EXTERNAL ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND OPTIMAL PLANT LOCATION: CORRECTION

This note shows that there is no interior solution in Mai and Hwang's oligopolistic location model with free entry when the sum of external economies scale and the degree of returns‐to‐scale is one or less than one. Furthermore, the shape of the demand function plays a key role in the determination of the oligopolistic firm's plant location.     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.     

Bidding for Labor

We present a competing-auction theory of the labor market, where job candidates auction their labor services to employers. An equilibrium matching function emerges which has many of the features commonly assumed, including constant returns to scale in large economies. The auction mechanism also generates equilibrium wage dispersion among homogeneous workers and constrained-efficient entry of vacancies in large economies. In a dynamic version of the model, we generate implied numerical values for equilibrium unemployment and wage dispersion. The theory makes the novel prediction that wage dispersion is a decreasing function of the discount factor and labor market tightness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E24, J31, J41, J64, D44.     

Indeterminacy Arising in Multi-sector Economies

We characterize a large class of constant-returns-to-scale economies with standard Cobb–Douglas production technologies, which, when perturbed to incorporate external effects, exhibit indeterminacy or multiple equilibria. The perturbations are constrained to maintain overall constant returns to scale. We characterize the magnitude of the external effects that yield multiple equilibria in terms of the parameters of the unperturbed economy. We show that it is very easy to construct large and plausible classes of economies that exhibit indeterminacy with constant returns to scale, and with external effects that are arbitrarily small.
JEL Classification Numbers: E00, E3, O40.     

Scale,scope, and regulation in the Texas gas transmission industry

This article describes and analyzes the Texas Railroad Commission's regulatory policies for the intrastate gas transmission industry, paying special attention to the impact of direct utility competition on scale and scope economies. Our econometric results suggest that most firms operate at substantial decreasing returns to scale, and the largest firms suffer the biggest diseconomies of scale. There are economies of scope between types of gas sales, but diseconomies of scope when a pipeline combines transportation with multiple categories of gas sales. These results suggest that the Texas Railroad Commission's liberal policies on entry and private contracting have not resulted in inefficient entry.     

The Inefficiency of Private Adaptation to Pollution in the Presence of Endogenous Market Structure

The paper considers an industry where production costs rise due to pollution, but where this effect can be partially off-set by investing in adaptation as a private good. The focus is not on external effects, but industries where economies of scale are introduced from adapting to pollution. The structure of the resulting oligopolistic market is endogenous, since the level of adaptation is chosen by the firms. The analysis of externalities usually disregards defensive or adaptation measures, with a few exceptions that point to considerable complications. The present debate on adaptation to climate change shows the importance of understanding defensive measures. I show that the market failure caused by economies of scale leads to production costs above the social optimum, i.e. to under-adapation. When pollution increases, adaptation only increases if demand is price inelastic. Otherwise, welfare loss from market failure decreases with pollution. The total welfare loss is only convex if demand is price inelastic and the influence of pollution on production costs is stronger than the influence of adaptation. Concave welfare loss has crucial implications for abatement policies.     

The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market increases welfare. If the input market is not very concentrated, entry in the final goods market may reduce welfare if the entrant is moderately cost inefficient. Hence, entry in the final goods market is more desirable if (1) the input market is very concentrated or (2) the cost difference between the incumbents and the entrant is either very small or very large. It follows from our analysis that entry increases the profits of the incumbent final goods producers if their marginal costs are sufficiently lower than the entrant’s marginal cost.     

Measuring productivity in an imperfect world

Most measures of multifactor productivity (MFP) assume constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Using a general aggregate production function together with duality theory and allowing for the possibilities of disequilibrium, markups and economies of scale, the study derives a more generalized MFP measure. The model was used to assess the economic performance in US manufacturing for the 1949 to 1988 period. The results suggest that scale and markups have substantial power in explaining MFP growth for all periods and that half of the measured MFP growth (as measured within the conventional framework) comes from biases due to scale economies, market power, and interaction effects.     

