Hysteresis in the development of unemployment: the EU and US experience

We examine hysteresis in EU and US unemployment by panel unit root tests. First generation tests indicate that unemployment is stationary. Second generation tests show mixed results. Idiosyncratic components are stationary in the US. A unit root in the US common component depends on the starting point of the sample. While the common component is nonstationary over the whole period, it is mean-reverting after initial observations are dropped. Hysteresis in EU unemployment is attributed to idiosyncratic, but not to common components. The findings might reflect a different regulation of labour markets and a lower degree of migration in the EU.     

Appropriation,migration, and unemployment

This article builds general equilibrium models to explore the relationship among appropriation, rural–urban migration, the minimum wage and unemployment. We find that the proportion of appropriated capital plays a key role in the effects of appropriation on unemployment and rural–urban migration. When the proportion of appropriated capital is large, a stronger control on appropriation by the government results in a lower unemployment rate and more rural–urban migrants, and vice versa. In the extended models, the conclusion may be different when the plundered factor changes from capital to land. In the situation with the agricultural sector employing unskilled labour and capital, appropriation has no impact on unemployment, and the effect on migration remains the same. We also discuss the implications of the minimum wage, and find that under plausible conditions, the rise of the minimum wage can alleviate appropriation and reduce unemployment. The situation of migration is ambiguous due to the impacts of two opposite factors.     

On the existence of involuntary unemployment equilibria

Conclusion We have proved the existence of equilibria implying involuntary unemployment of labour in non-competitive economies with fixed wage rate. We notice that model (II) and its extensions have not been presented as aninterpretation of Keynes' theory. We may define them as Keynesian models only in the sense that they admit involuntary unemployment equilibrium, which concept is basic to Keynes' theory. In any case, we think that these models are a first step in the development of more realistic microeconomic foundations for short-run macroeconomic theory.A first draft of this paper was presented in December 1972 at the Institute of Political Economy, Faculty of Economics and Banking, Siena University.     

Indeterminacy of equilibrium in stochastic OLG models

Summary. This paper studies the equilibria of a stochastic OLG exchange economies consisting of identical agents living for two periods, and having the opportunity to trade a single infinitely-lived asset in constant supply. The agents have uncertain endowments and the stochastic process determining the endowments is Markovian. For such economies, the literature has focused on studying strongly stationary equilibria in which quantities and prices are functions of the exogenous states of nature which describe the uncertainty: such equilibria are generalizations of deterministic steady states, and this paper investigates if they have the same special status as asymptotic limits of other equilibrium paths. The difficulty in extending the analysis of equilibria beyond the class of strongly stationary equilibria comes from the presence of indeterminacy: we propose a procedure for overcoming this difficulty which can be decomposed into two steps. First backward induction arguments are used to restrict the domain of possible prices; then if some indeterminacy is left, expectation functions are introduced to make the forward equilibrium equations determinate. The properties of the resulting trajectories, in particular their asymptotic properties, can then be studied. For the class of models that we study this procedure provides a justification for focusing on strongly stationary equilibria. For the model with positive dividends (equity or land) the justification is complete, since we show that the strongly stationary equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. For the model with zero dividends (money) there is a continuum of self-fulfilling expectation functions resulting in a continuum of equilibrium paths starting from any admissible initial condition: under conditions given in the paper, these equilibrium paths converge almost surely to one of the strongly stationary equilibria-either autarchy or the stochastic analogue of the Golden Rule. Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: March 22, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful for the stimulating environment and research support provided by the Cowles Foundation at Yale University during the Fall 2000 when this paper was first conceived. We are also grateful to the participants of the SITE Workshop at Stanford University and the Incomplete Markets Workshop at SUNY Stony Brook during the summer 2001 for helpful discussions. Correspondence to: M. Magill     

New jobs or recalls?

This study demonstrates the importance of explicitly accounting for the possibility of recalls in the analysis of unemployment composition and the determinants of unemployment spell durations. Using Austrian administrative data we estimate that recalls accounted for nearly one half of the employment to unemployment to re-employment transitions in 1985 with the probability of recall being mainly dependent on industry and job characteristics related to seasonal work. We then analyse unemployment spell durations in a competing risks framework and, indeed, find significantly different duration patterns across new jobs and recalls.This paper draws on research in which the first author has collaborated with Georg Fischer. We would like to thank seminar participants at the ZEW, Mannheim, the Institute for Advanced Studies Vienna, participants of the European Economic Association congress, Dublin, and two referees of this journal for valuable comments and criticisms.     

Learning and Efficiency with Search Frictions

This paper studies the allocative efficiency in a Moscarini (2005)-type equilibrium search environment with learning. It is shown that the stationary equilibrium is efficient if and only if the Hosios condition holds no matter whether learning is about firm-specific human capital or about general human capital. However, the stationary equilibrium can never be efficient if externalities exist from unemployment. In contrast, even with externalities, the stationary equilibrium can be efficient under some modified Hosios condition if there is no uncertainty (standard Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)-type equilibrium search environment). The key intuition is that the equilibrium can only be efficient if firm-worker matching is formed and terminated efficiently.     

