企业国际化经营中的财务战略

企业国际化经营中的财务战略董锋随着改革开放和国民经济的迅速发展，我国一批骨干型企业和企业集团已相继走出国门，经营业务逐步扩展利国际大市场之中，我国经济与世界经济接轨已是不可动摇的大趋势。在国内外市场上，我们已经也将必然会遇到国外企业的竞争与挑战。按照...     

银行财务管理系统的设计与管理

为适应国有银行向商业银行转轨,加强银行内部财务监督和控制,规范各项财务收支行为,推行全面成本管理,以中国工商银行<财务管理制度>和<基本会计制度>为依据,并针对中国工商银行上饶市分行财务管理的实际要求,我们设计开发了一套网络化的财务管理系统,运用于全行及所辖各县市支行、办事处及核算中心等分支机构进行财务管理.     

信托公司财务运营管理系统建设探索与实践

近年来,随着信托业"一法两规"的颁布实施,信托业进入高速发展时代,信托公司管理资产规模及产品数量不断增长,截止2015年末,行业信托资产规模跨入"16万亿元"大关。而传统基于手工处理的信托财务运营管理模式,因其存在核算内容不标准、费用计算口径不统一、押品管理不规范、合同等相关信息共享不及时等问题,难以适应不断细化、深化的管理要求,因此,迫切需要实现信托财务运营管理信息化。本文在这一背景下对信托财务运营管理系统建设进行研究探讨,提出通过信息系统建设将信托财务运营管理中的台账管理、账户管理、收付款与核销管理、押品管理、合同管理、报表统计、风险预警提示等工作整合到统一平台,实现数据集成、信息共享,提高信托产品运行期间财务运营管理效率,不断提升信托公司资产主动管理能力,提高行业整体管理水平。本文根据作者的工作实践,详细阐述了HX信托公司开发的信托财务运营管理系统建设的背景、遵循的原则、系统建设的策略、思路以及系统实际应用情况。最后,提示了信托财务运营系统的信息化建设需要注意的相关问题。     

大力推进财务信息集中管理系统建设

加强财务集中管理是企业管理工作的大势所趋,而财务信息的集中管理是财务集中管理的一项重要基础性工作.现在大多数中央企业都是综合性集团公司,企业规模较大、层次多、跨行业跨地区经营、产品或业务门类多,但由于缺乏必要的技术手段,财务信息集中程度低,信息不对称,监管力度和实效性不足,导致企业管理水平较低.更重要的是财务信息集中管理系统实施难度大,失败率高,这已引起了国家有关主管部门的高度关注.     

攻克财务电算化的难题——通用成本核算与管理系统

随着财务系统软件业的蓬勃发展,财务软件公司雨后春笋般地冒了出来。在这个繁荣的市场中,充满了机遇和挑战。财务软件系统中的一部分子系统突飞猛进地发展,成本系统就是其一。通过对几十家工业企业的调研,并对一些成本核算专版软件和基于ＤＯＳ版本通用成本核算软件的分析,结合实际开发的成功经验,总结出了一些在实际开发中需要考虑的问题和解决方案,供广大财务软件设计开发人员借鉴。一、基本概念在进行系统设计之前首先要对设计对象有一个明确的认识,下面是有关成本核算和管理的基本概念。○成本的涵义：成本是指工业企业的产品制…     

浅谈农村信用社财务管理系统的构建

随着农村金融机构改革的逐步深化，许多基层联社组建成为一级法人。法人治理结构的变化给联社对下级信用社的管理模式带来了深远影响，即从相对松散的联合转变为高度集中的管理。如何建立一套适合统一法人的财务管理系统已成为农村金融机构所面临的重要课题。从我国银行业会计发展的趋势来看，银行业会计发展的必然结果是集中式会计核算。     

谈财务理论研究方法

财务理论研究方法是指财务人员探讨财务工作规律和财务发展规律的手段、方式、程序和措施的总称。在财务学发展的历程中占据着重要的位置，开展财务研究方法的探讨和研究，将对财务理论产生直接的影响。但目前财务管理学界，对于财务管理研究方法的认识及其应用还存在着一些误区。首先，对财务理论研究方法的复杂性和多样性认识不足。     

