Whom to license patented technology

This paper examines the optimal licensing policy of a patent holder when potential licensees differ in their capacities in absorbing the patented technology. If two-part tariffs with non-negative royalties and fixed fees are feasible, the patent holder finds it optimal to license the strong firm exclusively whether or not an exclusive licensing of the weak firm deters the strong firm from entering the market. Hence, the potential trade-offs between strategic gains associated with licensing to weak competitors and efficiency gains associated with licensing to efficient competitors do not exist when two part tariffs are available. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Technology exploitation in the context of open innovation: Finding the right ‘job’ for your technology

In light of the recent economic crisis, many industrial firms attempt to capture additional value from their technologies by means of open innovation strategies. Besides acquiring external technology, many firms therefore increasingly try to license their own technology to other firms either exclusively or in addition to its application in their own products. This article shows that technology licensing offers important strategic benefits beyond generating licensing revenues, which underscore the need for an integrated management of technology licensing activities. Therefore, this article extends the concept of job-related markets that was recently developed in the managerial literature. A ‘job’ is the fundamental problem that a customer needs to resolve in a particular situation. Managers may transfer this job-related understanding to technology licensing activities because the right ‘job’ for a technology may be outside a firm’s boundaries, and it may help firms to identify additional licensing opportunities. On this basis, the article presents the concept of an integrated technology exploitation roadmap, which allows firms to use the job-related markets to integrate technology licensing in their strategic planning processes. An example of a machinery firm shows how this roadmap may contribute to strengthening a firm’s licensing business.     

Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market

In an economy with unionized labor market, we show that the payoff of an outside innovator may be higher under royalty licensing than under fixed-fee licensing and auction, if bargaining power of the labor union is sufficiently high. This result holds for both decentralized and centralized bargaining. It follows from our analysis that a combination of fixed-fee and output royalty can be preferable to the innovator compared to both royalty only licensing and auction (or fixed-fee licensing). We discuss the implications of positive opportunity costs of the licensees.     

Licensing and innovation with imperfect contract enforcement

Licensing promotes technology transfer and innovation, but enforcement of licensing contracts is often imperfect. We model contract enforcement as a game with perfect information but probabilistic enforcement and explore the implications of weak enforcement on the design of licensing contracts, the conduct of firms, and market performance. An upstream firm develops a technology that it can license to downstream firms using a fixed fee and a per‐unit royalty. Strictly positive per‐unit royalties maximize the licensor's profit if competition among licensees limits joint profits. With imperfect enforcement, the licensor lowers variable royalties to avoid cheating. Although imperfect contract enforcement reduces the profits of the licensor, weak enforcement lowers prices, increases downstream innovation, and in some circumstances can increase total economic welfare.     

Oligopolies with (Somewhat) Environmentally Conscious Consumers: Market Equilibrium and Regulatory Intervention

We consider a horizontally differentiated duopoly where consumers care about the product's “greenness.” Firms can be asymmetric: they may differ in the product's intrinsic value and may also differ in their chosen level of greenness. We examine the choice of greenness and the implications of various policy interventions. We show that (i) the choices of product greenness are strategic substitutes, (ii) the high‐intrinsic quality firm produces the greener product, (iii) the low‐quality firm's greenness may increase with the cost of its provision or decrease with consumer willingness to pay for it, (iv) a minimum quality standard (MQS) leads the greener firm to lower its environmental quality and can even reduce average quality, (v) greenness is underprovided even if consumers fully internalize the externality, and (v) an MQS can reduce welfare if the greenness of the high‐quality firm exceeds the MQS, even when environmental quality is underprovided. The effects of policy interventions on profits differ qualitatively across polices and firms: A firm that lobbies for one type of intervention may lobby against another similar one, and a firm may lobby for an intervention while its competitor may lobby against it. A subsidy for the development costs of a green product can financially hurt both firms.     

Leveraging of Reputation through Umbrella Branding: The Implications for Market Structure

The Klein–Leffler model explains how fear of reputation loss can induce firms to produce high‐quality experience goods. This paper shows that reputation can be leveraged across products via umbrella branding, but only by a firm with a monopoly on at least one product. Such a firm may be able to capture a market by using umbrella branding to make high quality credible at a lower price than the incumbent competitive firms. If monopolists compete for this capture, consumers are left better off than if the market remained competitive, in some cases even though the price increases.     