Disequilibrium rational expectations: Examples of unemployment with inflation

In this paper, we present a simple dynamic general disequilibrium model which generates both unemployment and inflation as a stationary long-run equilibrium. Rational expectations (in the mean) are an essential part of this equilibrium. Policy remedies are examined. By means of an example, it is shown that rational expectations are consistent with depressed economic activity and that government policy can play an important role. It is entirely possible for inflation and unemployment to persist indefinitely.     

Multiplicity of Cournot Equilibria and Involuntary Unemployment

In an overlapping generations model with Cournot competition on the goods market it is shown that a continuum of stationary states and perfect foresight trajectories exists with unemployment at arbitrary low wages. Decisive for this is the influence that different forecast functions have on the objective demand curve, even though they are consistent with perfect foresight. With an example it is shown that simple adaptive and constant memory forecast rules generate such unemployment equilibria. The corresponding temporary equilibrium dynamics may display stable unemployment and unstable full employment equilibria.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D43, D51, E24     

Estimating the public's social preference function between inflation and unemployment using survey data: The survey research center versus Gallup

Economists often use Gallup Poll data on presidential performance to analyze the interaction between politics and the state of the macroeconomy. The household survey undertaken by the Survey Research Center (SRC) of the University of Michigan provides an alternative data base. The SRC asks respondents about the government's performance specifically with respect to inflation and unemployment. We compare whether the Gallup or SRC data are the more useful for estimating the public's social preference function between inflation and unemployment for the Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton presidencies. The estimates that use Gallup Poll data are unsatisfactory because for two of the periods the coefficients of inflation and unemployment are not well estimated and for one period there is serial correlation of the residuals. The estimates using the SRC data set are satisfactory and the results are consistent with economic theory. We conclude that a researcher using survey data to estimate the public's reaction to varying rates of inflation and unemployment should prefer the SRC series when it is available. First version received: October 1995/final version received: July 1998     

A further investigation of unemployment persistence in European transition economies

This paper analyses the dynamics of the unemployment rate in the eight countries from Central and Eastern Europe which joined the EU in 2004. Unit root tests allowing for nonlinearities and structural changes suggest that the unemployment rate is not stationary in most of the sample countries. Tests allowing for fractional integration, however, reveal that shocks are highly persistent, implying a slow rate of convergence to the natural rate of unemployment. The unemployment rate is least persistent in Hungary and Slovenia, more persistent in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic States and extremely persistent in Poland. The degree of persistence appears to reflect the different levels of economic and institutional development in the countries and possibly also the role of the government.     

The nature of regional unemployment in Italy

Taking as a starting point the evidence of growing disparities for most of the 1984–2007 period, this article investigates the nature of regional unemployment in Italy. In particular, we assess whether the Italian regional unemployment rates contain a unit root and are, thus, subject to pure hysteresis, considering as alternative hypotheses both a linear and a non-linear stationary process. For that purpose, we employ three recently developed panel unit-root tests, taking account of structural breaks, cross-section dependence and non-linearities. Contrary to previous studies in the literature, our results reject the pure hysteresis hypothesis and support the characterisation of regional unemployment in Italy as a stationary but non-linear process, subject to multiple equilibria, in line with the ‘structuralist hypothesis’ advanced by Phelps (1994).     

Learning,non-equilibrium beliefs,and non-pecuniary payoffs in an experimental game

Summary. We present a parametric learning model of players' dynamic and possibly out-of-equilibrium beliefs about other players' preferences that also incorporates random utility (noise). We estimate the model using the data from the four-country ultimatum game experiments of Roth et al. (1991). We find evidence that in the US and in Israel, the estimated beliefs of proposers are stationary and out-of-equilibrium, that in Slovenia, they are in equilibrium, and that in Japan, they are out-of-equilibrium, change from period to period and move away from equilibrium over time. In Japan and in the US, the estimated proposers' beliefs are further away from the uniform prior than the estimated equilibrium beliefs. The results seem to provide support for a non-pecuniary payoff explanation in all countries. Received: May 16, 2000; revised version: December 15, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alvin Roth for providing us with the data sets of Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991). We are very grateful to Vincent Crawford, Joel Sobel, and an anonymous referee for all their comments and feedback. We are also grateful to J?rg Borrmann, Bruno Broseta, Jimmy Chan, Liran Einav, Bernd Engelmann, Drew Fudenberg, Oscar Jorda, Muriel Niederle, Pedro Pereira, Georg Weizs?cker, and audiences at the California Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and at the European Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society in Lausanne for their comments. Costa-Gomes was affiliated with the Harvard Business School during part of his work on this project. The usual disclaimer applies. Correspondence to:M.A. Costa-Gomes and K.G. Zauner     

AN ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH MODEL OF CRIME,INEQUALITY, AND UNEMPLOYMENT*

We extend simple search models of crime, unemployment, and inequality to incorporate on‐the‐job search. This is valuable because, although simple models are useful, on‐the‐job search models are more interesting theoretically and more relevant empirically. We characterize the wage distribution, unemployment rate, and crime rate theoretically, and use quantitative methods to illustrate key results. For example, we find that increasing the unemployment insurance replacement rate from 53 to 65 percent increases unemployment and crime rates from 10 and 2.7 percent to 14 and 5.2 percent. We show multiple equilibria arise for some fairly reasonable parameters; in one case, unemployment can be 6 or 23 percent, and crime 0 or 10 percent, depending on the equilibrium.     

