Long‐Run Stockholder Consumption Risk and Asset Returns

We provide new evidence on the success of long‐run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting microlevel household consumption data, we show that long‐run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross‐sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or nonstockholder consumption risk, and implies more plausible risk aversion estimates. We find that risk aversion around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross‐section of stocks.     

Preferred Stock Returns, CreditWatch, and Preferred Stock Rating Changes

This paper examines the announcement effects of CreditWatch placement and reratings upon a sample of preferred stock issues that were placed on CreditWatch and later rerated or affirmed by Standard & Poor's. Results indicate that CreditWatch provides information to market participants and may have reduced the surprise associated with subsequent reratings. CreditWatch placement may be an erroneous signal, however, since nearly 50 percent of the issues placed for negative reasons were not downgraded, but affirmed, upon removal from Credit Watch.     

Common Stock Returns and Rating Changes: A Methodological Comparison

This paper examines the adjustments in a firm's common stock price during the eleven months before and during the month of announcement of a bond rating change. Based on several different measures of abnormal security return, the findings are consistent with the proposition that bond downgradings convey information to common stockholders. For bond upgradings, the price adjustments were statistically insignificant in the month of announcement, although in the eleven preceding months, upgraded firms exhibited positive abnormal returns. While the results do not fully support earlier research, we stress that the main contribution of this article lies in the scrutiny it gives to issues of methodology in assessing the possible price effects of bond reclassifications.     

Underwriter Quality and Long‐Run IPO Performance

We analyze the relationship between the quality of underwriters and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in light of underwriter marketing, certification and screening, and information production. We find that higher underwriter quality (measured by the number of managing underwriters, underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment) predicts better long‐run performance, even when returns are value weighted. We compare underwriter quality measures and find that the effects of the number of managing underwriters and underwriter reputation are mutually complementary and are especially strong among IPOs with high uncertainty, while absolute price adjustment, which is more likely to be associated with information production than marketing or certification/screening, loses significance. Our findings are consistent with the marketing and certification and screening roles of investment banks but lend little support for the information production role of underwriters.     

Understanding the Distributional Impact of Long‐Run Inflation

The impact of fully anticipated inflation is systematically studied in heterogeneous agent economies with an endogenous labor supply and portfolio choices. In stationary equilibrium, inflation nonlinearly alters the endogenous distributions of income, wealth, and consumption. Small departures from zero inflation have the strongest impact. Three features determine how inflation impacts distributions and welfare: financial structure, shock persistence, and labor supply elasticity. When agents can self‐insure only with money, inflation reduces wealth inequality but may raise consumption inequality. Otherwise, inflation reduces consumption inequality but may raise wealth inequality. Given persistent shocks and an inelastic labor supply, inflation may raise average welfare. The results hold when the model is extended to account for capital formation.     

Institutional Trade Persistence and Long‐Term Equity Returns

Recent studies show that single‐quarter institutional herding positively predicts short‐term returns. Motivated by the theoretical herding literature, which emphasizes endogenous persistence in decisions over time, we estimate the effect of multiquarter institutional buying and selling on stock returns. Using both regression and portfolio tests, we find that persistent institutional trading negatively predicts long‐term returns: persistently sold stocks outperform persistently bought stocks at long horizons. The negative association between returns and institutional trade persistence is not subsumed by past returns or other stock characteristics, is concentrated among smaller stocks, and is stronger for stocks with higher institutional ownership.     

Market Risk,Interest Rate Risk,and Interdependencies in Insurer Stock Returns: A System‐GARCH Model

We examine market risk, interest rate risk, and interdependencies in returns and return volatilities across three insurer segments within a System‐GARCH framework. Three main results are obtained: market risk is greatest for accident and health (A&H) insurers, followed by life (Life) and property and casualty (P&C) insurers; interest rate sensitivity is negative and greatest for Life insurers; and interdependencies in returns are significant with the magnitude being strongest between P&C and A&H insurers. The implication is that greatest diversification benefits arise between Life and the other segments of the insurance industry. Market risk and interest rate risk for diversified firms are smaller than those for nondiversified firms for both product and geographic diversification.     

