TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

SENIORITY WAGES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH*

Economies that lack well‐developed markets for mobilizing household savings may, in some instances, grow faster than those that are financially more developed, provided that their labour markets are also characterized by seniority rather than spot wages. This occurs because of a Kaldorian redistribution effect in a model where households have finite‐horizons and where older workers, as an endogenous feature, have higher saving rates.     

WAGES,HOURS OF WORK AND JOB SATISFACTION OF RETIREMENT‐AGE WORKERS*

I analyse, theoretically and empirically, the effects of pension benefits, family conditions and the personal characteristics of older individuals on their labour supply, wages, hours worked and job satisfaction, in the framework of the Nash bargaining condition whereby an older worker and a firm bargain over employment conditions such as wages, hours of work and job investment. It is stressed that as workers become older they tend to give greater priority to the number of hours worked, work environment and type of job than to wages, and try to improve these through job investment, even at the cost of lower wages.     

OCCUPATIONAL AND INDUSTRY SPECIFICITY OF HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE BRITISH LABOUR MARKET

This paper builds on the recent literature on the importance of occupational and industry experience on wages and extends Kambourov and Manovskii's (2002) study using British data. Occupational experience is estimated to make a significant contribution to wage growth, while the evidence on industry specificity is not very supportive. The second contribution of the paper is that it assesses whether there is heterogeneity in the estimated returns to work experience across one-digit industries and occupations. The findings suggest that industry and occupational experience is important for individuals in professional and managerial jobs or jobs in the banking and finance sector.     

Dismissal conflicts and unemployment

We analyse the institutional sources of dismissal conflicts when workers’ effort is not perfectly observable. We build an efficiency wage model with firing costs to capture their effect on employment through wages. In this context, whenever there is a dismissal, a double moral hazard problem can arise. Resolution of this problem by a third party will be imperfect due to asymmetric information. In turn, disciplinary dismissals will not be costless and firing costs will have a negative effect on aggregate employment. The solution to this problem does not necessarily imply the elimination of firing costs.     

Tenure, business cycle and the wage-setting process

We analyze the interaction between job tenure and external labor market conditions in wage determination. First, we introduce a model that combines job matching with business-cycle effects. As the employment relationship progresses, the worker appropriates a portion of the value of the match-specific human capital she accumulates, gradually becoming shielded from the cyclical variations in external labor market conditions: the employment relationship is progressively “internalized”. Then, we present empirical evidence supporting this prediction: the elasticity of wages to the unemployment rate decreases with tenure. This finding is robust to different specifications that allow for job heterogeneity, and it contributes to the interpretation of recent evidence of changes in the effect of the business cycle on wages.     

Employment protection reform in search economies

The design of employment protection legislation (EPL) is of particular importance in the European debate on the contours of labor-market reform. In this article we appeal to an equilibrium unemployment model to investigate the virtues of EPL reform which reduces the red tape and legal costs associated with layoffs and introduces a U.S.-style experience-rating system, which we model as a combination of a layoff tax and a payroll subsidy. The reform considered shows that it is possible to improve the efficiency of employment protection policies without affecting the extent of worker protection on the labor market. These results are consistent with the conventional wisdom that experience rating is desirable, not only as an integral component of unemployment-compensation finance, as most studies acknowledge, but also as part and parcel of a virtuous EPL system.     

THE SPOT MARKET MATTERS: EVIDENCE ON IMPLICIT CONTRACTS FROM BRITAIN

Based on the methodology of Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) , this paper investigates the relative importance of the spot market and implicit contracts in the determination of British real wages. Empirical work is carried out separately for males and females with individual-level data taken from the New Earnings Survey Panel for the years 1976–2001. In contrast to previous studies that used North American data, the spot market is found to be more important than implicit contracts in determining real wages, although we do find some support for contracting effects. Further evidence is provided through the analysis of individual wage sequences. These suggest that the downwardly rigid wage sequences implied by implicit contracts with costless worker mobility are not prevalent in Britain.     

Are judges biased by labor market conditions?

When a firing litigation is taken to court, only the characteristics of the employee's misconduct should be relevant for the judge's decision. Using detailed data from an Italian bank and aggregate macro data, this paper shows that, instead, local labor market conditions influence the court's decision: The same misconduct episode may be considered sufficient for firing in a tight labor market but insufficient otherwise. We reach this conclusion after taking carefully into consideration the non-random selection of firing litigations for trial. Although these results refer to the specific situation considered, they raise more general issues. For macroeconomists they suggest that higher unemployment rates may increase firing costs via the effect on courts’ decision criteria; thus, the real extent of firing rigidities cannot be assessed without considering the role of courts. For labor law scholars, these findings are important because, following traditional principles, the law should be applied in the same way for all citizens and over the entire national territory.     

Competition, human capital and income inequality with limited commitment

We develop a dynamic model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up and non-competitive covenants, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. When contracts are not enforceable, high barriers lower the outside value of ‘skilled workers’ and reduce the incentive to accumulate human capital. In contrast, low barriers can result in over-accumulation of human capital. This can be socially optimal if there are positive spillovers. A calibration exercise shows that this mechanism can account for a sizable portion of cross-country income inequality.     

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems

The following properties of the core of a one-to-one matching problem are well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a distributive lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is the same for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (Von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problems. We show that a set V of matchings is a stable set of a one-to-one matching problem only if V is a maximal set satisfying the following properties: (a) the core is a subset of V; (b) V is a distributive lattice; and (c) the set of unmatched agents is the same for all matchings belonging to V. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b), and (c).     

Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle

According to the outside option principle the holdup problem can be solved when the non-investor has a binding outside option. The investor then becomes residual claimant, creating efficient investment incentives. This paper reports about an experiment designed to test this. We find that when the outside option is binding investment levels fall short of the efficient level, but holdup is less of a problem than predicted when the outside option is non-binding.     

Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model

In an equilibrium model of the labor market, workers and firms enter into dynamic contracts that can potentially last forever, but are subject to optimal terminations. Upon termination, the firm hires a new worker, and the worker who is terminated receives a termination contract from the firm and is then free to go back to the labor market to seek new employment opportunities and enter into new dynamic contracts. The model permits only two types of equilibrium terminations that resemble, respectively, the two kinds of labor market separations that are typically observed in practice: involuntary layoffs and voluntary retirements. The model allows for the simultaneous determination of a large set of important labor market variables including equilibrium unemployment and labor force participation. An algorithm is formulated for computing the model's equilibria. I then simulate the model to show quantitatively that the model is consistent with a set of important stylized facts of the labor market.