Land and Urban Unemployment

This paper re–examines the effects of expansion of land itself on unemployment and welfare in the mobile–capital Harris–Todaro model with land in agriculture. We show the possibility of immiserization and the harmful effects on employment contrary to the conventional results.     

Search in cities

The aim of this paper is to expose the recent developments of urban search models which incorporate a land market into a search-matching framework. Using these models, we will be able to explain why unemployment rates vary within a city, how city structure affects workers’ labor-market outcomes, how unemployment benefits and the job-destruction rate affect the growth of cities and why workers living far away from job centers search less intensively and experience higher unemployment rates than those residing closer to jobs. We are also able to explain why, as compared to whites, black workers spend more time commuting to work but travel less miles and search for jobs over a smaller area.     

Hysteresis in unemployment for 17 OECD countries: Stationary test with a Fourier function

In this empirical study, we apply stationary test with a Fourier function proposed by Becker et al. (2006) to re-examine the hysteresis hypothesis in unemployment for 17 OECD countries over the 1960 to 2009 period. The hysteresis in unemployment is confirmed for most of these 17 OECD countries, with the exception of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Sweden and the USA, when Becker et al.'s (2006) stationary test with a Fourier function is conducted.     

Land collateral and labor market dynamics in France

The value of land in the balance sheet of French firms correlates positively with their hiring and investment flows. To explore the relationship between these variables, we develop a macroeconomic model with firms that are subject to both credit and labor market frictions. The value of collateral is driven by the forward-looking dynamics of the land price, which reacts endogenously to fundamental and non-fundamental (sunspot) shocks. We calibrate the model to French data and find that land price shocks give rise to significant amplification and hump-shaped responses of investment, vacancies and unemployment that are in line with the data. We show that both the endogenous movements in the firms׳ discount factor and the sluggish response of the land price are key elements that drive the results.     

Testing for unemployment hysteresis in nonlinear heterogeneous panels: International evidence

Nonlinear behavior of unemployment is well documented in the literature, and thus linear unit root tests may not be appropriate in this case. This paper tests for hysteresis of unemployment for 29 OECD countries through the use of a new nonlinear panel unit root test developed by Ucar and Omay (2009). The test examines the joint null hypothesis of linearity and a unit root against the alternative hypothesis of nonlinear stationarity. Large power gains are achieved by both combining cross-sectional information with nonlinearities in the data. In addition, after the unit root null being rejected, we use a sequential panel selection method suggested by Chortareas and Kapetanios (2009) to classify the whole panel into a group of stationary countries and a group of non-stationary countries. The empirical findings show that the nonlinear panel test gives strong evidence in favor of the natural rate hypothesis of unemployment for 23 of 29 OECD countries, in contrast to those obtained by Chang's (2002) linear panel test that 17 countries display evidence of stationary unemployment.     

The all-pay auction with complete information

Summary In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium.We are grateful to Jacques Crémer, Chuangyin Dang, Jürgen Dennert, Chaim Fershtman, Martin Hellwig, Arthur Robson, Heinrich Ursprung, Eric van Damme, Ton Vorst, and the referees for helpful comments. We benefitted from presentations at the World Congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona, the European Meeting on the Economics of Information at Tilburg University, the Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings at the University of Illinois, and seminars at Texas A&M University, The Pennsylvania State University, Tilburg University and the University of Montreal. Baye is grateful for support from the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University and the Tinbergen Institute where earlier versions of this paper were completed. Kovenock acknowledges support from Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, the Tinbergen Institute, the Center for Economic Studies at the University of Munich, the Institut d'Analisi Economica CSIC at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the Krannert School of Management, and the Jay N. Ross Young Faculty Scholar Award.     

What do information frictions do?

Summary. We present an overlapping generations model in which a labor market friction (moral hazard) coexists and interacts with a credit market friction (costly state verification). Our main results are: (i) while credit market frictions have long- and short-run real effects, labor market frictions typically have only short-run effects unless they also affect the volume of investment per worker, (ii) the frictions amplify each other to produce higher long-run unemployment than would result from only labor market frictions, (iii) these distortions may prolong the effect of temporary shocks, and (iv) the dynamics of economies with both frictions are qualitatively similar to their frictionless counterparts.Received: 25 February 2003, Revised: 1 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: E13, E24, O41, O17. Correspondence to: Joydeep BhattacharyaWork on this paper began while Bhattacharya was visiting the University of Texas at Austin and was completed when Chakraborty was visiting the IMF Institute in Washington, DC. We are grateful to both institutions for their hospitality. For helpful comments and suggestions we thank Valerie Bencivenga, Dean Corbae, Scott Freeman, Rajesh Singh, participants at the Macro Tea in Austin, and especially, an anonymous referee of this journal. The usual caveat applies.