The Case for Maximizing Long‐Run Shareholder Value

Criticism of the shareholder model of corporate governance stems in part from misunderstanding about what shareholder wealth maximization means for the other stakeholders of public companies. The corporate goal of shareholder wealth maximization does not imply that such stakeholders “do not matter.” Managers maximize shareholder value by maximizing the total expected cash flows available to distribute to all of their stakeholders. To maximize such cash flows, managers must provide their customers with desirable goods and services at attractive prices—which in turn requires that managers attract the employees, suppliers, and financial capital needed to conduct their businesses by providing each of these groups with market‐determined returns on their contributions to firm value. In this way, successful corporations benefit all of their stakeholders, and what is good for the corporation is generally good for society. External forces such as the media and government exert considerable influence on corporate actions and, in so doing, they play a role in helping to limit negative corporate “externalities” such as pollution and climate change. But direct regulation of productive activities should be used sparingly, and subjected to ongoing cost‐benefit analysis. Government regulation replaces the collective decisions of a broad marketplace of stakeholders using their own resources to act in their own interests with decisions made by government officials with complicated incentives and using resources generated by others. More generally, government should seek to regulate corporate actions only in the limited situations in which there are no market solutions for reducing the effects of externalities. For example, government plays a critically important role in identifying and deterring corporate fraud, and in ensuring competition and a level playing field for companies and all their stakeholders.     

Effects of Analysts’ Ratings on Insurer Stock Returns: Evidence of Asymmetric Responses

We examine the information value contained in insurer rating changes. Using a contemporary event study approach, we document an asymmetric reaction of stock prices to rating changes: downgrades cut share prices by approximately 7 percent but upgrades have little significant effect. This result varies across agencies as share prices react more strongly to A.M. Best and Standard & Poor's downgrades than to Moody's. We observe a similar asymmetric reaction to rating changes subject to a common rating benchmark. Finally, we find that prices fall most dramatically when a rating downgrade from one rating agency follows a downgrade from another agency.     

The Leveraging of Corporate America: A Long‐Run Perspective on Changes in Capital Structure

In a study published recently in the Journal of Financial Economics, the authors of this article documented a substantial increase in the use of debt financing by U.S. companies over the past century. From 1920 until the mid‐1940s, the aggregate leverage of unregulated U.S. companies was low and stable, with the average debt‐to‐capital ratio staying within the narrow range of 10% to 15%. But during the next 25 years, the use of debt by U.S. companies more than doubled, rising to 35% of total capital. And since 1970, aggregate leverage has remained above 35%, peaking at 47% in 1992. Moreover, this pattern has been observed in companies of all sizes and operating in all unregulated sectors. Changes in the characteristics of U.S. public companies during this period provide little help in explaining the increase in corporate leverage. For example, the displacement of tangible by intangible assets in many sectors of the U.S. economy during the past 50 years would have led most economists to predict, holding all other things equal, a reduction rather than an increase in aggregate corporate leverage. Instead, according to the authors' findings, the main contributors to the increases in U.S. corporate leverage since the 1940s have been external changes, including increases in corporate income tax rates, the development of financial markets and intermediaries, and the reduction in government borrowing in the decades following World War II. The authors' analysis also identifies these last two changes—the development of financial markets, including the rise of institutional investors and shareholder activism, and the post‐War reduction in government debt—as having played the biggest roles in the leveraging of corporate America.     

What Drives Firm‐Level Stock Returns?

I use a vector autoregressive model (VAR) to decompose an individual firm's stock return into two components: changes in cash-flow expectations (i.e., cash-flow news) and changes in discount rates (i.e., expected-return news). The VAR yields three main results. First, firm-level stock returns are mainly driven by cash-flow news. For a typical stock, the variance of cash-flow news is more than twice that of expected-return news. Second, shocks to expected returns and cash flows are positively correlated for a typical small stock. Third, expected-return-news series are highly correlated across firms, while cash-flow news can largely be diversified away in aggregate portfolios.     

Private Equity and Long‐Run Investment: The Case of Innovation

A long‐standing controversy is whether leveraged buyouts (LBOs) relieve managers from short‐term pressures from public shareholders, or whether LBO funds themselves sacrifice long‐term growth to boost short‐term performance. We examine one form of long‐run activity, namely, investments in innovation as measured by patenting activity. Based on 472 LBO transactions, we find no evidence that LBOs sacrifice long‐term investments. LBO firm patents are more cited (a proxy for economic importance), show no shifts in the fundamental nature of the research, and become more concentrated in important areas of companies' innovative portfolios.     

