Equilibrium Analysis of A Dual‐CHannel Supply Chain Under Different Market Powers

We examine the effect of firms’ market powers on the optimal strategies and profits of partners and make comparisons under different structures in a dual‐channel supply chain, where the manufacturer provide a value‐added service to differentiate the product for the customer to some extent. We consider centralised decision and decentralised decision cases where supply chain partners have different market power structures, including the Manufacturer‐Stackelberg, Retailer‐Stackelberg and Nash Game. We find that the direct sale price and added value are unchanged under different power structures. However, dominating power structures always lead to inefficiency for the whole dual‐channel supply chain. The more power one of the channel partners has, the larger profit loss the whole supply chain will suffer.     

Competition under manufacturer service and retail price

This research highlights the importance of service from manufacturers in the interactions between two competing manufacturers and their common retailer, facing end consumers who are sensitive to both retail price and manufacturer service. A game-theoretic framework is applied to obtain the equilibrium solutions for every entity. This article studies and compares results from three possible supply chain scenarios, (1) Manufacturer Stackelberg, (2) Retailer Stackelberg, and (3) Vertical Nash. This research concludes that consumers receive higher service level when every channel member possesses equal bargaining power (e.g., Vertical Nash). An interesting result shows that as the market base of one product increases, the competitor also benefits but at a lesser amount than the manufacturer of the first product. Furthermore, when one manufacturer has some economic advantage in providing service, the retailer will act to separate market segment by selling the product with low-cost/lower-quality service at a low price and selling the product with high-cost/high-quality service at a high price. The results and the modeling approach are useful references for managerial decisions and administrations.     

不同力量对比供应链中制造商竞争策略研究

笔者采用纳什博弈和斯坦伯格博弈结构,分别表述力量对等和力量不对等供应链中零售商和制造商的决策过程,分4种情形探讨了2个制造商在不同竞争策略下,供应链中成员的最优决策。从制造商的角度出发,着重分析在不同力量结构的供应链中制造商的竞争策略选择。研究结果表明:制造商竞争策略的选择依赖于产品的差异性及生产成本的大小。     

Symmetry-breaking in two-player games via strategic substitutes and diagonal nonconcavity: A synthesis

This paper is an attempt to develop a unified approach to symmetry-breaking in strategic models arising in industrial organization by constructing two general classes of two-player symmetric games that always possess only asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. These classes of games are characterized in some abstract sense by two general properties: payoff nonconcavities and some form of strategic substitutability. Our framework relies on easily verified assumptions on the primitives of the game, and relies on the theory of supermodular games. The underlying natural assumptions are satisfied in a number of two-stage models with an investment decision preceding product market competition. To illustrate the generality and wide scope for application of our approach, we present some existing models dealing with R&D, capacity expansion and information provision, which motivated this study.     

Strategic Product Line Choice under Asymmetric Demand Structure

We examine strategic product line choices of manufacturers in a stylised duopoly model where products have asymmetric and interdependent market conditions. We characterise the optimal product line decisions and show that manufacturers always prefer to have head‐to‐head competition (and never segment markets) when product line setup cost is small relative to profitability of the products. When setup costs are high, symmetric manufacturers may prefer to have asymmetric product lines or market segmentation. We show that high setup costs lead to the market segmentation outcome only if there is no significant market size difference and the level of product substitutability is moderate.     

Maximum‐revenue versus Optimum‐welfare Export Taxes: a Delegation Game*

In the Eaton and Grossman (1986 ) Bertrand duopoly model of strategic export taxes, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to policymakers who maximize tax revenue rather than welfare. However, both countries delegating to policymakers who maximize tax revenue is not a Nash equilibrium unless the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently high. For a wide range of values for the degree of product substitutability, the game is a prisoner's dilemma where both countries are better off delegating to policymakers who maximize tax revenue but both will delegate to policymakers who maximize welfare in the Nash equilibrium.     

