迷雾中的欧洲

欧洲也在“摸着石头过河”。     

东亚货币联盟

本文简要分析了东亚(泛指东北亚及东南亚各国和地区)成立货币联盟的可行性,对成立东亚货币联盟的利弊作了较为详细地探讨,并提出了自己的观点.     

欧洲银行业压力测试分析

文章阐述了欧洲银行业压力测试的方法和结果,并详尽分析了这一测试结果。研究表明,欧洲银行业压力测试覆盖范围广泛且具备代表性,测试结果可能不足以反映欧洲银行的状况,但此次测试大幅提高了欧洲银行业的透明度,降低了市场不确定性,有助于欧洲主权债务危机的进一步缓和。此外,压力测试模型并没有主权违约的假设,反映出欧盟,尤其是欧元区成员国无一可能违约,这也可能大幅舒缓投资者的疑虑。     

欧洲的转机在哪？

欧洲的一揽子救助方案一而再再而三地落空,欧债危机发生这么久了还不见转机,反而愈演愈烈,欧洲债务危机何时是尽头？     

货币联盟中的货币政策承诺与财政纪律

单一货币政策和成员国分散的财政政策的相互作用和协调是货币联盟面临的一个重要问题。本文运用博弈模型分析了货币联盟中有关财政与货币政策几种协调安排的宏观经济含义,指出在成员国无法达成目标一致的条件下,财政纪律和货币政策承诺有助于通货膨胀目标的实现,但产出目标能否实现则取决于财政纪律的合理性。合理的财政纪律必须考虑成员国基础环境、财政政策乘数及其溢出效应以及潜在产出水平等因素。无效的财政纪律将损害货币政策承诺的效力。本文认为2005年欧洲经济货币联盟对《稳定与增长公约》的改革只是缓和了危机而没有从根本上解决危机,财政纪律危机风波仍将上演,对SGP的改革也远未结束。     

对当前欧洲债务危机的影响及对策分析

本文通过对欧洲主权债务危机的最新进展的分析,从金融机构、实体经济、救助计划等方面对欧洲债务危机的发展的趋势与走向进行了预判,并通过金融投资、对外贸易等角度探讨了其对我国经济发展的可能影响,并在此基础上,提出了我国应对的相关政策建议。     

后欧洲债务危机对中国贸易的影响

2009年由希腊引发的欧洲主权债务危机爆发至今,依然影响着世界的经济、贸易与金融。欧盟作为中国第二大贸易伙伴,由于其实施收缩财政政策、降低赤字占GDP比重、缩小贸易逆差的措施,对我国的贸易造成了一些不利的影响,同时欧元在后欧债危机不稳定的因素继续存在,直接减弱了中国对欧盟出口产品的竞争力。怎样找出中国对欧盟贸易中面临的不利因素,应对不利的影响,是我们面临的任务。本文在分析危机发生的因素上,分析了欧盟和中国的贸易状况,为我国对外贸易提出了一些参考意见。     

Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union

Do plans for a monetary union in Europe call for limits on the freedom of the country members of the union to use fiscal policy? In order to provide a tentative answer, we simulate the IMF model MULTIMOD, given various shocks, in the case of a European Monetary Union consisting only of France and Germany. The results clearly indicate the possible value of allowing unfettered use of fiscal policy in both countries. The reasons lie partly in differences in the initial position of the two, partly in differences in their preferences. We also examine the change in the policy significance of the current account in the monetary union. Current account imbalances clearly cease to have the same significance in a monetary union; but they do not therefore become irrelevant.     

欧洲货币联盟基础不稳

欧洲货币联盟大厦的基石—《稳定与增长公约》,在2002年遭受了严重的冲击。几乎所有欧元区的国家都采取了扩张的财政政策。德国、葡萄牙两国财政赤字超越3％的红线,法国和意大利也濒临红线。欧元区国家又宣布2004年达成财政平衡的目标已经不能实现,必须要推迟。本文通过对货币联盟运行一年来的现状进行分析,认为欧元区国家财政扩张的原因主要在于:内部的不对称冲击、货币联盟自身的缺陷及政治联合的滞后。如果不加快改革,货币联盟大厦则有倾覆的危险。     

Social protection and regional convergence in a European Monetary Union

This paper addresses convergence in social protection and GDP in a European Economic and Monetary Union. We evaluate the impact of recently proposed EC social minimum requirements on regional convergence within the EC. Subsequently, we analyze a system of differentiated social norms as a means of raising social protection in countries with lower social standards.     

Transatlantic Trade-Offs in the Age of Balanced Budgets and European Monetary Union

We develop a model of monetary and fiscal policies appropriate for considering U.S.-European policy interactions in an era of near-balanced budgets and European monetary union. We study the determinants of policy trade-offs and incentives for central banks and governments across the Atlantic. Smaller, more open economies face more favorable trade-offs, since openness enhances policy effectiveness via the exchange-rate channel. Changes in Europe's monetary arrangements do not affect U.S. trade-offs, although they alter the trade-offs facing European policy-makers. Fiscal trade-offs depend crucially on the extent to which fiscal policy is distortionary. Changes in taxes and spending move both employment and inflation in the desired direction following a worldwide supply shock when spending is financed with distortionary taxes.     

From the European Monetary System to Economic and Monetary Union — How and why?

The paper starts from the premise that the Delors Report is the main point of reference to create economic and monetary union in the EC countries. After a brief review of the Report, the study focuses on the transition phase leading to union and in particular to the gradual transfer of monetary authority to the EC level. It is argued that the attribution of (i) adjustment of short-term interest differentials, (ii) intervention policy vis-a-vis third countries and (iii) changes in reserve requirements to the European System of Central Banks would give this new collective body significant centralized authority, while leaving ultimate power to national governments concerning realignments in the transition stage.     

The Currency Denomination of World Trade after European Monetary Union

This paper addresses the question of which role the currencies of the three major economies in the world might play in global trade after European economic and monetary union. Based on historical data about trade flows and invoicing practices as well as “G-3” economies' inflation records, it is argued that, most likely, the U.S. dollar will maintain its dominant role in trade denomination for quite an extended period of time after the European changeover. From the data discussed, the euro will immediately take on the role of the second most important trade vehicle currency, well in advance of the Japanese yen. Due to network effects, the euro is likely to gradually expand its share in global trade invoicing thereafter, primarily at the expense of the dollar in Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and, perhaps, also in Asia.J. Japan Int. Econ., Dec. 1998,12(4), pp. 424–454. London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group and CEPR, European Central Bank, DG Research, Kaiserstrasse 29, 60311 Frankfurt, Germany.Copyright 1998 Academic Press.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers F19, F14, F33, F49, E41.     

Joining the European Monetary Union—Comparing First and Second Generation Open Economy Models

We log-linearise the Dellas and Tavlas (DT) model of monetary union and solve it analytically. We find that the intuition of optimal currency area analysis of DT’s second generation open economy model is essentially the same as that of first generation models. Monetary union results in no welfare loss if its member states are symmetric. However, asymmetry causes loss in welfare both due to the failure of the union policy to deal suitably with a country’s asymmetric shocks and due to an active monetary policy by the union in pursuit of its distinct objectives. The asymmetry in DT is largely due to the differing wage rigidities across countries. JEL Classification Numbers: F41, F42, E4