Child labor and the minimum wage: Evidence from India

This study examines how changes in the minimum wage affect child labor in India. The analysis uses repeated cross sections of India's NSSO employment data from 1983 to 2008 merged with data on state-level minimum wage rates. Theoretically, the impact of the minimum wage on child work could go either way, so empirical evidence from a country with high rates of child labor and a myriad of minimum wage laws across states and industries helps to lessen the ambiguity. Results indicate that regardless of gender, in urban areas, a higher minimum wage reduces child labor in household work. In rural areas a similar result applies for girls while household labor does rise for boys. The minimum wage has virtually no impact on child work outside of the home across urban and rural areas.     

Wages,selectivity, and vacancies: Evaluating the short-term and long-term impact of the minimum wage on unemployment

Using a circular matching model (Marimon R, Zilibotti F. Unemployment vs. mismatch of talents: Reconsidering unemployment benefits. Economic Journal 1999;109; 266–291), where the wage setting is similar to Weiss (Weiss A. Job queues and layoffs in labor markets with flexible wages. Journal of Political Economy 1980; 88; 526–538), we reexamine Card and Krueger's (Card, D., Krueger, A. Myth and Measurement, the New Economics of the Minimum Wage. Princeton University Press; 1995) intuition on the impact of the minimum wage on unemployment. In the short term, a rise in the minimum wage increases the employment level by making firms less selective. In the long term, numerical simulations show that, despite the reduction of job creation, introducing a minimum wage may lower unemployment as soon as workers and jobs are sufficiently differentiated. However, beyond some limit, the wage increase raises unemployment whatever the degree of differentiation is.     

Training, search and wage dispersion

This paper combines on-the-job search and human capital theory to study the coexistence of firm-funded general training and frequent job turnovers. Although ex ante identical, firms differ in their training decisions. The model generates correlations between various firm characteristics that are consistent with the data. Wage dispersion exists among ex ante identical workers because workers of the same productivity are paid differently across firms, and because workers differ in their productivity ex post. Endogenous training breaks the perfect correlation between work experience and human capital, which yields new insights on wage dispersion and wage dynamics.     

The impact of minimum wages on youth employment in Portugal

On January 1, 1987, the legal minimum wage for workers aged 18 and 19 in Portugal was raised by 49.3%. This shock is used as a “natural experiment” to evaluate the impact of the minimum wage change on teenagers’ employment. The method is to compare, based on firm-level microdata, the employment growth of 18-19-year-old workers with employment growth of older workers. The main findings are that the increase in the minimum wage significantly reduced employment of 18 and olds, but increased employment of 20- olds.     

The empirical content of the job search model: Labor mobility and wage distributions in Europe and the US

Job search models of the labor market hypothesize a very tight correspondence between the determinants of labor turnover and individual wage dynamics on one hand, and the determinants of wage dispersion on the other. This paper offers a systematic examination of whether this correspondence is present in the data by estimating a rudimentary partial equilibrium job search model on a 3-year panel of individual worker data covering 10 European countries and the U.S. We find that our basic job search model fits the data surprisingly well. This also allows us to point at a number of interesting empirical regularities about wage distributions. Our results suggest that cross-sectional data on individual wages contain the basic information needed to obtain a reliable measure of the “magnitude of labor market frictions”, as measured by a parameter of the canonical job search model. Finally, we use our results in a cross-country comparison of the intensity and nature of job-to-job turnover. We arrange countries into two different groups according to their turnover intensity. We further show that the nature of job-to-job turnover is very different between those two groups: Turnover is predominantly voluntary in low-turnover countries, whereas it is to a large extent involuntary in high-turnover countries.     

Oligopsony and the distribution of wages

We propose a simple model of wage dispersion arising from oligopsonistic competition in the labor market. Our model has workers who are equally able but who have heterogeneous preferences for non-wage characteristics, while employers have heterogeneous productivity characteristics. We completely and explicitly solve for the equilibrium wage distribution and show that “inside” and “outside” forces interact in wage determination. This interaction generates spillover effects of minimum wages in a manner which is consistent with the empirical evidence.     

