Bank regulation and supervision and its welfare implications

This study provides a general equilibrium model to explore the welfare implications of bank regulation and supervision (RS). The model supports the basic expectations regarding the positive effects of RS on the growth rate, output, credit, investment, wages and profits; and its negative effects on the interest rate. In addition, RS is observed to lead to a convergence effect. Furthermore, it is observed that the decision of banks to monitor and charge differentiated interest rates to firms depends on the distribution of firm-specific moral hazard rates; bank monitoring increases profits as the distribution of producer type improves.     

What broad banks do, and markets don’t: Cross-subsidization

We show that interbank markets are a poor substitute for “broad” banks that operate across regions or sectors. In the presence of regional or sectoral asset and liquidity shocks, interbank markets can distribute liquidity efficiently, but fail to respond efficiently to asset shocks. Broad banks can condition on the joint distribution of both shocks and, hence, achieve an efficient internal allocation of capital. This allocation involves the cross-subsidization of loans across regions or sectors. Compared to regional banks that are linked through well-functioning interbank markets, broad banks lead to higher levels of aggregate investment, higher output, and less fluctuations within regions. However, broad banks generate endogenously aggregate uncertainty.     

Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition

We study the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information. While financial opening increases banks’ riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases.     

Does financial liberalization improve the allocation of investment?: Micro-evidence from developing countries

Using firm level panel data from 12 developing countries we explore whether financial liberalization improves the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. A summary index of the efficiency of investment allocation that measures whether investment funds are going to firms with a higher marginal return to capital is developed. We examine the relationship between this and various measures of financial liberalization and find that liberalization increases the efficiency with which investment funds are allocated. This holds after various robustness checks and is consistent with firm level evidence of a stronger association between investment and fundamentals after financial liberalization.     

The second-best use of social cost estimates

A significant literature has developed to estimate the damages to third parties from new electricity generation technologies. This paper focuses on how such estimates can be profitably used in the present regulatory environment, and in the potential new environment that may result from restructuring in the electricity industry.     

Self-insurance vs. self-financing: A welfare analysis of the persistence of shocks

We study the welfare cost of market incompleteness in a generalized Bewley model where idiosyncratic risk takes the form of entrepreneurial productivity shocks. Market incompleteness in our framework has two dimensions. First, in the Bewley tradition, only a limited set of instruments for consumption smoothing is available. Second, entrepreneurs? capital rental is subject to collateral constraints. As is well known, it is harder to self-insure against more persistent shocks, and the welfare cost of missing consumption insurance increases with shock persistence. On the other hand, with collateral constraints, an increase in shock persistence leads to better allocation of production factors through entrepreneurs? self-financing, and the welfare cost of imperfect capital rental markets decreases with shock persistence. The overall welfare cost of market incompleteness can be increasing, decreasing, or even non-monotone in shock persistence, depending on the relative strengths of its two components—the cost of missing insurance and the cost of imperfect capital markets.     

A model of collateral, investment, and adverse selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.     

Regulation and the market for checks

This paper presents an analysis of the market for checks using the monopoly problem as an approximation. The need for such an analysis arises due to the following policy proposal: from time to time, the Turkish government considers increasing the lump-sum amount that drawee banks are legally responsible to pay per bad check. The purpose of this proposal is to ease out firms' liquidity needs especially during recessions. We show that banks will tend to restrict the quantity of checks as a response to such a policy action. We report that a percentage point increase in banks' obligation per bad check could lead up to a 1.7% decline in the total supply of checks on the margin. This means that such a policy change may harm the real economy rather than providing support. We establish that the extent of the monopoly distortion depends on three main factors: (i) the elasticity of demand for checks, (ii) how fast the fraction of bad checks increases with the total supply of checks, and (iii) the degree of preference heterogeneity.     

Sunspots and predictable asset returns

This paper uses a stylised asset-pricing model to show that sunspots may cause asset returns to be predictable, a widely documented feature of many speculative markets. This result parallels and extends previous works showing that sunspots render asset prices excessively volatile.     

An Assessment of Bank Merger Success in Germany

Abstract. German banks have experienced a merger wave since the early 1990s. However, the success of bank mergers remains a continuous matter of debate.This paper suggests a taxonomy to evaluate post-merger performance on the basis of cost and profit efficiency (CE and PE). I identify successful mergers as those that fulfill simultaneously two criteria. First, merged institutes must exhibit efficiency levels above the average of non-merging banks. Second, banks must exhibit efficiency changes between merger and evaluation year above efficiency changes of non-merging banks. I assess the post-merger performance up to 11 years after the mergers and relate it to the transfer of skills, the adequacy to merge distressed banks and the role of geographical distance. Roughly every second merger is a success in terms of either CE or PE. The margin of success in terms of CE is narrow, as efficiency differentials between merging and non-merging banks are around 1 and 2 percentage points. PE performance is slightly larger. More importantly, mergers boost in particular the change in PE, thus indicating persistent improvements of merging banks to improve the ability to generate profits.     

