Samaritan agents? On the strategic delegation of aid policy

Should a donor delegate the responsibility for allocating its aid budget to a less inequality-averse agent to alleviate the consequences of the Samaritan's Dilemma it is facing? I show that when aid impact differs across recipients the optimal type of agent depends on whether or not committing to a greater share for countries where the productivity of aid is low raises the combined domestic incomes of recipients. This is the case for donors too concerned with efficiency ex post. They therefore delegate the decision on the discretionary aid allocation rule to agents more sensitive to distributional issues than themselves.     

Changing aid regimes? U.S. foreign aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror

This paper explores how U.S. bilateral economic aid has changed over time, focusing on how the recent era-in which the War on Terror has played a prominent role in the Bush administration's aid policy-differs from previous eras. In particular, has the renewed geopolitical role of aid coincided with a reduction of aid to the poorest countries or less weight on need in U.S. aid allocation decisions? We start with an analysis of annual U.S. aid budgets from 1955 to 2006. Controlling for domestic political and economic conditions, we find that the War on Terror's effect on the aid budget is significantly larger than is immediately apparent. To explore how the emphasis on need may have changed over time, we use country-level panel data on aid allocations to 119 countries across the same time period. This shows that U.S. aid flows-for the poorest as well as other developing countries-increased with the War on Terror. However, after rising for 35 years, the emphasis placed on need has been falling steadily for core aid recipients during the War on Terror.     

The dynamic implications of foreign aid and its variability

The paper examines the effects of aid and its volatility on consumption, investment, and the structure of production in the context of an intertemporal two-sector general equilibrium model, calibrated using data for aid-dependent countries in Africa. A permanent flow of aid mainly finances consumption rather than investment—consistent with the historical failure of aid inflows to translate into sustained growth. Large aid flows are associated with higher real exchange rates and smaller tradable sectors because aid is a substitute for tradable consumption. Aid volatility results in substantial welfare losses, providing a motivation for recent discussions of aid architecture stressing the need for greater predictability of aid. These results are also consistent with evidence from cross-country regressions of manufactured exports, presented later in the paper.     

Donor ideology and types of foreign aid

We examine how donor government ideology influences the composition of foreign aid flows. We use data for 23 OECD countries over the period 1960–2009 and distinguish between multilateral and bilateral aid, grants and loans, recipient characteristics such as income and political institutions, tied and untied aid, and aid by sector. The results show that leftist governments increased the growth of bilateral grant aid, and more specifically grant aid to least developed and lower middle-income countries. Our findings confirm partisan politics hypotheses because grants are closely analogous to domestic social welfare transfer payments, and poverty and inequality are of greatest concern for less developed recipient countries.     

Good governance and good aid allocation

We model the aid allocation process as a rent-seeking contest between two countries and investigate the effects of differing allocation rules on recipients' behavior in a simple framework. We investigate the aid allocation mechanism design that attempts to increase the governance quality of potential recipient countries: the potential recipients spend costly resources improving governance, while the donor country allocates the fund based on their governance quality. The paper compares two mechanisms: one uses a simple winner-takes-all tournament to award the entire available purse to the country with the best governance; while under the other aid is distributed among countries in proportion to their governance qualities. The paper shows the second mechanism outperforms the first only if competing countries are sufficiently asymmetric. Moreover, the recipient who is most effective in governance – and stands to benefit the most from development assistance – has interests opposite to those of the donor. In addition, the paper shows that if the donor country allocates the fund based on both governance and the levels of poverty, it may result in a poverty trap: the leaders of potential recipient countries deliberately allocate funds away from the poorest so as not to better their position in order to receive more aid.     

The effect of foreign aid on corruption: A quantile regression approach

This paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on corruption using a quantile regression method. We show that foreign aid generally reduces corruption, and its reduction effect is greater in less corrupt countries. Moreover, this effect is different by different donor countries.     

Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

This paper considers the impact of foreign aid flows on the risk of civil conflict. We improve on earlier studies on this topic by addressing the problem of the endogenous aid allocation using GDP levels of donor countries as instruments. A more structural addition to the literature is that we efficiently control for unobserved country specific effects in typical conflict onset and conflict continuation models by first differencing. The literature often overlooks the dynamic nature of these types of models, thereby forcing unlikely i.i.d. structures on the error terms implicitly.¹ As a consequence, malfunctioning institutions, deep-rooted political grievances, or any other obvious, yet unobserved and time persistent determinants of war are simply assumed away. We find a statistically significant and economically important negative effect of foreign aid flows on the probability of ongoing civil conflicts to continue (the continuation probability), such that increasing aid flows tends to decrease civil conflict duration. We do not find a significant relationship between aid flows and the probability of civil conflicts to start (the onset probability).     

On the provision of official and private foreign aid

The provision of official relative to private foreign aid varies considerably between donor countries. We explain the variations in terms of country size, household composition, income distribution, and the government's ability to commit to aid, and derive inter alia the results: (1) official aid crowds out private aid, (2) total aid and official aid collected from each household are lower in more populous countries, (3) total aid is lower if (i) the distribution of income favors the more altruistic households, and (ii) the government can credibly commit to a certain level of aid. Evidences suggest that the theoretical results can explain stylized facts.     

Imports and TFP at the firm level: the role of absorptive capacity

This paper estimates the effect of the decision to import intermediate goods and capital equipment on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) at the firm level on a panel of Spanish firms (1991–2002). We use two alternative approaches. In the first, we estimate TFP and apply a diff‐in‐diff estimator with a control group constructed by propensity‐score matching. In the second, direct method, we estimate TFP with imported inputs as a state variable in one stage. Both approaches show that the effect of a firm's decision to source intermediates and capital equipment abroad on its TFP depends critically on its capacity to absorb technology, measured by the proportion of skilled labour.     

The brain drain and the world distribution of income

Skilled emigration (or brain drain) from developing to developed countries is becoming the dominant pattern of international migration today. Such migration is likely to affect the world distribution of income both directly, through the mobility of people, and indirectly, as the prospect of migration affects the rate of return to education in both the sending and receiving economies. This migration pattern will therefore affect human capital accumulation and fertility decisions in both the sending and receiving economies. This paper analyzes these effects in a dynamic two country model of the world economy where agents in both countries make optimal fertility and human capital decisions. The implications of the analysis for the world distribution of income are derived in the light of recent empirical findings of the brain drain literature. The analysis shows that the current trend towards predominantly skilled emigration from poor to rich countries may in the long run increase inequality in the world distribution of income as relatively poor countries grow large in terms of population. In the short run however, it is possible for world inequality to fall due to rises in GDP per capita in large developing economies with sufficiently low skilled emigration rates.     

Company interests and foreign aid policy: Playing donors off against one another

The evidence on conditionality indicates that this instrument sometimes works, and sometimes does not work. We suggest that third parties to the donor-recipient relationship influence the aid disbursement. The halt in aid that should follow non-compliance could trigger the recipient to cancel contracts with companies from donor countries, which creates incentives for the companies to put pressure towards aid disbursement. We use a multi-agent triadic model of the relationships between a recipient and two donors and two companies to illustrate that recipients may act strategically to make third parties (like companies and others) influence the disbursement decision. Failing to take account of third parties’ role yields the opposite result; conditionality becomes successful.     

Fungibility and the flypaper effect of project aid: Micro-evidence for Vietnam

While most economists assume that aid is fungible, most aid donors behave as if it is not. Recipient government responses to development project aid are studied in the context of a specific World Bank-financed project. We estimate the impact of a rural road rehabilitation project in Vietnam on the kilometers of roads actually rehabilitated and built. Using local-level survey data collected for this purpose, we test whether the evidence supports the standard economic argument that there will be little or no impact on rural roads rehabilitated, given fungibility. Instead of full fungibility, we find evidence for a “flypaper effect”. Although impacts on rehabilitated road kilometers were less than intended, more roads were built in project areas. Our results suggest that there was fungibility within the sector, but that aid largely stuck to that sector.     

Aid effectiveness,governance and public investment

In this paper, we develop a growth model in which aid finances infrastructure investment and pro-poor spending in order to analyze ways through which aid can be made more effective. We assume that the recipient countries are aid-dependent in the early phase of development and that they ultimately become independent. In the model, donors can accelerate a recipient's independence from aid by investing in infrastructure. We demonstrate that even a small increase in aid can improve aid effectiveness and that aid effectiveness depends more on the growth rate than on the efficiency of the government.     

Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?

We investigate whether elected members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the World Bank, using panel data for 157 countries over the period 1970–2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and the number of World Bank projects a country receives, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional, country and year effects. The size of World Bank loans, however, is not affected by UN Security Council membership.     

Multiple equilibria arising from donor’s aid policy in economic development

This paper presents a neoclassical growth model comprising education and child labor with a focus on developing and aid-receiving countries to demonstrate cyclical growth and bifurcation in economic development. The appearance of multiple equilibria has often been attributed to the internal affairs of recipient countries, such as technology in production, subsistence minimum in consumption, and liquidity constraints in investment. The main argument of this paper is that the aid allocation policy employed by donor countries, thereby the motive of aid-providers, leads to divaricated and cyclical development in the recipient countries.     

Walrasian General Equilibrium Allocations and Dynamics in Two-Sector Growth Models

This paper analyzes and solves miniature Walrasian general equilibrium systems of momentary and moving equilibria. The Walrasian framework encompasses the fundamental neoclassical and classical two‐sector growth models; the families of solutions of steady‐state and persistent growth per capita in various competitive two‐sector economies are parametrically characterized. Moreover, the endogenous behavior of relative prices and the sectoral allocation of primary factors are analyzed in detail. The technology parameters of the capital good industry are decisive for obtaining long‐run per capita growth in closed (global) economies. A review of the literature complements the theorems on the general equilibrium allocations, dynamic systems, and the time paths of Walrasian two‐sector economies.     

Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies

Countries emerging from civil war attract both aid and policy advice. This paper provides the first systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the post-conflict growth process. It is based on a comprehensive data set of large civil wars, and covers 17 societies that were in their first decade of post-conflict economic recovery. We first investigate whether the absorptive capacity for aid is systematically different in post-conflict countries. We find that during the first 3 post-conflict years absorptive capacity is no greater than normal, but that in the rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level. Thus, ideally, aid should phase in during the decade. Historically, aid has not, on average, been higher in post-conflict societies, and indeed it has tended to taper out over the course of the decade. We then investigate whether the contribution of policy to growth is systematically different in post-conflict countries, and in particular, whether particular components of policy are differentially important. For this we use the World Bank policy rating database. We find that growth is more sensitive to policy in post-conflict societies. Comparing the efficacy of different policies, we find that social policies are differentially important relative to macroeconomic policies. However, historically, this does not appear to have been how policy reform has been prioritized in post-conflict societies.     

The impact of the Interaction between institutional quality and aid volatility on growth: theory and evidence

We analyze both theoretically and empirically, the effect of aid volatility and its interaction effect with institutional quality on per capita economic growth. Our theoretical model, in which an aid-recipient government, operating in an institutional environment of some given quality (making choices over the distribution of aid), predicts that a negative effect of aid volatility on growth is mitigated by stronger institutional quality. We use panel data covering the period 1984–2004 for 78 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Using Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) we find the relationship between growth and aid volatility is significantly negative and depends on institutional quality. Our baseline results are robust to various computations of aid volatility and foreign aid, time periods, sub-samples and additional covariates.     

Absorptive capacity and the effects of foreign direct investment and equity foreign portfolio investment on economic growth

This study examines the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) and equity foreign portfolio investment (EFPI) on economic growth using data on 80 countries from 1979 through 1998. The results largely suggest that lagged FDI and EFPI do not have direct, unmitigated positive effects on growth, but some data are consistent with the view that the effects of FDI and EFPI are contingent on the ‘absorptive capacity’ of host countries, with particular respect to financial or institutional development. Moreover, extreme bound analysis (EBA) of significant results indicates that the estimates are robust compared to other empirical studies on growth.     

Aid allocation and poverty reduction

This paper derives a poverty-efficient allocation of aid and compares it with actual aid allocations. The allocation of aid that has the maximum effect on poverty depends on the level of poverty and the quality of policies. Using the headcount, poverty-gap, and squared poverty gap measures of poverty, alternatively, all yield similar poverty-efficient allocations. Finally, we find that the actual allocation of aid is radically different from the poverty-efficient allocation. With the present allocation, aid lifts around 10 million people annually out of poverty in our sample of countries. With a poverty-efficient allocation, the productivity of aid would nearly double.