existed than in the present period, reasoning that an examination of a less regulated market might reveal useful insights about present day market agents' postcrisis actions. The years immediately following the Panic of 1907 merit study because the period shares important features with the post‐2008 crisis financial system: increasing interconnectedness, the growing complexity accompanying the rise of new industries, the rapid deployment of new communications technologies, and substantial innovation in financial instruments. Because the 1907 crisis preceded the Clayton Anti‐Trust Act of 1914, it also provides a window into studying market agents' behavior before legislation was enacted to discourage banking system concentration. We find evidence that the market share of corporate bond underwritings at J.P. Morgan & Co. increased in the post‐1907 crisis period. We suggest a mechanism by which market share increased: a more concentrated configuration of corporate bond underwriting syndicates. We also indicate that Morgan's increased share may have been a proxy for increased certification value of underwriter reputation because of systemic knowledge Morgan gained during the resolution of the Panic of 1907 rather than for increasing bargaining power. We do not find evidence that Morgan used market power to extract rents from issuers despite increased market share and more concentrated syndicate organization. While our results must be interpreted cautiously due to data limitations, possible lessons for present‐day policy makers are that consolidations in the financial system after a financial crisis are complex. Some consolidations may come about from information and reputational gains produced during the crisis. Others may be moves by some firms to concentrate market power and still others from efforts to improve efficiencies in intermediation.     

Operating Expenses and the Rent Premium of Energy Star and LEED Certified Buildings in the Central and Eastern U.S.

This paper investigates the relationship between operating expenses and rents of Energy Star and LEED certified buildings in the Central and Eastern United States. Several studies have shown that sustainable buildings command a rent premium compared to comparable conventional buildings. Lower operating expenses are expected to be a major source of the rent premium that sustainable buildings command. This is especially the case for buildings with triple-net leases, where tenants directly benefit from savings in operating costs. For a large dataset of U.S. office buildings this study finds significantly lower operating expenses in LEED certified buildings. However, savings in operating expenses only explain part of the rent premium. Additional factors must be at work. Surprisingly, we find significantly higher operating expenses in Energy Star rated buildings. Hence, intangible benefits appear to be the major source of rental premiums of Energy Star rated buildings.     

Regulator performance,regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations.     

Spatial Variation in the Determinants of House Prices and Apartment Rents in China

This paper provides an examination of China??s residential real estate market at the county level using data from that country??s 2000 census. The market is a new one, having only been fully established in 1998. The analysis in the paper is in the form of an aggregate (county-level) hedonic model specified in two versions. Global parameters results are estimated using spatial error model specifications while more local effects are estimated by geographically weighted regression. Global results are typical in that structural characteristics such as floor space and contextual characteristics such as level of in-migration are important in residential prices. Local results, however, indicate significant spatial variation in the effect of both structural amenities and locational context on housing prices. In a simpler specification, rents are shown to respond positively to both median house prices levels and the supply of apartments available at market prices, but also with significant spatial variation across China.     

Bidding rings and the winner's curse

This article extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value environments. We show that efficient collusion is always possible in private value environments, but may not be in common value environments with a binding reserve price. In the latter case, collusion does more than simply transfer rents from the seller to the buyers, it also gives buyers a chance to pool their information prior to trade and make an efficient investment decision. However, full efficiency may not be compatible with information revelation. Buyers with high signals may be better off if no one colludes, leading to inefficient trade. This result provides a possible explanation for the low incidence of joint bidding, especially on marginal tracts, in U.S. federal government offshore oil and gas lease auctions.     

Rents and Intangible Capital: A Q+ Framework

In recent years, U.S. investment has been lackluster, despite rising valuations. Key explanations include growing rents and growing intangibles. We propose and estimate a framework to quantify their roles. The gap between valuations—reflected in average Q—and investment—reflected in marginal q—can be decomposed into three terms: the value of installed intangibles; rents generated by physical capital; and an interaction term, measuring rents generated by intangibles. The intangible related terms contribute significantly to the gap, particularly in fast-growing sectors. Our findings suggest care in a pure-rents interpretation, given the rising role of intangibles.     

What determines the issue price of lease asset-backed securities in China?

In this study, a unique data set is used to examine the pricing factors of lease asset-backed securities (ABS) in China's primary securitization market. In addition to conventional risk factors, such as credit enhancement, underlying asset characteristics, credit rating, and deal structure, we find that originators (i.e., leasing companies) play a critical role in determining the issuing price of lease ABS in China, as state-owned originators and high profitability lessors are more likely to receive a lower initial yield spread. We also find that non-state-owned guarantors, as a form of external credit enhancement for a tranche, can significantly broaden the issuance spread, which is opposite to the situation in mature securitization markets. In addition, lease ABS investors in China may underestimate the risks posed by the diversification level of the asset pool of lease ABS, and reputable underwriters can help the product earn a lower yield spread in the primary market. Our findings indicate some similarities between the pricing factors in China's lease ABS market and those in mature securitization markets, although they still have their own unique features.