Seller Over-Pricing and Listing Contract Length: The Effects of Endogenous Listing Contracts on Housing Markets

This paper examines how seller pricing decisions influence listing contract length and how these decisions affect price and liquidity in housing markets. Because list price affects broker effort required to sell the property, brokers respond to seller overpricing by increasing the negotiated listing contract length. At the same time, sellers respond to longer listing contracts by adjusting their list price strategy. Both list price and length of marketing time affect broker sales effort and therefore a property’s realized selling price and liquidity. Analysis of house transaction data from Virginia indicates that greater over-pricing by sellers prompts brokers to pursue longer listing contracts, which subsequently lengthen marketing time but increase selling price. The results reveal a novel transmission mechanism from higher list price (which induces longer contracts) to selling price and liquidity.     

The Trade-off Between the Selling Price of Residential Properties and Time-on-the-Market: The Impact of Price Setting

When a house is placed on the market, the seller must choose the initial offer price. Setting the price too high or too low affects the marketability of the property. While there is near universal agreement that the seller faces a trade-off between selling at a higher price and selling in less time, there is less agreement about how to measure this trade-off. This paper offers a framework for analysis and shows that an increase in the list price increases expected time-on-the-market (TOM). Because house buyers must solve a type of signal extraction problem, the effect of a higher list price is magnified for houses in a market segment having a low predicted variance of the list price. This paper also shows that the list price of houses which are withdrawn before sale has a higher mean and variance, and that the possibility of withdrawal censors information about the time-on-the-market.     

Selling price,financing premiums,and days on the market

Home buyers face the task of trading off selling price and the time required to sell a property. One factor that may affect this decision is the presence of financing premiums. The effects of financing premiums on the time a single-family home remains on the market is examined in this paper. The question is to what extent home sellers are willing to compromise on financing premiums and make concessions to buyers in order to sell their properties more quickly.The study uses a sample of single-family residential homes sold with assumption financing and new conventional financing. The sample covers segments of time when interest rates were relatively low and stable (1975–1976) and when rates were much higher on average and more volatile (1980).The results show that financing premiums were present in selling prices of assumption-financed home sales during the 1975–1976 period and that sellers were able to capture a premium and maintain the same average time on the market as properties with other types of financing. During a period of unfavorable market conditions, such as 1980, the results indicate that home sellers with assumption financing conceded or negotiated away any premium in order to significantly decrease the number of days their properties stayed on the market for sale.     

Agent Change and Seller Bargaining Power: A Case of Principal Agent Problem in the Housing Market

When a seller hires an agent to sell his/her property, a successful outcome depends on the list price, marketing time, unobserved relative bargaining power of the buyers and sellers, and the effort levels of the seller and the seller’s agent. A divergence with respect to the list/transaction prices and the expected effort levels between seller and agent will create a principal-agent interest conflict. This conflict in some cases results in an agent change before the house is sold. The change will reduce the relative bargaining power of the seller, affecting the observed marketing time and transaction price. This study estimates the effects of an agent change on marketing time and transaction price after controlling for degree of overpricing, list-price revisions, marketing time, and endogenous selection bias. Our results show that: (1) on average, an agent change increases the marketing time by about 3 months and adversely affects the transaction price by about 2.7 %. Furthermore, we found that an agent change before the expiration of the listing contract, compared to that of after the expiration, has a smaller effect on the marketing time (2.3 vs. 3.8 months) and has a smaller transaction price discount (2.1 % vs. 4.2 %).     

Efficiency and Incentives in Residential Brokerage

The literature on broker intermediation in residential real estate has shown positive pricing effects associated with the use of a broker and mixed results as far as the pricing effects of nonstandard commission structures. On the premise that real estate broker incentives emanate from two primary sources, factors that increase broker operating efficiency and negotiable features arising from the relationship between the listing broker and the seller, this study assesses the degree to which these incentives affect the marketing time, probability of sale, and selling price of single-family houses. Of particular interest, this study investigates efficiency and broker intermediation effects on residential property associated with a broker concentrating his listings into a service area. Empirical results show that properties within an individual broker??s GIS-determined service area are more likely to sell, sell faster, and sell with an associated price premium. These effects are more concentrated in the market for higher priced homes. Also, additional compensation favorably motivates the broker with higher-priced properties, but has no effect on the sale of lower-priced properties.     

Golf courses and residential house prices: An empirical examination

The importance of location is well known in the literature on real estate valuation. Our study extends this body of literature by being the first to examine empirically the effect on the selling price of single-family residential properties when they abut a golf course. We determine the incremental effect on the sales price of houses on the golf course by fitting a standard hedonic pricing model to a sample of 717 sales transactions drawn from a sub-urban area of a large city. We employ a matched-pair research design to hold constant the price effects of other location factors on these golf course properties. Our results indicate that a golf course location adds 7.6 percent to a property's sales price. We believe this finding is of interest to developers in their design of a golf course subdivision and to appraisers who wish to make location-specific value adjustments of golf course properties.     