Competition,economies of scale,and diversity of firm sizes

This paper presents an empirical example in which small firms are able to compete by specializing, without monopolistic conduct, despite economies of scale. The viability of small commercial banks in Illinois is established both by casual observation and by a finding of constant returns to scale, not correcting for specialization. A second specification of the cost function, correcting for specialization, exhibits economies of scale, suggesting that specialization is the means by which small banks survive. Monopoly conduct is ruled out by a Rosse–Panzar test, rejecting the alternative hypothesis that monopoly power has allowed inefficient banks to survive.     

Trade Policies for Exporting Industries under Free Entry

This paper computes optimal export taxes and domestic production subsidies for exporting industries under free entry. We show that domestic welfare is not at maximum, as is typically believed, when the export price is a monopoly price, and the domestic price is a competitive price, because a market structure effect has to be taken into account. Furthermore, we show that the optimal tax/subsidy formulas for an oligopoly coincide with those under perfect competition, if foreign and domestic demand functions are both linear. We also discuss optimal trade policies when only one instrument is available, and we run numerical simulations to determine and compare optimal trade taxes under endogenous and exogenous market structures.     

Optimal Fiscal Policies,Congestion and Over‐entry*

By shedding light on market imperfections and the congestion of public goods, we show that free entry in a market equilibrium will lead to excessive entry relative to the social optimum. Moreover, by specifying a generalized congestion function, it is also shown that different fiscal policies, including labor income tax, capital income tax and government expenditure, play a distinct role in terms of remedying market distortions. Specifically, optimal income taxes decrease with the degree of market imperfections in order to remove the monopoly inefficiency, while they increase with the degree of congestion in order to remedy the adverse externality caused by congestion distortion. Since a higher degree of increasing returns to an expansion in the variety of intermediate goods is found to intensify the congestion effect of government infrastructure expenditure, the optimal rule of government expenditure proposed by Barro (1990) should be modified.     

The motor vehicle industry in an emerging nation: the case of Brazil

As in other emerging nations, in Brazil, the motor vehicle industry is considered to be strategically important for economic development because of its backward and forward linkages and possibilities for export-led growth. This study analyses prospects for the industry by estimating an industry-level cost function that includes output of both vehicles and component parts with capital, labour and intermediate goods as inputs. The cost elasticity of output (an indicator of scale properties) and the elasticity relationships among inputs are explored. One unexpected outcome of the work that appears to be robust is that during early years of the study period, the industry had constant returns or even diseconomies of scale. However, during later years, when output was greater, there were economies of scale. This finding is likely the result of some combination of the entry of new firms, the development of new models or technological change. The study concludes that if firm output can be increased, economies of scale can be expected to strengthen the position of the Brazilian industry in the international marketplace.     

STABILITY OF THE COURNOT SOLUTION AND FREE ENTRY: A NOTE*

Taking a traditional approach, I show that by using the discrete adjustment system, the Cournot solution in a free entry oligopoly with increasing returns to scale is stable only when the number of firms is very small. We must pay attention to stability when using the free entry Cournot oligopoly model.     

Free and second-best entry in oligopolies with network effects

We compare the number of firms in equilibrium in a Cournot industry with positive network effects and complete compatibility, under free and second-best entry. Under free entry, the firms decide whether to enter the market or not; in the second-best problem, the number of firms is established by the regulator to maximize social welfare (the regulator controls entry but not production). We show that when individual equilibrium output decreases with entry (business-stealing competition), free entry may lead to more or less firms than the second-best problem. This contrasts with the standard (nonnetwork) Cournot oligopoly model, wherein with business-stealing competition, free entry leads to an excessive number of firms compared with the second-best solution.     

Walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria. Part II: Pure strategies

We examine the connection between Walrasian equilibria of a limit economy (with infinitesimal firms) and noncooperative (Cournot) equilibria of approximating finite economies (with significant firms). Nonconvex production sets, decreasing returns in the aggregate, and endogenous determination of the number of active firms are allowed. A Walrasian equilibrium is a limit of pure strategy noncooperative equilibria only if a condition (loosely analogous to downward sloping demand in the partial equilibrium constant returns to scale case) holds. The condition is also sufficient to guarantee the existence of a robust sequence of pure strategy noncooperative equilibria which converges to the Walrasian equilibrium.     

Aumann-Shapley prices as a scarf social equilibrium

Considered are economies with a single output (a single consumption good) which is produced from l inputs by means of an increasing returns to scale production function f. We show that for quasi-concave and homogeneous functions f of degree r ? 1, the Aumann-Shapley prices constitute a simple Scarf Social Equilibrium. Put differently, Shapley value of the associated atomless game is in the core of that game. Such is not the situation, however, in the more general case when f exhibits increasing returns to scale (but in homogeneous).     

Mark-ups, economies of scale and the role of knowledge spillovers in OECD industries

Using R&D-based models of economic growth as a foundation, this paper argues that market-driven knowledge creation is necessarily linked as an engine of productivity growth to economies of scale and market-power. A cost function and factor demand model is applied to a cross-country industry data set to study market-power, economies of scale and the role of knowledge in an integrated approach. Empirical results reveal the presence of market-power and economies of scale in all of the industries investigated. R&D and spillovers explain some of the productivity growth observed. Spillovers are identified as an external source of economies of scale.     

Is big better? On scale and scope economies in the Portuguese water sector

The ‘big is better’ idea has recently been challenged in network industries. Scale economies are considered finite so that for the individual utility an optimal scale of operations arises. A similar observation yields for scope economies as joint production is not predicted univocally anymore. In the water sector, scale economies and joint production are preferred. Nevertheless, several countries are restructuring the sector in order to improve the scale and scope of operations. This article intends to provide some insights into this matter. We analyze the Portuguese water market structure using non-parametric techniques with data from the year 2005. After surveying the literature on scale and scope economies, we discuss the peculiarities of the Portuguese water sector. The paper confirms the natural monopoly features. Although scope economies are absent, it highlights scale economies. The optimal scale of the utilities is located between 160,000 and 180,000 inhabitants. As such, the Portuguese water sector optimally counts 60 water utilities.     

Production and costs in the South African motor vehicle industry

This study investigates the existence of economies of scale in the South African motor vehicle industry as well as the substitution possibilities between input pairs and the direct and cross-price elasticities of demand for the various inputs. Because of data limitations, a translog cost function was estimated for only a three input model corresponding to a homogeneous production function involving capital, labour and intermediate goods. The issue of the existence of economies of scale in the South African motor vehicle industry is a particularly important one because South Africa once again is a member of GATT and a full participant in the international trade arena. The null hypothesis of constant returns to scale was rejected at the 0.5% level of significance. Thus, the results of this model are certainly consistent with economies of scale in the South African motor vehicle industry. The estimated direct price elasticities were consistent with the hypothesis that, during the past two decades, capital was the productive factor with the most elastic demand, and the estimated cross-elasticities between input pairs generally supported the hypothesis that all inputs are substitutes.     

Excess Entry in the Absence of Scale Economies

It is well-known that with free entry, more firms than is socially optimal typically enter provided there are economies of scale. This paper investigates the possibility of excess entry in the absence of scale economies We thank Simon Anderson, Tom Holmes, the late Arijit Mukherji, and Xavier Vives for helpful comments. We also thank the participants at the July 2001 Australasian Meetings of the Econometric Society in Auckland, June 2002 University of Melbourne-National University of Singapore Symposium and seminar participants at the University of Sydney and University of New South Wales for useful suggestions. We are especially thankful to an anonymous referee whose meticulous comments have helped us to improve the paper