Strommarktdesign: Zur Ausgestaltung der Auktionsregeln an der EEX

This paper studies the design of power exchanges in liberalized electricty markets. We analyze several pricing rules for day ahead trading and show that a uniform price mechanism has quite desirable properties as compared to its alternatives. We then discuss how the particular cost structure of electricity generation can be accounted for by appropriate bid formats. We moreover analyze the effects of bid caps and price floors in electricity auctions on market performance, as well as several other aspects of electricity market design. In particular, we discuss linkage of independently operating markets for electricity, reserve energy and transmission capacities, coupling of national power exchanges, and the effects of transparency on the outcome of electricity markets.     

Supply function equilibria with capacity constraints and pivotal suppliers

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators' bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation firms. If a generation firm's rivals are capacity constrained then the firm may be pivotal; that is, the firm could substantially raise the market price by unilaterally withholding output. However the SFE literature has not fully considered the impact of capacity constraints and pivotal firms on equilibrium predictions. We characterize the set of symmetric supply function equilibria for uniform-price auctions when firms are capacity constrained and show that this set is increasing as capacity per firm rises. We provide conditions under which asymmetric equilibria exist and characterize these equilibria. In addition, we compare results for uniform-price auctions to those for discriminatory auctions, and we compare our SFE predictions to equilibrium predictions of models in which bidders are constrained to bid on discrete units of output.     

Techno-?konomische Bewertung eines ver?nderten Zuschnitts von Marktgebieten für elektrische Energie in Mitteleuropa

As a consequence of the paradigm shift in terms of the European Union??s or at least not 20/20/20 energy policy, the liberalization of the German electricity market and the German nuclear energy phase-out, power generation is often still located far from the main load centers. Hence the frequency of grid congestions is expected to rise. These congestions cannot, or not cost-efficiently, be handled with conventional congestion management methods. One approach to solve the problem is the modification of market areas via the splitting or the coupling of existing areas. This study quantitatively and qualitatively deals with the economic impacts of alternative market area definitions in Central Europe. Furthermore, our analysis puts a special emphasis on the implications of the nuclear energy phase-out in Germany in this context. Simulated power generation- and network costs are used for measuring the relative merit of the market zoning adopted. The study identifies three main scenarios as alternatives to the existing market areas: Based on an inter-German separation, for a more detailed examination (1) Austria is detached from southern Germany, (2) the Dutch market area is merged with the northern German zone and (3) the Swiss market area is integrated with the southern German zone and Austria. The implemented simulations show a distinctive trend towards economic advantages regarding alternative market areas in Central Europe. In case of a splitting of existing areas, network costs are the key factor for reducing total costs, whereas for the coupling of markets power generation costs are more crucial. Regarding the nuclear energy phase-out, the achievable cost savings are lower but still positive.     

MERCHANT TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT*

We examine the performance attributes of a merchant transmission investment framework that relies on ‘market driven’ investment to increase transmission network capacity needed to support competitive wholesale markets for electricity. Under a stringent set of assumptions, the merchant investment model has a remarkable set of attributes that appears to solve the natural monopoly problem and the associated need for regulating electric transmission companies. We expand the merchant model to incorporate several attributes of wholesale power markets and transmission networks that the merchant model ignores. These include market power in wholesale electricity markets, lumpiness in transmission investment opportunities, stochastic attributes of transmission networks and associated property rights definition issues, strategic behavior by potential merchant transmission investors and issues related to the coordination of transmission system operators and merchant transmission owners. Incorporating these more realistic attributes of transmission networks and the behavior of transmission owners and system operators leads to the conclusion that several potentially significant inefficiencies may result from reliance on the merchant transmission investment framework. Accordingly, it is inappropriate for policymakers to assume that they can avoid dealing with the many challenges associated with stimulating efficient levels of investment in electric transmission networks by adopting the merchant model.     