Intraday Patterns in the Cross‐section of Stock Returns

Motivated by the literature on investment flows and optimal trading, we examine intraday predictability in the cross‐section of stock returns. We find a striking pattern of return continuation at half‐hour intervals that are exact multiples of a trading day, and this effect lasts for at least 40 trading days. Volume, order imbalance, volatility, and bid‐ask spreads exhibit similar patterns, but do not explain the return patterns. We also show that short‐term return reversal is driven by temporary liquidity imbalances lasting less than an hour and bid‐ask bounce. Timing trades can reduce execution costs by the equivalent of the effective spread.     

Long‐Run Inflation and the Distorting Effects of Sticky Wages and Technical Change

We show that the Calvo price‐setting model is not necessarily inconsistent with evidence of a weak relation between positive trend inflation and price dispersion. We identify the interaction between sticky wages and technical change as factors disrupting the allocative role of the wage system under positive trend inflation. In turn, this interaction generates inefficient wage dispersion, as opposed to price dispersion, which fuels inflation costs. We conclude that it is too early to dismiss the New Keynesian model as a useful vehicle to assess the costs of inflation.     

Higher Order Effects in Asset Pricing Models with Long‐Run Risks

This paper shows that the latest generation of asset pricing models with long‐run risk exhibit economically significant nonlinearities, and thus the ubiquitous Campbell‐Shiller log‐linearization can generate large numerical errors. These errors translate in turn to considerable errors in the model predictions, for example, for the magnitude of the equity premium or return predictability. We demonstrate that these nonlinearities arise from the presence of multiple highly persistent processes, which cause the exogenous states to attain values far away from their long‐run means with nonnegligible probability. These extreme values have a significant impact on asset price dynamics.     

Long‐Run Consumption Risk and Asset Allocation under Recursive Utility and Rational Inattention

We study the portfolio decision of a household with limited information‐processing capacity (rational inattention [RI]) in a setting with recursive utility. We find that RI combined with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty could lead to a significant drop in the share of portfolios held in risky assets, even when the departure from the standard expected utility setting with full‐information rational expectations is small. In addition, we show that the equilibrium equity premium increases with the degree of inattention because inattentive investors with recursive utility face greater long‐run risk and thus require higher compensation in equilibrium.     

Value versus Growth: Time‐Varying Expected Stock Returns

Is the value premium predictable? We study time variations of the expected value premium using a two‐state Markov switching model. We find that when conditional volatilities are high, the expected excess returns of value stocks are more sensitive to aggregate economic conditions than the expected excess returns of growth stocks. As a result, the expected value premium is time varying. It spikes upward in the high volatility state, only to decline more gradually in the subsequent periods. However, out‐of‐sample predictability of the value premium is close to nonexistent.     

Industry‐Specific Human Capital,Idiosyncratic Risk,and the Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns

Human capital is one of the largest assets in the economy and in theory may play an important role for asset pricing. Human capital is heterogeneous across investors. One source of heterogeneity is industry affiliation. I show that the cross‐section of expected stock returns is primarily affected by industry‐level rather than aggregate labor income risk. Furthermore, when human capital is excluded from the asset pricing model, the resulting idiosyncratic risk may appear to be priced. I find that the premium for idiosyncratic risk documented by several empirical studies depends on the covariance between stock and human capital returns.     

Are Expected Inflation Rates and Expected Real Rates Negatively Correlated? A Long‐Run Test of the Mundell‐Tobin Hypothesis

Some empirical evidence suggests that the expected real interest and expected inflation rates are negatively correlated. This hypothesis of negative correlation is sometimes known as the Mundell‐Tobin hypothesis. In this article we reinvestigate this negative relation from a long‐term point of view using cointegration analysis. The data on the historical interest rate on T‐bills and the inflation rate indicate that the Mundell‐Tobin hypothesis does not hold in the long run for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. We also obtain similar results using the real interest rate on index‐linked gilt traded in the United Kingdom.     

Bank Panics,Government Guarantees,and the Long‐Run Size of the Financial Sector: Evidence from Free‐Banking America

Governments attempt to increase the confidence of financial market participants by making implicit or explicit guarantees of uncertain credibility. Confidence in these guarantees presumably alters the size of the financial sector, but observing the long‐run consequences of failed guarantees is difficult. We look to America's free‐banking era and compare the consequences of a broken guarantee during the Indiana‐centered Panic of 1854 to the Panic of 1857 in which guarantees were honored. Our estimates of a model of endogenous market structure indicate substantial negative long‐run consequences to financial depth when panics cast doubt upon a government's ability to honor its guarantees.