营销渠道的冲突与协调研究——基于我国食品制造商和直接零售商合作博弈的实证分析

当渠道的非合作导致的冲突被逐渐认识到时,渠道成员就会有意识地开展合作。那么,合作是否确实减少了冲突,增进了协调呢？本文利用博弈理论提出六个假设,然后用现代计量方法进行实证检验,最后得出以下结论：渠道合作博弈优于非合作博弈,渠道成员间倾向于合作博弈,合作博弈下的营销渠道纵向成员（参与方）选择为地位相当者,渠道合作博弈中普遍存在隐性冲突,其程度与成员影响力的运用有关,合作博弈下的渠道成员普遍比较协调,营销渠道成员合作的协调及持续协调与诚信公平相关。     

International trade in genetically modified products

This paper investigates competition between two markets that sell close substitutes: a traditional product and a genetically modified (GM) product. Tightening an import quota on the GM product raises the prices of both goods and hurts consumers. Two scenarios are considered under free trade: Cournot–Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium. A Stackelberg type monopolist produces more, and the competitive traditional firms produce less, than in Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In the long run, an import ban on the GM product does not help competitive producers of the genetically modified organism (GMO)-free products but benefits only the landowners in Europe.     

A Cournot–Nash Model of Family Decision Making

This paper models a two-person family. Each family member is utility maximising, yet family members are interdependent because of caring and public goods within the family. The two family members' interdependent utility maximisation problems are first solved using a non-cooperative, or Cournot–Nash, game theoretic framework. The Cournot–Nash equilibrium is then used as a threat point in a bargaining game. The paper provides a rigorous derivation of the properties of household demands, a full analysis of the determinants of intra-household resource allocation, including the effect of varying household bargaining power, and consideration of policy implications.     

Rent Seeking and Allocative Efficiency

This paper considers a rent‐seeking game (specifically, a winner‐takes‐all contest) with incomplete information. By allowing for sequential moves, a Bayesian‐Stackelberg equilibrium can be constructed. It can be shown that, at the Bayesian‐Stackelberg equilibrium, it is always possible that the allocative efficiency argument fails. That is, there are cases in which the Stackelberg follower is more efficient but loses the contest. Using a specific class of distributions, it is also shown that sometimes the corrupt official will choose the Bayesian‐Stackelberg equilibrium over the Bayesian‐Nash equilibrium in order to maximise the expected bribe revenue. That is, when designing the rules of the rent‐seeking game, the dynamic nature of competition will be taken into account.     

The Interplay of Wage and Exchange Rate Policies in Singapore: A Case of Collective Bargaining in Macroeconomic Management

This article analyzes an optimization model of the policy game between Singapore's National Wage Council and the Monetary Authority of Singapore and further simulates the model over policy rules (Nash game versus non-Nash game), economic scenarios, and the game players' preference and bargaining power. The results indicate that the exchange rate appreciation and wage growth act as substitutes under the Nash rule of policy responses, whereas they act as complements under the non-Nash rule. Under the Nash rule, the exchange rate appreciation tends to be procyclical and wage growth countercyclical; union workers' bargaining power relative to employers' strengthens the procyclical appreciation uniformly but reinforces the countercyclical wage growth only when the economy undergoes a downturn. Both the Nash and non-Nash rules call for more moderate appreciation and more flexible wage adjustments than their actual movements. (JEL E64 , E61 , F41 )     

Reputation with observed actions

Summary A single long-run player plays a fixed stage game (simultaneous orsequential move) against an infinite sequence of short-run opponents that play only once but can observe all past realized actions. Assuming that the probability distributions over types of long and short-run players have full support, we show that the long-run player can always establish a reputation for theStackelberg strategy and is therefore guaranteed almost his Stackelberg payoff in all Nash equilibria of the repeated game.The financial support of the National Science Foundation, Grant SES 90-7999, and of Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank David Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Seminar Participants at UCLA, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and University of Naples for useful discussions and suggestions.     

SPATIAL DISCRIMINATION,PRODUCT SUBSTITUTABILITY AND WELFARE

The paper examines a quantity–location duopoly game in a spatial discrimination model in which the delivered goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes or complements. By extending the range of the unit transportation cost analysed in the existing literature, it is shown that a dispersed equilibrium arises in which the choice of the optimal locations is affected by the degree of product substitutability. The interaction between the latter and the size of the transportation cost is also discussed in order to verify its welfare implications. In particular, it is shown that in this spatial framework imperfect substitutability may increase welfare.     