Vergleich von Allokationsmethoden zur Kapazitätsvergabe bei grenzüberschreitenden Netzengpässen

Several market initiatives within Europe aim at implementing flow-based methods for capacity allocation. Compared to the common transaction-based methods, these new methods are supposed to lead to an improved utilisation of cross-border capacities. In order to quantify the implications, a model for the coupled consideration of the power plant dispatch and the resulting load flows in the transmission system was developed. By means of detailed data of the Central Western European region the model was used to highlight the advantages of a flow-based allocation. Due to the more accurate mapping of the actual flows within the algorithm, the trade volume can be increased significantly leading to an enhanced convergence of the single market prices. However, the involved market players do not benefit in the same way from the trading possibilities in the presented case. The algorithm does not send direct economic signals regarding the profitability of different locations of power plants because of the required simplifications in the practical implementation. But the system-wide impact of the input in a certain location can be evaluated and therefore also be controlled where appropriate.     

Price Sensitivity of Hourly Day-ahead and Quarter-hourly Intraday Auctions in Germany

The introduction of the quarter-hourly intraday auction in 2014 for the German market confirms a tendency towards short-term energy markets. The reason for the new market was the need to trade shorter periods than just hours a day-ahead to minimize open positions in the more volatile continuous intraday trading. The increased production capacity of solar power boosted this requirement for new short-term power products. The quarter-hourly market shows a distinctive zigzag price formation. We identify two influencing factors: first, the solar residual that combines the trading of solar power ramps around midday as well as the gradients of consumption and thermal power plant ramps throughout the course of the day, and second, a characteristic two stage market design with higher liquidity for the hourly than for the quarter-hourly auction. Therefore, demand, solar generation and inflexible ramps of thermal power plants are hedged at the hourly day-ahead auction and use the quarter-hourly auction only to balance the remaining differences. To prove this argument the price sensitivities of the hourly day-ahead and quarter-hourly intraday auctions in Germany are compared based on actual bid and ask curves from 2015 and 2016. Finally, the development of an adequate design of future spot markets is discussed.     

Design von Informationsfeedback in Regelenergiemärkten

Information feedback is a much debated issue on balancing power markets: which information on past auctions should be published and when? The article analyzes advantages and disadvantages of different feedback policies applied to the example of the Swiss balancing power market. Our main conclusion is that the publication of the marginal bid is usually recommendable. This is often not the case for additional information (e.g. extramarginal bids). However, the answer depends on the specific market design and the market structure.     

The European Single Market in Electricity: An Economic Assessment

The European single market in electricity has been promoted vigorously by the European Commission since 1996. We discuss how national electricity markets and cross-border electricity markets have been reshaped by the process. We examine the Commission’s own work on evaluating the benefits of the single market. We look at the wider evidence of impact on prices, security of supply, the environment, and innovation. We conclude that the institutional changes are extensive and there has been significant market harmonisation and integration. However, the measured benefits are difficult to identify, but likely to be small. This is partly because over the same period there has been a large rise in subsidised renewable generation that is driven by the decarbonisation agenda.

     

The impact of introducing seven-day-trading on the Austrian electricity market

This paper analyses the impacts of the new daily green electricity production forecasting policy by the Austrian Green Electricity Settlement Agency (OEMAG) and the newly introduced seven-day electricity trading mechanism by the European Energy Exchange (EEX) on the Austrian electricity market. By treating these two market policy alterations as natural experiments and applying statistical and econometric methods to a unique data set, it is investigated whether thereby (i) a reduction of the green electricity production forecasting uncertainties and (ii) a generally more efficient electricity market with accompanying lower net costs is attained. Furthermore, we analyse whether (iii) seven-day-trading helps to mitigate the Friday-Monday effect that is often observed on stock and other exchanges markets. Finally, we investigate whether or not (iv) the underlying market design might tempt OEMAG to systematically overstate its forecasts on green power generation.     