基于BPR的高职院校财务流程化管理系统的设计与优化

针对高职院校财务管理存在的问题,设计基于BPR的财务流程化管理系统。通过开发和实施基于BPR的财务流程化管理系统,能够实时监控和自动化处理财务信息,提高财务管理效率和质量。通过优化和改进基于BPR的财务流程化管理系统,实现财务标准化和规范化管理,保证财务流程的合规性和可追溯性。通过深入研究和全面分析,解决高职院校财务管理存在的问题,并提出创新的管理模式和技术方案,为高职院校财务管理优化提供有力支持。     

银行财务管理系统的发展趋势

财务总账通常作为银行核心系统的一部分而存在。然而,国内外银行业长期以来主要靠各自的科技部门开发出的银行核心系统,其主要功能是满足客户服务和银行业务处理的需要,因此该系统中总账的财务核算功能普遍较弱。其他业务支持系统,如采购、人力资源等常常没有相应的系统,或系统与财务总账不集成。     

Concentrated Ownership, No Dividend Payout Requirement and Capital Structure of REITs: Evidence from Turkey

This paper studies empirically the capital structure of Turkish REITs as they offer unique and so far untested angles. They do not have to pay out dividends, yet enjoy the exemption from paying corporate taxes since their legal foundation in 1998. Several financial meltdowns occurred in the last three decades, keeping investors with a doubt about Turkey??s financial and political stability. The last meltdown in 2001 is part of the sample period. Findings show that Turkish REITs employ little long-term debt in their capital structure. The legal requirement that a leader entrepreneur be present with a minimum equity position of 25% introduces the agency problem between the majority and minority owners. The leader entrepreneurs, as non-taxable institutional investors, appear to dictate Turkish REITs?? dividend and debt policies and deplete REITs?? dividends, causing them to go to the long-term debt market. The financial meltdown of 2001 exerts negative short-term and positive long-term influence on the debt ratios while inflation??s effect is negative. Firm size, REITs?? engagement in development and stock market development influence debt ratios positively; tangibility and a few firm, ownership, and country-specific determinants appear to have either mixed or no influence on Turkish REITs?? debt policies.     

Morgan Stanley Roundtable on Capital Structure and Payout Policy

A group of finance academics and practitioners discusses a number of topical issues in corporate financial management: Is there such a thing as an optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure for a given company? What proportion of a firm's current earnings should be distributed to the firm's shareholders? And under what circumstances should such distributions take the form of stock repurchases rather than dividends? The consensus that emerged was that a company's financing and payout policies should be designed to support its business strategy. For growth companies, the emphasis is on preserving financial fl exibility to carry out the business plan, which means heavy reliance on equity financing and limited payouts. But for companies in mature industries with few major investment opportunities, more aggressive use of debt and higher payouts can add value by reducing taxes and controlling the corporate “free cash flow problem.” Both leveraged financing and cash distributions through dividends and stock buybacks represent a commitment by management to shareholders that the firm's excess cash will not be wasted on projects that produce growth at the expense of profitability. As for the choice between dividends and stock repurchases, dividends appear to provide a stronger commitment to pay out excess cash than open market repurchase programs. Stock buybacks, at least of the open market variety, preserve a higher degree of managerial fl exibility for companies that want to be able to capitalize on unpredictable investment opportunities. But, as with the debt‐equity decision, there is an optimal level of financial fl exibility; too little can mean lost investment opportunities but too much can lead to overinvestment.     

MORGAN STANLEY ROUNDTABLE ON Capital Structure and Payout Policy

A group of distinguished finance academics and practitioners discuss a number of topical issues in corporate financial management: Is there such a thing as an optimal, or value‐maximizing, capital structure for a given company? What proportion of a firm's current earnings should be distributed to the firm's shareholders? And under what circumstances should such distributions take the form of stock repurchases rather than dividends? The consensus that emerges is that a company's financing and payout policies should be designed to support its business strategy. For growth companies, the emphasis is on preserving financial flexibility to carry out the business plan, which means heavy reliance on equity financing and limited payouts. But for companies in mature industries with few major investment opportunities, more aggressive use of debt and higher payouts can add value both by reducing taxes and controlling the corporate free cash flow problem. In such cases, both leveraged financing and cash distributions through dividends and stock buybacks signal management's commitment to its shareholders that the firm's excess cash will not be wasted on projects that produce low‐return growth that comes at the expense of profitability. As for the choice between dividends and stock repurchases, dividends provide a stronger commitment to pay out excess cash than open market repurchase programs. Stock buybacks, at least of the open market variety, preserve more flexibility for companies that want to be able to capitalize on unpredictable investment opportunities. But, as with the debt‐equity decision, there is an optimal level of financial flexibility: too little can mean lost investment opportunities, but too much can lead to overinvestment.     