The Strategic Significance of Negative Externalities

Negative externalities have competitive relevance in a market when they have selective impacts – as, for example, when a product in use imposes greater costs on consumers of rival products than on other people. Because managers have discretion over aspects of product design that affect external costs, the externality in such cases may be viewed as a strategic variable. This paper presents evidence of the existence of competitively relevant negative externalities. I introduce a metric for the externality's competitive effect, the external cost elasticity of demand, which I estimate econometrically using data from the motor vehicle industry. Managerial implications are considered. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consumer Feelings and Equilibrium Product Quality

This paper considers the possibility that a firm can invest not only in the true product quality, but also in activities such as merchandizing and store atmospherics that influence consumer perception of the product quality. Consumers make their purchase decisions based on the signal (perception) of quality they experience, where the signal is influenced by both the true product quality valued by the consumer and the affect of the consumer at the time of the signal formation. In this situation, a firm finds it optimal to invest in both product quality and in variables inducing affect, even though rational consumers, in equilibrium, correctly solve back for the true product quality. We uncover an asymmetry in the effects of the cost of producing quality and the cost of inducing affect. As a firm's cost of quality decreases, the firm will find it optimal to invest more both in the true quality and in the affect inducement, even if it does not have a lower cost of inducing affect. Conversely, if a firm finds it easier to induce affect, then the product quality decreases but affect-inducing activities increase.
Under competition, we find that the firm investing more in quality also invests more in affect creation. An implication of this is that in a competitive environment, consumers can rationally associate an up-lifting store atmosphere, affect inducing merchandizing, or mood-creating communication with high quality products even when the firm has no need to signal their private cost of quality information, and when there is no consumption externality of the affect. We also analyze the case in which firms might have different costs and consumers are uncertain about the costs incurred by a given firm. Here again we show that the perceived quality production is positively correlated with both the true quality and the affect inducing activities.     

Welfare improving licensing with endogenous choice of prices versus quantities

This paper investigates the endogenous choice of prices versus quantities by taking into account patent licensing where the patent holder, which is itself a producer within the industry, licenses its cost-reducing innovation to the rival firm through a two-part tariff contract. For substitute products we find that both Cournot and mixed price-quantity competition may constitute the equilibrium outcomes, depending on the innovation size. Contrary to the results in Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002), we show that the optimal licensing contract definitely leads to an increase in social welfare. Our result reinforces the positive welfare effect of patent licensing.     

Group Buying Commitment and Sellers’ Competitive Advantages

This paper examines a model of duopoly firms selling to an exogenously formed buyer group consisting of members with heterogeneous preferences. Two research questions are addressed: (1) when is it optimal for a buyer group to commit to exclusive purchase from a single seller, and (2) how does the presence of group buying and the exclusive purchase commitment associated with it affect firms’ incentives to invest in quality improvement? We find that, even though exclusive purchase commitment benefits buyers when the competing products provide similar quality, it may lower buyer surplus if one product is significantly advantaged and/or the competing products are not highly differentiated horizontally. This result is robust even if the buyer group is formed endogenously. In addition, contingent on the similarity between the competing sellers’ investment costs, the sellers’ incentives to improve quality may be positively or negatively affected by the presence of group buying.     

Rent Division, Restructuring, and Managerial Risk Taking: A Strategic Bargaining Model

This paper demonstrates that, when the manager of a poorly performing firm generates firm-specific rents, strategic considerations associated with anticipated future restructuring may lead to the adoption of risky operating policies. Furthermore, this bias toward risky policies may be exacerbated by increases in managerial entrenchment. This is the case even when the manager does not have an ownership stake in the firm. On the other hand, a manager of a firm that is performing well will prefer safer policies. These results are driven by endogenously determined management-borne costs of financial distress, and obtain under both restructuring regimes that enforce the priority of creditor claims as well as restructuring regimes that induce deviations from absolute priority.     

Can strategic flexibility help firms profit from product innovation?

Although it is generally acknowledged that product innovation is critical for firms to sustain their competitive advantages, innovating firms sometimes fail to obtain economic returns from product innovation. This study focuses on the moderating effect of strategic flexibility (composed of resource flexibility and coordination flexibility) on the relationship between product innovation and firm performance, in order to address an important but previously unexplored question: Can strategic flexibility help firms profit from product innovation? Our empirical test, utilizing a sample of 607 Chinese firms, reveals that the moderating effect of resource flexibility on the positive relationship between product innovation and firm performance is negative, while that of coordination flexibility is positive. Further, such moderating effects are especially likely to be profound for firms confronting a high level of competitive intensity. We conclude by discussing our contributions, the implications, and possible future extensions.     

What induces firms to license foreign technologies? International survey evidence

The paper provides insights into drivers of foreign technology licensing from the licensee's perspective, using data across 114 nations. Technology licensing enables licensees to access proven technologies without development delays, although licensors might deny licenses for strategic reasons. Results show that firms with own R&D are more likely to license foreign technologies, as are larger firms and firms in the nations' main business cities. However, the macroeconomic and institutional environment matters as well: domestic interest rates, informal sector competition, and the literacy of a country's labor force all impact foreign technology licensing. Some implications for technology policy are discussed.     

Competing Platforms

Why do competing platforms or networks exist? This paper focuses on instances where the value of a platform depends on the adoption decisions of a small number of firms, and analyzes the strategic competition among platforms to get this oligopolistic side on‐board. I study a bilateral contracting game among platforms and firms that allows for general externalities across both contracting and noncontracting partners, and examine when a market will sustain a single or multiple platforms. When firms can join only one platform, I provide conditions under which market‐tipping and/or market‐splitting equilibria may exist. In particular, even without coordination failure, congestion effects, or firm multihoming, multiple platforms can co‐exist in equilibrium despite being inefficient from the perspective of the contracting parties. Expanding the contracting space to include contingent contracts may exacerbate this inefficiency.     