Analytical Screens for Electricity Mergers

Electricity mergers pose distinct challenges for competition policy. Electricity demand is highly inelastic in the short run, storage is limited, and transmission constraints limit the ability to substitute generation at other locations. As a result, a merger can affect prices in many different markets and even generators with small market shares may be able to exercise market power. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approach for screening horizontal mergers, based on the concentration thresholds in the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, can fail to identify mergers that lessen competition, and mergers that fail the FERC screen may have no significant anticompetitive effect. We propose competitive residual demand (CRD) analysis, which examines the supply curves of the markets affected by a merger and considers the ability and incentive of firms to raise prices before and after a proposed merger. CRD analysis is a relatively easy way to address the incentives for generators to exercise market power and relies on data that are often available. Vertical (convergent) mergers between electricity and gas raise additional concerns, and we propose a methodology to screen vertical mergers.     

Electronic markets for telecommunications transport capacities

Until recently inter-carrier sales and purchase of telecommunications transport capacities were mainly based on long-term bilateral contracts between capacity supplying and demanding operators. Not long ago various firms started to supplement this traditional decentralized organization of the capacity business by setting up institutionalized electronic market places to trade network capacity products similar to traditional commodity exchanges. This paper portrays the mechanics of the new capacity trading approach along with its advantages and disadvantages for both established and new carriers. Eleven electronic carrier capacity market places were identified around the globe and analyzed with regard to the volume and structure of carrier capacity products being traded. Results suggest that operators of electronic capacity markets face severe difficulties in motivating major carriers to participate in the market. Former transmission network monopoly holders are particularly reluctant to participate in electronic carrier capacity market places. Incumbents fear that their participation could accelerate the decline of transport capacity prices. On a more general level the analysis suggests that new intermediaries in electronic markets are likely to fail when (1) supply and demand is highly concentrated and (2) trust in the quality of the products traded and in the commercial settlement processes is not firmly established.     

Who should own a renewable technology? Ownership theory and an application

We investigate the market implications of ownership of a new low-cost production technology. We relate our theoretical findings to measure the impact of renewable energy penetration into electricity markets and examine how the ownership of renewable capacity changes market outcomes (prices, outputs, emissions). As current public policies influence renewable energy ownership, this research provides useful insights for policy makers. We show how and why ownership of renewable capacity matters when there is market power in energy market. We apply our findings to the wholesale electricity market in Ontario, Canada, to analyze the impact of different ownership structures for wind capacity expansions. Using both simulation analysis and empirical analysis of market data, we show that the price-reducing effects of wind expansion are smaller when a larger strategic firm owns new wind capacity. Lastly, we show that the effect of wind ownership on emissions depends on both the amount of generation displaced by wind output and the emissions rate of displaced generation.     

欧盟电力市场化改革最新进展及启示

欧盟推进电力市场化改革的主要目标是要建立欧洲统一电力市场。根据欧盟电力市场化改革第2号指令的要求,2007年7月开始全部用户市场开放,在2004年7月和2007年7月分别实现输电运行机构和配电运行机构从竞争性业务中分离出来。为进一步加强跨国电力交易,欧盟加快了泛欧洲输电网建设进程,推进统一的输电交易和阻塞管理机制,推动各国深化电力改革和各国电力市场之间的融合。而欧盟电力市场化改革及推进面临挑战。对中国而言,建立统一开放的电力市场体系是电力市场化改革方向,但业务分拆和电力市场机制建设必须协调推进。     

Spectrum auctions in a thin market: The Korean case

In 2010, the Korean government adopted spectrum auctions and introduced a market mechanism into spectrum management. However, the government has often been confronted with conflicts between diverse policy goals of spectrum auctions. A thin spectrum market, where only three incumbent MNOs bid for spectrum, has led to concerns that the government may fail to maximize revenues.Based on the past experiences in Korea, this paper examines the Korean government's choice of auction rules in the face of conflicting policy goals. This paper also recommends that the government implement the following regulatory reforms and consider the auction related measures to deepen its spectrum market or increase the number of bidders: (i) relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions, (ii) introduction of regional or site-specific spectrum licenses, and (iii) modification of auction formats. Spectrum markets tend to be thin in many countries, and the Korean experience may offer implications for those countries when they implement spectrum auctions.     