数字经济、人力资本红利与产业结构高级化

基于省际面板数据,利用广义矩估计(GMM)、面板门槛回归(PTR)等计量模型考察数字经济、人力资本红利与产业结构高级化之间的动态关系.研究发现:在数字经济发展下,人力资本红利有助于推动产业结构高级化进程.从不同地区来看,东部地区的人力资本红利和西部地区的数据要素对于本地的产业结构高级化呈现积极影响.进一步研究发现,当数据要素积累到一定阶段将提升我国人力资本红利对于产业结构高级化的积极影响.     

股利税与资本结构:中国的经验证据

已有研究主要考察了企业所得税对资本结构的影响,却较少有研究探讨个人所得税对资本结构的影响,基于中国的此类研究则处于空白。我国2012年颁布的股息红利差别化个人所得税政策,将投资者的股利税与持股时间相结合。基于这一税收改革,我们发现,投资者持股时间越长(短)的企业,因为在改革之后其投资者的股利税会下降(上升),这些企业债务融资的比重显著降低(提高)。此外,股利税对资本结构的影响,在股利支付力度较大的企业更为显著。进一步,股利税对不同类型债务融资比重的影响存在差异。本文的结论不仅为"税收与公司财务"这一经典的学术领域提供了来自中国的经验证据,也补充了中国在相关学术领域的缺失。     

R-Squared and Dividend Payout: Evidence from the Korean Market

The authors investigate R ² and its relationship with dividend payouts in the Korean stock market. R ² is derived from the market model regression. Their results are consistent with the previous literature on corporate governance and dividend payouts: they find that R ² is higher for business group (chaebol) firms and that there is a negative relationship between R ² and dividend payout. However, the relationship is not stronger for the business group firms than for the non-business group firms. The findings elucidate the relationship between R ² and dividend payout policy in the United States.     

Capital Structure and the Ex‐Dividend Day Return

We apply an option‐pricing framework to the ex‐dividend behavior of common stocks. The framework explains the observed behavior of positive returns on the ex‐dividend day and predicts that ex‐dividend day returns will be higher for firms with greater financial leverage. Empirical testing supports the prediction. In contrast to prior studies, we find that dividend‐capture activity has no significant impact on ex‐dividend behavior, and we offer an explanation based on the importance of tick intervals.     

股权分置改革、高股利分配与投资者利益保护——基于驰宏锌锗的案例研究

本文以我国股权分置改革为制度背景,从股利代理理论和投资者保护理论角度出发,研究驰宏锌锗的股利分配行为与投资者利益保护的关系。分析结果表明,驰宏锌锗在股权分置改革过程中所进行的股利分配,有严重侵占中小股东利益之嫌。针对这一问题,我们建议监管当局要加强对上市公司高股利分配行为的监管,并继续完善中小投资者法律保护建设,尤其是执行层面的监督。上市公司则应该提高其所披露信息的质量,促进公司稳定和谐发展。     

Cost Structure and Payout Policy

I investigate the effects of firms’ proportion of fixed and variable costs on their payout policy and find that firms with higher fixed costs have significantly higher volatility in their future cash flows and more variable future operating incomes. These firms pay a lower fraction of their operating income in dividends and share repurchases. Finally, these firms return higher fractions of their payouts via share repurchases because this method offers greater flexibility. The results are robust to several alternate specifications and firm‐level controls, and show that firms’ cost structures play a significant role in payout policy choices.     

Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout Policy: A Test Using Antitakeover Legislation

Managers strongly prefer not to pay dividends as dividend payouts reduce the amount of cash subject to managerial discretion ( Easterbrook, 1984 ; Jensen, 1986 ). Previous empirical tests of the relationship between corporate governance and dividend payout policy employ endogenous measures of this agency problem. Using a relatively exogenous measure that incorporates state antitakeover laws and the differences‐in‐differences approach, our analysis indicates that dividend payout ratios and propensities fall when managers are insulated from takeovers. The impact of antitakeover laws on dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance and small firms.