Search efficiency,wage dynamics and welfare

Advances in information technology have improved the job-search process in the labor market. We analyze the effects of this improvement by constructing a search-and-matching model with two sectors: a risky sector with firm-specific productivity shocks and a risk-free sector. The risky sector is characterized by a low level of commitment between employers and workers – either party can end the employment relationship. We show that a better job-search process generates more job matches in the risky sector, and this benefits workers by improving their outside options. The effect on employers is subtle: while it is easier to fill vacancies, workers become more expensive. At the same time, the ease of finding new workers makes it harder for employers to keep their wage promises to workers and increases wage volatility. Our paper contributes to the literature by offering a novel explanation for the observed rise in wage volatility.     

Evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an informal sector: Domestic workers in South Africa

What happens when a previously uncovered labor market is regulated? We exploit the introduction of a minimum wage in South Africa and variation in the intensity of this law to identify increases in wages for domestic workers and no statistically significant effects on employment on the intensive or extensive margins. These large, partial responses to the law are somewhat surprising, given the lack of monitoring and enforcement in this informal sector. We interpret these changes as evidence that strong external sanctions are not necessary for new labor legislation to have a significant impact on informal sectors of developing countries, at least in the short-run.     

Assessing the distributive effects of minimum wage

This paper analyzes the role of Uruguay's sharp minimum wage increases after 2004 amidst the country's slight wage inequality decrease. We found that the minimum wage increase has contributed to the reduction of wage inequality for formal workers mainly. However, we also found a negative impact on employment outside the capital city, Montevideo, and observed a reduction in working hours. These results raise doubts about the effectiveness of minimum wage as a redistribution instrument in developing countries.     

Does Raising the Minimum Wage Help the Poor?*

What is the impact of raising the minimum wage on family incomes? Using data from the 1994–1995 to 2002–2003 Survey of Income and Housing, the characteristics of low-wage workers are analysed. Those who earn near-minimum wages are disproportionately female, unmarried and young, without postschool qualifications and overseas born. About one-third of near-minimum-wage workers are the sole worker in their household. Due to low labour force participation rates in the poorest households, minimum-wage workers are most likely to be in middle-income households. Under plausible parameters for the effect of minimum wages on hourly wages and employment, it appears unlikely that raising the minimum wage will significantly lower family income inequality.     

Effects of Local,State, and Federal Minimum Wage on Employment Growth among Teenagers in the Restaurant Industry

Over the last 20 years, local municipalities have been implementing minimum wage ordinances at an accelerated rate. These local changes, along with state and federal minimum wage increases, are included in the examination of the impact of minimum wage hikes on employment growth of teenagers in the food services and drinking places subsector. While most minimum wage research focuses on employment levels, recent contributions highlight the importance of analyzing employment growth. Following this trend, this study focuses on teenagers within the restaurant industry to test for the impact of minimum wages on inexperienced workers. Using a distributed-lag model, the results show that an increase in a minimum wage reduces employment growth for teenagers within this subsector. The effects of minimum wages within this demographic were most strongly felt in the first three years following an increase in minimum wage. Specifically, the results show that a 10% increase in the minimum wage decreases the employment growth rate by approximately 2.27% over a period of three years.

     

Employment and hours of work

This paper develops a dynamic model of the labor market in which the degree of substitution between employment and hours of work is determined as part of a search equilibrium. Each firm chooses its demand for working hours and number of vacancies, and the earnings profile is determined by Nash bargaining. The earnings profile is generally nonlinear in hours of work, and defines the trade-off between employment and hours of work. Concave production technology induces firms to overemploy and, as a result, hours of work are below their optimal level. The Hosios condition is not sufficient for efficiency. When there are two industries, workers employed by firms with higher recruitment costs work longer and earn more. That is, “good jobs” require longer hours of work. Interestingly, technology differentials cannot account for working hours differentials.     