A signaling approach to soft budgets

A new explanation for soft budget constraints is given. Projects of an agent are often the more profitable, the more confident the agent is in the principal's competence and/or supports. Principals can signal support and/or competence through a soft budget constraint.     

ENDOGENOUS SELECTION OF PRODUCERS,ASSET PRICES,AND PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN*

This paper presents a simple heterogeneous agent model to show that shocks that reduce aggregate borrowing capacity of producers under borrowing constraints cause endogenous productivity slowdowns through declines in asset prices and biased selections of producers. These dynamics of the model replicate the qualitative features of the Japanese economy during the 1990s, including a decline in the within effect in total factor productivity growth decomposition as well as default on mortgage loans. Policy experiments demonstrate that foreclosure restrictions already in place mitigate an exogenous productivity slowdown, but that a tightening of foreclosure restrictions causes an endogenous productivity slowdown.     

Inflation, investment and economic performance: The role of internal financing

This paper studies a link between inflation and economic activity that is built on two hypotheses. First, firms mitigate informational frictions in financial markets by accumulating retained earnings over a period of time. Second, firms allocate earnings among three competing uses - dividends, current investment, and the accumulation of internal funds - and inflation directly distorts this allocation decision as well as the real value of accumulated internal funds. The model predicts that the level of inflation - both unanticipated and expected inflation - as well as the variability of inflation distort firms’ internal financing decisions, increases frictions in financial markets, reduces the level and efficiency of investment, and reduces aggregate output. The marginal effects of inflation are increasing in the inflation rate.     

On the welfare equivalence of asset markets and banking in Diamond Dybvig economies

Why do people choose bank deposit contracts over a direct participation in asset markets? In their seminal paper, Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) answer this question by claiming that bank deposit contracts can implement allocations that are welfare superior to asset markets equilibria. The present paper demonstrates that this claim is false whenever the asset market participants are highly rational.     

Credit policies,macroeconomic stability and welfare: The case of China

Using a new Keynesian DSGE model with credit constraints, we study the impact on macroeconomic volatility of a macroprudential credit policy of the type implemented by the Central Bank of China. We find that the countercyclical credit policy plays a non-negligible role in stabilizing the real economy, and that this effect is distinctly more pronounced when credit conditions are looser. By means of a second-order approximation method, we show that the macroprudential credit policy can significantly boost welfare, benefiting the entrepreneurial sector more than the household sector. The results can yield insights for the institutional and policy setting of China and other emerging countries.     

Information disclosure, banking development and knowledge-driven growth

In this study we develop a knowledge-driven growth model which explicitly models the banking sector as monopolistically competitive. The main mechanism through which financial intermediaries affect the real economy is through the evaluation and provision of liquidity to R&D projects. We distinguish two scenarios. In the regime with information disclosure, banks are able to use the stock of information obtained by the banking industry from evaluating R&D projects. This information externality brings about efficiency improvements, thereby leading to a positive entry of banks, more bank-funded research and in turn positive economic growth. By contrast, in the regime with no information disclosure, it is not profitable for new banks to enter the industry. This implies that no more potential R&D projects can be evaluated and hence financed, thus leading the economy to a zero-growth equilibrium.     

The costs of uncoordinated regulation

Patents encourage firms to undertake research and development by protecting innovator revenues from competition. Controls on pollution of the environment are intended to close the gap between the private and social costs of natural resource use. This paper examines the incentives that are created by the interaction of these two separate pieces of regulation. A model is developed that shows how an incumbent, patent-holding firm can take advantage of environmental regulation to exclude rivals from her market.     

Asset prices, debt constraints and inefficiency

We consider (possibly non-stationary) economies with endogenous solvency constraints under uncertainty over an infinite horizon, as in Alvarez and Jermann (2000) [5]. A sort of Cass Criterion (Cass, 1972 [10]) completely characterizes constrained inefficiency under the hypothesis of uniform gains from risk-sharing (which is always satisfied in stationary economies when the autarchy is constrained inefficient). Uniform gains from risk-sharing also guarantee a finite value of the intertemporal aggregate endowment at a constrained optimum. Hence, no equilibrium exhibits a null interest rate in the long run. Finally, constrained inefficiency occurs if and only if there exists a feasible redistribution producing a welfare improvement at all contingencies.