Buyers' and sellers' agents in the housing market

We explain why buyers in the housing market use an agent employed by the seller. Such agents reduce buyers' search costs so that more buyers search a particular house. This increases the probability of the sale of the house and possibly also its selling price. However, since the selling price increases, if at all, by less than the fee paid by the seller to the agent, both buyers and sellers are better off. We identify two characteristics that give rise to sellers' agents and show that markets that do not have such agents are missing at least one of these characteristics.     

Do Buyer Incentives Work for Houses during a Real Estate Downturn?

The impact of incentives on marketing duration is examined for residential real estate using data from the Multiple Listing Service during a real estate downturn. The focus is on incentives offered directly by sellers to potential homebuyers. The evidence suggests that incentives are not capitalized into the selling price during the softened market conditions. Alternatively, incentives are found to have a significant reduction in marketing time, however this is found to be true only for closing costs and not for other incentive classifications. The benefit of reduced expected market time from offering incentives is quickly diminished when the seller initially overprices the listing by a large amount.     

List Price Information in the Negotiation of Commercial Real Estate Transactions: Is Silence Golden?

We examine the use (and non-use) of list price information in the process of marketing commercial real estate. While housing market research suggests that list prices can serve as a strong anchor and/or signal, list price information is included in less than one-third of the commercial property sales and is less likely to be included as part of the sellers’ offering information for larger and more complex properties. Given the potentially powerful effect of list prices (first offers) on outcomes, the non-use of list price information is a puzzle. We speculate that the limited use of list prices may be due to the sellers’ interests in both maintaining their informational advantage and not truncating higher than expected offers, especially during periods of economic growth or with more complex properties. Using a two-stage selection correction model, we find that office properties which provide list price information are, on average, associated with lower price outcomes (ceteris paribus) and that these outcomes vary by price cohort and economic condition. It is important to note, however, that while these findings identify a correlation, they do not necessarily imply causation. Our results support the notion that asymmetric information and information signaling play a dominant role in explaining the sellers’ strategic non-use of list price information in the commercial real estate market and that the signaling effect is more pronounced in higher priced properties and during periods of strong economic growth.     

Home Price,Time-on-Market,and Seller Heterogeneity Under Changing Market Conditions

This paper develops a formal model to examine the effect of changing market conditions and individuals’ selling constraints on selling price and time-on-market. Using the concept of Relative Liquidity Constraint (RLC)—a stochastic variable that captures the randomness of future individual constraints and market conditions—the study presents the first ex ante analysis that extends the investigation of the issue of seller heterogeneity to the point of the buying decision, that is, from the perspective of the buyer’s (future seller’s) point of view. We show that seller constraint, as well as the uncertainty of such a constraint, significantly depresses the expected selling price and increases risk. Our closed-form formulas provide a set of simple quantitative tools that enable buyers and sellers to adjust the “market average” to their ex ante “individual expectations”.     

Spatial Competition and Shopping Externalities: Evidence from the Housing Market

In search markets, greater spatial concentration of sellers increases price competition. At the same time, though, a greater concentration of sellers can create a shopping externality by attracting more buyers to the site. Using housing sales data, we test for spatial competition and shopping externality effects on prices and marketing time. We find that they reflect both competitive and shopping externality effects from surrounding houses, although the relative strength varies with how fresh the house is in the market, the freshness of surrounding houses, and the phase of the market cycle. New listings have the strongest shopping externality effect on neighboring houses that have been on the market for some time. Vacant houses have their strongest competition effects in the declining market and externality effects in the rising market. Fresh houses on the market reap little benefit from shopping externalities in all phases of the market cycle.     

Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands

Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy‐out price. In one‐shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy‐out price, if a similar product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first auction increases, but revenue in the second auction decreases, as does the sum of revenues. The buy‐out price causes the auction sequence to become inefficient, because the first item may be awarded to a bidder who should have received none.     

Minimum Service Requirements, Limited Brokers and Menuing of Services

In the past few years, many states have responded to the increasing number of limited service brokers by passing minimum service requirements. Limited service brokers can be viewed as those brokers who are offering their marketing and representative services A La Carte as opposed to the more traditional full-services brokers offering of a Table D??h?te (one size fits all) for their services. Supporters claim the legislation is necessary to protect consumers who are otherwise hurt by limited service brokers, but critics assert that this legislation is anti-competitive and not necessary. This study provides empirical evidence that sellers using limited service brokers experience a trade-off between a higher selling price and longer marketing spans with accompanying lower probabilities of finding a buyer during a given marketing period.     