Firms’ location decision across asymmetric countries and employment inequality

This paper analyzes the effect of globalization (lower trade costs) on production and trade patterns if, firms are vertically linked, stages of production differ in labor-factors intensity and countries differ in labor-factors prices. In order to reflect the “Continental Europe” experience, relative wages are assumed fixed and spatial changes in production are translated into changes in relative (skilled to unskilled) employment levels. The asymmetry in factors prices across countries results in a unique agglomeration equilibrium for a broad range of trade costs. At low trade costs, firms’ location depends on production costs—vertical specialization occurs. This paper also provides a consistent explanation of the observed increase in employment inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in relatively high-unskilled wage countries.     

The minimum wage, employment, and the AS-IF methodology: A forecasting approach to evaluating the minimum wage

Out-of-sample employment forecasts for 33 U.S. industries which are likely to be sensitive to the federal minimum wage are, more often than not, more accurate when information about the minimum wage is not taken into account. This is true even in instances where this information improves wage forecasts. When employment forecasts conditional on the minimum wage are better, the improvement is typically small. These results are invariant to the number of workers previously making less than the new minimum wage, and to the value of the minimum wage relative to industry average wages. First version received: August 1999/Final version received: July 2000     

Spatial heterogeneity in the wage curve

Blanchflower and Oswald argue that the wage curve is a predictable empirical relationship with the “unemployment elasticity of pay” of about −0.1. Using GWR I find evidence of significant spatial heterogeneity in the unemployment elasticity of pay for US counties.     

The impact of minimum wages on employment of low‐wage workers

This study provides empirical evidence on the impact of a minimum wage increase on employment of workers in the formal sector who have wages below the minimum level in Vietnam. Using the difference‐in‐differences with propensity score matching and the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys of 2004 and 2006, the article finds that the minimum wage increase in 2005 reduced the proportion of workers having a formal sector job among low‐wage workers. Most workers who lost formal sector jobs became self‐employed.     

Alternative theories of wage dispersion

We analyze labor market models where the law of one price fails—i.e., models with equilibrium wage dispersion. We begin considering ex ante heterogeneous workers, but highlight a problem with this approach: If search is costly the market shuts down. We then assume homogeneous workers but ex post heterogeneous matches. This model is robust to search costs, and delivers equilibrium wage dispersion. However, we prove that the law of two prices holds: Equilibrium implies at most two wages. We explore other models, including one combining ex ante and ex post heterogeneity which is robust and delivers more realistic wage dispersion.     

Unemployment and product market competition in a Cournot model with efficiency wages

This paper analyzes the impact of product market competition on unemployment, wage and welfare in a model where unemployment is caused by the efficiency wage consideration and oligopolistic firms compete in quantity. It is shown that while more intense competition in the product market increases output and reduces price, it does not necessarily lead to a lower unemployment rate or a higher wage for workers. Depending on the technologies, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the level of employment (respectively, wage, welfare) is not always monotonic, and, in some instances, has an inverted U‐shape.     

Wage/tenure contracts with heterogeneous firms

This paper investigates equilibria where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk averse workers search for new job opportunities whether employed or unemployed. We generalize previous work by assuming firms have different productivities. Equilibrium implies more productive firms always offer more desirable contracts. Thus workers never quit from more productive firms for less productive firms. Nevertheless turnover is inefficient as employees with long tenures at low productivity firms may reject outside job offers from more productive firms. A worker who quits to a more productive firm may accept a wage cut. Such wage cuts are compensated by faster “promotion” rates to higher wage levels in the future. We also generalize previous arguments by showing equilibria exist where the distribution of offers contains interior mass points and find equilibrium wage/tenure contracts need not be smooth.     

ON EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS WITH ENDOGENOUS ON-THE-JOB SEARCH

We consider an equilibrium search model and employment contracts when workers have endogenous on-the-job search. When a firm tries to retain an employee by matching outside offers, variable search intensity leads to a moral hazard problem. We first consider workers with identical productivities. We derive an equilibrium where firms commit not to respond to outside offers and workers search less. Second, we investigate the case with heterogeneous workers and asymmetric information. Assuming that firms can commit to retain all workers irrespective of their ability, we establish conditions under which it is optimal to do so. This policy again reduces the incentive for active on-the-job search. We discuss an equilibrium where all firms use these so-called ‘pooling’ contracts.