文化创意产品的版权博弈分析

以人的创造力和知识创新为核心要素的文化创意产业日益成为未来经济增长的动力源泉。在深入了解文化创意产业的内涵及特征的基础上，为促进这一新兴产业更快更好地发展，本文研究了文化创意产业主体之间为占有市场，选择对创意产品采取竞争或激励措施的博弈问题。本文的研究发现：纳什均衡中，文化创意产品的版权博弈双方为了自身收益最大化会独立进行价值投入；斯坦克尔伯格均衡中，版权受让商的价值投入与版权让与商的努力水平成正比，与价值投入成本成反比，双方在纳什均衡条件下投入较少，而各自的均衡期望收益在斯坦克尔伯格均衡条件下更高。     

Trading networks with price-setting agents

In a wide range of markets, individual buyers and sellers trade through intermediaries, who determine prices via strategic considerations. Typically, not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries, and they trade at correspondingly different prices that reflect their relative amounts of power in the market. We model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers, sellers, and traders engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has to the traders. We show that the resulting game always has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and that all equilibria lead to an efficient allocation of goods. Finally, we analyze trader profits in terms of the graph structure — roughly, a trader can command a positive profit if and only if it has an “essential” connection in the network, thus providing a graph-theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of competition among traders.     

On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game

We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel–fringe game à la Salant, 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop Nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop cartel–fringe game. Thus, the outcome of the cartel–fringe open-loop equilibrium can be supported as an outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. However the interpretation of the cartel–fringe model, where from the outset the fringe is assumed to be price taker, as a limit case of an asymmetric oligopoly with the agents playing Nash–Cournot, does not extend to the case where firms can use closed-loop strategies.     

More on tariffs and non-traded goods

The general equilibrium effects of a small tariff on relative prices are analysed within a demand and supply model which provides further insights into Dornbusch's (1974) results. It is shown that the elasticity of the price of non-traded goods with respect to the tariff is a weighted average of the degree of substitutability between non-traded goods and importables on the supply side and that on the demand side. When complementarity is ruled out, the price of non-traded goods increases with the tariff, but less than proportionally.     

Unequal Contributions from Symmetric Agents in a Local Interaction Model

The main findings of the theory on the private provision of public goods under the assumptions of symmetric agents and normality are that (1) there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which everybody contributes the same; and (2) this pattern is stable. We show that these findings no longer hold in a context characterized by local interaction. In this context, it is always possible to find preferences satisfying the assumption of normality such that the symmetric Nash equilibrium is unstable, and there exist asymmetric Nash equilibria which are locally stable.     

On Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in a market for pure indivisibles without money

This paper deals with the Walrasian property of Nash and strong equilibria of a specific strategic market game which refers to a pure exchange economy involving purely indivisible commodities and no money. The game is of sealed-bid auction type and it is shown that any Nash equilibrium at which no agent is in status quo is a strong equilibrium and implements a Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, it appears that two modifications of the game's rules ensure that any strong equilibrium outcome is Walrasian. These results are identical to those obtained by Svensson for markets involving purely indivisible goods and money.     

产需双重不确定情形下绿色农产品供应链的协调研究

为解决产需不确定性给绿色农产品供应链运营带来的复杂影响,寻求绿色农产品生产商和销售商面对产需双重不确定情形下各自的最优决策,研究从农产品产出和市场需求双重不确定性视角出发,结合目前消费者对绿色农产品的需求偏好,构建由生产商和销售商组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,探究收益共享契约能否有效协调产需都不确定的绿色农产品供应链。研究结果表明:分散决策时的批发价契约无法协调此供应链。引入收益共享契约后,在合适的共享系数范围内,生产商的农资投入量会增加,农产品的绿色度会比分散决策时高,同时销售商的销售价格降低;当农产品订购量变大后,引入契约后的生产商和销售商各自的利润相较于分散决策时更高。