An analysis of firm-level innovation strategies in the US biotechnology industry

This study examines factors that may affect innovation strategies and performance of firms in the biotechnology industry. Specifically, differences between factors common to firms with high R&D intensity and those to firms with low R&D intensity are investigated. Biotechnology firms with relatively higher levels of R&D intensity attribute their innovation performance to research-based innovation factors and strategies such as strengthening their own research capabilities, entering into research collaborations with universities, industry leaders and other biotech firms, and licensing their technology. These strategies can be summarized as alignment within the industry. Firms with relatively lower R&D intensity have a hybrid focus—they invest in R&D but may also have products on the market. These firms attribute their innovation performance more so to production-based innovation factors and strategies such as gaining market access and maintaining connections with customers. Their strategy focuses on competitiveness, marketing, and distribution channels, while not ignoring the importance of a strong research base and the need to advance technologically. In a sense, strategies employed to achieve successful innovation reflect the stage of innovation in which a firm is operating for a particular product or process.     

Green management,firm innovations,and environmental turbulence

The multifaceted nature of firm innovation has prevented researchers from fully explaining the relationship between firm innovation and green management. This study, building on the Schumpeterian theory of innovation, explores this relationship by examining three major types of firm innovation—strategic innovation, managerial innovation, and product innovation—and their respective relationships with green management, considering several dimensions of environmental turbulence as distinctive boundary conditions. We propose that both strategic innovation and managerial innovation facilitate green management, which in turn mediates these effects on new product performance. The results of a survey of 303 Chinese firms provide strong support for this mediating logic. Moreover, we find that market turbulence weakens the effect of strategic innovation on green management whereas technological turbulence strengthens such effect but the effect of managerial innovation on green management is not influenced by environmental turbulence. Our research contributes to the innovation as well as green management and sustainability literatures by offering a framework in which to analyze firm innovation and green management and by showing how firms pursue sustainability and prosperity under specific environmental conditions.     

Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction

This paper analyzes the relationship between incumbency and R&D incentives in the context of a model of technological competition in which technologically successful entrants are able to license their innovation to (or be acquired by) an incumbent. That such a sale should take place is natural, since postinnovation monopoly profits are greater than the sum of duopoly profits. We identify three key findings about how innovative activity is shaped by licensing. First, since an incumbent's threat to engage in imitative R&D during negotiations increases its bargaining power, there is a purely strategic incentive for incumbents to develop an R&D capability. Second, incumbents research more intensively than entrants as long as (and only if) their willingness to pay for the innovation exceeds that of the entrant, a condition that depends critically on the expected licensing fee. Third, when the expected licensing fee is sufficiently low, the incumbent considers entrant R&D a strategic substitute for in-house research. This prediction about the market for ideas stands in contrast to predictions of strategic complementarity in patent races where licensing is not allowed.     

Strategic Delegation with Multiproduct Firms

This paper shows that a multiproduct firm may find it optimal not to delegate the sales of all products and therefore to employ different distribution channels for different products. It faces the following trade-off: There is a strategic effect associated with delegation, but if both products' sales are delegated, intrafirm competition is not internalized. By delegating the sales of just one of the products while selling the other product directly—partial delegation—the multiproduct manufacturer strikes just the right compromise: The externalities between its owns products are internalized partially while a strategic advantage is achieved against its rival single-product manufacturer. Partial delegation also holds if both products are sold by a common retailer; it dominates full delegation when both manufacturers are multiproduct firms .     

Consumer Standards as a Strategic Device to Mitigate Ratchet Effects in Dynamic Regulation

Strategic delegation to an independent regulator with a pure consumer standard improves dynamic regulation by mitigating ratchet effects associated with short‐term contracting. A pure consumer standard alleviates the regulator's myopic temptation to raise output after learning the firm is inefficient. Anticipating this tougher regulatory behavior, efficient firms find it less attractive to exaggerate costs. This reduces the need for long‐term rents and mitigates ratchet effects. A welfare standard biased toward consumers entails, however, allocative costs arising from partial separation of the firms' cost types. A trade‐off results, which favors strategic delegation when efficient firms are relatively likely.     

The Low‐Quality Advantage in Vertical Product Differentiation

By assuming a triangular distribution of consumers' willingness to pay for quality, this paper makes use of the stylized fact that low‐income households are more numerous than high‐income households, and thus, income distributions are right‐skewed. Accordingly, we present a straightforward two‐firm, two‐stage vertical product differentiation model with quality‐dependent marginal production costs, where the firm offering the low‐quality product has the larger market share and profit than the top‐quality competitor. This can be termed low‐quality advantage and may explain the success of large retailers serving the masses by offering low‐quality products. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.