Payoff uncertainty,bargaining power,and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations

This article investigates the sequencing choice of a buyer who negotiates with the sellers of two complementary objects with uncertain payoffs. The possibility of inefficient trade may generate strict sequencing preference. The buyer begins with the weaker seller if the sellers have diverse bargaining powers and with the stronger one if both sellers are strong bargainers. This sequencing is likely to increase the social surplus. Moreover, the buyer may find it optimal to raise her own acquisition cost by committing to a minimum purchase price or outsourcing. The first‐ and second‐mover advantages for the sellers are also identified.     

Housing prices and the optimal time-on-the-market decision

This paper provides a model for housing prices based on a seller solving the optimal time-on-the market problem. Given the seller’s optimal time-on-the market, analytical expressions are provided for both the expected time-on-the-market and the sales price. These expressions facilitate the computation of comparative statics. Consistent with economic intuition, we show that (i) both the expected time-on-the market and sales price decrease as interest rates increase, (ii) the expected time-on-the market increases and the expected sales price decreases as offer activity declines, and (iii) the expected time-on-the market and expected sales price both increase as the list price increases.     

Can Short Restrictions Actually Increase Informed Short Selling?

We use the 2008 short selling regulations to test whether short sale restrictions can increase informed short selling. For the preborrow requirement, we find more negative price reactions to short interest announcements though no reliable increase in the price impact of short sales volume. For the stocks with banned short sales, we find an increase in the price impact of short sale volume though no reliable change in the price reaction to short interest announcements. Both restrictions, however, are associated with increased informed trading. Our results suggest that short restrictions will not reduce informed short selling and may actually result in an increase by increasing the proportion of informed short sellers..     

卖空者与内幕交易——来自中国证券市场的证据

本文研究上市公司内部人减持、年报、诉讼、分析师评级、停复牌以及高送转等重大公告前后卖空交易行为的变化,系统考察卖空者是否参与内幕交易以及何种因素影响卖空者参与内幕交易,发现卖空率较高的股票具有较低的未来收益,表明卖空者拥有信息优势,属知情交易者;卖空者拥有非常精确的择时交易能力,在重大利空公告前显著增加卖空量,而在利好公告前则显著减少卖空头寸,表明卖空者作为知情交易者的信息优势源自内幕消息;公司内、外部投资者的信息不对称程度越低或公司所在地的法治水平越高,卖空者参与内幕交易的行为就越少。因此,监管机构应密切关注公司重大消息发布前后卖空量的异常变动,同时,完善信息披露规则、健全证券分析师制度并强化法律法规的执行力度,才能有效防范卖空者参与内幕交易。     

Integrating auction and search markets: The slow Dutch auction

The issue of choosing to sell property by auction or by traditional negotiated search markets is addressed in this article. A general selling institution called the slow Dutch auction is introduced. This general selling mechanism reduces to either a conventional auction, a posted offer, or some time dependent mix of these selling institutions depending on the pricing rule chosen by the seller. We model search by having potential buyers whose private valuation for the property is unknown to the seller arrive randomly over time. With this general framework the seller's problem is to choose a selling mechanism that maximizes expected wealth. Surprisingly, we find that the optimal selling institution is always a posted offer market. The seller chooses an optimal posted price and waits until a buyer arrives who is willing to pay this price. Auctions are never optimal.     

The Optimal Choice for Lenders Facing Defaults: Short Sale,Foreclose, or REO

When mortgage borrowers default and have no desire or ability to keep their property, then loss mitigation involves a sale of the property via one of the following options: (1) the lender allows pre-foreclosure “short sale” by the borrower, (2) the lender institutes the foreclosure process under a notice of default and the property is sold during the process by the borrower, and (3) the lender forecloses on the property, takes title, and sells the property in the market as real estate owned (REO). Sale of the property in the above three options is conducted by a motivated seller, either the owner or the lender, who desires to sell the property as quickly as possible. Thus, relative to a no-default sale, the house is most likely to be sold at a discounted price. It is generally expected that the discount would be lower in the case of a “short sale.” This option, however, may result in a longer marketing time, thus a higher total loss, than the other two options. We developed a model that allows simultaneous estimation of price and time-on-market effects of “short sales,” foreclosures, and REO options. We find that the short-sale option has the lowest-price discount, but significantly higher costs associated with marketing time. The pattern of price discount and marketing time reverses as we move to a sale while in the process of foreclosure and to a sale with an REO status.     

Information, Search, and House Prices: Revisited

Buyers pay different prices for nearly identical homes. One explanation for this is that housing markets are thin, resulting in price bargaining between sellers and buyers. If the relative bargaining power of buyers varies, so will sales prices. One hypothesis is that the relative bargaining strength of buyers coming from outside the local market relative to that of local residents is weak, because distant buyers have high search costs and may know less about the nuances of the local market. Our results, based upon a large number of single-family home transactions from the state of Florida, lend support to this hypothesis. Another related hypothesis is that buyers?? price expectations are anchored to prices they were accustomed to at their previous residence. Hence, if they come from high price markets they will tend to pay more for their new home. This hypothesis is also supported by our results.