INEFFICIENCIES AND MARKET POWER IN FINANCIAL ARBITRAGE: A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY MARKETS*

For two years prior to the collapse of California's restructured electricity market, power traded in both a forward and a spot market for delivery at the same times and locations. Nonetheless, prices in the two markets often differed in significant and predictable ways. This apparent inefficiency persisted, we argue, because most firms believed that trading on inter‐market price differences would yield regulatory penalties. For the few firms that did make such trades, it was not profit‐maximizing to eliminate the price differences entirely. Skyrocketing prices in 2000 changed the major buyers' (utilities') incentives and exacerbated the price differentials between the markets.     

Cost Recovery in Congested Electricity Networks

Large scale investments in European electricity networks are foreseen in the next decade. Pricing the network at marginal cost will not be sufficient to pay for those investments as the network is a natural monopoly. This paper derives numerically the socially optimal transmission prices for cost recovery, taking into account that electricity networks are often congested, while allowing for market power in generation. The model is illustrated with a Stackelberg game for the Belgian electricity market.     

Local Energy Markets*

In current power markets, the bulk of electricity is sold wholesale and transported to consumers via long-distance transmission lines. Recently, decentralized local energy markets have evolved, often as isolated networks based on solar generation. We analyze strategic pricing, investment, and welfare in local energy markets. We show that local energy markets yield competitive equilibrium prices and provide efficient investment incentives. Yet, we find that strategic behavior leads to allocative inefficiency. We propose a clearing mechanism that induces truth-telling behavior and restores first-best welfare.     

The role of Internet auctions in the expansion of B2B markets

In the wake of the advent of the World Wide Web, businesses are scrambling to take advantage of changes in their markets. While the consumer side of the Web explosion has been much touted, it is the business-to-business (B2B) market that has quietly surpassed expectations. An important business model that is responsible for this new market expansion is the Internet or Web auction. Businesses are adapting traditional auctions to the instantaneous “real-time” advantage of the Net to reach new markets that were previously cost-prohibitive by reducing transaction costs. Advantages such as the size and scope of the audience are giving Internet auctions a major role in the emerging global economy. This article examines the enormous impact of Internet auctions on B2B markets. We look at the kinds of auctions being conducted and their relevance to emerging business paradigms. We examine the circumstances under which you choose to conduct Web auctions and their impact on pricing mechanisms, information asymmetries, and channel relationships.     

Mixed Oligopoly and Market Power Mitigation: Evidence from the Colombian Wholesale Electricity Market*

Using information on price bids in wholesale electricity pools and empirical techniques described in the literature on electricity markets, this study identifies the market power mitigation effect of public firms in the Colombian market. The results suggest that while private firms exercise less market power than is predicted by a profit-maximization model, there are marked differences between private and public firms in their exercise of unilateral market power. These findings support the hypothesis of the market power mitigation effect of public firms.     

Mechanism choice and the buy-it-now auction: A structural model of competing buyers and sellers

A striking feature of many online sales platforms is the coexistence of multiple sales mechanisms. Items on eBay, for instance, are frequently offered through auctions, posted prices, and buy-it-now auctions. In this article, I study how this mechanism multiplicity influences the welfare of buyers and sellers. I specify and estimate a structural model of mechanism choice in online markets, in which I consider both sides of the market: On the demand side, buyers' choices among available listings are equilibrium outcomes of an entry game. On the supply side, sellers make equilibrium decisions when choosing sales mechanisms and prices. I estimate this model using data from sales of baseball tickets on eBay and calculate consumer and seller rents in three markets: the actual market with all three sales mechanisms and two counterfactual markets with auctions and fixed prices or only fixed-price listings, respectively. I find that the addition of auctions to fixed-price markets hurts sellers and risk-averse buyers but benefits risk-neutral buyers. Additionally, the consumer surplus increases when buy-it-now auctions are offered but the seller surplus is reduced further. I discuss the intuition for the cause of this result.